

*draft-nir-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-01*

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# ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF protocols

Yoav Nir  
CFRG  
IETF 89

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# What is this draft?

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- ❖ A description of the ChaCha20 stream cipher, the Poly1305 authenticator, and Adam's AEAD combination of them both.
- ❖ Enough details and test vectors for a competent coder to make a correct implementation
- ❖ Security considerations to allow a good coder to avoid pitfalls in implementations, such as side-channels.
- ❖ A stable reference for IETF protocols
  - ❖ Such as ESP and TLS.

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# What this draft is not

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- ❖ We don't define the algorithms
  - ❖ Suggestions and critiques are welcome, but should really be taken up with DJB in other venues.
- ❖ The draft does not contain any security proofs, although we might want to reference some.
- ❖ The draft doesn't contain specific instructions on how to avoid timing attacks on Poly1305, or whether that is even a concern.
- ❖ We don't explain the reasoning behind the design.

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# Changes from regular ChaCha

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- ❖ The nonce : block sequence number split was changed from 64:64 to 96:32
  - ❖ Existing AEAD constructions have 96-bit nonces
  - ❖  $2^{32}$  64-byte blocks should be enough (256 GB)
    - ❖ For an ESP packet or a TLS record. Tarball?
- ❖ Adam's AEAD construction:
  - ❖ Encrypt
  - ❖ One-time MAC key by running ChaCha20 on a nonce
  - ❖ Poly1305 (AAD || AADlen || ciphertext || ciphertext\_len)

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# Design decisions

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- ❖ Lengths, and conversion from external to internal representation is little-endian, unlike the "network order" that was common in earlier specs
- ❖ Bit instead of byte count in lengths
- ❖ The 96:32 split for nonce:counter
- ❖ Poly1305 one-time key generation using Chacha20
- ❖ Use only the 20-round 256-bit key variation of ChaCha
  - ❖ 8- and 12- round variations exist, as well as 128-bit key
  - ❖ Performance for 256-bit and 128-bit is the same
  - ❖ But reduced rounds would be faster

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# What's missing

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- ❖ More test vectors at every stage
  - ❖ Need someone else to check the test vectors
  - ❖ Otherwise we're setting the implementers up for failure.
- ❖ Can probably get an undergrad to do it next year.
- ❖ Better discussion of the security considerations
- ❖ References to security proofs
- ❖ More?

Questions?

Comments?

Volunteer to review?

Volunteer to provide references?

Volunteer to check the test vectors?