

Deterministic Generation of Elliptic Curves (a.k.a. "NUMS" Curves)

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Motivation

- Reduced customer confidence in NIST-standardized curves (FIPS 186-3)
- Industry moving to Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) ciphersuites (e.g. ECDHE)
- We need new curves that have independently-verifiable provenance and also perform better for the standard ECC algorithms and protocols

Our Requirements (1 of 2)

- New curves must support standard security levels
 - 128-bit and 256-bit mandatory, 192-bit desired
- New curves generated deterministically from the security level
 - Rigid parameter generation for primes and curve constants
- New curves must work with the existing ECC protocol infrastructure
 - Must support standard ECDHE and ECDSA algorithms
 - Must work with TLS 1.2, X.509v3/PKIX, CMS (both for S/MIME and code signing)

Our Requirements (2 of 2)

- New curves must have good performance for both key agreement and digital signatures
- New curves must support standard EC point representations
 - Retain existing (x,y) coordinate encoding formats
- New curves must support standard group and field order bit length
 - Recommend alignment at CPU register boundary: 64-bit length alignment

Our EC Research

- Comprehensive analysis
 - Curve forms and their arithmetic
 - Prime forms
 - Performance in protocols
 - Constant-time and exception-free implementation
 - Full paper at <http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/130>
- Open source implementation
 - <http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/nums/default.aspx>

Findings -- Curve Form Pros & Cons

Curve Family	Pros	Cons
Weierstrass	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Prime order• Widely deployed in existing infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Slower than T-Edwards• Harder constant-time implementation
Montgomery	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Easier constant-time implementation• x-coordinate only	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Slower ECDHE than T-Edwards• Can't be used with ECDSA• Not prime order
Twisted Edwards	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Fastest overall performance• Easier constant-time implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Not prime order

Twisted Edwards represents the best overall option

NUMS Curves -- "Nothing Up My Sleeves"

- NUMS parameter generation algorithm:
 1. Start with security level s (e.g. $s = 128$)
 2. Find smallest $c > 0$ such that $p = 2^{2s} - c$ is prime and $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$
 3. Given this p
 - For Weierstrass, find smallest $|b|$ such that $\#E(\text{GF}(p))$ and $\#E'(\text{GF}(p))$ are prime, choose $\pm b$ based on smaller group order
 - For T-Edwards, find smallest $d > 0$ such that $\#E(\text{GF}(p)) = 4q$ and $\#E'(\text{GF}(p)) = 4q'$ where q, q' prime, $q < q'$
- For standard security levels, resulting primes and curves are:

Security Level	Prime (p)	Weierstrass (b) E: $y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b$	T-Edwards (d) E: $-x^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2$
128	$2^{256} - 189$	152961	15342
192	$2^{384} - 317$	-34568	333194
256	$2^{512} - 569$	121243	637608

NUMS Benchmarks: Scalar Multiplication

Security Level	Prime (p)	Scalar Multiplication (in 10^3 cycles)			
		Weierstrass		T-Edwards	
		Fixed base	Variable base	Fixed base	Variable base
128	$2^{256}-189$	107	270	82	216
192	$2^{384}-317$	252	714	201	588
256	$2^{512}-569$	488	1504	391	1242

Results for scalar multiplication on an Intel Core i7-2600K (Sandy Bridge) processor running Linux (Ubuntu). Compilation tool: GNU GCC.

NUMS Benchmarks: ECDHE

Security Level	Prime (p)	ECDHE Cost (in 10^3 cycles)	
		Weierstrass	T-Edwards
128	$2^{256}-189$	379	300
192	$2^{384}-317$	968	791
256	$2^{512}-569$	1993	1638

Results for ECDHE on an Intel Core i7-2600K (Sandy Bridge) processor running Linux (Ubuntu). Compilation tool: GNU GCC.

- Gueron-Krasnov (2013): an implementation of the NIST curve P-256, computes ECDHE in 490,000 cycles
- ECDHE cost: 1 fixed base cost + 1 variable base cost + ε overhead

Recommendations to CFRG

- The requirements on Slides 3 & 4 should form the basis for defining new ECC curves for the IETF.
 - While TLS is the first group to ask for new curves, the CFRG's process and recommendations here will establish precedent for future requests from other WGs.
- Our Weierstrass-form curves are suitable "drop-in" replacements for the NIST curves that provide significantly improved performance.
- Our twisted Edwards curves provide even greater performance and are compatible with ECDHE, ECDSA, TLS 1.2, PKIX, CMS, ...

Questions?

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