RTCWeb Security: What Assurances Can/Should We Deliver?

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Overview

- RTCWeb functionality is too dangerous to enable by default
 - General agreement that users must consent to its use
- But how are they to consent intelligently?
 - What properties do users expect/want?
 - How well do they conform to what we can technically deliver?
- Objective of this discussion
 - Work through a bunch of the common cases
 - Try to answer above questions

Gaming Sites I: A Closed, Anonymous World

- I sign onto PokerWeb looking for a game
 - "Find me someone to play heads-up no-limit"
- Result: I end up in a call with someone...

pokerweb.example.org
Call with Checkraiser119

User Expectations?

- Site Relationship
 - I am visiting PokerWeb
 - They control the call
- Duration of consent
 - Long-term: I'm going to playing a lot
 - Don't want to consent each time
- Peer identity
 - Anonymous: I have no idea who this person is
 - ... they were just assigned to me by PokerWeb

Gaming Sites II: Repeat Business

- I sign onto PokerWeb looking for a game
 - "Is CheckRaiser 119 on line?"
- Result: I end up in a call with someone...

pokerweb.example.org
Call with Checkraiser119

User Expectations

- Pseudonymity
 - I'm playing with Checkraiser 119 (whoever that is)
 - ... same person I played with before
- This identity comes solely from PokerWeb
 - Displayed by their user interface (not in the browser chrome)
 - Identity was *assigned* by PokerWeb
 - * Not globally meaningful
- Do users really expect the browser to protect them here?

Calling Services I: A closed, non-anonymous world


- I have an account on SocialWeb
 - ... "friends" with a bunch of my real-world friends
 - Want to call one of my friends

```
socialweb.example.org
```

User Expectations

- Site Relationship
 - I am visiting SocialWeb
 - They control the call
- Duration of consent
 - Long-term: I'm going to playing a lot
 - Don't want to consent each time
- Peer identity
 - I know who I am talking to
 - I added them to my friend list

Ad Hoc Calling from Embedded Advertisements



Option A: Ad in an IFRAME

Option B: Injected ad

User expectations

- When I place this call I'm talking to Ford
- Not giving Ford long-term access to my camera and microphone
- But I'm on Slashdot...
 - Do I think Slashdot has endorsed this?

Common Themes

- Consent
 - How to make long-term consent grants secure
 - How to safely give short-term consent
- Authenticating the person you are talking to
 - Anonymous peers
 - Pseudonymous peers
 - Peers with long-term identities

Making long-term grants secure

- Basic problem: site controls interface
 - They can initiate a call to anyone
 - But I don't want them to bug my house
 - * These are semi-contradictory
- How do I allow someone to make calls without letting them make calls?

Partial Digression: Network Attackers

- Assumption: I've authorized PokerWeb
- I'm in an Internet Cafe and visit any URL
 - Attacker injects IFRAME pretending to be PokerWeb
 - But calls go to him

```
www.slashdot.org
pokerweb.example.org
new PeerConnection() {
   ...
  });
```

• Result: attacker has bugged your computer

User Expectations

- It's safe to authorize PokerWeb and then surf the Internet
 - Without being bugged
- Including on insecure networks
 - This may include your home network
- Unfortunately, this is not true here...

Potential Long-Term Consent Security Features

- Live with it (require clear UI)
- Require user interaction with browser chrome for all calls
 - User interaction alone is not enough because of clickjacking
- Require user interaction for calls to "new" peers
- Require JS to be delivered over HTTPS (only stops network attacks)
- None of these are that great

Short-Term Consent

- Need some mechanism to allow immediate calls
 - To people you have no previous relationship with
- Conflicting requirements
 - Low-impact
 - Not something users will just click through
 - Can we do anything to help here?

Characterizing Short-Term Consent

- User doesn't really know who they are calling
 - And if they do, it's "Ford"
- We don't have the technical means to give this kind of identity
 - Best-case scenario is an authenticated domain name
 - Do you want to call www.ford.com?

What about the site I'm visiting?

- Adam Barth: the user thinks he's on Slashdot
 - Even though Slashdot neither placed the ad nor is the called party
- Should the top-level site get to have an opinion?
 - Protect the user?
 - Protect its reputation?
 - What about privacy?

Enforcing Pseudonymity

- "This is the same person" enforced by PokerWeb
 - Identity could be owned by someone else tomorrow
- What can the browser enforce? Cryptographic continuity
 - This is the same *machine* I talked to last time
 - Not that great a substitute

Verifying who you are talking to

- Assumption: we only sort-of-trust the calling site
 - (Alan Johnston, Matthew Kaufman)
- Need to be able to cryptographically verify the other side
 - PKI plausible for some applications (especially when you're calling an organization)
 - Verify keying material (fingerprint, SAS) through side channel [draft-kaufman-rtcweb-security-ui-00]