

Network Time Security

draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security-09

draft-ietf-ntp-cms-for-nts-message-04

draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp-01

Dr. Dieter Sibold Kristof Teichel Stephen Röttger

IETF 93 (Prague, Czech Republic), July 19–24, 2015

History

Document's Dependency Graph

Scope

Progress/Major Changes

Implementation


Implementation Status

Major Changes

Open Questions

Next Steps

- ▶ **IETF 83:** Presentation of security issues of RFC 5906 (autokey)
- ▶ **IETF 84:** Presentation of plan for a new autokey standard
- ▶ **IETF 85–86:** I-D “draft-sibold-autokey-*nn*”
- ▶ **IETF 87–90:** I-D “draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security-*nn*”
- ▶ **Since IETF 92:**
 - draft-ietf-ntp-network-time-security-*NN*
 - draft-ietf-ntp-cms-for-nts-message-*NN*
 - draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp-*NN*



Network Time Security shall provide:

- ▶ Authenticity of time servers
- ▶ Integrity of synchronization data packets
- ▶ Conformity with TICTOC's Security Requirements (RFC 7384)
- ▶ Support of NTP and PTP

Two independent implementations from:

- ▶ Network Time Foundation
- ▶ University of Applied Science Wolfenbüttel, Germany

Currently both implementations focus on the realization of NTS for NTP

- ▶ Implementation of the authentication frame work and the secure cookie exchange
- ▶ Securing the time request and time response messages of the unicast associations

Network Time Foundation

- ▶ Cryptographic primitives for CMS based authentication complete
- ▶ Unit tests for same nearly complete
- ▶ Systems with older versions of OpenSSL will be unable to use this implementation unless OpenSSL version is manually updated (such systems include RHEL 5, CentOS 5 and Mac OS X)

University of Applied Science Wolfenbüttel

- ▶ This is current work in the context of a Master thesis

Network Time Security draft

- ▶ Description of Authentication and cookie exchange is replaced by a list of requirements
- ▶ CMS-base exchanges are moved to an appendix (Appendix B)

NTS for NTP draft

- ▶ Implementation **MUST** provide authentication and cookie exchange as described in Appendix B of the NTS document
- ▶ Implementation **MAY** optionally provide alternative means for authentication and cookie exchange (e. g. DTLS or DANE)

Stefan Weimers comments

- ▶ Clear separation of initial cookie exchange and subsequent time exchange messages
- ▶ Photuris cookie for the CMS-based authentication to protect for DoS attacks
- ▶ Session state variable definition as *opaque structure* (RFC 5077)

- ▶ Implementation
 - Finalization and testing of the unicast associations
 - Considerations regarding Broadcast/Multicast mode
- ▶ CMS-based association exchange: Introduction of additional features and partial redrafting. Relevant for:
 - Network Time Security draft, Appendix B
 - NTS for NTP draft