

Private Communication in ICN

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What Does Private Mean?

- Doesn't ICN need parity with emerging IP consensus?
 - The environment has changed since 2006, 2009 (RFC7258)
 - Encryption by default (c.f. IAB statement 11/2014, DPRIVE, TCPINC)- It's a pretty bright line
- Support applications that need confidentiality, variety of authentication schemes, resistance to MITM and eavesdropping
 - Personal finance, Healthcare, On-line Commerce, IM, politically sensitive search, blogging, B2B
- Forward secrecy
 - Resist passive data collection
 - Indicates use of ephemeral keys with short lifetimes - distinct from typical ICN 'content verification' key lifetime
 - Probably also indicates use of symm ciphers with frequent key changes
- Separable authentication if we can't use identifiable/bound/traceable public keys
- Resist/reject injected messages
 - Esp. if Interests can "actuate"
- Useable for network infra?
 - Routing updates, fragments, control/hop-by-hop messages (whatever those turn out to be)
- Application Interface
 - For IP, privacy happens 'above' the 'base' network (openssl, frameworks)
 - How do ICN applications express their prefs/requirements?
 - How do ICN applications learn what is happening?

Object Privacy?

- Different goal from media protection schemes, where long-lived content is encrypted with keys that can be retrieved by authorized consumers
- Negotiate ephemeral master key (ECDHE, e.g.), derive symm key(s)
- Authenticate (at least S -> C for retrieval, mutual for interaction)
- Encrypt content at S with ephemeral key
 - And 'produce' it with some sort of unique-ified name?
 - How does client know what name to use?
 - Can't be a self-certifying name, since C doesn't know the content in advance
 - Could use a short-lived manifest?
 - Does ephemeral 'content' need a 'signature' also, to 'bind' the name to some anchor?
- How long should "private objects" be valid if they're encrypted with ephemeral keys that can't be recovered?
 - Is there any value in caching them, beyond local-repair?
- C + S have to engage somehow to negotiate keys
 - Or they have to do some very expensive per-Interest D-H operation
- Client might need to store objects, and then ... what?
 - No value in storing the un-recoverable version
- If the name exposes the communication ... what was the point?

Session Privacy?

- Plenty of existing well-understood schemes with varying properties
- ICN *names* themselves expose information
 - Can we provide just enough *name* to route, but leak as little as possible?
 - Mandate link encryption?
- Challenging to ensure that entire series of Interest messages reach a consistent destination
- Are there other potential advantages to interactive "sessions" that leverage the expense of asymmetric crypto and generation of key material?
- What would the implications for ICN be?

Implications

- Private session packets don't name "objects"
 - [Routable prefix] + [session/client nonce] + [sequence] ?
 - Need distinct messages for setup of "private sessions"?
 - Are the messages inside still Interest and Data?
- No opportunistic caching?
 - And some "natural multicast" properties may go away
 - But no more cache poisoning, so ...
- Opens questions about binding 'publisher' to 'content'
- May need to understand/control paths "private" message streams take
- "Just use well-known public keys" ... goes away
- Some of the MTU/fragmentation issues change
- New DoS vectors?
 - Maybe we can finally use client puzzles

Implications (2)

- Still plenty of ICN goodness
 - Active, intelligent forwarding features
 - Receiver-driven flow control
 - In-network local repair, local retransmission (for individual clients)
 - Mobility still may benefit
 - Provenance/'publisher' concepts still available
 - Opportunity for in-network congestion control
 - Opportunity for *native* CDN support
 - New "layering" model
 - Opportunity for more explicit signalling
 - Opportunity for API clarity and richness
- Shift focus away from "content sharing" and towards other network functions: flow and congestion control, mobility, SP needs, CDNs, TE, QoS, VPN, P2P

Discussion

- Where does the community stand?
 - comfortable saying "Parity with IP doesn't matter", or "It's fine to propose stepping backward"?
 - comfortable saying "Name exposure is acceptable, but encrypt content"?
 - uncomfortable with an ICN architecture that offers *less* than IP?

Backup