Achieving E2E Security

Phill Hallam-Baker Comodo Inc.

15 Year Standards Stalemate





S/MIME

 Deployed in 5 billion clients

PGP

 Monopoly of mindshare



Success Criteria

Everyone uses encryption by default

- Can't be any more effort to use than email
 - Stop making humans do computer work
 - S/MIME certificate enrollment
 - Don't need to be a human factors expert
 - Its removing stupidity, not being clever
 - Secure email is going to look the same as email

Dividing the Problem

Share this

Research here

- 3. Trust Model
- 4. Transport





Alice sends email to Bob

• Types 'Bo'


- Autocompletes to "Bob"
<bob@example.com>

- Checks it's the right Bob
- Writes message
- Hits send

Why not encrypt?

- Sender Doesn't know
 - The key to use
 - The key data
 - If it was the right key
 - If it is current
 - If Bob uses S/MIME or PGP
 - Cipher suites (most S/MIME limited to 3DES)
 - Wrapped message to protect headers
 - If Bob accepts or prefers encrypted mail http://prismproof.org/

Security Models



End to End

Asset Models

Asset	Hop by Hop	End to End
Content	TLS, S/MIME, PGP	S/MIME, PGP
Meta Data	TLS	[S/MIME]
Routing	TLS	
Traffic	Tor	
		http://prismproof.org/

Content Protection

No apparent deficiencies

Meta Data Protection

Main

Desert


Exotic Transports Onion routing Flood fill

- Meta Data Protection
 - Wrap messages to hide headers[*]
 - STARTTLS Everywhere
 - STARTTLS Pinning

Key Management

- Solved but badly
 - Publication
 - Discovery
- Unsolved
 - Manage decryption keys with multiple devices
 - Key recovery for non-enterprise applications

Plumbing Requirements



Trust Model Requirement

- Hypotheses
 - "Trust model X is completely insecure"
 - "Trust model Y is better than Z"
 - How do we empirically determine which is true?
 - How hard is it for an attacker?

New Opportunities

Harber-Stornetta Patent Expiry

JSON



