TURN by name (00)

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The setup

- Suppose you want to send a UDP packet to a DNS-named endpoint through TURN, e.g.
 - Your ICE peer sends you:

```
candidate:1 1 udp 99999 some.endpoint.example.com
(yes, this can happen!)
```

- Network admin requires all UDP traffic to go through an auto-discovered TURN server ("escape hatch")
- Using a TURN server as a proxy for any reason

How it works today

- First, the client resolves the DNS name to an IP address.
 - Or possibly more than one, especially IPv4 + IPv6
- Then it uses TURN to connect to the IP address.

But what if...

- the network admin doesn't allow some/most DNS lookups?
 - e.g. to prevent SSH-DNS, and use TURN as a pinhole for trusted users
- the DNS is supposed to be different for different clients?
 - o e.g. GeoDNS, split-horizon DNS

Solution: name resolution via TURN

- Client only contacts the TURN server
- DNS packets flow between TURN server and DNS server.
- Unified access control for network administrators
 - Just give trusted users TURN access

How? Option 0: Hardcode DNS

- Tunnel DNS queries through the TURN server, just like any other UDP packet.
- Advantages
 - No change to TURN server!
- Disadvantages
 - Client has to hardcode the IP address of a D server.
 - Breaks recursive DNS caching, DHCP config, etc.

How? Option 1: ResolveRequest


- Add a new request type, ResolveRequest
 - The request includes a DNS name
 - The TURN server performs name resolution
 - The response includes the IP address
 - Client sends traffic to the IP address from then on
- Advantages:
 - Respects DHCP, caching, GeoDNS, etc.
- Disadvantage:
 - Totally unlike any current TURN functionality!


How? Option 2: TURN by name





- Allow endpoints to be identified by name
 - o extends CreatePermission, Send, ChannelBind, etc.
- Advantages:
 - Respects DHCP, caching, GeoDNS, etc.
 - Completely abstracts DNS from client (like SC and HTTP(S) CONNECT). Never reveals the IP.
- Disadvantages:
 - More complex to implement
 - requires TURN to maintain IP->DNS mapping


TURN client **TURN** server CreatePermission Req (peer-a.example.com)




























Open problem: timeout conflict

- DNS resolution can be slow (up to ~10 seconds)
- STUN (and hence TURN) request responses have to be fast, ≤79×RTT
 - Designed for actions that can be performed pulled locally and in-memory
 - Thanks to Jonathan Lennox for spotting this!

Open problem: timeout conflict




Proposal 0: Just extend the timeout



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- Problems:
 - Client sends a bunch of extra/redundant requences
 no reason.
 - If the response packet is lost, the retry waits the timeout (~10s).


Proposal 1: Late indication



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- Problems:
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Proposal 2: Reverse Request



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- Problems:
 - This would be the first Server-to-Client Reque STUN history.

Proposal 3: EAGAIN



TURN client **TURN** server **DNS** server CreatePermission Req DNS name lookup (peer-a.example.com) (peer-a.example.com) CreatePermission Response Err 102(?) DNS result (retry: 200ms) (192.0.2.15)200 Permission is CreatePermission Req already (peer-a.example.com) installed for this address. CreatePermission **Success Indication**

In conclusion, TURN by name

solves

- TURN to DNS-named endpoints on restricted networks
- making TURN parallel to SOCKS 5 or HTTP CONNECT
- but still needs discussion about
 - the choice to hide peer IPs from the client
 - the interaction with STUN timeouts