

# Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) Security Key Management Design Alternatives

DTN Interim Working Group Meeting

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<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-viswanathan-dtnwg-pkdn>

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-templin-dtnskmreq>

# Problem: How to make public keys / revocations available in a timely manner in DTNs?

## 1. Request-response

- Receiver requests revocation information
- Trusted authority responds with requested information

## 2. Publish-subscribe

- Receiver requests revocation information once
- Trusted authority sends periodic updates for requested information

## 3. Blacklist broadcast

- Trusted authority periodically broadcasts revocation information

## 4. Whitelist broadcast

- Trusted authority periodically broadcasts valid public-key information

## 5. Publish with proxy subscribe (PKDN)

- Sender routes certificate through trusted authority to receiver
- Trusted authority verifies validity of certificate and sends periodic updates

# PKDN Characterization

Public Key Distribution Network (PKDN) uses publish with proxy subscribe

PKDN is an overlay on top of DTN


- It does not use any other communication channel other than DTN

PKDN has four architectural entities

- **PKDN Sender** for sending a node's certificate to a PKDN receiver
- **PKDN Router** for validating certificates from PKDN Senders
  - A network of PKDN Routers results in a distribution network
  - Redundancy in distribution network ensures that all nodes in the network will eventually receive revocation information
  - Router discovery through manual configuration or dynamic discovery
- **PKDN Receiver** for receiving validated certificates and revocation information from PKDN Routers
- **Certificate Revocation Manager (CRM)** for injecting authenticated revocation information into the distribution network formed for PKDN Routers

# Technical update: PKDN Solution

- Publish-Subscribe network for delta CRL distribution
  - Revocation Manager is the root of trust
    - Creates and sends authentic delta CRLs
  - Routers subscribe either to Revocation Manager or to other routers
  - End-users subscribe to their respective
- Forwarding as a mechanism for trust establishment



# PKDN Router Functions

## Routing

- Receive and validate certificates from PKDN Senders
- Forward valid certificates to PKDN Receivers

## Cache synchronization

- Receive certificate revocation updates from CRM to maintain a consistent local Certificate Revocation List
- Forward certificate revocation updates to other PKDN Routers

## Revocation update dissemination

- Send periodic certificate revocation updates to PKDN Receivers

# PKDN vis-à-vis DTN Key Management Requirements

## **REQ1: Must Provide Keys When Needed**

- Receivers receive validated sender certificates encapsulated with initial message bundles
- Senders can access validated certificates of receivers either from PKDN Routers or from receivers or through manual configuration

## **REQ2: Must Be Trustworthy**

- Certificates are signed by trusted authorities
- Certificate revocation are signed by trusted authorities

## **REQ3: No Single Point of Failure**

- Path redundancy in distribution network formed by PKDN Routers avoid single points of failures

## **REQ4: Multiple Points of Authority**

- Multiple certificate and certificate revocation authorities can be allowed for a single PKDN instance

## **REQ5: No Veto**

- PKDN Routers, Senders, and Receivers can validate certificates and certificate revocation issued by multiple authorities

# PKDN vis-à-vis DTN Key Management Requirements

## **REQ6: Must Bind Public Key with DTN Node Identity**

- Realized using standard public key certificate structures (certificate includes name plus public key)

## **REQ7: Must Support Secure Bootstrapping**

- Realized using standard public key certificate structures (all DTN nodes must have root public key installed)

## **REQ8: Must Support Revocation**

- PKDN Routers and CRM achieve this property

## **REQ9: Revocations Must Be Delay Tolerant**

- Achieved by designing PKDN as a strict overlay on top of DTN, and by using **event-driven semantics**

# Candidate Multicast Key Management Design (draft-templin-dtnskmmreq)

## **Delay-Tolerant Key Administration (DTKA)**

Distributed Key Authorities (KAs)

Every KA multicasts authenticated key management bulletins

A minimum number of KA bulletins are needed to recreate authorized key updates for that point in time

### Design Constraints

All nodes in the DTN need to receive bulletins in timely manner

Bulletins contain current and future node-key association for all DTN nodes

All DTN nodes maintain a local data-base of valid keys at that point in time

[http](http://ipnsig.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/IPNSIG-DTN-Security-Key-Management.pdf)

[://ipnsig.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/IPNSIG-DTN-Security-Key-Management.pdf](http://ipnsig.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/IPNSIG-DTN-Security-Key-Management.pdf)



# PKDN vis-à-vis Multicast Key Management

## DTKA

- Whitelist broadcast (bulletin w/ future public keys)
- Time-based synchronization (sender must send cryptographic bundles only after receiver receives key bulletins with sender's key)
- Mechanism identical for sender to have receiver's key and for receiver to have sender's key.
- Key revocation is implicit (revoked keys are not included in the future bulletins)
- Requires time-bound consistency of node-key association on all DTN nodes.

## PKDN

- publish-with-proxy-subscribe unicast
- **Event-based synchronization** (sender encapsulates its public-key certificate in the cryptographic bundle for the receiver)
- Provides mechanism for receiver to have sender's key. Can support multiple additional mechanisms for sender to have receiver's key.
- Key revocation is explicit (key certification and revocation are issued separately potentially by separate authorities.)
- Requires *eventual* consistency of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) on all PKDN Routers. Requires delta-CRL to *eventually* reach all DTN nodes.