DTN Security Key Management

IETF93 - July 22, 2015

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OTN Security Key Management

DTN nodes observe the Streamlined Bundle Security Protocol (SBSP) SBSP requires a public key distribution system All DTN nodes must subscribe to the public key distribution service https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-templin-dtnskmreq/

Public Key Distribution Alternatives

Request-Response

- Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
- Not delay tolerant

Publish-Subscribe

- Receiver informs Trusted Authority of interest in specific keys
- Trusted Authority informs receiver if keys are revoked
- Receiver has no way of knowing whether new keys are valid on first use

Blacklist Broadcast

Trusted authority broadcasts list of all revoked certificates

Whitelist Broadcast

Trusted authority broadcasts list of all valid certificates

Whitelist Broadcast

- Requires reliable DTN multicast
- Requires that receivers trust a secured trust authority
- Receivers need assurance that the trust authority has not been compromised
- Answer multiple trust authorities each multicast portions of the whitelist bulletin

DTN Security Key Management Requirements

REQ1: Must Provide Keys When Needed

REQ2: Must Be Trustworthy

REQ3: No Single Point of Failure

REQ4: Multiple Points of Authority

REQ5: No Veto

REQ6: Must Bind Public Key with DTN Node Identity

REQ7: Must Support Secure Bootstrapping of a Node's Identity and its

Public Key

REQ8: Must Support Revocation

REQ9: Revocations Must Be Delay Tolerant

DTN Security Key Management Design

DC1: Must Perform Timely Key Provisioning

DC2: Pub/Sub Model

DC3: Publication Must Be Spread Over Multiple KAs

DC4: Availability and Security

imitations and Challenges

Requires scalable, reliable multicast

- DTN multicast reliable (hop-by-hop rather than end-to-end retransmission)
- Scalability not an issue for many DTNs

Key Authorities must be protected against physical attacks (must be kept in secured facilities)

Scaling can be accommodated by organizing Key Authorities in confederations, where each confederation services a portion of the DTN

Scaling of public key whitelist itself must be considered. May not work well with millions of keys