Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric Keys

draft-irtf-cfrg-re-keying

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Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric Keys, S. Smyshlyaev, Ed.

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Many thanks for comments and considerations to:
- Mihir Bellare
- Scott Fluhrer
- Dorothy Cooley
- Yoav Nir
- Maksim Kollegin
- Jim Schaad
- Paul Hoffman
- Dmitry Belyavsky
Motivation

Re-keying is needed to increase the lifetime of session keys, otherwise tightly limited by the bounds following from:

- general combinatorial properties of cipher modes of operation (recent example: Sweet32);
- estimations of material needed for success of various cryptanalysis methods for a used cipher (linear, algebraic, differential, logical etc.);
- side-channel cryptanalysis methods of block ciphers (e.g. recent “TEMPEST attacks against AES” paper, 50 sec. to get an AES key from the distance of 30 cm).

Example: re-keying in TLS 1.3 — KeyUpdate

Recommended to do KeyUpdate after $\approx 2^{24.5}$ full-size records (AES-GCM).

\[
\text{traffic_secret}_N = \text{HKDF}_{\text{Expand}}(\text{traffic_secret}_N - 1, [...])
\]

\[
\text{write_key} = \text{HKDF}_{\text{Expand}}(\text{traffic_secret}_N, "key", [...])
\]
Main objective

To prepare a document with „a menu of choices for developers“ for re-keying mechanisms.

- Secure and efficient procedures, solving the re-keying task in the majority of common cases.
- Rather small redundancy of mechanism set.
- General recommendations and choice principles — when to choose which mechanism.

- External/internal, parallel/serial, hash-based/cipher based, with/without master key.
- Security (according to the models of «Increasing the Lifetime of a Key: A Comparative Analysis of the Security of Re-Keying Techniques», M. Abdalla, M. Bellare) — \( \approx \) quadratical increase of key lifetime.
IETF 97, Seoul, November 2016

- A proposal from the CFRG chairs to create a document with a framework for re-keying.
- CFRG meeting: talk on re-keying, discussion.

draft-irtf-cfrg-re-keying, “Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric Keys”

- February 27, 2017 — the -00 version: general considerations, main set of mechanisms.
- March 7, 2017 — the -01 version: usage recommendations and principles of choice added.

IETF 98, Chicago, March 2017

- A CFRG side meeting on re-keying
- One-hour wide discussion of the document, a number of important considerations.
Main decisions about the I-D (IETF 98 side meeting)

Considerations on the scope and aims of re-keying

- Consider the following reasons to use re-keying:
  - additional side channel resistance (against DPA or EMI style attacks);
  - PFS security regarding segments of encryption process;
  - lightweight cryptography, usage of ciphers with 32-bit and 64-bit blocks;
  - additional security against possible future attacks on the used ciphers — as a safety margin. Important notice: This MUST NOT be used as a method to prolong life of ciphers that are already known to be vulnerable.

- To add words that no post-quantum issues can be solved by re-keying.

- To add words about reasons remaining for ciphers with large block sizes (e.g. ChaCha20) — side-channel resistance, PFS, safety margin.
Considerations on the recommendations and guidelines

- To base on the following frame: external re-keying is chosen on a protocol level (independently of a block cipher and a block cipher mode), while an internal re-keying is chosen linked to a block size (of a used cipher) and block cipher mode of operation.

- To add a text about advantages and disadvantages of various types of re-keying based on Seoul CFRG (IETF 97) slides.

- To provide sample cases (working examples or toy examples) for choosing one or another type of re-keying for the protocols.

- To change the order of chapters such that the main part of recommendations would be given before the description of specific mechanisms.

- Not to consider related questions for stream ciphers.
Considerations on the mechanisms themselves

- To add explicit text about the principles of choice of constants for internal re-keying CTR mode.
- For the modes: to consider primarily CTR and GCM — but also add CCM and CBC with corresponding comments.
- To add clarifications about advantages and disadvantages of usage of the same primitives for re-keying.
- When choosing constants for internal re-keying, consider only lengths that are multiples of 8.
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- June 5, 2017 — the -02 version: major revision — most of concerns from Chicago (IETF 98) meeting addressed.
- June 20, 2017 — the -03 version: major revision based on a list of considerations by Russ Housley.
- June 30, 2017 — the -04 version: major revision based on considerations by Shay Gueron and Dmitry Belyavsky.
Current state and plans

draft-irtf-cfrg-re-keying, “Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric Keys”

The structure, principles, major recommendations and most mechanisms (with security bounds) seem to be negotiated and do not tend to be changed.

- Internal re-keying for CCM:
  - Request at IETF 98 meeting — mechanism proposal added to I-D.
  - Either obtain security proofs for CCM with re-keying (need assistance here) or exclude the mechanism.

- Decide whether to add a section about key trees.

- Test vectors — to be added.

- Call for considerations and concerns:
  - Have all the concerns, that had been discussed at IETF 98 meeting, been properly addressed?
  - Any new comments on formulations about usage recommendations from developers of protocols (maybe from the IoT field)?
Thank you for your attention!

Questions?

• Materials, questions, comments:
  • svs@cryptopro.ru
Key diversification (external re-keying)

- Uses an initial (negotiated) key as a master key, which is never used directly for the encryption but is used for session key derivation.
- A new derived session key (and IV) for each section (of size \( \leq L \)).

\[
\begin{align*}
K & \xrightarrow{KDF} K_1 \\
& \quad \downarrow \text{KDF} \\
& \quad \text{Message } (1,1) \\
& \quad \text{Message } (1,2) \\
& \quad \cdots \\
& \quad \text{Message } (1,q) \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
K & \xrightarrow{KDF} K_2 \\
& \quad \downarrow \text{KDF} \\
& \quad \text{Message } (2,1) \\
& \quad \text{Message } (2,2) \\
& \quad \cdots \\
& \quad \text{Message } (2,q) \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
& \quad \cdots \\
& \quad \text{Message } (N,q) \\
\end{align*}
\]
NIST Special Publication 800-108

**KDF in Counter Mode**

\[ K_i = \text{PRF}(K, [i]_2|\text{label}|0x00|\text{Context}|[L]_2) \]

**KDF in Feedback Mode**

\[ K_i = \text{PRF}(K, K_{i-1}|[i]_2|\text{label}|0x00|\text{Context}|[L]_2) \]

**KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode**

\[ A_i = \text{PRF}(K, A_{i-1}); \]
\[ K_i = \text{PRF}(K, A_i|[i]_2|\text{label}|0x00|\text{Context}|[L]_2) \]
Security analysis


- Parallel variant: $K_i = \text{PRF}(K, i)$.
- Serial variant: $K_i = \text{PRF}(\text{StateKey}_i, 0)$,  
  $\text{StateKey}_{i+1} = \text{PRF}(\text{StateKey}_i, 1)$, $\text{StateKey}_1 = K$.

The lifetime of keys drastically increases (independently of the encryption mode) — complete and correct security proofs exist.
Parallel variant: the capacity of the initial key

If we have really hard restrictions on key capacity (e.g., an adversary with powerful side-channel analysis equipment), it can exceed even for the initial ("master") key.

NIST Special Publication 800-108: Key Hierarchy (Key Tree)

An example:

```
Key[i] = KDF( KDF( KDF( RootKey, i&Mask1), i&Mask2), i&Mask3)
```

Parallel variant: $K_i = \text{PRF}(K, i)$.

Serial variant: $K_i = \text{PRF}(\text{StateKey}_i, 0)$, $\text{StateKey}_{i+1} = \text{PRF}(\text{StateKey}_i, 1)$, $\text{StateKey}_1 = K$.

Advantages

- The material encrypted on each derived key $K_i$ can be strictly limited by $L$ without strict limits on the lifetime of the original key $K$.
- The adversary cannot combine the information (input-output behaviour, side-channel information...) obtained when observing work on several derived keys.
- The leakage of one derived key $K_i$ does not have any impact on other derived keys.
- The mechanism can be chosen independently of a mode of operation.
Key diversification (external re-keying)

- Parallel variant: $K_i = \text{PRF}(K, i)$.
- Serial variant: $K_i = \text{PRF}(\text{StateKey}_i, 0)$,
  \[ \text{StateKey}_{i+1} = \text{PRF}(\text{StateKey}_i, 1), \text{StateKey}_1 = K. \]

Disadvantages

- In both variants $K_1 \neq K$ — thus, we always have to make at least one PRF calculation, even for extremely short plaintexts (the proofs significantly depend on keeping some state ($K$ and StateKey$_i$) unused with the cipher itself).
- An external mechanism: if L is restrictive, inconvenient restrictions on the size of an individual message (with its own header, IV, MAC etc.) appear.
And what if we have chosen some certain mode of operation and want to

1) keep the properties of
   • having the strong limits of the section that is explicitly encrypted with any symmetric key;
   • impossibility of an adversary to combine the information obtained from different sections
   — to limit the possibility of an adversary to study anything about any encryption key by one section;

2) obtain also the properties of
   • being efficient on short plaintexts (without any additional operations on such);
   • not restarting encryption with new IV’s (and MAC calculation) frequently.
Internal re-keying („key meshing“)

- $K_1 = K$, $IV_1 = IV$;
- $(K_{i+1}, IV_{i+1}) = F(K_i, IV_i, i + 1)$.

$$K = K_1 \xrightarrow{F} K_2 \xrightarrow{F} K_3 \xrightarrow{F} \ldots$$

Message $(1)$

Message $(2)$

\[ \ldots \]

Message $(q)$

section 1 \quad section 2 \quad section 3 \quad \ldots

size of sections = const = $l$, $ql < L$
The proposed method of re-keying („key meshing“)

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For CTR/GCM with n-bit block, CTR$_i$ = (ICN | counter), with c-bit counter value and (n − c)-bit ICN.

- K$_{i+1}$ = ACPKM-CTR(K$_i$) = MSB$_k$(E$_{K_i}$($W_1$)|...|E$_{K_i}$($W_J$)),
- The section size MUST be less than $2^{c/2-1}$ blocks.

Lifetime of a Key = $L$

K = K$_1$ $\xrightarrow{\text{ACPKM}}$ K$_2$ $\xrightarrow{\text{ACPKM}}$ K$_3$ $\xrightarrow{\text{ACPKM}}$ ...

Message $(1)$

Message $(2)$

... 

Message $(q)$

section 1 section 2 section 3 ...

size of sections = const = $l$, $ql < L$
Internal re-keying („key meshing“)

**draft-irtf-cfrg-re-keying**

For CTR/GCM with \( n \)-bit block, \( \text{CTR}_i = (\text{ICN} \mid \text{counter}) \), with \( c \)-bit counter value and \((n - c)\)-bit ICN.

- \( K_{i+1} = \text{ACPKM-CTR}(K_i) = \text{MSB}_k(E_{K_i}(W_1) | ... | E_{K_i}(W_J)) \),
- The section size MUST be less than \( 2^{c/2-1} \) blocks;
- \((n - c + 1)\)-th bit of each \( W_j \) is 1;
- \( W_j \) are defined for any
  - block size \( n \) of \( 64 \leq n \leq 512 \),
  - counter size \( c \) of \( 32 \leq c \leq \frac{3}{4}n \),
  - key size \( k \) of \( 128 \leq k \leq 512 \).
- \( W_j \) are pairwise different fixed constants for all allowed \( n, c, k \).
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\[ K_{i+1} = \text{ACPKM-CTR}(K_i) = \text{MSB}_k(E_{K_i}(W_1)||...|E_{K_i}(W_J)). \]

Disadvantages

- The leakage of one section key \( K_i \) will lead to a leakage of all following keys.
- The mechanism must not be chosen independently of a mode of operation.
Internal re-keying („key meshing“)

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\[ K_{i+1} = \text{ACPKM-CTR}(K_i) = \text{MSB}_k(E_{K_i}(W_1)|...|E_{K_i}(W_J)). \]

Advantages (Performance)

- There are no additional unnecessary operations for short plaintexts — if the plaintext length is shorter than the section size, the initial key will be used;
- The plaintext size is not needed to be known in advance — key transformations are made when and only when needed;
- Transparency: no need to restart the encryption process with new IV’s (and GHASH calculation).
\[ K_{i+1} = ACPKM-CTR(K_i) = MSB_k(E_{K_i}(W_1)|...|E_{K_i}(W_J)) \].

Advantages (Security)

- The material encrypted on each section key \( K_i \) can be strictly limited by \( L \) without strict limits on the lifetime of the original key \( K \);
- The adversary cannot combine the information (input-output behaviour, side-channel information...) obtained when observing work on several section keys;
- The total lifetime of an initial key drastically increases.

Really?
**Advantages (Security)**

- The material encrypted on each section key $K_i$ can be strictly limited by $L$ without strict limits on the lifetime of the original key $K$;
- The adversary cannot combine the information (input-output behaviour, side-channel information...) obtained when observing work on several section keys;
- The total lifetime of an initial key drastically increases.

Really?
Security model

Cipher mode with internal re-keying is considered as an extension of a base cipher mode of operation, since it affects the process of processing of every single message.

Internal re-keying method must not be considered without specifying cipher mode of operation.
Security models

Security models for block ciphers

- PRF — «Pseudorandom function»;
- PRP-CPA — «Pseudorandom permutation in chosen plaintext attack»;
- PRP-CCA — «Pseudorandom permutation in chosen ciphertext attack».

Security models for cipher modes

A security model for the cipher mode (for encryption) — LOR-CPA

An adversary A has access to an oracle $O^\text{LOR}$. Before starting the work the oracle $O^\text{LOR}$ chooses $b \in \{0, 1\}$. The adversary A can make requests to the oracle $O^\text{LOR}$. Each of these requests is a pair of strings $(M^0, M^1)$, where $|M^0| = |M^1|$. In response to the request $(M^0, M^1)$ the oracle returns a string C that is a result of the processing of the string $M^b$ according to the $\mathcal{SE}$ cipher mode.
Known for CTR

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{CTR}}^{\text{LOR-CPA}} (t, q, m) \leq 2 \cdot \text{Adv}_{E}^{\text{PRF}} (t + q + nqm, qm). \]

Main result for CTR-ACPKM

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{CTR-ACPKM}}^{\text{LOR-CPA}} (t, q, ml) \leq 6m \cdot \text{Adv}_{E}^{\text{PRP-CPA}} (t + mlqn, ql + s) + \\
+ m \cdot \frac{(ql)^2}{2^n} + m \cdot \frac{2sql + s^2 - s}{2^n}, \]

where \( s = k/n \), \( l \) is a section size.
Comparison with CTR

Base assumptions

In case of the block cipher that has no specific methods to decrease the security, the values of adversary’s advantages are bounded in the following way:

\[
\text{Adv}^\text{PRF}_E (t, q) \approx \frac{t}{2^k} + \frac{q^2}{2^n},
\]

\[
\text{Adv}^\text{PRP-CPA}_E (t, q) \approx \frac{t}{2^k},
\]

\[
\text{Adv}^\text{PRP-CCA}_E (t, q) \approx \frac{t}{2^k}.
\]
### Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security bound</th>
<th>Formula</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Adv}^{LOR-CPA}_{\text{CTR}} (t, q, m\ell) \sim m^2 \cdot \frac{2q^2\ell^2}{2^n}, )</td>
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<td>( \text{Adv}^{LOR-CPA}<em>{\text{CTR-ACP}</em>{KM}\ell} (t, q, m\ell) \sim m \cdot \frac{2q^2\ell^2}{2^n}. )</td>
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Comparison

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{CTR}}^{\text{LOR-CPA}} (t, q, m\ell) \sim m^2 \cdot \frac{2q^2 \ell^2}{2^n}, \]

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{CTR-ACP}KM_\ell}^{\text{LOR-CPA}} (t, q, m\ell) \sim m \cdot \frac{2q^2 \ell^2}{2^n}. \]
Performance for AES

Does not it reduce speed?

Machine characteristics
Intel Core i5-6500 CPU 3.20GHz, L1 D-Cache 32 KB x 4, L1 I-Cache 32 KB x 4, L2 Cache 256 KB x 4.

Speed of the encryption (OpenSSL) process in the base CTR mode with the hardware supported AES-256 was: 3800 MB/s.

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<td>3722.0</td>
<td>3753.7</td>
<td>3765.3</td>
<td>3770.0</td>
<td>3786.5</td>
<td>3795.2</td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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The CTR-ACPKM mode with the AES-256 cipher (hardware support).
Performance for AES

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The CTR-ACPKM mode with the AES-256 cipher (hardware support).
Performance

Speed of the encryption process in the base CTR mode with the hardware supported AES-128 cipher is 5160 MB/s.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MB/s</td>
<td>5040.4</td>
<td>5061.3</td>
<td>5080.6</td>
<td>5105.0</td>
<td>5120.1</td>
<td>5139.4</td>
<td>5150.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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The CTR-ACPKM mode with the AES-128 cipher (hardware support).
External and internal re-keying: allies or rivals?

Two disadvantages to be eliminated by combination

- **External**: if \( L \) is restrictive, inconvenient restrictions on the size of an individual message (with its own header, IV, MAC etc.) appear.
- **Internal**: section key compromise \( \Rightarrow \) compromise of all next ones.

\[
\begin{align*}
K_D & \rightarrow K_1 = K_{1,1} & \rightarrow K_{1,2} & \rightarrow K_{1,3} & \rightarrow \cdots \\text{ACPKM} \\text{ACPKM} \\text{ACPKM} \\
\text{Message} (1,1) & & \cdots & & \\
\text{Message} (1,q) & & & & \\
\text{Message} (2,1) & \rightarrow K_2 = K_{2,1} & \rightarrow K_{2,2} & \rightarrow K_{2,3} & \rightarrow \cdots \quad \text{ACPKM} \quad \text{ACPKM} \\
\text{Message} (2,1) & & \cdots & & \\
\text{Message} (2,q) & & & & \\
\text{Message} (N,1) & \rightarrow K_N = K_{N,1} & \rightarrow K_{N,2} & \rightarrow K_{N,3} & \rightarrow \cdots \quad \text{ACPKM} \quad \text{ACPKM} \\
\text{Message} (N,1) & & \cdots & & \\
\text{Message} (N,q) & & & & \\
\end{align*}
\]

size of section = const = \( l \)
Summary

- **External re-keying (defined independently of a mode):**
  - drastically increases the lifetime of keys (considering general bounds, classical and side-channel attacks on a used cipher);
  - almost does not affect performance for long messages;
  - provides forward and backward security of section keys;
  - requires additional operations (KDFs) even for very short plaintexts;
  - procedures (IVs, . . . ) must be handled separately — not transparent;
  - in case of restrictive L: 1) the message sizes can become inconvenient; 2) the key tree should be used — it becomes less effective, if we do not use some additional techniques.

- **Internal re-keying approach (defined for a particular mode):**
  - drastically increases the lifetime of keys (considering general bounds, classical and side-channel attacks on a used cipher);
  - almost does not affect performance for long messages;
  - does not affect short messages transformation at all;
  - transparent (works like any encryption mode): does not require changes of IV’s and restarting MACing;
  - but does not provide backward security of section keys — if needed, should be combined with ext. re-keying (for much larger sections).