

IPv6 DOTS Signal Option

draft-francois-dots-ipv6-signal-option-01

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
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Key idea

- ▶ Objective: signal DDoS attacks from a DOTS client (detection) to DOTS server (mitigation)
- ▶ Regular signalling paths for delivering DOTS signals might be also affected by the DDoS → Adding an auxiliary mechanism for signaling (does not substitute)
- ▶ Use IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option Header [RFC2460]
 - ▶ Embed the information into pre-existing packet
 - ▶ signaling information is embedded into outgoing IPv6 packets
 - ▶ in an opportunistic manner (not all packets, not only those outgoing to the DOTS server... but some well chosen)
 - ▶ the DOTS client initiate this process, intermediate capable routers can store the information and embed it into other packets


Option processing (Example)

-  Client
-  Server
-  Gateway
-  Capable Router
-  Non-capable Router
-  Forwarded IPv6 packet





Option processing (Example)

- ▶ The client tries to initialize the regular signaling
- ▶ The client initializes the Hop-by-hop based signaling → outgoing IPv6 are selected for *marking*





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- ▶ The client tries to initialize the regular signaling
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- ▶ Non-capable routers ignore the option and forward the packets
- ▶ The client continues the *marking*




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- ▶ When arriving at capable agents (gateways, routers), embedded information is stored
- ▶ The gateway tries to initialize the regular signaling
- ▶ The capable router having saved the information embeds it again in other IPv6 packets




Option processing

- ▶ Selection of packets is rule-based to only consider a subset
- ▶ A sequence of rules where each is defined by
 - ▶ 1st level: a filter on IPv6 header to be matched
 - ▶ 2nd level: a ratio of previously matched packets
 - ▶ + a timeout
- ▶ When a rule expires (timeout) the next one is applied
- ▶ Rules are manually configured
- ▶ Recommendation: first rules should select more packets (taking benefit of the first instant before losing connectivity)

- 1: all outgoing IPv6 packets with a 10 second timeout
- 2: all outgoing IPv6 packets with a ratio of 10% and a 1 minute timeout
- 3: all outgoing multicast IPv6 packets with a ratio of 10% and a 1 minute timeout
- 4: all outgoing anycast IPv6 packets with a ratio of 10% and a 5 minute timeout
- 5: all outgoing IPv6 packets heading to the DOTS server with a ratio of 100% and a one hour timeout

Example



Deployment considerations 1/2

- ▶ IPv6 extension headers are often rate-limited or dropped entirely
 - ▶ One reason is the overhead of processing
 - ▶ Our proposed option is only used under a DDoS attack and performance might be so already degraded
 - ▶ Keep limited the use to the intra-domain use case
- ▶ Modification to IP layers implementations
 - ▶ capable routers: need to extract store and embed signaling information
 - ▶ clients: need to create the specific option header to be embedded then
 - ▶ servers and gateways: all DOTS signaling information contained in IPv6 headers has to be transmitted to the application layer

Deployment considerations 2/2

- ▶ Need an interface for modifying/listening IPv6 packets
 - ▶ use of Hop-by-Hop option for applications → header violation
 - ▶ advanced socket API (RFC3542)
- ▶ Header insertion issue (rfc2460bis)
 - ▶ considered as harmful
 - ▶ potential solution by encapsulating into new packets
 - ▶ keep the use limited to routers under the same authority and make transparent packet modifications → fits well the intra-domain use case

Security considerations

- ▶ Forged option headers from non legitimate sources to entail additional processing on routers
 - ▶ Source-based filtering to discard those since we know which sources can emit such IPv6 packets
 - ▶ The option can be signed by the clients and verified by the servers and gateways (intermediate capable routers do not for efficiency reason → exclude TTL from the signature calculation)
- ▶ Replay attack from a compromised router to inject more packets
 - ▶ Thanks to the id and TTL, other agents will not consider the header