

BRSKI overview and issues

- Very short BRSKI overview.
- recap of incoming/outgoing discussion
- audit token, nonce-full/nonce-less versions
- online view, offline view
- ownership voucher details: Kent

The cast

Manufacturer

Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA)

Registrar

Join Assistant/Proxy


New Node (pledge)

(ownership) voucher

LL
fe80::123-
→ fe80::proxy

ULA
fd12:345::1-
→ registrar

(circuit proxy, IPIP, NAT66)




Incoming (callhome) / Outgoing Debate

I-D.ietf-netconf
-call-home


Call Home

-outgoing TCP, followed by swap of client/server




Tcp client
TLS server

6tisch
Will use incoming,
With COMI+
System-keystore
proxy



Outgoing



ANIMA
Decided to stick
With outgoing via
proxy

Audit tokens and ownership

Mix of contradictory requirements!

Audit Token

- Weak to no link to owner
 - May be bearer token!
 - Likely contains link to owner's public key.
 - **May link to some DN/CN of owner**
- Uses MASA to serve as registration, providing audit trail to subsequent "owners"
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Ownership Voucher

- Strong link to owner
- MASA either produces the voucher (possibly "online"), or provides access to already created voucher.
- MASA stores history of previous vouchers.
- **(controversial), may include Voucher Revocation List!**

Token Requirements

- Online validation
 - May include NEA-type assessment of current firmware of device (remote attestation) back to vendor.
 - Strong connection to supply chain to provide proof of ownership.
- Offline validation
 - Need to collect all Tokens/Vouchers onto stable storage for use offline.
 - National security concerns, disaster recovery, protection against vendor going out of business
 - Uncooperative/immature supply chain
 - Need to include voucher in bearer token form inside packaging as QR code
 - Supporting re-sale of devices, transitive trust of ownership vouchers