# Use cases and Gap Analysis Hares (editor)

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
Sue Hares

### Use Cases and Requirements for an Interface to Network Security Functions (draft-pastor-i2nsf-merged-use-cases-00)

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#### **Analysis of Existing work for I2NSF**


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
### **Combined Use Cases**

### Where the Story Begins...

- We need to close the gap between customers and security vendors or service providers
  - Customer security services are being offloaded to network or cloud based infrastructures
  - There is a demand for management interfaces of these delegated
- Draft contains use cases and requirements for a common interface to Network Security Functions (NSF). It considers several use cases, organized in two basic scenarios:
  - Access Networks
  - Data Centers



## Terminology: A Couple of Basic Definitions



#### **NSF**


Network Security Function (NSF): A functional block within a network infrastructure to ensure integrity, confidentiality and availability of network communications, to detect unwanted activity, and to deter and block this unwanted activity or at least mitigate its effects on the network

#### **vNSF**


Virtual Network Security Function: A network security function that runs as a software image on a virtualized infrastructure, and can be requested by one domain but may be owned o managed by another domain



### The Scenarios. A Global View



### The Scenarios. Common Use



### Instantiation and Configuration

Client sends security requirements through interface 1 to the security controller, which instantiates and configure the NSF through Interface 2

#### **Updating**

The client requires the update of security service functions, including adding or deleting a security function, and updating configurations

#### **Collecting Status**

When users want to get the executing status of security functions they can request statistics information

#### **Validation**

Users may require to validate NSF availability, provenance, and/or its correct execution

### The Two Scenarios at Play



#### **Cloud Datacenter**

The on-demand, dynamic nature of datacenter deployment essentially requires that the network security "devices" be in software or virtual form factors

#### **On-demand vFirewall**

- A service provider needs the ability to dynamically deploy virtual firewalls for each client's set of servers based on established security policies and underlying network topologies.
- Simplify the highly complex process,
  by the automation of firewall policy



#### **Access Network**

Customers (enterprise user, network administrator, residential user...) that request and manage security services hosted in the network service provider (NSP) infrastructure

#### vNSF deployment

- Instantiate a security service as one or the combination of several vNSF(s)
- Make it available for provisioning

#### vNSF customer provisioning

- Customer enrollment and cancellation to a vNSF
- Configuration of the vNSF, based on specific configurations, or derived from common security policies
- Retrieve and list of the vNSF functionalities, extracted from a manifest or a descriptor

### And a Few Essential

### Requirements Key Requirements

The I2NSF framework should provide a set of standard **interfaces** that **facilitate**:

- Dynamic creation, enablement, disablement, and removal of network security functions;
- Policy-driven placement of new function instances in the right administrative domain;
- Attachment of appropriate security and traffic policies to the function instances
- Management of deployed instances in terms of fault monitoring, event logging, inventory, etc.
- Single and multi-tenant environments and traffic policies.
- Premise-agnostic
- Translation of security policies into functional tasks and into vendor-specific configurations

#### **Security Considerations**

- Relationship between different actors must be associated with administrative domains
  - Closed environments with one administrative domain
  - Open environments where some NSFs can be hosted in different administrative domains
    - More restrictive security
    - Co osure
- **Attestation**

e clients

### Gap analysis

#### Interfaces for Virtual Security Functions Manager


#### Interface: A

For Service Function Vendors to register their available service functions & instances, and a set of policies (or policy profiles) that can be dynamically set by 3rd party security controller or management system (e.g. Operator's OSS or management system).


 common mechanism to inform the Network Operator Mgmt Sys what they offer and what attributes can be dynamically configurable or

Interface: B &

For Clients dynamically set the policies (or profiles) to the VNFs that are supported, monitor & verify the execution & performance.



### **Filters**




application - wide Intent (ODL: NIC/Nemo) L3SM VPN service, SUPA ECA/Intent policy Device level: P.I. 12RS RIB, FB-FIB Device level: protocol Isis, ospf. bap. L3

**Device level:** 

IP, system, tunnels

Security Working Groups



### Other Areas

- ETSI-NFV EMS to VNF interface
  - Defines interface between EMS (element management system) and VNF
  - This matches I2NSF work
  - OPNFV Moon project An interface between EMS-VNF
    - Problems: NO dynamic control, only 1 definition, no room for existing vendor, no fine grain authentication, no allowance for central control
  - CSA 1 definition, 10 implementation agreements
    - All are concerned about the NMS-NSF interface

### Call for Help



Security experts to help review and guide these documents