

DANE Based Solution for Delegation Problems of HTTPS in CDN

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
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<http://netsec.ccert.edu.cn/duanhx/files/2014/05/httpsincdn.pdf>

Overview

- TLS is designed as an E2E protocol, but CDN splits TLS tunnel into 2 segments




- We study delegation problems in current practices by survey and measurement
- DANE based solution for CDN delegation

Outline

- Delegation Problem of HTTPS in CDN
- DANE Based Solution & Demo

HTTPS in CDN and DNS redirection

- Websites use CDN for performance and security, supporting HTTPS



EV(Extended Validation) cert., other than DV

- DNS CNAME redirection is the most popularly used for request rerouting

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
online.citibank.com.      285      IN      CNAME   online.citibank.com.edgekey.net.
online.citibank.com.edgekey.net. 15322   IN      CNAME   e5035.b.akamaiedge.net.
e5035.b.akamaiedge.net.  19       IN      A       23.2.2.106
```

Surveys on top CDNs and websites

- 20 popular CDN providers
 - Akamai, Azure, Bitgravity, Cachefly, CDNetworks, CDN77, CND.net, ChinaCache, CloudFlare, CloudFront, InCapsula....
 - All 20 support DNS CNAME rerouting
 - 19 support HTTPS
- top 1 million websites from Alexia
 - 10,721 support HTTPS and use one of 20 CDNs

Invalid Certificate		Valid Certificate	
Status 200	Other	Custom Cert	Shared Cert
15%	54%	20%	11%
69%		31%	

Current practice1 : Custom Certificate

- Type 1: Web owners upload their certificate to CDN, with their private keys(**shared private key**)
- Type 2: CDN providers apply new certificate on behalf of web owners
- Shortcomings
 - **Web owners cannot keep private keys secret**
 - Web owners cannot revoke their delegation **independently**


This certificate has been verified for the following u
SSL Server Certificate

Issued To	
Common Name (CN)	www.apple.com
Organization (O)	Apple Inc.
Organizational Unit (OU)	Internet Services for Akamai
Serial Number	52:C3:FD:89:F2:C5:37:84:50:FE:

Issued By	
Common Name (CN)	Symantec Class 3 EV SSL CA -
Organization (O)	Symantec Corporation
Organizational Unit (OU)	Symantec Trust Network

Current Practice2: Shared Certificate

- CDN providers apply shared certificates, adding web's domain name to the cert's Subject Alternative Name(SAN) extension
- **Shortcomings**
 - Web sites lose their certified identity(cert.), e.g. website has an EV cert. but CDN has a DV cert.
 - Web owner can not revoke the certificate independently



Requirements/Goals


- The browser must be able to obtain the identity (cert.) of the original website and its delegation to the CDN
 - Especially when web site use EV certificate
- Web owners must be able to keep their private key secret
- Web owners must be able to revoke their delegation independently

DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities(DANE) in brief

- DANE binds web site's domain name with its certificate by TLSA RR, secured by DNSSEC
- DANE Usages(RFC 6394,6698):
 - CA constraints (0): <CA, domain>
 - Service Certificate Constraints(1): <cert, domain>
 - Trust Anchor Assertion(2): <self-signed CA, domain>
 - Domain-Issued Certificate(3): <selfsigned cert., domain>

Delegation based on current DANE

- For delegated service (RFC 6394, 3.4) :
 - Web owner uses certificate constraints(usage 1 or 3) to control what cert. CDN should present.




- Web owner can keep their private key
- Revoke delegation by deleting TLSA RR

Problem of current DANE for certificate delegation

- Same as that in shared certificate:
 - Browser cannot know the certified identity of the original website, without it's certificate
 - Especially, if the web owner has an EV certificate, current DANE based solution downgrades the confidence of the user toward the original web server

Extending DANE: Delegation Token

- This problem can be solved by a minor extension : to add the certificate of original web server with a new TLSA RR: original server's cert.



Delegation should be explicitly shown to end users

Welcome to nginx! - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

Welcome to nginx!

(Tsinghua University) <https://dane4cdn.ipv6sec.info>

Verified by: StartCom Ltd.

ipv6sec.info
which is run by (unknown)
Verified by: StartCom Ltd.

Your connection to this website is encrypted to prevent eavesdropping.

More Information

DANE4CDN HTTPS certificate is validated by DANE4CDN extension.
Website : dane4cdn.ipv6sec.info
CDN : proxy.ipv6sec.info

Website Cert

Certificate of CDN (Delegatee)

Certificate of Website (Delegator)

- Screen capture from our firefox Extension as a POC

Proposed extension to TLSA RRs for delegation

- **Reuse** current usage to bind CDN's cert.:

_443._tcp.website 1 IN TLSA 1 0 1 ed3c...080

Certificate Constraint
(Certificate of delegatee)

Full Certificate

- **Extending** usage(4) with cert. of delegator (original web site)

_443._tcp.website 1 IN TLSA 4 0 0 3082.... DB39


Certificate of delegator

Full Certificate


Proposed extension to selector field

- **Extending** selector field with chain of certificates
 - 0 -- Full certificate: the Certificate binary structure as defined in [[RFC5280](#)]
 - 1 -- SubjectPublicKeyInfo: DER-encoded binary structure as defined in [[RFC5280](#)]
 - 2 -- Chain of Certificates: to build trust of the delegator, in case that the browser cannot get these certificates by itself.

The Interaction of Authentication



The Interaction of Authentication



-----> Steps of standard web browsing

-----> Steps added/changed by DANE based solution

Summary

1. Certificate delegation between CDN and website is an emerging requirement.
2. DANE can be used to express such a delegation relationship
3. Current form of delegation in DANE is insufficient: cannot show original certificate, at least could cause cert downgrade.
4. A slight extension could cover such scenario nicely, with a new usage and selector

Demo

& ?

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