12NSF Framework July, 2015

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Problems

- Unlike traditional networking device, network-based security functions (NSFs) do not operate relative to standards
 - Many evaluative bodies exist, which review the efficacy of network security product
 - Many regulatory/compliance directives call for the use of loosely defined classes of network security
- How do we define interfaces to devices that have no standardized implementations?

Potential For Imposed Constraints

- Narrowly defined NSF categories, or their roles when implemented within a network
- Attempts to impose functional requirements or constraints, either directly or indirectly, upon NSF developers
- Result in a limited lowest-common denominator approach, where interfaces can only support a limited set standardized functions, without allowing for vendor-specific functions
- Results in endorsing a best-common-practice for the implementation of NSFs

Packet-Based Paradigm for FlowBased NSF

- Rather than attempting to create a standard based on NSF classes, a solution may exist in provisioning packet processing
- All NSFs, regardless of function, process:
 - Packet headers
 - Packet payloads
 - Contextual and state information associated with packets


Three Sub-Interface Types

- Configuration
 - Device configuration
 - Network configuration
- Signaling
 - Status
 - Counters
 - Queries
 - Alerts
- Provisioning
 - Capabilities
 - Policy
 - Object Configuration


Suggested Framework - Provisioning

- Four root tree structure:
 - Subject match values based on packet data
 - Packet header Can be standardized
 - Packet payload Provided by NSF capabilities
 - Object match values based on context
 - Ex.: State, time, geo-location, etc.
 - Many can (and should) be standardized, but many also from NSF capabilities
 - Function invoked security function
 - Defined by NSF capabilities
 - Function:Instance (ex. IPS:<signature base>)
 - Action egress processing
 - Invoke signaling
 - Packet forwarding and/or transformation
 - Possibility for SDN/NFV integration

I2NSF Architecture




Interface to vNSFs



<u>Characteristics</u> :

- Single NSF can have multiple instantiations that are distributed across the network.
- Different rules/policies could be imposed to different instantiations.
- Each NSF may have its own sub-controller for all its instantiations
- Policies to one instantiation can be moved/copied to another NSF instantiation
- Multiple vNSFs (of different types or same type can share one physical server.
- Multiple vNSFs collectively together to enforce the rules for large flows

NSF Provisioning Components Breakdown



Data Over the Registration Interface

Flow Based NSF Capability Index

Subject (header fields, payload,)	Object Context , external to bits/bytes in packets	Functions	Actions	Description
Layer 2 Header (Src/Dst, Vid, VxLAN, TRILL, EtherTypes) Layer 3 (Src/Dst, MPLS, GRE, IPv4/IPv6,)	Access domain,	WebFilter, App Control Authentication Encryption, IPS/IDS/AV URL filter	Pass/ drop/ mirror/ Statistics (report Destinatio n)	Name-value pairs that describe Service capability, or the URL of a Heat template that describes the SF.
	Time: Start/end/duration			
TCP (Port, flags, SYN, FIN,)	Zone (corresponding header bits in the packets)			Service layer attributes
UDP layer (port, HTTP Layer	Tenant ID (corresponding header bits in the packets)			
	Application ID (corresponding header bits in the packets)			
		IETF PCP?	Open/Clo se	
		IETF TRAM		

Security Function Catalog DB

SF Catalog DB is built by Network SF Manager or orchestration system based on the SF Registration Process

Vendors	Function name	Туре	instances	Flow based Security Polices Objects supported (Potentially IANA registered in the future)	Flow based Security Polices Action supported
X		FW		Layer 2/3/4; IETF PCP	Pass/drop
		IPS		Time span	
		IDS			
		Webfilter		HTTP, App ID	Call VideoOptimization
Υ					

