
#### Session-Based Content Distribution with CCNx-KE

Christopher Wood PARC, UCI ICNRG 95 – Buenos Aires – 4/3/16


#### Session-Based Communication in CCN

- Problem:
  - A client and server (replica) want to establish a secure session in which all messages (interests and content objects) will be encrypted.
- Solution:
  - Use CCNx-KE a TLS-like key exchange protocol tailored for CCN.
  - Clients authenticate the server (and vice versa) and the parties establish a shared forward-secure session key.
  - The session key is used to encrypt all subsequent traffic carrying application data.


#### Standard CCN Session Communication



#### Standard CCN Session Communication



#### **Ideal Session Relocation**



## **CCNx-KE** Features

- A consumer authenticates itself with a content producer and creates a forward-secure key and session.
- The content producer can serve content under that session or issue a move token to let another party serve content.
- Authentication and authorization are decoupled from data production
  - Benefits:
    - no private keys need to be shared between the server and replica
    - minimal information disclosure

#### Problems to Address

- 1. What is the trust relationship between the producer and the replica?
- 2. How is the move token transferred from the producer or the replica, or how is it created so that the replica can use it?


### Trust

- The producer and replica have some relationship.
  - The producer pays for replica services.
  - A MNO distributes users to the best replica.
  - The authentication server passes the user to a load balancer (via a move token).
- The producer is capable of creating a secure channel between the replica.
- The producer and replica can create and share keys (and re-key) on a regular basis.

# Move Token Goals

- A move token must enable the replica to decrypt interests and encrypt content responses
  - This requires the traffic secret established by CCNx-KE
- A consumer must **prove** that they fetched their move token from the producer

## Move Token Usage



# Move Token Construction

- Move challenge Y = H(X), for some  $X \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{128}$
- Move token
  - T = k<sub>ID</sub> || Enc<sub>k</sub>(Y || traffic\_secret)
- Move proof

#### Х

## Move Token Construction

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Replica check: 1. If k<sub>ID</sub> not valid, drop 2. Y || traffic\_secret = Dec<sub>k</sub>(T) 3. If H(X) != Y, drop

#### Properties

- k<sub>ID</sub> is a key that's routinely refreshed between the producer and replica (e.g., on a daily basis).
- Replica work is minimized:
  - no public-key crypto
  - single symmetric decryption and hash computation
- Two round trips before data can be retrieved
  - 1) Authenticate with the producer
  - 2) Start a new session with the replica and get the first chunk of data

# Summing Up

- CCNx-KE is used to separate authentication and authorization from the retrieval of actual application data.
- Producers can upload encrypted data to a replica that only authorized consumers can decrypt.
- The replica session is used as a form of "transport encryption."