

TLS authentication using ETSI TS 103 097 and IEEE 1609.2 certificates

IETF meeting 93 – Prague – TLS WG session

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Objective & Motivations

- **Objective:** enable C/S authentication using C-ITS* certificates
- **Motivations:** C-ITS networks are highly mobile with a limited bandwidth
 - X.509 certificates are not optimized for bandwidth and delay-sensitive applications
 - Definition of new certificates for C-ITS
 - US: IEEE 1609.2
 - EU: ETSI TS 103 097
- **Use case:** secured communication between a vehicle and a server on the Internet:
 - e.g. vehicle data upload on a remote log server
 - e.g. vehicle software update
 - e.g. traffic light information via 3G/LTE communication (SPAT)
 - Authentication between an ITS-Station and a server should be possible using C-ITS certificates

Modifications on TLS Handshake

Client

Server

ClientHello

/* cert_type extension */ ----->

ServerHello

/* cert_type extension */

Certificate*

ServerKeyExchange*

CertificateRequest*

Certificate <-----

ServerHelloDone

ClientKeyExchange

CertificateVerify*

[ChangeCipherSpec]

Finished ----->

[ChangeCipherSpec]

<-----

Finished

Application Data <----->

Application Data

* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.

Technical modifications

- ClientHello and ServerHello messages of the handshake protocol SHALL include the cert_type extension [RFC 6091]

```
enum {  
    X.509(0), OpenPGP(1), RawPublicKey(2),  
    IEEE(TBD), ETSI(TBD), (255)  
}CertificateType;
```

Technical specifications

- CertificateRequest SHALL be filled with the following values:

```
enum {
    rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4), rsa_ephemeral_dh_RESERVED(5),
    dss_ephemeral_dh_RESERVED(6), fortezza_dms_RESERVED(20), ECDSA_sign(64), (255)
}ClientCertificateType;

opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;

struct {
    ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
    SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>;
    DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
}CertificateRequest;
```

CertificateRequest
as defined in [RFC 5246]

Filled
values

ClientCertificateType ECDSA_sign(64)

SignatureAndHashAlgorithm {0x04,0x03} (ECDSA-SHA256)

DistinguishedName List of HashedId8 [ETSI TS 103 097] (The server informs the client about the certificate authorities it trusts to help the client to select a corresponding certificate)

Thank you!

Verification of ETSI certificate

ETSI TS 103 097 certificate format:

version	signer_info	subject_info	verification /encryption keys	assurance_level	ItsAid_ssp list	validity_restrictio ns	signature
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1. Verify that the certificate content is conform to one of ETSI profiles.
2. Verify the certificate's signer identity:
IF The certificate digest included in `signer_info` is known:
 Go to step 3.
ELSE:
 IF It is a root certificate digest:
 Verification failed (error – untrusted root CA).
 ELSE:
 Pause the current certificate verification process and start verification of the next certificate in the chain recursively by restarting from step 1. Once verified, resume the certificate verification.
3. Verify that the certificate is not in the Certificate Revocation List (CRL).

4. Verify the signature of the certificate (see [10] for details).
5. Verify `subject_info`: `subject_name` shall be a 32 bytes hash of the server URL. Note that this step is only done by clients. Servers shall ignore this step.
6. Verify `validity_restrictions`: only time validity is checked, space validity (geographical region) is ignored.
7. Verify `its_aid_ssp`: ITS-AID included in the certificate shall be consistent with those included in the signer's certificate (heritage).