



Manufacturer Usage Descriptions

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This presentation covers two drafts

- draft-lear-ietf-netmod-mud-00.txt
- draft-lear-ietf-netmod-acl-dnsname-00.txt

The overall concept will be presented in OPSAWG and SAAG.

Big Problem

- We know how to manage large numbers of the same device (e.g., ca. 120 – 300 million iPhones)
- We don't know how to manage larger numbers of types of devices

The Network Needs Two Pieces of Information

- What the device is
- **How the network should protect it**




We have some assumptions and constraints

- Things serve a single- or limited number of uses
 - (this solution is not intended for all devices)
- Things have very few resources to devote to security.
- The larger the footprint on the endpoint, the larger the threat surface (more code = more bugs)
- Strong security will not be possible in some instances.
- This approach requires a **file server** and not a semantically-aware NETCONF server serve **files** (or pages).


Expressing Manufacturer Usage Descriptions

Device emits a URI using DHCP, LLDP, or through 802.1ar

Router or firewall queries `connected.example.com` for policy associated with that URI



Expressing Manufacturer Usage Descriptions



Need a way to specify the recommendations

- This is **network configuration information** (access-lists)
- Don't want to reinvent the wheel (this group is producing access lists)
- The configuration is meant for **millions** of devices in a wide variety of deployments
- We need a way to abstract out certain aspects
 - What controllers a Thing should speak to
 - What is “local”
 - Maybe the notion of a “manufacturer”
 - We need to know how often a MUD controller should query for description updates
 - Some additional meta-information (like linking to ANIMA)

What Controllers a Thing may speak to

- They may be local network management stations
- They may be cloud-based services
 - iPhones speak to Apple for their management
 - Android devices speak to Google for their management

Other functions can be (mostly) described with the existing model.

draft-lear-ietf-netmod-mud-00

- Augments ACL draft
- Adds some meta information
 - When to check for updates
 - MASA server
 - When was file touched last
 - Is the device still supported by the vendor?
- Abstracts away IP addresses
 - manufacturer/same-manufacturer
 - manufacturer, model
 - controller
 - local-networks

draft-lear-ietf-acl-dnsname-00

- Augments the ietf-acl model
- “Just” adds DNS names as a filter
- Approach was based on discussion on the list
- Needs more review

Open Issues & Questions

- Access-lists can be applied both inbound and outbound
 - Let this device (not) transmit to {some set of devices or services}
 - Let this device (not) receive from {some set of devices or services}
 - The existing ACL model does not address this. Should we?
- Given the scale of risk, configuration generated by these models really **MUST** be signed.
 - There needs to at least be normative reference to how this should be done. Where?
- Normal extensibility mechanisms can't be used. Currently versioning the URI (simplest approach)
 - (Remember, no NETCONF?)

What is needed...

- Would like more eyes on the drafts and the concept
 - Including co-authors/editors!
- Can these drafts be adopted as WG drafts?

