

NETCONF and RESTCONF Client/Server Models

Drafts covered:

- draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-01
- draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server-02
- draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server-02
- draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server-02
- draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server-02

NETCONF WG
IETF 98 (Chicago)

Recap

- In the IETF 97 (Seoul), we reported little progress on any of the drafts.
- The only real change made to the drafts then was to address the keystore-renaming issue.
- But we had said that, with zerotouch winding down, that the expectation was that these drafts would start to get more attention.

Updates since IETF 97

- While zerotouch did NOT wind down as expected, these drafts still got a fair amount of attention.
- Keystore:
 - Replaced cert-chain idiom with PKCS#7 structures
 - Added 'private-key' as a configurable data node, and removed the 'generate-private-key' and 'load-private-key' actions.
 - Moved 'user-auth-credentials' to the ietf-ssh-client module.
- SSH Client/Server
 - removed transport-specific grouping (module only defines one grouping now)
 - Simplified the "client-auth" part in the ietf-ssh-client module. It now inlines what it used to point to keystore for.
 - Added cipher suites for various SSH-specific algorithms.
- TLS Client/Server
 - removed transport-specific grouping (module only defines one grouping now)
 - Filled in previously incomplete 'ietf-tls-client' module.
 - Added cipher suites for various TLS-specific algorithms

Updates since IETF 97 (cont.)

- NETCONF Client/Server
 - Added to ietf-netconf-client ability to connected to a cluster of endpoints, including a reconnection-strategy.
 - Added to ietf-netconf-client the ability to configure connection- type and also keep-alive strategy.
 - Updated both modules to accommodate new groupings in the ssh/tls drafts.
- RESTCONF Client/Server
 - Filled in previously missing 'ietf-restconf-client' module.
 - Updated the ietf-restconf-server module to accommodate new grouping 'ietf-tls-server-grouping'
- Other drafts are planning to use these models:
 - draft-ietf-netmod-syslog-model
 - draft-ietf-pce-pcep-yang

Open Issues

- Keystore:
 - Should 'private key' be a union?
 - Add back `generate-private-key` action?
- SSH Client/Server:
 - Simplified client-auth okay for call-home apps?
- TLS Client/Server:
 - Simplified client-auth okay for call-home apps?
- NETCONF Client/Server:
 - Should NETCONF-client be a grouping?
- RESTCONF Client/Server:
 - Should RESTCONF-client be a grouping?



Same Issue



Same Issue

Should 'private-key' be a union?

What should be the treatment for when NACM hides a value, resulting in an invalid response?

```
leaf private-key {
  nacm:default-deny-all;
  type union {
    type binary;
    type enumeration {
      enum "RESTRICTED" {
        description
          "The private key is restricted due to access-control.";
      }
      enum "INACCESSIBLE" {
        description
          "The private key is inaccessible due to being protected
            by the cryptographic hardware modules (e.g., a TPM).";
      }
    }
  }
  mandatory true;
  description
    "A binary string that contains the value of the private
    key. The interpretation of the content is defined in the
    registration of the key algorithm. For example, a DSA key
    is an INTEGER, an RSA key is represented as RSAPrivateKey
    as defined in \[RFC3447\], and an Elliptic Curve Cryptography
    (ECC) key is represented as ECPrivateKey as defined in
    \[RFC5915\]";
}
```

Add back `generate-private-key` action?

This action was removed when we added 'private-key', protected by "nacm:default-deny-all" (see previous slide).

But:

1. It is still best practice to have a device generate the private key
 - so it never leaves the device)
2. The private key needs to be generated in hardware sometimes
 - no option to set via configuration

My plan is to add this action statement back, with the explanation that it only updates the "operational" datastore, so that certificates can be configured on top of these system-generated private keys.

Any concerns?

Simplified client-auth okay for call-home apps?

- Works great for traditional clients, and also for call-home apps that want to use the same client-auth for *ALL* devices.
- For more complicated call-home apps, is it okay to assume that the app would use business logic to handle special client-auth logic?

```
module: ietf-ssh-client
```

```
  groupings:
```

```
  ssh-client-grouping
```

```
    +---- server-auth
```

```
    | ...
```

```
    +---- client-auth
```

```
    | +---- username?      string
```

```
    | +---- (auth-type)?
```

```
    |   +--:(certificate)
```

```
    |     | +---- certificate?  leafref {sshcom:ssh-x509-certs}?
```

```
    |   +--:(public-key)
```

```
    |     | +---- public-key?  -> /ks:keystore/keys/key/name
```

```
    |   +--:(password)
```

```
    |     +---- password?      union
```

Configures just a single client.



The SSH-client grouping is presented here. A similar single-client construct exists in the TLS-client grouping as well.

Should NC/RC-client be a grouping?

- Having configuration for NC/RC-servers makes sense
 - since the server's backend MUST implement the modules it claims to support.
- But clients are different
 - A client must have business logic of some sort to do something. Specifically, an NC/RC client needs to be linked into an application that orchestrates its function.
- That being the case, how can a client ever be configured on its own?
 - Shouldn't the application itself be the thing that is configured?
- Should these client models be groupings instead of a containers?

Next Steps

- Work through remaining issues
- Complete Call Home reference implementation
 - exercises ietf-ssh-server call-home configuration
- Wait for other implementations
 - Syslog?
 - PCE-PCEP?
- Then Last Call

Questions, Comments, Concerns?