#### Email and TLS

draft-ietf-uta-email-deep-01
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#### DEEP Overview

- Focus on MUAs IMAP/POP/Submission (does not cover MTA relay)
- Confidentiality Assurance Level for mail account (UI indicator, TLS use, cert verification)
- Prefer Implicit TLS over STARTTLS
- Security Tags, Latching (like HSTS)
- Logging/reporting, Protocol Details

# Changes in draft (a)

- Update and clarify abstract
- Use term confidentiality instead of privacy in most cases.
- Move certificate pinning sub-section to account setup section and attempt to define it more precisely.
- Add note about end-to-end encryption in AVAS section.

# Changes in draft (b)

- Swap order of DNSSEC and TLSA subsections.
- Change meaning of 'tls I0' and 'tls I2' latches to require certificate validation.
- Replace cipher suite advice with reference to RFC 7525. Change examples to use TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_I28\_GCM SHA256 as cipher.

# Changes in draft (c)

- Add text to update IMAP, POP3 and Message Submission standards with newer TLS advice.
- Add clearer text in introduction that this does not cover SMTP relay.
- Update references to uta-tls-certs.
- Recommend STARTTLS for SMTP
   Submission in addition to Implicit TLS.

### Open Issues

- Need to update more text related to tls 10
   & tls 12 latches requiring cert validation.
- Email version of RFC 7469 (public key pinning)? Anyone able to propose text?
- Deployment data on port 465 vs. 587 would be helpful. I don't have cycles to gather this data.