YANG Data Model for Key Chains

Abstract

This document describes the key chain YANG data model. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol authentication and other applications requiring symmetric keys. A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a Key ID, key string, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication or encryption algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, key strings and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be automated.

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

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1. Introduction

This document describes the key chain YANG [YANG-1.1] data model. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol authentication and other applications requiring symmetric keys. A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a Key ID, key string, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication or encryption algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, key strings and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be automated.

In some applications, the protocols do not use the key chain element key directly, but rather a key derivation function is used to derive a short-lived key from the key chain element key (e.g., the master keys used in [TCP-AO]).

1.1. Requirements Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [KEYWORDS] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Tree Diagrams

A simplified graphical representation of the complete data tree is presented in Section 3.3. The following tree notation is used:

- Brackets "[" and "]" enclose YANG list keys. These YANG list keys should not be confused with the key chain keys.
- Curly braces "{" and "}" contain names of optional features that make the corresponding node conditional.
- Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration (read-write), "ro" means state data (read-only), "-x" means RPC operations, and "-n" means notifications.
- Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!" denotes a container with presence, and "*" denotes a "list" or "leaf-list".
- Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also marked with a colon "":").
Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not shown.

2. Problem Statement

This document describes a YANG [YANG-1.1] data model for key chains. Key chains have been implemented and deployed by a large percentage of network equipment vendors. Providing a standard YANG model will facilitate automated key distribution and non-disruptive key rollover. This will aid in tightening the security of the core routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT].

A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a Key ID, key string, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication or encryption algorithm. A key chain can be used by any service or application requiring authentication or encryption using symmetric keys. In essence, the key chain is a reusable key policy that can be referenced wherever it is required. The key chain construct has been implemented by most networking vendors and deployed in many networks.

A conceptual representation of a crypto key table is described in [CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]. The crypto key table includes keys as well as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the key table includes key selection criteria and is designed for a deployment model where the details of the applications or services requiring authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The YANG key chain model described herein doesn’t include key selection criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does not preclude it. [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection criteria.

2.1. Applicability

Other YANG modules may reference ietf-key-chain YANG module key-chain names for authentication and encryption applications. A YANG type has been provided to facilitate reference to the key-chain name without having to specify the complete YANG XML Path Language (XPath) expression.

2.2. Graceful Key Rollover Using Key Chains

Key chains may be used to gracefully update the key string and/or algorithm used by an application for authentication or encryption. To achieve graceful key rollover, the receiver MAY accept all the...
keys that have a valid accept lifetime, and the sender MAY send the key with the most recent send lifetime. One scenario for facilitating key rollover is to:

1. Distribute a key chain with a new key to all the routers or other network devices in the domain of that key chain. The new key’s accept lifetime should be such that it is accepted during the key rollover period. The send lifetime should be a time in the future when it can be assured that all the routers in the domain of that key are upgraded. This will have no immediate impact on the keys used for transmission.

2. Assure that all the network devices have been updated with the updated key chain and that their system times are roughly synchronized. The system times of devices within an administrative domain are commonly synchronized (e.g., using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [NTP-PROTO]). This also may be automated.

3. When the send lifetime of the new key becomes valid, the network devices within the domain of that key chain will use the new key for transmissions.

4. At some point in the future, a new key chain with the old key removed may be distributed to the network devices within the domain of the key chain. However, this may be deferred until the next key rollover. If this is done, the key chain will always include two keys: either the current and future key (during key rollovers) or the current and previous keys (between key rollovers).

Since the most recent send lifetime is defined as the one with the latest start-time, specification of “always” will prevent using the graceful key rollover technique described above. Other key configuration and usage scenarios are possible, but these are beyond the scope of this document.

3. Design of the Key Chain Model

The ietf-key-chain module contains a list of one or more keys indexed by a Key ID. For some applications (e.g., OSPFv3 [OSPFV3-AUTH]), the Key ID is used to identify the key chain key to be used. In addition to the Key ID, each key chain key includes a key string and a cryptographic algorithm. Optionally, the key chain keys include send/accept lifetimes. If the send/accept lifetime is unspecified, the key is always considered valid.
Note that different key values for transmission versus acceptance may be supported with multiple key chain elements. The key used for transmission will have a valid send-lifetime and invalid accept-lifetime (e.g., has an end-time equal to the start-time). The key used for acceptance will have a valid accept-lifetime and invalid send-lifetime.

Due to the differences in key chain implementations across various vendors, some of the data elements are optional. Finally, the crypto algorithm identities are provided for reuse when configuring legacy authentication and encryption not using key chains.

A key chain is identified by a unique name within the scope of the network device. The "key-chain-ref" typedef SHOULD be used by other YANG modules when they need to reference a configured key chain.

3.1. Key Chain Operational State

The key chain operational state is included in the same tree as key chain configuration consistent with Network Management Datastore Architecture [NMDA]. The timestamp of the last key chain modification is also maintained in the operational state. Additionally, the operational state includes an indication of whether or not a key chain key is valid for transmission or acceptance.

3.2. Key Chain Model Features

Features are used to handle differences between vendor implementations. For example, not all vendors support configuration of an acceptance tolerance or configuration of key strings in hexadecimal. They are also used to support security requirements (e.g., TCP-AO algorithms [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]) not yet implemented by vendors or implemented by only a single vendor.

It is common for an entity with sufficient permissions to read and store a device’s configuration, which would include the contents of this model. To avoid unnecessarily seeing and storing the keys in cleartext, this model provides the aes-key-wrap feature. More details are described in the Security Considerations (Section 5).
3.3. Key Chain Model Tree

```yang
++--rw key-chains
    ++--rw key-chain* [name]
        ++--rw name                string
        ++--rw description?        string
        ++--rw accept-tolerance {accept-tolerance}?
            ++--rw duration?     uint32
        ++--ro last-modified-timestamp?   yang:date-and-time
        ++--rw key* [key-id]
            ++--rw key-id         uint64
            ++--rw lifetime
                ++--rw (lifetime)?
                    ++--:(send-and-accept-lifetime)
                        ++--rw send-and-accept-lifetime
                            ++--rw (lifetime)?
                                ++--:(always)
                                    | ++--rw always?           empty
                                ++--:(start-end-time)
                                    ++--rw start-date-time?
                                        ++--yang:date-and-time
                                    ++--rw (end-time)?
                                        ++--:(infinite)
                                            | ++--rw no-end-time?      empty
                                        ++--:(duration)
                                            | ++--rw duration?         uint32
                                    ++--:(end-date-time)
                                        ++--rw end-date-time?
                                            ++--yang:date-and-time
                    ++--:(independent-send-accept-lifetime)
                        | {independent-send-accept-lifetime}?
                            ++--rw send-lifetime
                                ++--rw (lifetime)?
                                    ++--:(always)
                                        | ++--rw always?           empty
                                    ++--:(start-end-time)
                                        ++--rw start-date-time?
                                            ++--yang:date-and-time
                                    ++--rw (end-time)?
                                        ++--:(infinite)
                                            | ++--rw no-end-time?      empty
                                        ++--:(duration)
                                            | ++--rw duration?         uint32
                                    ++--:(end-date-time)
                                        ++--rw end-date-time?
                                            ++--yang:date-and-time
                                ++--rw accept-lifetime
                                    ++--rw (lifetime)?
        ++--rw (lifetime)?
```

Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]
4. Key Chain YANG Model

```yang
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-key-chain@2017-06-15.yang"
module ietf-key-chain {  
    yang-version 1.1;  
    namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain";  
    prefix key-chain;  
    import ietf-yang-types {  
        prefix yang;  
    }  
    import ietf-netconf-acm {  
        prefix nacm;  
    }  
    organization  
        "IETF RTGWG - Routing Area Working Group";  
    contact  
        "WG Web:  <https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/rtgwg>  
            WG List:  <mailto:rtgwg@ietf.org>  
                Editor: Acee Lindem  
                    <mailto:acee@cisco.com>  
```
This YANG module defines the generic configuration data for key chains. It is intended that the module will be extended by vendors to define vendor-specific key chain configuration parameters.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 8177; see the RFC itself for full legal notices.

reference "RFC 8177";

revision 2017-06-15 {
    description
        "Initial RFC Revision";
    reference "RFC 8177: YANG Data Model for Key Chains";
}

feature hex-key-string {
    description
        "Support hexadecimal key string.";
}

feature accept-tolerance {
    description
        "Support the tolerance or acceptance limit.";
}

feature independent-send-accept-lifetime {
    description
"Support for independent send and accept key lifetimes."

feature crypto-hmac-sha-1-12 {
  description
    "Support for TCP HMAC-SHA-1 12-byte digest hack."
}

feature cleartext {
  description
    "Support for cleartext algorithm. Usage is
    NOT RECOMMENDED."
}

feature aes-cmac-prf-128 {
  description
    "Support for AES Cipher-based Message Authentication
    Code Pseudorandom Function."
}

feature aes-key-wrap {
  description
    "Support for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap."
}

feature replay-protection-only {
  description
    "Provide replay protection without any authentication
    as required by protocols such as Bidirectional
    Forwarding Detection (BFD)."
}

identity crypto-algorithm {
  description
    "Base identity of cryptographic algorithm options."
}

identity hmac-sha-1-12 {
  base crypto-algorithm;
  if-feature "crypto-hmac-sha-1-12"
  description
    "The HMAC-SHA1-12 algorithm."
}

identity aes-cmac-prf-128 {
  base crypto-algorithm;
  if-feature "aes-cmac-prf-128"
  description
    "The AES-CMAC-PRF-128 algorithm - required by
    Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 5926 for TCP-AO key derivation functions.

identity md5 {
    base crypto-algorithm;
    description
        "The MD5 algorithm.";
}

identity sha-1 {
    base crypto-algorithm;
    description
        "The SHA-1 algorithm.";
}

identity hmac-sha-1 {
    base crypto-algorithm;
    description
        "HMAC-SHA-1 authentication algorithm.";
}

identity hmac-sha-256 {
    base crypto-algorithm;
    description
        "HMAC-SHA-256 authentication algorithm.";
}

identity hmac-sha-384 {
    base crypto-algorithm;
    description
        "HMAC-SHA-384 authentication algorithm.";
}

identity hmac-sha-512 {
    base crypto-algorithm;
    description
        "HMAC-SHA-512 authentication algorithm.";
}

identity cleartext {
    base crypto-algorithm;
    if-feature "cleartext";
    description
        "cleartext.";
}

identity replay-protection-only {
    base crypto-algorithm;
}
if-feature "replay-protection-only";

description
  "Provide replay protection without any authentication as
  required by protocols such as Bidirectional Forwarding
  Detection (BFD).";
}

typedef key-chain-ref {
  type leafref {
    path
      "/key-chain:key-chains/key-chain:key-chain/key-chain:name";
  }
  description
    "This type is used by data models that need to reference
    configured key chains.";
}

grouping lifetime {
  description
    "Key lifetime specification.";
  choice lifetime {
    default "always";
    description
      "Options for specifying key accept or send lifetimes";
    case always {
      leaf always {
        type empty;
        description
          "Indicates key lifetime is always valid.";
      }
    }
    case start-end-time {
      leaf start-date-time {
        type yang:date-and-time;
        description
          "Start time.";
      }
    }
    choice end-time {
      default "infinite";
      description
        "End-time setting.";
    }
    }
  }
}

Lindem, et al.               Standards Track                   [Page 12]
case duration {
  leaf duration {
    type uint32 {
      range "1..2147483646";
    }
    units "seconds";
    description "Key lifetime duration, in seconds";
  }
}
case end-date-time {
  leaf end-date-time {
    type yang:date-and-time;
    description "End time.";
  }
}
}
}

container key-chains {
  description "All configured key-chains on the device.";
  list key-chain {
    key "name";
    description "List of key-chains.";
    leaf name {
      type string;
      description "Name of the key-chain.";
    }
    leaf description {
      type string;
      description "A description of the key-chain";
    }
    container accept-tolerance {
      if-feature "accept-tolerance";
      description "Tolerance for key lifetime acceptance (seconds).";
      leaf duration {
        type uint32;
        units "seconds";
        default "0";
        description "Tolerance for key lifetime acceptance (seconds).";
      }
    }
  }
}

Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]
leaf last-modified-timestamp {
  type yang:date-and-time;
  config false;
  description
      "Timestamp of the most recent update to the key-chain";
}

list key {
  key "key-id";
  description
      "Single key in key chain.";
  leaf key-id {
    type uint64;
    description
      "Numeric value uniquely identifying the key";
  }
  container lifetime {
    description
      "Specify a key’s lifetime.";
    choice lifetime {
      description
        "Options for specification of send and accept lifetimes.";
      case send-and-accept-lifetime {
        description
          "Send and accept key have the same lifetime.";
        container send-accept-lifetime {
          description
            "Single lifetime specification for both send and accept lifetimes.";
          uses lifetime;
        }
      }
      case independent-send-accept-lifetime {
        if-feature "independent-send-accept-lifetime";
        description
          "Independent send and accept key lifetimes.";
        container send-lifetime {
          description
            "Separate lifetime specification for send lifetime.";
          uses lifetime;
        }
        container accept-lifetime {
          description
            "Separate lifetime specification for accept
leaf crypto-algorithm {
  type identityref {
    base crypto-algorithm;
  }
  mandatory true;
  description "Cryptographic algorithm associated with key.";
}

container key-string {
  description "The key string.";
  nacm:default-deny-all;
  choice key-string-style {
    description "Key string styles";
    case keystore {
      leaf keystore {
        type string;
        description "Key string in ASCII format.";
      }
    }
    case hexadecimal {
      if-feature "hex-key-string";
      leaf hexadecimal-string {
        type yang:hex-string;
        description "Key in hexadecimal string format. When compared to ASCII, specification in hexadecimal affords greater key entropy with the same number of internal key-string octets. Additionally, it discourages usage of well-known words or numbers.";
      }
    }
  }
}

leaf send-lifetime-active {
  type boolean;
  config false;
  description "Indicates if the send lifetime of the
key-chain key is currently active.
}

leaf accept-lifetime-active {
    type boolean;
    config false;
    description
        "Indicates if the accept lifetime of the
         key-chain key is currently active.";
}

container aes-key-wrap {
    if-feature "aes-key-wrap";
    description
        "AES Key Wrap encryption for key-chain key-strings. The
        encrypted key-strings are encoded as hexadecimal key
        strings using the hex-key-string leaf.";
    leaf enable {
        type boolean;
        default "false";
        description
            "Enable AES Key Wrap encryption.";
    }
}

<CODE ENDS>

5. Security Considerations

The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such as NETCONF [NETCONF] or RESTCONF [RESTCONF]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [NETCONF-SSH]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [TLS].

The NETCONF access control model [NETCONF-ACM] provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a pre-configured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content. The key strings are not accessible by default, and NETCONF access control model [NETCONF-ACM] rules are required to configure or retrieve them.

When configured, the key strings can be encrypted using the AES Key Wrap algorithm [AES-KEY-WRAP]. The AES key-encryption key (KEK) is not included in the YANG model and must be set or derived independent of key chain configuration. When AES key encryption is used, the
hex-key-string feature is also required since the encrypted keys will contain characters that are not representable in the YANG string built-in type [YANG-1.1]. It is RECOMMENDED that key strings be encrypted using AES key encryption to prevent key chains from being retrieved and stored with the key strings in cleartext. This recommendation is independent of the access protection that is availed from the NETCONF access control model (NACM) [NETCONF-ACM].

The cleartext algorithm is included as a YANG feature. Usage is NOT RECOMMENDED except in cases where the application and device have no other alternative (e.g., a legacy network device that must authenticate packets at intervals of 10 milliseconds or less for many peers using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD]). Keys used with the cleartext algorithm are considered insecure and SHOULD NOT be reused with more secure algorithms.

Similarly, the MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms have been proven to be insecure ([Dobb96a], [Dobb96b], and [SHA-SEC-CON]), and usage is NOT RECOMMENDED. Usage should be confined to deployments where it is required for backward compatibility.

Implementations with keys provided via this model should store them using best current security practices.

6. IANA Considerations

This document registers a URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [XML-REGISTRY]. It follows the format in [XML-REGISTRY].

    URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain
    Registrant Contact: The IESG.
    XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

This document registers a YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [YANG-1.0].

    name: ietf-key-chain
    namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain
    prefix: key-chain
    reference: RFC 8177
7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security  
Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest  
Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011,  

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[TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]  
Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms  
for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,  
DOI 10.17487/RFC5926, June 2010,  

[YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]  
Chen, I., "YANG Data Model for RFC 7210 Key Table", Work  
in Progress, draft-chen-rtg-key-table-yang-00, March 2015.
Appendix A. Examples

A.1. Simple Key Chain with an Always Valid Single Key

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<key-chains xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain">
  <key-chain>
    <name>keychain-no-end-time</name>
    <description>
      A key chain with a single key that is always valid for transmission and reception.
    </description>
    <key>
      <key-id>100</key-id>
      <lifetime>
        <send-accept-lifetime>
          <always/>
        </send-accept-lifetime>
      </lifetime>
      <crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-256</crypto-algorithm>
      <key-string>keystring_in_ascii_100</key-string>
    </key>
  </key-chain>
</key-chains>
```

A.2. Key Chain with Keys Having Different Lifetimes

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<key-chains xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain">
  <key-chain>
    <name>keychain2</name>
    <description>
      A key chain where each key contains a different send time and accept time and a different algorithm illustrating algorithm agility.
    </description>
    <key>
      <key-id>35</key-id>
      <lifetime>
        <send-lifetime>
          <start-date-time>2017-01-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time>
          <end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time>
        </send-lifetime>
      </lifetime>
    </key>
  </key-chain>
</key-chains>
```
<accept-lifetime>
  <start-date-time>2016-12-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time>
  <end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time>
</accept-lifetime>
</lifetime>
<crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-256</crypto-algorithm>
<key-string>
  <keystring>keystring_in_ascii_35</keystring>
</key-string>
</key>
<key>
  <key-id>36</key-id>
  <lifetime>
    <send-lifetime>
      <start-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time>
      <end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time>
    </send-lifetime>
    <accept-lifetime>
      <start-date-time>2017-01-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time>
      <end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time>
    </accept-lifetime>
  </lifetime>
  <crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-512</crypto-algorithm>
  <key-string>
    <hexadecimal-string>fe:ed:be:af:36</hexadecimal-string>
  </key-string>
</key>
</key-chain>
</key-chains>
</data>
A.3. Key Chain with Independent Send and Accept Lifetimes

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
  <key-chains xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain">
    <key-chain>
      <name>keychain2</name>
      <description>
        A key chain where each key contains different send times and accept times.
      </description>
      <key>
        <key-id>35</key-id>
        <lifetime>
          <send-lifetime>
            <start-date-time>2017-01-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time>
            <end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time>
          </send-lifetime>
          <accept-lifetime>
            <start-date-time>2016-12-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time>
            <end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time>
          </accept-lifetime>
        </lifetime>
        <crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-256</crypto-algorithm>
        <key-string>
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        </key-string>
      </key>
      <key>
        <key-id>36</key-id>
        <lifetime>
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            <end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time>
          </send-lifetime>
          <accept-lifetime>
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            <end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time>
          </accept-lifetime>
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        </key-string>
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  </key-chains>
</data>
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