DHCP Privacy Updates

draft-krishnan-dhc-dhcpv6-privacy-00 draft-jiang-dhc-dhcpv4-privacy-00

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Goals

- Evaluate and document the potential privacy issues in the current DHCP protocol (both DHCPv6 and DHCPv4)
 - Enumerate the identifiers used in the protocol
 - Describe mechanisms that currently exist in DHCP that affect privacy
 - Describe potential attacks
 - Mitigation strategies and solutions to come later

- Identifiers
- Current Mechanisms
- Attacks
- Differences between DHCPv4 and DHCPv6
- Work Plan

Identifiers

DUID
Client ID
Server ID

IA_NA, IA Address
IA_TA
IA_PD, IA Prefix

Interface ID
Subscriber ID
Remote ID

Civic Location

Geographic Location

ORO
Vendor Class
Client HW Address
Client System Arch

Client FQDN

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Attacks

- Device type and OS discovery (fingerprinting)
 - The type of device the client uses as well as the Operating system running on the device can be guessed using information in DHCP messages
- Finding location information of client
 - From DHCP options designed to provide such information to clients
- Finding previously visited networks
 - By looking at information that leaks from the DHCP messages on the *new* network

Attacks (2)

- Finding a stable identity & correlation of activities over time
 - Using stable DHCP identifiers that persist across networks and time
 - Possibility of location tracking
- Bulk information collection
 - Pervasive monitoring
 - Using one or more of the passive attacks described earlier
 - Leasequery & bulk leasequery

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DHCPv6 and DHCPv4

- They have very similar behaviors
 - Consequently, existing mechanisms that affect privacy and potential attacks are similar
- The Options are a bit different

DHCPv6	DHCPv4	
DUID	Client ID	
IA_NA, IA_TA, IA_PD, IA Address and IA Prefix Options	'yiaddr' field and 'requested IP address' option	
Client Link-layer Address Option	'htype' and 'chaddr' fields	
ORO	Parameter Request List	
Remote ID, Interface ID	Relay agent information option	

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Use cases

- 1. The obvious one: client discloses identifiers that can be used for tracking/identification
 - Identifiers: MAC, client-id, remote-id
 - Location: addresses in confirm
 - Identifying information: tomeks-laptop.isc.org

2. Tethering

- A phone enables tethering, starts announcing its server-id
- We need to also address server anonymity

3. Forget me!

- Servers tend to assign the same address/prefix to returning clients
- Some clients want to explicitly have their addresses/prefixes changing over time
- Solution to #1 won't work when client has to be identifiable by the operator, e.g. cable modem clients

Proposed schedule

Milestone	Planned date	Comments
Initial submission of problem analysis draft-jiang-dhc-dhcp-privacy-00 draft-krishnan-dhc-dhcpv6-privacy	Oct/Nov 2014	-00 submitted
Problem analysis adoption	Nov 2014	
Initial submission of mitigation drafts	End of 2014?	1 volunteer, looking for more
Mitigation drafts adoption	Feb 2015?	
WGLC on problem analysis	?	
WGLC on mitigation	?	
Problem analysis: submit to IESG	?	
Mitigation: submit to IESG	?	

Next Steps

Adopt these drafts as WG items?