Challenges and Possibilities with IoT Security

Eliot Lear, Michael Behringer, Hannes Tschofenig

Number of connected devices (Billions)



Big Problem

- We know how to manage large numbers of the same device (e.g., ca. 120 – 300 million iPhones)

- We don't know how to manage larger numbers of **types** of devices

Many different dimensions to consider

Static environments

Dynamic systems

The Network Needs Two Pieces of Information

- What the device is
  - Trusted introduction between the network and the device so that each trusts the other
- How the network should protect it
  - Who/what is the device intended to communicate with, and how?

At the IETF

- What the device is
  - Trusted introduction between the network and the device so that each trusts the other
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- ANIMA bootstrapping
- ACE
- Zerotouch deployment

- MUD (in various groups)
- Autoattach (opsawg/IEEE)

What the device is: trusted introduction

Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures

draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-02

Max Pritikin, Michael Richardson, Michael Behringer, Steinthor Bjarnason

Objective

Enrol a new device into the correct network:

- Zero-touch (device is "factory default")
- "Secure":
  - authenticate new device
  - authenticate network

these are a MUST for large scale → IoT

- Philosophy: bootstrap a key infrastructure (LDevID) from IDevIDs, the rest is easy

Secure Enrolment Process



Features

- New device has only link local connectivity
  - Can only attack first hop
- New device can be cryptographically authenticated
- New device can authenticate network
  - Join only the authorized network

- Applicability: Potentially anywhere, network devices, sensors, etc.

Possible Security Zones



Protocols
Disclaimer: Work in Progress



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

Other Approaches

- 6TISCH:
  - dTLS / CoAP / 6top transport
  - uses IDevID to derive LDevID (for link security)
  - Goal: transport YANG (ANIMA goal: derive LDevID)
- NETCONF:
  - Goal: transport YANG (ANIMA goal: derive LDevID)
  - Many protocols supported: http, https, DNS, mDNS, DHCP, removable storage, ...
  - Uses IDevID directly (ANIMA uses IDevID to derive LDevID)
- 802.1x / EAP / PANA:
  - Needs to “know” which network to join.

How should the network protect a Thing?

Assumptions and Assertions

Assumptions	Assertions
A Thing has a single or small number of uses.	Because a Thing has a single or a small number of intended uses, it all other uses must be unintended
Start simple, but allow for richer approaches LATER	Any intended use can be clearly identified by the manufacturer
Even those Things that can protect themselves today may not be able to do so tomorrow	All other uses can be warned against in a statement by the manufacturer
Network administrators are the ultimate arbiters of how their networks will be used	Manufacturers are in a generally good position to make the distinction

Translating intent into config

Any intended use can be clearly identified by the manufacturer

```
access-list 10 permit host
controller.mfg.example.com
```

All other uses can be warned against in a statement by the manufacturer

```
access-list 10 deny any any
```

How to locate the policy? A URI

https://mud.mfg.example.com/.well-known/mud/CAS11LCDL/version2.12

"Manufacturer"

Model

Version

Expressing Manufacturer Usage Descriptions



Makes use of YANG-based XML

```
<?xml version = '1.0' encoding = 'UTF-8'? >
<edit-config
 xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"
 xmlns:inet="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-inet-types"
 xmlns:mud="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:cisco-manpolicy"
 xmlns:acl="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-acl">
 <mud:supportInformation>
 <mud:lastUpdate>2015-05-12T20:00:50Z</mud:lastUpdate>
 <mud:cacheValidity>1440</mud:cacheValidity>
 </mud:supportInformation>
 <config>
 <top>
 <acl:access-list>
 <acl:access-list-entries>
              <acl:access-list-entry>
               <acl:rule-name>access-thermostat-controller</acl:rule-name>
               <acl:matches>
               <inet:hostname>controller.example.com</inet:hostname>
               </acl:matches>
               <acl:actions>
               <acl:permit/>
               </acl:actions>
 </acl:access-list-entry>
              <acl:access-list-entry>
                <acl:rule-name>let-me-talk-to-other-thermostats</acl:rule-
name>
                <acl:matches>
                <mud:sameManufacturer/>
                </acl:matches>
                 <acl:actions>
                 <acl:permit/>
                 </acl:actions>
                </acl:access-list-entry>
                <acl:access-list-entry>
                 <acl:rule-name>deny-other</acl:rule-name>
                 <acl:actions>
                 <acl:deny/>
                 </acl:actions>
                </acl:access-list-entry>
 </acl:access-list-entries>
 </acl:access-list>
 </top>
 </config>
</edit-config>
```

Only the text in red would have to change with the proposed standardization

Expressing Manufacturer Usage Descriptions



So what do we need to do this?

A way to communicate identifiers	IEEE 802.1AR & IEEE 802.1X, DHCP, LLDP
A way to express network configuration	YANG
A way to retrieve the policy	HTTP/TLS
An access-list model	draft-ietf-netmod-acl-model
A URI to point at the policy	draft-lear-ietf-netmod-mud
Use of DNS Names in ACLs	draft-lear-ietf-acl-dnsname-00
A new PKIX constraint for the URI	draft-lear-ietf-pkix-mud-extension-00
A DHCP option for the URI (2nd best)	draft-lear-ietf-dhc-mud-option-01
An LLDP TLV	(later)

X.509 Constraint or DHCP option?

- IEEE 802.1AR has stronger security properties
- DHCP is the **2nd choice** to deliver the MUD URI
- DHCP is still useful - assertion is from the device for **its protection.**
- No code impact for systems already implementing 802.1AR
- Very easy to implement and deploy for any system already implementing DHCP
- Need to think about software variations and attestation

Open Issues & Questions

- Serialization of the MUD File needs to be more fully specified.
- Extensibility is a challenge
- Given the scale of risk, configuration generated by these models really MUST be signed.
  - Advice needed
- Looking for more eyes on draft MUD constraint
  - ANIMA work is currently leveraging MUD for discovery. Should we write another constraint?
- Protocol review of ANIMA

Standardizing device security models

Device Management for Security



- **OMA LWM2M** reuses IETF technologies, such as CoAP, DTLS, and Resource Directory.
- Servers are deployable on gateways and in the cloud. Authorized may get access to the data.
- Objects allow to determine device status and to configure device.
- Various objects specified providing information about sensors/actuators, software/firmware versions, device meta-data, and ACLs.
- LWM2M tutorial is available.



Questions?