

(challenge, response)

Schnorr

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# Schnorr signing, roughly

Let  $G$  generate a group of prime order  $q$

Secret key is  $x$ , public key  $P = xG$

Choose (pseudo)random nonce  $n$ , ephemeral  $E = nG$

Challenge  $c = \text{hash}(E, \text{message})$

Response  $r = n - cx \pmod{q}$

Then  $E = rG + cP$

# Ed25519-style Schnorr

Signature is  $(E, r)$

Check  $E == rG + \text{Hash}(E, \text{msg}) * P$

Benefit: can batch verification

Benefit: more natural in eg BLINKER

Good for smartphones and servers

# Old-style Schnorr

Signature is  $(c,r)$

Check  $\text{Hash}(rG+cP, \text{msg}) == c$

Benefit:  $c$  can be half-length  $\rightarrow$  shorter sigs

Benefit: can do EC first, hash later

Benefit: don't have to parse untrusted points

Good for deeply embedded devices, IoT

# Bells and whistles

Hashing separated by setting and curve perso

Propose fixed-length for less code

Setting can include “msg is actually  $H(msg)$ ”

Hashing includes public key

Sigs are derandomized with a PRF (req'd by CFRG)

Encode everything in fixed length (no ASN.1)!

That's all

Questions?