


LoRaWAN Authentication with RADIUS

draft-garcia-radext-radius-lorawan-01

Dan Garcia-Carrillo (University of Murcia)
Rafael Marin-Lopez (University of Murcia)
Arunprabhu Kandasamy (Acklio)
Alexander Pelov (Acklio)

LoRaWAN - *Long Range Wide Area Network




- Long range:
upto 20km
**(depending on environment)
- Low Power:
25mW, 20yrs battery life
- Data Rate:
Upto 50kbps
- Payload:
11-242 bytes

*Alexander Pelov, Alper Yegin Slides from Ip-wan BoF

**<https://hal-institut-mines-telecom.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01331966>

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
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LoRaWAN Authentication - Motivation

- LoRaWAN does not reuse standards
- Include a standard authentication, AAA, framework in LoraWAN.
 - AAA infrastructure proven to be well known, battle-tested techs. Deployed in the wild, since years.. ex: eduroam
 - *Scalable, federation aware

LoRaWAN Authentication - LoRaWAN 1.0 Join procedure


1. Commissioning



LoRaWAN Authentication - LoRaWAN 1.0 Join procedure

1. Commissioning

2. Over the Air Activation (Join Procedure)



LoRaWAN Authentication - Message Definition

- The request (join-request)

Size(bytes)	8	8	2
Join Request	AppEUI	DevEUI	DevNonce

- The Response (join-accept)


Size(bytes)	3	3	4	1	1	16(opt)
Join Accept	AppNonce	NetID	DevAddr	DLSettings	RxDelay	CFList

LoRaWAN Authentication - Keys

- AppKey
 - specific for the end-device that is assigned by the application owner to the end-device
- NwkSKey
 - to decrypt the MAC commands
- AppSKey
 - to decrypt the Application specific data

LoRaWAN Authentication - LoRaWAN 1.0 Join procedure


1. Commissioning



LoRaWAN Authentication - LoRaWAN 1.0 Join procedure

1. Commissioning

2. Over the Air Activation (Join Procedure)




LoRaWAN Authentication - LoRaWAN 1.0 Join procedure

1. Commissioning

2. Over the Air Activation (Join Procedure)

3. RADIUS Extension



* MIC field empty. To be calculated by the RADIUS server.

** Optional field.

LoRaWAN Authentication with RADIUS

- New RADIUS Attributes
 - JoinRequest (containing the join-request)
 - JoinAnswer (containing the join-accept)
 - Nwkskey (containing the NwkSKey)
 - Appskey (containing the AppSKey, optional)
- Keys are transported as RADIUS attributes
 - Consideration for transporting key materials securely
 - Similar to RFC 6218 (Cisco Vendor-Specific RADIUS Attributes for the Delivery of Keying Material)
 - RFC6614 (Radius over TLS)

LoRaWAN Authentication with RADIUS

- Open Issues
 - The Join Request has AppEUI indicating the Organization, but to route JR and JA* through the AAA infrastructure we need to specify a realm (e.g. um.es).



- A mechanism for matching the AppEUI to the domain name of the organization is needed.
- Possible solution would be an inverse approach of [\[RFC7043\]](#) using DNS.

LoRaWAN Authentication with RADIUS

- **Proof of concept Implementation**

- End Device (Nemeus)
 - usb key with Java app
- Base station (ExpEmB)
 - Intel Atom, 2GB RAM
- Lora Network server(Acklio)
 - implemented in golang
- RADIUS(bronze1man)
 - implemented in golang

Next: Implementation in FreeRADIUS



- [Lora Base station] www.expemb.com/en/product/multi-connectivity-service-gateway-sgwmc-x86lr-12132/
- [LoRa Network Server] www.ackl.io
- [End-device] www.nemeus.fr/en/mk002-usb-key
- [Radius] github.com/bronze1man/radius

LoRaWAN Authentication with RADIUS

- Acknowledgements
 - Thanks, to Sri Gundavelli, Yeoh Chun-Yeow, Alan DeKok, Stephen Farrell and Mark Grayson., for their valuable comments
 - This work has been possible partially by:
 - The SMARTIE project (FP7-SMARTIE-609062 EU Project)
 - The Spanish National Project CICYT EDISON (TIN2014-52099-R) granted by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of Spain (including ERDF support).

Comments and Questions?

- Thanks for your attention

Backup Slides

- Key and MIC calculation

join-request

cmac = aes128_cmac(AppKey, MHDR | AppEUI | DevEUI | DevNonce)

MIC = cmac[0..3]

join-accept

cmac = aes128_cmac(AppKey, MHDR | AppNonce | NetID | DevAddr | RFU | RxDelay | CFList)

MIC = cmac[0..3]

NwkSKey = aes128_encrypt(AppKey, 0x01 | AppNonce | NetID | DevNonce | pad16)

AppSKey = aes128_encrypt(AppKey, 0x02 | AppNonce | NetID | DevNonce | pad16)

The pad16 function appends zero octets so that the length of the data is a multiple of 16.

MIC*[RFC4493]

Backup Slides

- **Size of RADIUS attributes**

(incl. Type & length fields)

Request = 25B

Accept = 19B

NwkSKey = 34B

AppSKey = 34B

Backup Slides

- **Nonce**

The DevNonce can be extracted by issuing a sequence of RSSI measurements under the assumption that the quality of randomness fulfills the criteria of true randomness