The AutoVPN Architecture: draft-sheffer-autovpn-00


Yaron Sheffer and Yoav Nir IETF-89, London


Overview

- Opportunistic IKE/IPsec between two gateways
 - Each one representing one host
 - A host may be collocated with a gateway
- ICMP used to discover IPsec entities
- Endpoints are identified by certificates
 - Typically, self-signed certificates
 - Optionally bound to the identity (verified) by off-line means
- Unlike alternatives, AutoVPN has nothing to do with DNS

Typical Use Case


- Two mail servers speaking SMTP
 - Probably with STARTTLS
- Protected by firewall/VPNs








Protocol Flow Unencrypted traffic flows as usual while Host 1 Gateway 1 ost 2 the signaling Syn protocol is running Ack **Unencrypted Traffic** Probe Request **Probe Response Probe Complete** IKE Message #1 **IKEv2 Signaling**

Protected Traffic









Some Details

- Using ICMP "extension objects"
- Protocol messages bound together with nonces
 - Also bound to IKE message #1
- IKE extended with a nonce and with a human readable "contact details" payload
 - Payload? Notification?

Identity

- The protocol uses IDi/IDr, and endpoints present certificates
- An admin can phone up the other side and validate the fingerprint
 - Identity is important, even in an opportunistic context!
- An optional shared secret allows each side to "roll" its certificate

Next Steps

- This is an early draft, WG feedback is requested
- Coordination with other OE activities