



ERICSSON

# Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)


draft-selander-ace-cose-ecdhe-05  
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IETF98 ACE, MAR 27 2017



# DESIGN GOALS



- Use strong existing design – SIGMA-I
- Small code and message size
- Reuse existing primitives
  - CBOR
  - COSE
- Minimize choices
- Stay in one UDP packet
- End-to-End not Hop-by-Hop Security
- Counter proposal – carry DTLS inside of CoAP



# EDHOC with Asymmetric Keys



- The parties exchanging messages are called "U" and "V". U and V exchange identities and ephemeral public keys. They compute the shared secret and derive the keying material.

```
Party U                                     Party V
|                                     |
|           S_U, N_U, E_U, ALG_1, EXT_1           |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     |
|           message #1           |
|                                     |
| S_U, S_V, N_V, E_V, ALG_2, Enc(K_2; EXT_2, ID_V, Sig(V, aad_2); aad_2) |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     |
|           message #2           |
|                                     |
|           S_V, Enc(K_3; EXT_3, ID_U, Sig(U; aad_3); aad_3)           |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                                     |
|           message #3           |
|                                     |
```

# EDHOC with Symmetric Keys



- Similar to the asymmetric case but without COSE\_Sign0 with an COSE\_Encrypt0 in message\_1 to encrypt EXT\_1 and get PSK proof-of-possession already in message\_1 (may be used for DoS protection).

```
Party UParty V  
|           S_U, N_U, E_U, ALG_1, EXT_1           |  
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+  
|           message #1           |  
|  
| S_U, S_V, N_V, E_V, ALG_2, Enc(K_2; EXT_2, ID_V, Sig(V, aad_2); aad_2) |  
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+  
|           message #2           |  
|  
|           S_V, Enc(K_3; EXT_3, ID_U, Sig(U, aad_3); aad_3)           |  
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+  
|           message #3           |
```

# EDHOC Key Schedule



- Use HKDF for as the primitive
- $K_i = \text{HKDF}(\text{PSK}, \text{Ephemeral Secret}, \text{info structure})$
- Info structure = [
  - \* Algorithm Identifier or IV identifier
  - \* aad information
    - \* aad information = [
      - \* Message i data
      - \* Hash of all previous messages
      - \* certificate if one is used.

# EXAMPLE

- Sending EDHOC embedded in OSCOAP has been removed. EDHOC is now sent as payload.
- OSCOAP Master Secret, Master Salt, and identities can be obtained from EDHOC.




Figure 5: Transferring EDHOC in CoAP

# NEXT STEPS

- One existing implementation of -05 by Jim Schaad. One more implementation ongoing by SICS
- Look for better review of cryptographic properties
- Test vectors, error messages.





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