CONSOLIDATED, UNEDITED, RAW NOTES FROM SIPCORE IETF90 MONDAY _______________________________________________________________________________________ RAW NOTES BY BRIAN ROSEN Monday Session 13:00 Notes by Brian Rosen Clarifications on use of REFER (Robert Sparks) draft-sparks-sipcore-refer-clarifications-00 AR and Christer what to know about contact in dialog REFER RS: Can we say "If you send REFER in dialog, use whatever your local contact is" Room seems to agree There was a proposed update to 6665 to clarify to use GRUU in any dialog creating message Andrew: that's what I thought it meant, but clarify is okay Keith: who is modifying what doc? Robert: Separate doc to update 6665 Doc will be revved soon Explicit Subscriptions for REFER (Robert Sparks) draft-sparks-sipcore-refer-explicit-subscription-00 Nosub option tag Andrew: May not get used much AUthorizing refer sub (proposal is possession allows it, temp GRUU can be used) Andrew: how about target dialog? Robert: Don't know in advance who the target is always Christer: same situation as CLUE, don't understand the whole thing yet, but there is interest Using DANE for SIP TLS Sessions (Chairs) (draft-johansson-dispatch-dane-sip-01) Jon: Work needed, but maybe less than proposed. Need more generic TLS use and then cite that in our work. So, agree with what chairs proposed. Wes: Working on DANE, happy to help. Updates to DANE happening, if you need stuff added, ask now. Do need protocol specific stuff. Choices to be made: do you need CA or not? Dan: Good use cases in browsers is so-so, but e.g. XMPP uses a lot of DANE. SMTP is starting to use DANE. Wes: Actually DANE suggests use CA OR don't, not both _______________________________________________________________________________________ RAW NOTES BY MICHAEL PROCTOR SIPCORE - IETF90 21/7/2014, 1300-1500 Clarifications on use of REFER - RjS ------------------------------------ RjS presented his slides. No objections to two proposed text updates Christer: Do we need to insist on gruu? RjS: Covered separately. ABR: (floor) Be explicit - gruu required if any chance of being addressed out of dialog Other potential work: update rfc6665 to require gruu Christer: Is this a separate document? RjS: Yes ABR: (floor) Seperate document or possibly errata, although errata may not be read by implementors AndrewAllen: Thought this was what was meant all along - not harmful to clarify KeithDrage: Lost in weeds - what is updated / already updated / being updated? RjS: This draft updates 3515 - should have drawn a diagram RjS: Hearing that people want this, and as a separate document. Explicit Subscriptons for REFER - RjS ------------------------------------- RjS presented his slides. Not asking for adoption today. Proposal: add "nosub" too AndrewAllen: This basically allows you to do everything in 4488, deprecate it? RjS: Move to historic in a couple of years if nobody is using it ABR: (floor) useful if you want to see fate of call (?) Refer-Events-At uri: nobody had comments Accepting an Event: refer subs: Is possession of URI sufficient authentication? AndrewAllen: Is there a reason not to use target-dialog? RjS: Info about target-dialog not available to subscriber AndrewAllen: uris are likely to be static - info available on subsequent days when reallocated? Christer: You could add target-dialog header to URI returned in Refer-Events-At uri RjS: That URI needs to be more unique - multiple REFERs could be in progress Christer: Can subscription be refreshed indefinitely? RjS: Server can terminate subscription PaulK: (floor) Why are we talking about gruus? Yes - it is unique and globally routable. But not really a gruu in the permanent/temp gruu associated with an AoR sense. RjS: This is an example, not the only way to do it. AndrewAllen: Suggesting temp-gruus adds complexity. Some temp-gruus may be invalidated / limited. Might have to re-use if attempting lots of REFERs. Unspecified how long a temp-gruu will live. RjS: Will address this in the text. JonPeterson: What are the consequences of exploiting this? Call duration? RjS: All you see is some of the headers from the responses to an INVITE JonPeterson: This is what needs to be documented. RjS: Plea for input concerning what would break if someone subscribes to REFER pkg. AndrewAllen: Could you unSUBSCRIBE someone else's subscription? RjS: You would need to know the dialog id too. KeithDrage: 2nd document - does it update anything? RjS: No - defines new option tag Christer: I support this work JonPeterson: REFER-baiting: Is there some interaction we need to pay attention to? RjS: Something to think about - Brian! Using OAuth for SIP - Rifaat ---------------------------- Rifaat presented his slides. PaulK: How many people are familiar with this? Comfortable with this? (laughter) RjS: I follow the gist of the presentation. PaulK: Presumably photo server allows multiple auth servers, user chose Facebook. Does 302 indicate multiple auth servers? ABR: That is done before this flow. JonPeterson: UI element to select "Log in using..." not typically available in SIP. Can be solved, but moving towards a hybrid SIP/Web solution. 401 isn't going to do it. RjS: He is suggesting that when in SIP space, you need credentials, you need to move to the web space, and do it in HTTP. Bring the token back to the SIP space. Just a strawman. JonPeterson: Did you mean the REGISTER goes to Facebook? Rifaat: No JonPeterson: Pushing the problem around. Still need the interface step where you choose who to use as your IdP. ABR: (floor) Confusion because we don't know what use-cases are driving this. JonPeterson: What is the goal? Placing a call? Rifaat: Yes, or access to voicemail server Rifaat: Need to talk about the use-cases. Exchange a Code with Access Token JonPeterson: Why the extra step? (auth code --> access token) Why should the proxy manage these tokens? Does this make sense in the SIP space? Why do you trust the proxy more than the UA? JonPeterson: Imagine forwarding the access token/refresh token/ master-key to the UA. There is a reason not to in the web world - does the same logic apply in SIP? JonPeterson: Unclear that SIP use-cases map to the more complex web OAUTH model. MattRyan: Trying to correlate a SIP REGISTER with an HTTP GET. Not necessarily the right mapping. JonPeterson: It is worse than that. You register with something you have a direct business relationship. Not the same model as oauth. MattRyan: That's kind of my point. Which services do I want authorization for? RjS: In the use-cases you are going to write, don't use proxies and registrars. Basic phone-to-phone call. BrianRosen: There may be lots of services that can use this. JonPeterson: This would support a radically different world. PaulK: (floor) First assumption: this draft was to replace digest or something like that. E.g. proxy accepting facebook IDs. Backup slides: Authenticate & obtain access token JonPeterson: This flow makes sense to me. We should address the header/body discussion in a wider context than here. Authenticated Requests PaulK: I can see this would work, but does it buy us something we don't already have? JonPeterson: It's replacing digest as you said PaulK: Assuming Facebook wants to support SIP JonPeterson: Not reciprocal, which would be desirable. Christer: 3GPP has an interest in this. Browser access to IMS doesn't require IMS credentials. JonPeterson: Going to "meta-up". Bring back some lessons from WebRTC back to SIP, like IdP. Christer: WebRTC is seen as an access to IMS. Maybe add 3GPP use-cases. PaulK: This is like the blind people and the elephant. JonPeterson: Recommend a requirements/use cases phase. Look at STIR, especially if you want it to work with telephone numbers. PaulK: Please contribute on-list. More input is helpful. It takes a village to have an idiot. SIP DANE - PaulK ---------------- PaulK presented his slides. JonPeterson: Don't think we need to do nothing. Dane changes mainly to unify handling across multiple usages. Believe that DNSSEC will happen, in a mostly-CA-free environment. WesH: Co-author of SMTP/DANE and other DANE documents - happy to help. Some DANE fixes in progress. Why a protocol-specific usage is necessary - depends on whether your environment uses CAs. DANE can be tied to existing CA infrastructure. Can also be used without CA bindings at all. Choice to be made for each protocol. DNSSEC is getting more and more deployed. DanYork: DANE to replace CAs is just one mode to use DANE. DANE used extensively with XMPP. Lots of SMTP is now using DANE too. tram is discussing DANE with TURN servers. JonPeterson: We are in a position to specify, but not endorse DANE modes. Key sizes need to be considered too. WesH: Read the DANE ops draft - it says you should not use both CA and non-CA modes. PaulK: It's going to take a group of people to make this happen. Will start on the mailing list.