Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Attacks which employ Forged ICMP/ICMPv6 Error Messages (draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-01)


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Background

- BCP38 mitigates network attacks that rely on IP source address spoofing
- However, BCP38 does not address ICMPbased attacks
 - in which the IP addresses of the embedded packet are spoofed


ICMP Generation





Src Addr: B Dst Addr: A Dst Addr: D

ICMP-based Attack Scenario



draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering

- Simple, effective, and straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to mitigate attacks that use forged addresses in ICMP messages
- In-line with BCP38

draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering

- If implemented with ACLs:
 - IF embedded packet's Destination Address is from within my network

THEN forward as appropriate

• IF embedded packet's Destination Address is anything else

THEN deny packet

 Or perform unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) on the Dst address of the embedded payload

Moving forward

• Adopt as opsec wg item?