#### No domain left behind:

is Let's Encrypt democratizing encryption?

Maarten Aertsen<sup>1</sup>, Maciej Korczyński<sup>2</sup>, **Giovane C. M. Moura**<sup>3</sup>, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob<sup>2</sup>, Jan van den Berg<sup>2</sup>

> <sup>1</sup>National Cyber Security Centre The Netherlands

<sup>2</sup>Delft University of Technology The Netherlands

> $^3$ SIDN Labs The Netherlands

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#### Disclaimer

- ▶ None of the authors is in any way affiliated with Let's Encrypt
- ▶ In other words: we do not speak for them
- ▶ But if you like their work, you may consider supporting them

# The Encryption Rush

# Ed Snowden NSA's revelations



- ► Massive, widespread surveillance
- ► Worst nightmares came true

# The Encryption Rush

# Ed Snowden NSA's revelations



- Massive, widespread surveillance
- Worst nightmares came true

### Consequences:

- ► For many, it was a wake-up call (and panic)
- Market distrust in vendors
- Provided a great momentum for better security

#### Reactions:


- ▶ IETF: RFC 7258, RFC 7624
- ► iOS/Android: mobile phone encryption by default
- Cloud providers enabling encryption everywhere
- **.**..



# More than half of web traffic is encrypted nowadays

Yet that leaves out a lot of people without HTTPS







https://telemetry.mozilla.org/, based on Let's Encrypt stats page

 $<sup>^2 {\</sup>tt https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/https/metrics/}$ 

# Certificates are required for encryption on the web

### Barriers to ubiquitous web encryption (X.509 cert):

- ▶ Cost: purchase, deployment and renewal
- ► Complexity: request, deployment (at scale)

### Let's Encrypt<sup>3</sup> aims to make encrypted traffic ubiquitous

- ▶ Issue and re-issue costs: **\$0.00**
- ► Complexity mitigated by **automation** 
  - 1. ACME protocol<sup>4</sup>
  - 2. and clients, e.g. Certbot<sup>5</sup>



<sup>3</sup> https://letsencrypt.org

 $<sup>{\</sup>rm ^4draft\text{-}ietf\text{-}acme\text{-}acme\text{-}latest} \rightarrow {\rm https://ietf\text{-}wg\text{-}acme.github.io/acme/}}$ 

https://certbot.eff.org/

#### No domain left behind

Is Let's Encrypt democratizing encryption?

#### Research question

"In its first year of certificate issuance, has Let's Encrypt been successful in democratizing encryption?"

#### Approach: measurements

- ▶ Analyze issuance in the first year of *Let's Encrypt*
- ▶ Show adoption trend from various perspectives
- ▶ Analyze coverage for the lower-cost end of the market



# Methodology

- ▶ Period covered: Sept. 2015-2016 (1st year)
- ▶ Results based on FQDNs reduced to 2LD/3LD form
  - ▶  $a.b.c.d.com \rightarrow d.com$

#### Datasets

Certificates $\rightarrow$	Certificate transparency <sup>6</sup>
Domain to IP mapping $\rightarrow$	Farsight DNSDB <sup>7</sup>
Organization mapping $\rightarrow$	Methodology from previous work $^8$ , using whois data & Maxmind GEOIP2
Registration info $\rightarrow$	.nl registry (SIDN)


<sup>7</sup> https://www.dnsdb.info/



 $<sup>^{6} {\</sup>rm https://www.certificate-transparency.org/known-logs}$ 


# Let's Encrypt Adoption Rate

▶ Steady growth




# Who's using Let's Encrypt?

▶ 98% of certificates are issued outside Alexa 1M ...



### Who's using Let's Encrypt?


- ▶ ... yet issuance is not restricted to lower end of the market
  - ▶ meaning: big players also use in their subdomains



# Growth is attributed to adoption by major players

3 hosting providers are responsible for 47% of the Let's Encrypt certified domains


#### November 2015




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
#### September 2016






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### Issuance is dominantly for web hosting


So far, no surprises



# Over 90% of domains in hosting are on shared hosting

Issuance is dominantly for the lower-cost end of the market


- ▶ Shared hosting =  $10 \text{ domains/IP}^9$
- ► Let's Encrypt reaches those with less incentive to encrypt



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>S. Tajalizadehkhoob et al., "Apples, oranges and hosting providers: heterogeneity and security in the hosting market." IEEE NOMS 2016


### Let's Encrypt certificates are valid for 90 days

The majority of certificates are correctly renewed after their first expiration



# Let's Encrypt: domain age use

- Case study: .nl
- ▶ Determine the age of the domain when the cert was issued




Median, Q25, Q75 and number of monthly new certificates for .nl domains  ${\bf n}$ 



# Let's Encrypt: deployment

- ▶ https scans + cert processing (lower bound)
- ▶ 25K randomly chosen *Let's Encrypt* FQDN





#### Conclusions

#### We show that

- ▶ Let's Encrypt has been a success
  - ► Reduces costs & complexity
- ► Democratize encryption by covering low cost end of the market (shared hosting)
  - but big players also use it
- ▶ Automation works: Let's Encrypt's allows for bulk issuing
  - ▶ 3 hosting providers are responsible for 47% of the *Let's Encrypt* certified domains
- ► The majority of certificates are correctly renewed after their first expiration (90 days)

#### And find that

Let's Encrypt has indeed started to democratize encryption.

#### Future work

#### Future work

- extend measurement period
- issued versus deployed
  - active scans on shared hosting require prior knowledge of domains served (SNI)
- use by malicious actors

#### Contact details

Giovane C. M. Moura giovane.moura@sidn.nl

Download our paper at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.03005

