

Signatures

Watson Ladd

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The proposal redux

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- Solution: Use r as the key for HMAC of a counter value
- Or use SHA3, which has arbitrary length output
- Mandate double length scalar: no reason to think harder!

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- Otherwise we have nonstandard, untested assumptions
- Under mild assumptions replace r with random number
- Apply Forking Lemma

Properties

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- “Online”: only need to store two hash states for one pass through M
- Avoids trouble spots for implementors
- Most proposed schemes have this property
- But most are somewhat more complicated