# IETF88-MBQNED



#### IP Multicast Receiver Access Control

draft-atwood-mboned-mrac-req draft-atwood-mboned-mrac-arch

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
#### Overview



- Exploring the area of Receiver Access Control for IP Multicast
  - Subtitle: Making money using IP Multicast
  - Covers some of the same concerns as those of the "well-managed multicast" work that was presented in MBONED three years ago
  - much smaller scope of interest
  - MBONED: "application" level drafts
  - PIM: "network" level drafts


#### Trust Relationships: Unicast






# Trust Relationships: Multicast






### Trust Relationships: Multicast, Re-established






# Problem Size: mboned-maccnt-req





# Problem Size: Other work in my lab






#### Two Assumptions



- The End User (EU) acquires a "ticket" from the Merchant (or anyone else) containing:
  - Session Descriptor
  - Secure End User authentication
  - Possibly, an encryption key for the data stream
- The "Network Representative" has information on how to validate a "ticket" or assess the authorization of the EU or EU Device
- □ This makes the discussion today independent of the business model in use by the NSP and/or CP
- It restricts the scope of the work

## Problem Size: Today's Discussion





#### Two levels of interaction



- Application Level
  - EU presents the "ticket"
  - Goal: Join the group
- Network Level
  - End User Device issues IGMP/MLD

- To ensure that only legitimate subscribers get access
  - MUST be secure at Application Level
  - MUST be secure at Network Level

#### Two Approaches



#### Solution 1

- Carry the "ticket" in an extended network-level join exchange
  - The security of the two levels is implied by the fact that they are carried in a single level of message exchanges, which are secured

#### Solution 2

 Provide separate secure application level join and secure network level join functions, along with a method for explicitly coordinating them

## Extending IGMP



- Long history of attempts to extend IGMP
  - All of them abandoned
  - All were "restricted" solutions
    - Based on a particular version of IGMP, -OR-
    - Proposed a limited set of authorization methods
  - A list of citations is in the draft
- None of these attempts considered "accounting" specifically

# Securing IGMP/MLD



- One IRTF Internet Draft on securing IGMP
  - Once a device established a secure relationship with its router, it was allowed to send a join for any group.
- RFC 3376 suggests using AH to secure IGMP packets
- RFC 3810 is silent on the issue of securing MLD packets
- None of these attempts considered "accounting" specifically
  - No need to deploy the solution if accounting is unnecessary!

#### Goals



- List the requirements on a set of mechanisms that
  - allow the Network Service Provider to act on behalf of the Content Provider
  - meet the access control and revenue generation goals
  - remain as independent as possible from the specific business model in use

Specify an architecture that meets these goals

## Approach



- We explore Solution 2
  - Separate joins and explicit coordination
- Thus, the constraints fall naturally into three categories:
  - Application-level constraints
  - Network-level constraints
  - Interaction constraints

# Requirements



- Application level constraints
  - Authenticating and Authorizing Multicast End Users
  - Group Membership and Access Control
  - Independence of Authentication and Authorization Procedures
  - Re-authentication and Re-authorization
  - Accounting
  - Multiple Sessions on One Device
  - Multiple Independent Sessions on a LAN
  - Application Level Interaction must be Secured

## Requirements ..2



- Network level constraints
  - Maximum Compatibility with MLD and IGMP
  - Group Membership and Access Control
  - Minimal Modification to MLD/IGMP
  - Multiple Network Level Joins for End User Device
  - NSP Representative Differentiates Multiple Joins
  - Network Level Interaction must be Secured

### Requirements ..3



- Interaction constraints
  - Coupling of Network and Application Level Controls
  - Separation of Network Access Controls from Group Access Controls

#### **Building Blocks**



AAA: A general framework for managing access to networks, based on RADIUS and Diameter

- EAP: A general framework for negotiating a method for authenticating users
  - Some methods allow mutual authentication
  - Typically used for access to the "entire network"
  - Can be adapted to manage access to multicast groups

### Building Blocks..2



- PANA: A "lower layer" for EAP, between the EUD and the NSP
  - Can be used to create a key, known to the PANA Client (PaC) and the PANA Authentication Server (PAA) (= NSP Representative)
  - Enforcement is done by an Enforcement Point (EP)
- IGMP/MLD: Network-level access control for IP Multicast
  - Unsecured (in standard multicast)






- IP Security (IPsec): Protocols and methods for establishing the authenticity, integrity, and other cryptographic properties of IP datagrams
  - Can be used to secure IGMP/MLD
  - We call this secure form of IGMP/MLD Secure IGMP (SIGMP) or Secure MLD (SMLD)

#### Architecture





#### Results



- Secure Authentication of the End User
- Authorization is then possible using standard
   AAA interactions within the NSP
- A shared key is generated, which can be used to derive the necessary keys for protecting the IGMP/MLD exchanges

#### Documents



- Issued
  - MRAC Requirements
    - draft-atwood-mboned-mrac-req
  - MRAC Architecture
    - draft-atwood-mboned-mrac-arch
  - Secure IGMP
    - draft-atwood-pim-sigmp
- To Come
  - Using PANA+EAP to achieve the MRAC
  - Secure MLD
  - GSAM (coordination of Secure IGMP end points)

### Next Steps



- Request for feedback (on the list or elsewhere)
- If this work is found useful, we request a liaison statement to PIM WG asking for the SIGMP/ SMLD work to be done.

#### Thank You!





Questions?