Token Bindings IETF 99
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0RTT and 1RTT
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- Nick presents 0RTT and 1RTT discussion
  * Lucy & Martin expresses support for multiple drafts
- Nick presents changes from -01 
  * Martin asks question about DHE KEX - may need to open issue to ensure uniqueness
  * Nick clarifies the threat-model in play for DHE KEX
- Nick presents overview of 0-RTT TB initial handshake
- Nick presents exporters requirements for 0-RTT
  * Martin: protocols should specify a profile both for 0RTT and 0RTT-TB
  * Martin: include section that contains the profile for 0RTT-TB for HTTP
  * Martin: include advice for other protocols
- Nick presents options for switching exporters
  * Consensus around using normal exporter
  * Discussion at mic on the value of the client certificate analogy

Proxies and Terminators
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- Brian intro to TTRP draft based on feedback from IETF98
  * MikeJones: have usecases that require > 2 token bindings, pls specify syntax that allows multiple TBs
  * StefanSantesson: have you considered AJP?
  * Brian: no
  * EKR: sanitization seems sketchy
  * Brian: aware of feedback
  * Brian and EKR discussion the header security / sanitization issue
  * Dirk: based on google experience support the current proposal
  * ERK: why not establish a shared key and MAC the header
  * Brian: security considerations support that notion
  * EKR: risk of misconfiguration is signifficant - if the orig headers are passed thourough => major issue
  * Brian: worried about key mgmt for one specific application - need broader applicability
  * JohnBradley: what wg would be appropriate for a general solution?
  * MikeJones: ...
  * JoeSaloway: sanitization is a problem - needs a solution
  * WilliamDennis: not fully understand the problem.. more complexity adds risk that TB doesn't get deployed
  * (?)Google: passing EKM is better than new shared key mech
  * RichSaltz: assumption of trust in TTRP is not valid
  * MartinT: its simple to implement MAC using TLS exporter on the inside leg
  * EKR clarifies as AD that this is a WG decision
  * Discussion around the assumptions - is TLS used
  * LJ: how can we produce a document based on MartinThomsons ideas?
  * Brian: TTRP is important for getting deployment of TB
  * various folks involved in a discussion on where and when to create a MAC spec
  * WilliamDennis: complexity should be at the operator/data center level
  * LucyLynch: appreciate draft for exposing important issues: sanitization etc
  
  * Brian contiues preso
  * MartinT: don't provide information to backend that the backend can't use
  * MartinT: MikeJones request for > 2 TB IDs is fine
  * MartinT: make these Sec-* headers
  * StefanSantesson asks clarification on the sanitization issue
  * Vinnod: why not provide both TB ID and EKM for more complex applications?
  * Nick & Brian & MikeJ discuss requirements for > 2 TBs

  * Brian shows example of running code

- Open Mic:
  * StefanSantesson: TB for SAML?
  * MikeJones: should use confirmation method (borrowed from SAML) based on the work in OpenIDC
  * MikeJones: no opinion as to where it gets done 
  * JeffH: agree with Mike - 
  * There seems to be support...

  * Lucy: Nick - please include a problem statement