anima Working Group M. Richardson Internet-Draft Sandelman Software Works Intended status: Standards Track P. van der Stok Expires:May 6,August 24, 2021 vanderstok consultancy P. Kampanakis Cisco SystemsNovember 02, 2020E. Dijk IoTconsultancy.nl February 20, 2021 Constrained Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocolsdraft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-09draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-10 Abstract This document defines astrategyprotocol to securely assign apledgePledge to anowner, usingowner and to enroll it into the owner's network. The protocol uses an artifactsigned, directly or indirectly,that is signed by thepledge'sPledge's manufacturer. This artifact is known as a "voucher". This document builds upon the work in[RFC8366],[RFC8366] and [BRSKI], but defines an encoding of theresulting artifactvoucher inCBOR. Use with two signature technologies are described. Additionally, this document explains how constrained vouchers may be transported as an extension toCBOR rather than JSON, and enables the[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] protocol.Pledge to perform its transactions using CoAP rather than HTTPS. The use of Raw Public Keys instead of X.509 certificates for security operations is also explained. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire onMay 6,August 24, 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c)20202021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Survey of Voucher Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 5. Discovery and URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 6.ArtifactsBRSKI-EST Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6.1. Discovery, URIs and Content Formats . . . . . .7 6.1. Voucher Request artifact. . . . . 7 6.2. Discovery, URIs and Content Formats . . . . . . . . . . . 76.1.1. Tree Diagram6.3. Extensions to BRSKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.4. Extensions to EST-coaps . . .7 6.1.2. SID values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.4.1. Pledge Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86.1.3. YANG Module6.4.2. Registrar Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. BRSKI-MASA Protocol . . . . .9 6.1.4. Example voucher request artifact. . . . . . . . . .13 6.2.. . . . . . 10 8. Pinning in VoucherartifactArtifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.1. Registrar Identity Selection and Encoding . . . . . . . . 11 8.2. MASA Pinning Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.3. Pinning of Raw Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136.2.1. Tree Diagram9. Artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 6.2.2. SID values. . . . . . 15 9.1. Voucher Request artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 6.2.3. YANG Module. 15 9.1.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156.2.4. Example voucher artifacts9.1.2. SID values . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 6.3. Signing voucher and voucher-request artifacts. . . . . .18 6.3.1. CMS signing. 16 9.1.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 6.3.2. COSE signing. 17 9.1.4. Example voucher request artifact . . . . . . . . . . 21 9.2. Voucher artifact . . . . . . . . .19 7. Design Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . 21 9.2.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . .20 8. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . 21 9.2.2. SID values . . . . . . . .20 8.1. Clock Sensitivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . .20 8.2. Protect Voucher PKI in HSM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.2.4. Example voucher artifacts .20 8.3. Test Domain Certificate Validity when Signing. . . . . .20 9. IANA Considerations. . . . . . . 25 9.3. Signing voucher and voucher-request artifacts with COSE . 26 10. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 9.1. Resource Type Registry. . . . . . . 26 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . .20 9.2. The IETF XML Registry. . . . . . . . . 27 11.1. Clock Sensitivity . . . . . . . . .21 9.3. The YANG Module Names Registry. . . . . . . . . . 27 11.2. Protect Voucher PKI in HSM . . .21 9.4. The RFC SID range assignment sub-registry. . . . . . . .21 9.5. The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry. .22 9.6. Media-Type Registry. . 27 11.3. Test Domain Certificate Validity when Signing . . . . . 27 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . .22 9.6.1. application/voucher-cms+cbor. . . . . . . . . 27 12.1. Resource Type Registry . . .22 9.6.2. application/voucher-cose+cbor. . . . . . . . . . . .22 9.7. CoAP Content-Format. . 27 12.2. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 10. Acknowledgements. . . 27 12.3. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 12.4. The RFC SID range assignment sub-registry . . . . . .23 11. Changelog. 28 12.5. Media-Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 12.5.1. application/voucher-cose+cbor . . . . . . .24 12. References. . . . 28 12.6. CoAP Content-Format Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . .24 12.1. Normative References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 14. Changelog . . .24 12.2. Informative References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 Appendix A. EST messages to EST-coaps. . . . . . 30 15. References . . . . . . .26 A.1. enrollstatus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 15.1. Normative References . . . .26 A.2. voucher_status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 15.2. Informative References . . . . . . .28 Appendix B. CMS signed messages. . . . . . . . . . 32 Appendix A. EST messages to EST-coaps . . . . . .28 B.1. signed requestvoucher. . . . . . . 33 A.1. enrollstatus . . . . . . . . . . .28 B.2. requestauditing. . . . . . . . . . . 33 A.2. voucher_status . . . . . . . . . .30 B.3. CMS signed voucher-request example. . . . . . . . . . .3134 AppendixC.B. COSE examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 C.1.35 B.1. Pledge, Registrar and MASA keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38C.1.1.B.1.1. Pledge private key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38C.1.2.B.1.2. Registrar private key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 C.1.3.39 B.1.3. MASA private key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39C.2.B.2. Pledge, Registrar and MASA certificates . . . . . . . . .39 C.2.1.40 B.2.1. Pledge IDevID certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 C.2.2.40 B.2.2. Registrar Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41C.2.3.B.2.3. MASA Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43C.3.B.3. COSE signed voucher request frompledgePledge to Registrar . . 45C.4.B.4. COSE signed voucher request from Registrar to MASA . . . 47C.5.B.5. COSE signed voucher from MASA to Pledge via Registrar . .4948 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5149 1. IntroductionEnrollmentSecure enrollment of new nodes into constrained networks with constrained nodespresentpresents unique challenges. There are network bandwidth and codespacesize issues tocontend.contend with. A solution for autonomous enrollment such as [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] may be too large in terms of codespacesize or bandwidth required.ThisTherefore, this document defines a constrained version of[RFC8366]. Ratherthe voucher artifact [RFC8366], along with a constrained version of BRSKI [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] that makes use of the constrained CoAP-based version of EST, EST-coaps [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] rather thanserializingEST over HTTPS [RFC7030]. While theYANG definition in JSON, it[RFC8366] voucher is by default serializedinto CBOR ([RFC7049]). This document follows a similar, but not identical structure as [RFC8366] and supplements the brski partto[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]. There are three constrained situations describedJSON with a signature in CMS, thisdocument: 1. CMS signeddocument defines a new voucher serialization to CBORencoded vouchers transported using CoAP, protected by DTLS (coaps). 2.([RFC7049]) with a signature in COSEsigned CBOR encoded vouchers[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]. This COSE-signed CBOR-encoded voucher can be transported usingCoAP,secured CoAP or HTTP. The CoAP connection (between Pledge and Registrar) is to be protected byEDHOCeither OSCORE+EDHOC, orDTLS. 3. COSE signed CBOR encoded vouchers, integrated into the key exchange as described by [I-D.selander-ace-ake-authz] AdditionalDTLS (CoAPS). The HTTP connection (between Registrar and MASA) is to be protected using TLS (HTTPS). This document has a similar structure to [RFC8366] but adds sectionshave been addedconcerning: 1.Addition of voucher-requestVoucher-request artifact specificationas defined inbased on Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra], 2.Addition to [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] of voucherVoucher(-request) transportrequestsoverCoAP.CoAP based on Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] and on [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]. The CBOR definitions forthisthe constrained voucher format are defined using the mechanismdescribedescribed in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] using the SID mechanism explained in [I-D.ietf-core-sid]. As the tooling to convert YANG documents intoana list of SID keys is still in its infancy, the table of SID values presented here should be considered normative rather than the output of the pyang tool.Two methods of signingThere is additional work when theresulting CBOR object arevoucher is integrated into the key- exchange, described inthis document: 1. One is CMS [RFC5652]. 2. The other[I-D.selander-ace-ake-authz]. This work isCOSE_Sign1 [RFC8152] objects.not in scope for this document. 2. Terminology The following terms are defined in [RFC8366], and are used identically as in that document: artifact,imprint,domain, imprint, Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA),pledge,Pledge, Registrar, Trust of First Use (TOFU), and Voucher. The following terms from [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] are used identically as in that document: Domain CA, enrollment, IDevID, Join Proxy, LDevID, manufacturer, nonced, nonceless, PKIX. 3. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 4. Survey of Voucher Types [RFC8366] provides for vouchers that assert proximity, that authenticate theregistrarRegistrar and thatinclude different amountscan offer varying levels ofanti-replayanti- replay protection. This document does not make any extensions to thetypessemantic meanings ofvouchers. Time basedvouchers, only the encoding has been changed to optimize for constrained devices and networks. Time-based vouchers areincludedsupported in this definition, but given that constrained devices are extremely unlikely to have accurate time, their use is very unlikely. Mostusers ofPledges using these constrained vouchers will be online during enrollment and will use live nonces to provide anti-replay protection. [RFC8366] defined only the voucher artifact, and not the Voucher Request artifact, which was defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]. This document defines both a constrained voucher and a constrained voucher-request. They are presented in the order "voucher-request", followed by a "voucher" response as this is thetimeorder that theyoccur. This document defines both CMS-signed voucher requests and responses, and COSE signed voucher requests and responses. The use of CMS signatures implies the use of PKIX format certificates. The pinned- domain-cert presentoccur ina voucher, is the certificate oftheRegistrar.protocol. The constrained voucherand constrained voucherrequest MUST besigned.signed by the Pledge. It can sign using its IDevID X.509 certificate, or if an IDevID is not available its manufacturer-installed raw public key (RPK). Theuse ofconstrained voucher MUST be signed by the MASA. For the constrained voucher request this document defines twosigning formats permitdistinct methods for theusePledge to identify the Registrar: using either the Registrar's X.509 certificate, or using a raw public key (RPK) ofboth PKIX format certificates, andthe Registrar. For the constrained voucher also these two methods are supported to indicate (pin) a trusted domain identity: using either a pinned domain X.509 certificate, or a pinned raw publickeyskey (RPK). WhenRPKs are used,the Pledge is known by MASA to support RPK but not X.509 certificates, the voucher produced by the MASA pins the raw public key of theRegistrar: the pinned-domain-subject-public-key- infoRegistrar ina voucher, istheraw public key"pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info" field ofthe Registrar.a voucher. This is described in more detail in the YANG definition for the constrained voucher and in section Section 8. When the Pledge is known by MASA to support PKIX format certificates, the "pinned-domain-cert" field present in a voucher typically pins a domain certificate. That can be either the End-Entity certificate of the Registrar, or the certificate of a domain CA of the Registrar's domain. However, if the Pledge is known to also support RPK pinning and the MASA intends to pin the Registrar's identity (not a CA), then MASA MAY pin the RPK of the Registrar instead of the Registrar's End- Entity certificate in order to save space in the voucher. 5. Discovery and URI This section describes the BRSKI extensions to EST-coaps [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] to transport the voucher betweenregistrar,Registrar, join proxy andpledgePledge over CoAP. The extensions are targeted to low- resource networks with small packets. Saving header space is important and the EST-coaps URI is shorter than the EST URI. The presence and location of (path to) the management data are discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-known/core" including a resource type (RT) parameter with the value "ace.est" [RFC6690]. Upon success, the return payload will contain the root resource of the EST resources. It is up to the implementation to choose its root resource; throughout this document the example root resource /est is used. The EST-coaps server URIs differ from the EST URI by replacing the scheme https by coaps and by specifying shorter resource path names: coaps://www.example.com/est/short-name Figure 5 in section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations and corresponding paths which are supported by EST. Table 1 provides the mapping from the BRSKI extension URI path to the EST-coaps URI path.+------------------+-----------++-----------------+-----------+ | BRSKI | EST-coaps |+------------------+-----------++-----------------+-----------+ | /requestvoucher | /rv | | | | | /voucher_status | /vs | | | | | /enrollstatus | /es || | | | /requestauditlog | /ra | +------------------+-----------++-----------------+-----------+ Table 1: BRSKI path to EST-coaps path /requestvoucher, /voucher_status and /enrollstatusare neededoccur betweenpledgethe Pledge andRegistrar.Registrar (the BRSKI-EST protocol) and also between Registrar and MASA, but, as described in Section 7, this document addresses only the BRSKI-EST portion of the protocol. When discovering the root path for the EST resources, the server MAY return the full resource paths and the used content types. This is useful when multiple content types are specified for EST-coaps server. For example, the following more complete response is possible.[ EDNOTE: spell out where voucher artifacts are used6. BRSKI-EST Protocol The constrained BRSKI-EST protocol described inBRSKI flows sincethis section is between theAPIs ] [ EDNOTE:Pledge and the Registrar only. (probably via a join proxy, such as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy]) It extends both the BRSKI and EST-coaps protocols. 6.1. Discovery, URIs and Content Formats The/requestauditlogconstrained BRSKI-EST protocol described in this section is between the Pledge and/voucher-status are exchanged bythe Registrar only. (probably via a join proxy, such as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy]) It extends both the BRSKI andMASA.EST-coaps protocols. 6.2. Discovery, URIs and Content Formats TBD: content overlaps with Section 5, to be fixed - issue #79 TheJRC will likely talkPledge MAY perform a discovery operation on the "/.well-known/ core?rt=brski*" resource of the Registrar if it wishes toMASA overdiscover possibly shorter URLs for the functions, or if it has the possibility to use anormal (not constrained) medium. Do we need /ravariety of onboarding protocols or certificate enrollment protocols and/vs? Do we needit wants toremove them fromdiscover which of these protocols are available. For example, if theexample too? Also what happens toRegistrar supports a short BRSKI URL (/b) and supports thevoucher-requestvoucher format "application/voucher-cose+cbor" (TBD3), andresponsestatus reporting inthis case? Is MASA supposed to support contrained vouchers? ]both CBOR and JSON formats: REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski* RES: 2.05 Content</b>; rt="brski" </b/rv>; rt="brski.rv";ct=TBD2 TBD3 </b/vs>; rt="brski.vs";ct=50 60 </b/es>; rt="brski.es";ct=50 60Content-Format: 40 Payload: </b>;rt=brski, </b/rv>;rt=brski.rv;ct=TBD3, </b/vs>;rt=brski.vs;ct="50 60", </b/es>;rt=brski.es;ct="50 60" The Registrar is under no obligation to provide shorter URLs, and MAY respond to this query with only the "/.well-known/brski" end points defined in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] section 5. Registrars that have implemented shorter URLs MUST also respond in equivalent ways to the "/.well-known/brski" URLs, and MUST NOT distinguish between them. In particular, a Pledge MAY use the longer and shorter URLs in combination. The return ofthemultiple content-types in the "ct" attribute allows theclientPledge to choose the most appropriateone from multiple content types. ct=TBD2 stands for Content-Format "application/voucher-cms+cbor, and ct=TBD3 stands forone. Note that Content-Format"application/voucher-cose+cbor". Content-Formats TBD2 andTBD3areis defined in this document. The Content-Format ("application/json") 50 MAY besupported. Content-Formats ("application/cbor") 60, TBD2,supported and 60 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /vs and /es resources. Content-Format TBD3 MUST be supported by theRegistrar.Registrar for the /rv resource. If the "ct" attribute is not indicated for this resource, this implies that at least TBD3 is supported. The Pledge and MASA need to support one or more formats (at least TBD3) for thevoucher.voucher and for the voucher request. The MASAneeddsneeds to supportwhateverall formats that thepledge'sPledge, produced by thatmanufacturermanufacturer, supports. 6.3. Extensions to BRSKI A Pledge that only supports the EST-coaps enrollment method SHOULD NOT use discovery for BRSKI resources, since it is more efficient to just try the supported enrollment method via the well-known BRSKI/ EST-coaps resources, and it avoids the Pledge having to do complex CoRE Link Format parsing. A Registrar SHOULD host any discoverable BRSKI resources on the same (UDP) server port that the Pledge's DTLS connection is using. This avoids the Pledge having to reconnect using DTLS, in order to access these resources. 6.4. Extensions to EST-coaps A Pledge that only supports the EST-coaps enrollment method SHOULD NOT use discovery for EST-coaps resources, for similar reasons as stated in the previous section. A Registrar SHOULD host any discoverable EST-coaps resources on the same (UDP) server port that the Pledge's DTLS connection is using. This avoids the Pledge having to reconnect using DTLS, in order to access these resources. 6.4.1. Pledge Extensions A constrained Pledge SHOULD NOT perform the optional "CSR attributes request" (/att) to minimize network traffic and reduce code size (i.e. by not implementing the complex CSR attributes parsing code). When creating the CSR, the Pledge selects itself which attributes to include. One or more Subject Distinguished Name fields MUST be included. If the Pledge has no specific information on what attributes/fields are desired in the CSR, it MUST use the Subject Distinguished Name fields from its IDevID unmodified. The Pledge may receive such information via the voucher (encoded in a vendor- specific way) or some other, out-of-band means. A constrained Pledge MAY use the following optimized EST-coaps procedure to minimize both network traffic and code size: 1. if the BRSKI-received voucher, validating the current EST server, contains a pinned domain CA certificate, the Pledge provisionally considers this single certificate as the sole EST trust anchor, in other words, the single result of "CA certificates request" (/crts) to the EST server. 2. Using this trust anchor it proceeds with EST simple enrollment (/sen) to obtain its provisionally trusted LDevID. 3. Then, the Pledge attempts to validate that the trust anchor CA is the signer of the LDevID. If this is the case, the Pledge finally accepts the pinned domain CA certificate as the legitimate trust anchor CA for its domain and it also accepts its LDevID. 4. If this is not the case, the Pledge MUST perform an actual "CA certificates request" (/crts) to the EST server to obtain the EST CA trust anchors since these obviously differ from the (temporary) pinned domain CA. 5. When doing this request, the Pledge MAY use a CoAP Accept Option with value TBD287 ("application/pkix-cert") to limit the number of returned EST CA trust anchors to only one. Such limiting to only one has the advantages that storage requirements for CA certificates are reduced, network traffic can be reduced, and code size can be reduced (by not having to parse the alternative format 281 "application/pkcs7-mime;smime-type=certs-only" and not having to support CoAP block-wise transfer). 6. If the Pledge cannot obtain the single CA certificate or the finally validated CA certificate cannot be chained to the LDevID, then the Pledge MUST abort the enrollment process and report the error using the enrollment status telemetry (/es). The Content-Format ("application/json") 50 MAY be supported and 60 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /vs and /es resources. Content-Format TBD3 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /rv resource. If the "ct" attribute is not indicated for this resource, this implies that at least TBD3 is supported. When a Registrar receives a "CA certificates request" (/crts) request with a CoAP Accept Option with value TBD287 it SHOULD return only the single CA certificate that is the envisioned or actual authority for the current, authenticated Pledge making the request. The only exception case is when the Registrar is configured to not support a request for a single CA certificate for operational or security reasons, e.g. because every device enrolled into the domain needs to use at least multiple CAs. In such exception case the Registrar returns the CoAP response 4.06 Not Acceptable to indicate that only the default Content-Format of 281 "application/pkcs7-mime;smime- type=certs-only" is available. 6.4.2. Registrar Extensions When a Registrar receives a "CA certificates request" (/crts) request with a CoAP Accept Option with value TBD287 it SHOULD return only the single CA certificate that is the envisioned or actual authority for the current, authenticated Pledge making the request. The only exception case is when the Registrar is configured to not support a request for a single CA certificate for operational or security reasons, e.g. because every device enrolled into the domain needs to use at least multiple CAs. In such exception case the Registrar returns the CoAP response 4.06 Not Acceptable to indicate that only the default Content-Format of 281 "application/pkcs7-mime;smime- type=certs-only" is available. 7. BRSKI-MASA Protocol [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] section 5.4 describes a connection between the Registrar and the MASA as being a normal TLS connection using HTTPS. This document does not change that. The use of CoAP for the BRSKI-MASA connection is NOT supported. Some consideration was made to specify CoAP support for consistency but: o the Registrar is not expected to be so constrained that it cannot support HTTPS client connections. o the technology and experience to build Internet-scale HTTPS responders (which the MASA is) is common, while the experience doing the same for CoAP is much less common. o in many Enterprise networks, outgoing UDP connections are often treated as suspicious, and there seems to be no advantage to using CoAP in that environment. o a Registrar is likely to provide onboarding services to both constrained and non-constrained devices. Such a Registrar would need to speak HTTPS anyway. o similarly, a manufacturer is likely to offer both constrained and non-constrained devices, so there may in practice be no situation in which the MASA could be CoAP-only. Additionally, as the MASA is intended to be a function that can easily be oursourced to a third-party service provider, reducing the complexity would also seem to reduce the cost of that function. 8. Pinning in Voucher Artifacts The voucher is a statement from the MASA to the Pledge indicating who the Pledge's owner is. This section deals with the question of how that owner's identity is determined and how it is encoded within the voucher. 8.1. Registrar Identity Selection and Encoding Section 5.5 of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] describes BRSKI policies for selection of the owner identity. It indicates some of the flexibility that is possible for the Registrar. The recommendation made there is for the Registrar to include only certificates in the (CMS) signing structure which participate in the certificate chain that is to be pinned. The MASA is expected to evaluate the certificates included by the Registrar in its voucher request, forming them into a chain with the Registrar's (signing) identity on one end. Then, it pins a certificate selected from the chain. For instance, for a domain with a two-level certification authority, where the voucher-request has been signed by "Registrar" its signing structure includes two additional CA certificates: .-------------. | priv-CA (1) | '-------------' | v .------------. | Int-CA (2) | '------------' | v .--------------. | Registrar(3) | '--------------' Figure 1: Two Level PKI When the Registrar is using a COSE-signed constrained format voucher request towards MASA, instead of a regular CMS-signed voucher request, the COSE_Sign1 object contains a protected and an unprotected header, and according to [I-D.ietf-cose-x509], would carry all the certificates of the chain in an "x5bag" attribute placed in the unprotected header. 8.2. MASA Pinning Policy The MASA, having assembled and verified the chain in the signing structure, will now need to select a certificate to pin in the voucher in case there are multiple available. (For the case that only the Registrar's End-Entity certificate is included, only this certificate can be selected and this section does not apply.) The BRSKI policy for pinning by the MASA as described in Section 5.5.2 of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] leaves much flexibility to the manufacturer. The present document adds the following rules to the MASA pinning policy, in order to reduce on average the duration of BRSKI/EST on constrained, low-bandwidth networks: 1. for a voucher containing a nonce, it SHOULD select the most specific (lowest-level) CA certificate in the chain. 2. for a nonceless voucher, it SHOULD select the least-specific (highest-level) CA certificate in the chain that is allowed under the MASA's policy for this specific customer (domain). The rationale for 1. is that in case of a voucher with nonce, the voucher is valid only in scope of the present DTLS connection between Pledge and Registrar anyway, so it would have no benefit to pin a higher-level CA. By pinning the most specific CA the constrained Pledge can validate its DTLS connection using less crypto operations. The rationale for pinning a CA instead of the Registrar's End-Entity certificate directly is the following benefit on constrained networks: the pinned certificate in the voucher can in common cases be re-used as a Domain CA trust anchor during the EST enrollment and during the operational phase that follows after EST enrollment, as explained elsewhere in this document. Doing so avoids an additional transmission of this trust anchor over the network during the EST enrollment, saving potentially 100s of bytes and a CoAP transaction. The rationale for 2. follows from the flexible BRSKI trust model for, and purpose of, nonceless vouchers (Sections 5.5.* and 7.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]). Using the previous example of a domain with a two-level certification authority, the most specific CA ("Sub-CA") is the identity that is pinned by MASA in a nonced voucher. A Registrar that wished to have only the Registrar's End-Entity certificate pinned would omit the "priv-CA" and "Sub-CA" certificates from the voucher-request. In case of a nonceless voucher, the MASA would depending on trust level pin only "Registrar" certificate (low trust in customer), or the "Sub-CA" certificate (in case of medium trust, implying that any Registrar of that sub-domain is acceptable), or even the "priv-CA" certificate (in case of high trust in the customer, and possibly a pre-agreed need of the customer to obtain flexible long-lived vouchers). 8.3. Pinning of Raw Public Keys Specifically for constrained use cases, the pinning of the raw public key (RPK) of the Registrar is also supported in the constrained voucher, instead of an X.509 certificate. If an RPK is pinned it MUST be the RPK of the Registrar. .------------. | pub-CA (1) | '------------' | v .------------. | sub-CA (2) | '------------' | v .--------------. | Registrar(3) | | [RPK3] | '--------------' Figure 2: Raw Public Key pinning When the Pledge is known by MASA to support RPK but not X.509 certificates, the voucher produced by the MASA pins the RPK of the Registrar in the "pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info" field of a voucher. This is described in more detail in the YANG definition for the constrained voucher. A Pledge that does not support X.509 certificates cannot use EST to enroll; it has to use another method for certificate-less enrollment and the Registrar has to support this method also. It is possible that the Pledge will not enroll, but instead only a network join operation will occur, such as described in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]. How the Pledge discovers this method and details of the enrollment method are out of scope of this document. When the Pledge is known by MASA to support PKIX format certificates, the "pinned-domain-cert" field present in a voucher typically pins a domain certificate. That can be either the End-Entity certificate of the Registrar, or the certificate of a domain CA of the Registrar's domain. However, if the Pledge is known to also support RPK pinning and the MASA intends to pin the Registrar's identity (not a CA), then MASA SHOULD pin the RPK (RPK3 in figure Figure 2) of the Registrar instead of the Registrar's End-Entity certificate in order to save space in the voucher. To Be Completed further (TBD): Note, the above paragraphs are duplicated from the section Section 4 so we may have to resolve this duplication. 9. Artifacts This section describes the abstract (tree) definition as explained in [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams] first. This provides a high- level view of the contents of each artifact. Then the assigned SID values are presented. These have been assigned using the rules in [I-D.ietf-core-sid], with an allocation that was made via the http://comi.space service.6.1.9.1. Voucher Request artifact6.1.1.9.1.1. Tree Diagram The following diagram is largely a duplicate of the contents of [RFC8366], with the addition of proximity-registrar-subject-public- key-info, proximity-registrar-cert, and prior-signed-voucher-request. prior-signed-voucher-request is only used between the Registrar and the MASA. proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info replaces proximity-registrar-cert for the extremely constrained cases. module: ietf-constrained-voucher-request grouping voucher-request-constrained-grouping +-- voucher +-- created-on? | yang:date-and-time +-- expires-on? | yang:date-and-time +-- assertion | enumeration +-- serial-number | string +-- idevid-issuer? | binary +-- pinned-domain-cert? | binary +-- domain-cert-revocation-checks? | boolean +-- nonce? | binary +-- last-renewal-date? | yang:date-and-time +-- proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info? | binary +-- proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info? | binary +-- proximity-registrar-cert? | binary +-- prior-signed-voucher-request? binary6.1.2.9.1.2. SID values SID Assigned to --------- -------------------------------------------------- 2501 data /ietf-constrained-voucher-request:voucher 2502 data .../assertion 2503 data .../created-on 2504 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks 2505 data .../expires-on 2506 data .../idevid-issuer 2507 data .../last-renewal-date 2508 data /ietf-constrained-voucher-request:voucher/nonce 2509 data .../pinned-domain-cert 2510 data .../prior-signed-voucher-request 2511 data .../proximity-registrar-cert 2512 data mity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info 2513 data .../proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info 2514 data .../serial-number WARNING, obsolete definitions6.1.3.9.1.3. YANG Module In the constrained-voucher-request YANG module, the voucher is "augmented" within the "used" grouping statement such that one continuous set of SID values is generated for the constrained- voucher-request module name, all voucher attributes, and the constrained-voucher-request attribute. Two attributes of the voucher are "refined" to be optional. <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-constrained-voucher-request@2019-09-01.yang" module ietf-constrained-voucher-request { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher-request"; prefix "constrained"; import ietf-restconf { prefix rc; description "This import statement is only present to access the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040."; reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol"; } import ietf-voucher { prefix "v"; } organization "IETF ANIMA Working Group"; contact "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/> WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org> Author: Michael Richardson <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Author: Peter van der Stok <mailto: consultancy@vanderstok.org> Author: Panos Kampanakis <mailto: pkampana@cisco.com>"; description "This module defines the format for a voucher request, which is produced by a pledge to request a voucher. The voucher-request is sent to the potential owner's Registrar, which in turn sends the voucher request to the manufacturer or delegate (MASA). A voucher is then returned to the pledge, binding the pledge to the owner. This is a constrained version of the voucher-request present in draft-ietf-anima-bootstrap-keyinfra.txt. This version provides a very restricted subset appropriate for very constrained devices. In particular, it assumes that nonce-ful operation is always required, that expiration dates are rather weak, as no clocks can be assumed, and that the Registrar is identified by a pinned Raw Public Key. The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119."; revision "2019-09-01" { description "Initial version"; reference "RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices"; } rc:yang-data voucher-request-constrained-artifact { // YANG data template for a voucher. uses voucher-request-constrained-grouping; } // Grouping defined for future usage grouping voucher-request-constrained-grouping { description "Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work."; uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping { refine voucher/created-on { mandatory false; } refine voucher/pinned-domain-cert { mandatory false; } augment "voucher" { description "Base the constrained voucher-request upon the regular one"; leaf proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info { type binary; description "The proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info replaces the proximit-registrar-cert in constrained uses of the voucher-request. The proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info is the Raw Public Key of the Registrar. This field is encoded as specified in RFC7250, section 3. The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported. The EdDSA algorithm as specified in draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported. Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended. Support for the RSA algorithm is MAY, but due to size is discouraged."; } leaf proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info { type binary; description "The proximity-registrar-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info is an alternative to proximity-registrar-subject-public-key-info. and pinned-domain-cert. In many cases the public key of the domain has already been transmitted during the key agreement protocol, and it is wasteful to transmit the public key another two times. The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA public key, but is only a minor savings compared to a 256-bit ECDSA public-key. Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this specifications which define new leaf for other hash types."; } leaf proximity-registrar-cert { type binary; description "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC 5280, Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690. The first certificate in the Registrar TLS server certificate_list sequence (see [RFC5246]) presented by the Registrar to the Pledge. This MUST be populated in a Pledge's voucher request if the proximity assertion is populated."; } leaf prior-signed-voucher-request { type binary; description "If it is necessary to change a voucher, or re-sign and forward a voucher that was previously provided along a protocol path, then the previously signed voucher SHOULD be included in this field. For example, a pledge might sign a proximity voucher, which an intermediate registrar then re-signs to make its own proximity assertion. This is a simple mechanism for a chain of trusted parties to change a voucher, while maintaining the prior signature information. The pledge MUST ignore all prior voucher information when accepting a voucher for imprinting. Other parties MAY examine the prior signed voucher information for the purposes of policy decisions. For example this information could be useful to a MASA to determine that both pledge and registrar agree on proximity assertions. The MASA SHOULD remove all prior-signed-voucher-request information when signing a voucher for imprinting so as to minimize the final voucher size."; } } } } } <CODE ENDS>6.1.4.9.1.4. Example voucher request artifact Below is a CBOR serialization ofthe constrained-voucher-request isan example constrained voucher request from a Pledge to a Registrar, shown indiagnosticCBOR diagnostic notation. The enum value of the assertion field is calculated to bezero2 by following the algorithm described in section 9.6.4.2 of [RFC7950]. Four dots ("....") in a CBOR byte string denotes a sequence of bytes that are not shown for brevity. { 2501: { +2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2503, created-on / +4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2505, expires-on / +1 : 2, / SID= 2502, assertion / / "proximity" / +13: "JADA123456789", / SID= 2514, serial-number / +5 : h'01020D0F', / SID= 2506, idevid-issuer / +10: h'cert.der', / SID=2511, proximity-registrar-cert/ +3 : true, / SID= 2504, domain-cert -revocation-checks/ +6 : "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID= 2507, last-renewal-date / +12: h'key_info' / SID= 2513, proximity-registrar -subject-public-key-info / } }6.2.<CODE ENDS> 9.2. Voucher artifact The voucher's primary purpose is to securely assign apledgePledge to an owner. The voucher informs thepledgePledge which entity it should consider to be its owner.This document defines a voucher that is a CBOR encoded instance of the YANG module defined in Section 5.3 that has been signed with CMS or with COSE. 6.2.1.9.2.1. Tree Diagram The following diagram is largely a duplicate of the contents of [RFC8366], with only the addition of pinned-domain-subject-public- key-info. module: ietf-constrained-voucher grouping voucher-constrained-grouping +-- voucher +-- created-on? | yang:date-and-time +-- expires-on? | yang:date-and-time +-- assertion enumeration +-- serial-number string +-- idevid-issuer? binary +-- pinned-domain-cert? binary +-- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean +-- nonce? binary +-- last-renewal-date? | yang:date-and-time +-- pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info? binary +-- pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info? binary6.2.2.<CODE ENDS> 9.2.2. SID values SID Assigned to --------- -------------------------------------------------- 2451 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher 2452 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/assertion 2453 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/created-on 2454 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks 2455 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/expires-on 2456 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/idevid-issuer 2457 data .../last-renewal-date 2458 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/nonce 2459 data .../pinned-domain-cert 2460 data .../pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info 2461 data .../pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info 2462 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/serial-number WARNING, obsolete definitions6.2.3.<CODE ENDS> 9.2.3. YANG Module In the constrained-voucher YANG module, the voucher is "augmented" within the "used" grouping statement such that one continuous set of SID values is generated for the constrained-voucher module name, all voucher attributes, and the constrained-voucher attribute. Two attributes of the voucher are "refined" to be optional. <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-constrained-voucher@2019-09-01.yang" module ietf-constrained-voucher { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher"; prefix "constrained"; import ietf-restconf { prefix rc; description "This import statement is only present to access the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040."; reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol"; } import ietf-voucher { prefix "v"; } organization "IETF ANIMA Working Group"; contact "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/> WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org> Author: Michael Richardson <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Author: Peter van der Stok <mailto: consultancy@vanderstok.org> Author: Panos Kampanakis <mailto: pkampana@cisco.com>"; description "This module defines the format for a voucher, which is produced by a pledge's manufacturer or delegate (MASA) to securely assign one or more pledges to an 'owner', so that the pledges may establis a secure connection to the owner's network infrastructure. This version provides a very restricted subset appropriate for very constrained devices. In particular, it assumes that nonce-ful operation is always required, that expiration dates are rather weak, as no clocks can be assumed, and that the Registrar is identified by a pinned Raw Public Key. The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119."; revision "2019-09-01" { description "Initial version"; reference "RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices"; } rc:yang-data voucher-constrained-artifact { // YANG data template for a voucher. uses voucher-constrained-grouping; } // Grouping defined for future usage grouping voucher-constrained-grouping { description "Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work."; uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping { refine voucher/created-on { mandatory false; } refine voucher/pinned-domain-cert { mandatory false; } augment "voucher" { description "Base the constrained voucher upon the regular one"; leaf pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info { type binary; description "The pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info replaces the pinned-domain-cert in constrained uses of the voucher. The pinned-domain-subject-public-key-info is the Raw Public Key of the Registrar. This field is encoded as specified in RFC7250, section 3. The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported. The EdDSA algorithm as specified in draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported. Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended. Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY."; } leaf pinned-sha256-of-subject-public-key-info { type binary; description "The pinned-hash-subject-public-key-info is a second alternative to pinned-domain-cert. In many cases the public key of the domain has already been transmitted during the key agreement process, and it is wasteful to transmit the public key another two times. The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA public key, but is only a minor savings compared to a 256-bit ECDSA public-key. Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this specifications which define new leaf for other hash types"; } } } } } <CODE ENDS>6.2.4.9.2.4. Example voucher artifacts Belowathe CBOR serialization ofthe constrained-voucheran example constrained voucher is shown indiagnosticCBOR diagnostic notation. The enum value of the assertion field is calculated to be zero by following the algorithm described in section 9.6.4.2 of [RFC7950]. Four dots ("....") in a CBOR byte string denotes a sequence of bytes that are not shown for brevity. { 2451: { +2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2453, created-on / +4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2455, expires-on / +1 : 0, / SID = 2452, assertion/ /"verified" / +11: "JADA123456789", / SID = 2462, serial-number / +5 :h'01020D0F',h'E40393B4....68A3', / SID = 2456, idevid-issuer / +8 :h'cert.der',h'30820275....C35F', / SID = 2459, pinned-domain-cert/ +3 : true, / SID = 2454, domain-cert / / -revocation-checks / +6 :"2017-10-07T19:31:42Z","2017-10-07T19:31:42Z" / SID = 2457, last-renewal-date /+9 : h'key-info' / SID = 2460, pinned-domain -subject-public-key-info /} }The signing of the example is shown in Appendix B.3. 6.3.<CODE ENDS> 9.3. Signing voucher and voucher-request artifacts6.3.1. CMS signing The IETF evolution of PKCS#7 is CMS [RFC5652]. The CMS signed voucher is much like the equivalent voucher defined in [RFC8366]. A different eContentType of TBD1 is used to indicate that the contents are in a different format than in [RFC8366]. The id-ct- animaJSONVoucher allocated by [RFC8366] indicates a voucher and voucher-request encoded in JSON, and the new value TBD1 indicates that the voucher and voucher-request are encoded in CBOR. The ContentInfo structure contains a payload consisting of the CBOR encoded voucher. The [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] use of delta encoding creates a canonical ordering for the keys on the wire. This canonical ordering is not important as there is no expectation that the content will be reproduced during the validation process. Normally the recipient is the pledge and the signer is the MASA. [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] supports both signed and unsigned voucher requests from the pledge to the JRC. In this specification, voucher-request artifact is not signed from the pledge to the registrar. [EDNOTE: Confirm that voucher requests do not need to be signed ] From the JRC to the MASA, the voucher-request artifact MUST be signed by the domain owner key which is requesting ownership. The considerations of [RFC5652] section 5.1, concerning validating CMS objects which are really PKCS7 objects (cmsVersion=1) applies. The CMS structure SHOULD also contain all the certificates leading up to and including the signer's trust anchor certificate known to the recipient. The inclusion of the trust anchor is unusual in many applications, but without it third parties can not accurately audit the transaction. The CMS structure MAY also contain revocation objects for any intermediate certificate authorities (CAs) between the voucher-issuer and the trust anchor known to the recipient. However, the use of CRLs and other validity mechanisms is discouraged, as the pledge is unlikely to be able to perform online checks, and is unlikely to have a trusted clock source. As described below, the use of short-lived vouchers and/or pledge provided nonce provides a freshness guarantee. 6.3.2.with COSEsigningThe COSE-Sign1 structure is discussed in section 4.2 of[RFC8152].[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]. The CBOR object that carries the body, the signature, and the information about the body and signature is called the COSE_Sign1 structure. It is used when only one signature is used on the body. Support for ECDSA with sha256 (secp256k1 and prime256v1 curves) is compulsory. The supported COSE-sign1 object stucture is shown in Figure1.3. Support for EdDSA is encouraged. [EDNOTE: Expand and add a reference why. ] COSE_Sign1( [ h'A101382E', # { "alg": EC256K1 } { "kid" : h'789' # hash256(public key) }, h'123', #voucher-request binary content h'456', #voucher-request binary public signature ] ) Figure1:3: cose-sign1 example The [COSE-registry] specifies the integers that replace the strings and the mnemonics in Figure1.3. The value of the "kid" parameter is an example value. Usually a hash of the public key is used to idientify the public key. The public key and its hash are derived from the relevant certificate (Pledge, Registrar or MASA certificate). In AppendixCB a binary cose-sign1 object is shown based on the voucher-request example of Section6.1.4. 7.9.1.4. 10. Design Considerations The design considerations for the CBOR encoding of vouchers is much the same as for [RFC8366]. One key difference is that the names of the leaves in the YANG does not have a material effect on the size of the resulting CBOR, as the SID translation process assigns integers to the names.8.Any POST request to the Registrar with resource /est/vs or /est/es returns a 2.05 response with empty payload. The client should be aware that the server may use a piggybacked CoAP response (ACK, 2.05) but may also respond with a separate CoAP response, i.e. first an (ACK, 0.0) that is an acknowledgement of the request reception followed by a (CON, 2.05) response in a separate CoAP message. 11. Security Considerations8.1.11.1. Clock Sensitivity TBD.8.2.11.2. Protect Voucher PKI in HSM TBD.8.3.11.3. Test Domain Certificate Validity when Signing TBD.9.12. IANA Considerations9.1.12.1. Resource Type Registry Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Resource Type", within the "CoRE parameters" registry are specified below. These can be registered either in the Expert Review range (0-255) or IETF Review range (256-9999). ace.rt.rv needs registration with IANA ace.rt.vs needs registration with IANA ace.rt.es needs registration with IANA ace.rt.ra needs registration with IANA9.2.12.2. The IETF XML Registry This document registers two URIs in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is requested: URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher-request Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.9.3.12.3. The YANG Module Names Registry This document registers two YANG modules in the YANG Module Names registry [RFC6020]. Following the format defined in [RFC6020], the the following registration is requested: name: ietf-constrained-voucher namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher prefix: vch reference: RFC XXXX name: ietf-constrained-voucher-request namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained -voucher-request prefix: vch reference: RFC XXXX9.4.12.4. The RFC SID range assignment sub-registry ------------ ------ --------------------------- ------------ Entry-point | Size | Module name | RFC Number ------------ ------ --------------------------- ------------ 2450 50 ietf-constrained-voucher [ThisRFC] 2500 50 ietf-constrained-voucher [ThisRFC} -request ----------- ------ --------------------------- ------------ Warning: These SID values are defined in [I-D.ietf-core-sid], not as an Early Allocation.9.5. The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry This document registers an OID in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type" registry (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1), with the value: Decimal Description References ------- -------------------------------------- ---------- 46 id-ct-animaCBORVoucher [ThisRFC] 9.6.12.5. Media-Type Registry This section registers the'application/voucher-cms+cbor' media type andthe 'application/voucher-cose+cbor' in the "Media Types" registry. These media types are used to indicate that the content is a CBOR voucher either signed with acms structure or aCOSE_Sign1 structure[RFC8152]. 9.6.1. application/voucher-cms+cbor Type name: application Subtype name: voucher-cms+cbor Required parameters: none Optional parameters: none Encoding considerations: CMS-signed CBOR vouchers are CBOR encoded. Security considerations: See Security Considerations, Section Interoperability considerations: The format is designed to be broadly interoperable. Published specification: THIS RFC. Applications that use this media type: ANIMA, 6tisch, and other zero-touch imprinting systems Additional information: Magic number(s): None File extension(s): .vch Macintosh file type code(s): none Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF ANIMA WG Intended usage: LIMITED Restrictions on usage: NONE Author: ANIMA WG Change controller: IETF Provisional registration? (standards tree only): NO 9.6.2.[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]. 12.5.1. application/voucher-cose+cbor Type name: application Subtype name: voucher-cose+cbor Required parameters: none Optional parameters: cose-type Encoding considerations: COSE_Sign1 CBOR vouchers are COSE objects signed with one signer. Security considerations: See Security Considerations, Section Interoperability considerations: The format is designed to be broadly interoperable. Published specification: THIS RFC. Applications that use this media type: ANIMA, 6tisch, and other zero-touch imprinting systems Additional information: Magic number(s): None File extension(s): .vch Macintosh file type code(s): none Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF ANIMA WG Intended usage: LIMITED Restrictions on usage: NONE Author: ANIMA WG Change controller: IETF Provisional registration? (standards tree only): NO9.7.12.6. CoAP Content-Format Registry Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Content-Formats", within the "CoRE Parameters" registry are needed for two media types. These can be registered either in the Expert Review range (0-255) or IETF Review range (256-9999). Media type mime type Encoding ID References ---------------------------- ----------- --------- ---- ----------application/voucher-cms+cbor - - CBOR TBD2 [This RFC]application/voucher-cose+cbor "COSE-Sign1" CBOR TBD3 [This RFC]10.13. Acknowledgements We are very grateful to Jim Schaad for explaining COSE and CMS choices. Also thanks to Jim Schaad for correctinging earlier version of the COSE Sign1 objects. Michel Veillette did extensive work on pyang to extend it to support the SID allocation process, and this document was among the first users.We are grateful for the suggestions done by Esko Dijk. 11.14. Changelog -10 Design considerations extended Examples made consistent -08 Examples for cose_sign1 are completed and improved. -06 New SID values assigned; regenerated examples -04 voucher and request-voucher MUST be signed examples for signed request are added in appendix IANA SID registration is updated SID values in examples are aligned signed cms examples aligned with new SIDs -03 Examples are inverted. -02 Example of requestvoucher with unsigned appllication/cbor is added attributes of voucher "refined" to optional CBOR serialization of vouchers improved Discovery port numbers are specified -01 application/json is optional, application/cbor is compulsory Cms and cose mediatypes are introduced12.15. References12.1.15.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] Vucinic, M., Simon, J., Pister, K., and M. Richardson, "Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) for 6TiSCH", draft-ietf- 6tisch-minimal-security-15 (work in progress), December 2019. [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] Stok,P.,P. V. D., Kampanakis, P., Richardson,M.,M. C., and S. Raza, "EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)",draft-ietf-ace-coap- est-18draft-ietf-ace- coap-est-18 (work in progress), January 2020. [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] Pritikin, M., Richardson,M.,M. C., Eckert, T., Behringer,M.,M. H., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-44keyinfra-45 (work in progress),SeptemberNovember 2020. [I-D.ietf-core-sid] Veillette, M., Pelov, A., and I. Petrov, "YANG Schema Item iDentifier (YANG SID)",draft-ietf-core-sid-14draft-ietf-core-sid-15 (work in progress),July 2020.January 2021. [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] Veillette, M., Petrov, I., and A. Pelov, "CBOR Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG",draft-ietf-core-yang-cbor-13draft-ietf-core-yang-cbor-15 (work in progress), January 2021. [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis- struct-15 (work in progress), February 2021. [I-D.ietf-cose-x509] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Header parameters for carrying and referencing X.509 certificates", draft-ietf-cose-x509-08 (work in progress),JulyDecember 2020. [I-D.selander-ace-ake-authz] Selander, G., Mattsson,J.,J. P., Vucinic, M., Richardson, M., and A. Schellenbaum, "Lightweight Authorization for Authenticated Key Exchange.", draft-selander-ace-ake-authz-01authz-02 (work in progress),MarchNovember 2020. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>. [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>. [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>. [RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. [RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert, "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols", RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.12.2.15.2. Informative References [COSE-registry] IANA, ., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) registry", 2017, <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml>. [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy] Richardson, M., Stok, P. V. D., and P. Kampanakis, "Constrained Join Proxy for Bootstrapping Protocols", draft-ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy-02 (work in progress), February 2021. [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, "YANG Tree Diagrams", draft- ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams-06 (work in progress), February 2018. [RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>. [RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed., "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>. Appendix A. EST messages to EST-coaps This section extends the examples from Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]. The CoAP headers are only worked out for the enrollstatus example. A.1. enrollstatus A coaps enrollstatus message can be :GET coaps://[192.0.2.1:8085]/est/esPOST coaps://192.0.2.1:8085/est/es The corresponding coap header fields are shown below. Ver = 1 T = 0 (CON) Code =0x01 (0.010x02 (0.02 isGET)POST) Options Option (Uri-Path) Option Delta = 0xb (option nr = 11) Option Length = 0x3 Option Value = "est" Option (Uri-Path) Option Delta = 0x0 (option nr = 11) Option Length = 0x2 Option Value = "es" Payload = [Empty] The Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are omitted because they coincide with the transport protocol destination address and port respectively. A 2.05 Content response with an unsigned voucher status (ct=60) will then be: 2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/cbor) With CoAP fields and payload: Ver=1 T=2 (ACK) Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content) Options Option1 (Content-Format) Option Delta = 0xC (option nr 12) Option Length = 0x2 Option Value = 60 (application/cbor) Payload (CBOR diagnostic) = { "version":"1", "Status": 1, / 1 = Success, 0 = Fail / "Reason":"Informative human readable message", "reason-context": "Additional information" } The binary payload is: A46776657273696F6E6131665374617475730166526561736F6E7822 496E666F726D61746976652068756D616E207265616461626C65206D 6573736167656e726561736F6E2D636F6E74657874 764164646974696F6E616C20696E666F726D6174696F6E The binary payload disassembles to the above CBOR diagnostic code. A.2. voucher_status A coaps voucher_status message can be:GET coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/vsPOST coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/vs A 2.05 Content response with a non signed CBOR voucher status (ct=60) will then be: 2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/cbor) Payload =A46776657273696F6E6131665374617475730166526561736F6E7822 496E666F726D61746976652068756D616E207265616461626C65206D 6573736167656e726561736F6E2D636F6E74657874 764164646974696F6E616C20696E666F726D6174696F6E Appendix B. CMS signed messages Signed request-voucher-request payloads are sent from pledge to Registrar, as explained in Section 5.2 of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]. B.1. signed requestvoucher A CMS signed requestvoucher message from JRC to MASA is shown below. It would be CoAP POSTED to /est/rv. POST coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/rv (Content-Format: application/voucher-cms+cbor)a46776657273696f6e6131665374617475730166526561736f6e7822496e666f7 26d61746976652068756d616e207265616461626c65206d6573736167656e7265 61736f6e2d636f6e74657874764164646974696f6e616c20696e666f726d61746 96f6e<CODE ENDS> The payloadwould be in binary, butabove ispresentedrepresented inbase64 in this document. MIIDugYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIDqzCCA6cCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwCwYJ KoZIhvcNAQcBoIICQTCCAj0wggHioAMCAQICCH52Yde1TkYyMAoGCCqGSM49 BAMCMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhh bXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRpb24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgw Mi4xQVIgQ0EwIBcNMTkwMTMxMTEyOTE2WhgPOTk5OTEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMFwx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTELMAkGA1UEBwwCTEExFDASBgNV BAoMC2V4YW1wbGUgSW5jMQwwCgYDVQQLDANJb1QxDzANBgNVBAUTBld0MTIz NDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABMi0IfEcJeR+OsVxI78tn9xJ TwKLw1HMgMA/FQv1DP+VjXVBnYGmokXf+ueQvpXPdfYC+RUmGPgWorI7Vjjl n9mjgYowgYcwCQYDVR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUlmANhxa/f9DnUtCsdgd3 rWZdAqAwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUaNFlUflRv8gqQx0Nnwi8LSBbEWAwDgYDVR0P AQH/BAQDAgWgMCoGA1UdEQQjMCGgHwYIKwYBBQUHCASgEzARBgkrBgEEAbQ7 CgEEBAECAwQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAMDYGZbSUH1pPzxI6qXulJG9 ptshQJnZgRfGOzYTdM2GAiEAp3SYn0wyGlzyXYMqTTNqCK1n3yDxUGQhGIoK 3m00kjYxggE/MIIBOwIBATBpMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJD QTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhhbXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRp b24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgwMi4xQVIgQ0ECCH52Yde1TkYyMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQC AaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8X DTE5MDQwODEwNDgzNlowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEILEdCTOLs2Zy7w3LgvSZ XZEadz3LbznoFBs6FMFN91RaMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCBEcwRQIgASjDsIpr0tW/ n6dRHqvvqsqgZlHbtFnErUbWfhS0KD4CIQDDUEqc5wTmRGf0adEQVQzqmIgh MEgF10vqXv02gL1jLw== A 2.04 Changed response returning CBOR voucher signed with a cms structure(ct=TBD2) will then be: 2.04 Changed (Content-Format: application/voucher-cms+cbor) MIIDuwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIDrDCCA6gCAQExDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwCwYJ KoZIhvcNAQcBoIICQTCCAj0wggHioAMCAQICCH52Yde1TkYyMAoGCCqGSM49 BAMCMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhh bXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRpb24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgw Mi4xQVIgQ0EwIBcNMTkwMTMxMTEyOTE2WhgPOTk5OTEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMFwx CzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTELMAkGA1UEBwwCTEExFDASBgNV BAoMC2V4YW1wbGUgSW5jMQwwCgYDVQQLDANJb1QxDzANBgNVBAUTBld0MTIz NDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABMi0IfEcJeR+OsVxI78tn9xJ TwKLw1HMgMA/FQv1DP+VjXVBnYGmokXf+ueQvpXPdfYC+RUmGPgWorI7Vjjl n9mjgYowgYcwCQYDVR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUlmANhxa/f9DnUtCsdgd3 rWZdAqAwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUaNFlUflRv8gqQx0Nnwi8LSBbEWAwDgYDVR0P AQH/BAQDAgWgMCoGA1UdEQQjMCGgHwYIKwYBBQUHCASgEzARBgkrBgEEAbQ7 CgEEBAECAwQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAMDYGZbSUH1pPzxI6qXulJG9 ptshQJnZgRfGOzYTdM2GAiEAp3SYn0wyGlzyXYMqTTNqCK1n3yDxUGQhGIoK 3m00kjYxggFAMIIBPAIBATBpMF0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJD QTEUMBIGA1UECgwLRXhhbXBsZSBJbmMxFjAUBgNVBAsMDWNlcnRpZmljYXRp b24xEzARBgNVBAMMCjgwMi4xQVIgQ0ECCH52Yde1TkYyMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQC AaBpMBgGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8X DTE5MDQwODA3MzQxMFowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIP2rKa+J8LVdwYEmB2he uxsz05As0zoAAYkeyNqsh4fiMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCBEgwRgIhALOd2FKbe9FG kN4Pg7FIgF+//cQv/N+v7tDZMzGBAFN0AiEAu5BI0oQ4o0wZcrDyKoU2GbeX hlG/g+OgTUftYMJ32so= B.2. requestauditing A coaps requestauditing message contains the signed CBOR voucher : POST coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616]/est/ra (Content-Format: application/voucher-cms+cbor) Payload = TO BE FILLED A 2.05 Content response returning a log of the voucher (ct=60) will then be: 2.05 Content (Content-Format: application/cbor) Payload = { "version":"1", "events":[ { "date":"<date/time of the entry>", "domainID":"<domainID extracted from voucher-request>", "nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>" "assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>" "truncated":"<the number of domainID entries truncated>" }, { "date":"<date/time of the entry>", "domainID":"<anotherDomainID extracted from voucher-request>", "nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>" "assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>" } ], "truncation": { "nonced duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>", "nonceless duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>", "arbitrary": "<number of domainID entries removed entirely>" } } [EDNOTE: Change JSON to CBOR; Serialize CBOR payload to binary] B.3. CMS signed voucher-request example The voucher-request example, visualized in CBOR diagnostic notation in Section 6.1.4 is shown as a hexadecimal dump of the binary file. a11909c5a90274323031362d31302d30375431393a33313a34325a0474323031 362d31302d32315431393a33313a34325a01020d6d4a414441313233343536 373839054401020d0f0a4401020d0f03f50674323031372d31302d30375431 393a33313a34325a0c4401020d0f The voucher-request example has been signed by using the WT1234 certificate and key pair shown in Appendix C of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]. The CMS signing of the binary voucher- request leads to a binary signed voucher-request, shown with a hexadecimal representation shown in the payload of the request part of Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2. The breakdown of the CMS signed binary voucher-request file is visualized below: CMS_ContentInfo: contentType: pkcs7-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2) d.signedData: version: 1 digestAlgorithms: algorithm: sha256 (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1) parameter: <ABSENT> encapContentInfo: eContentType: pkcs7-data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1) eContent: <ABSENT> certificates: d.certificate: cert_info: version: 2 serialNumber: 9112578475118446130 signature: algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2) parameter: <ABSENT> issuer: C=US, ST=CA, O=Example Inc, OU=certification, CN=802.1AR CA validity: notBefore: Jan 31 11:29:16 2019 GMT notAfter: Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=example Inc, OU=IoT/serialNumber=Wt1234 key: algor: algorithm: id-ecPublicKey (1.2.840.10045.2.1) parameter: OBJECT:prime256v1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7) public_key: (0 unused bits) 0000 - 04 c8 b4 21 f1 1c 25 e4-7e 3a c5 71 23 bf 000e - 2d 9f dc 49 4f 02 8b c3-51 cc 80 c0 3f 15 001c - 0b f5 0c ff 95 8d 75 41-9d 81 a6 a2 45 df 002a - fa e7 90 be 95 cf 75 f6-02 f9 15 26 18 f8 0038 - 16 a2 b2 3b 56 38 e5 9f-d9 issuerUID: <ABSENT> subjectUID: <ABSENT> extensions: object: X509v3 Basic Constraints (2.5.29.19) critical: BOOL ABSENT value: 0000 - 30 0002 - <SPACES/NULS> object: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier (2.5.29.14) critical: BOOL ABSENT value: 0000 - 04 14 96 60 0d 87 16 bf-7f d0 e7 52 d0 000d - ac 76 07 77 ad 66 5d 02-a0 object: X509v3 Authority Key Identifier (2.5.29.35) critical: BOOL ABSENT value: 0000 - 30 16 80 14 68 d1 65 51-f9 51 bf c8 2a 000d - 43 1d 0d 9f 08 bc 2d 20-5b 11 60 object: X509v3 Key Usage (2.5.29.15) critical: TRUE value: 0000 - 03 02 05 a0 object: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name (2.5.29.17) critical: BOOL ABSENT value: 0000 - 30 21 a0 1f 06 08 2b 06-01 05 05 07 08 000d - 04 a0 13 30 11 06 09 2b-06 01 04 01 b4 001a - 3b 0a 01 04 04 01 02 03-04 sig_alg: algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2) parameter: <ABSENT> signature: (0 unused bits) 0000 - 30 46 02 21 00 c0 d8 19-96 d2 50 7d 69 3f 3c 000f - 48 ea a5 ee 94 91 bd a6-db 21 40 99 d9 81 17 001e - c6 3b 36 13 74 cd 86 02-21 00 a7 74 98 9f 4c 002d - 32 1a 5c f2 5d 83 2a 4d-33 6a 08 ad 67 df 20 003c - f1 50 64 21 18 8a 0a de-6d 34 92 36 crls: <EMPTY> signerInfos: version: 1 d.issuerAndSerialNumber: issuer: C=US, ST=CA, O=Example Inc, OU=certification, CN=802.1AR CA serialNumber: 9112578475118446130 digestAlgorithm: algorithm: sha256 (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1) parameter: <ABSENT> signedAttrs: object: contentType (1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) value.set: OBJECT:pkcs7-data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1) object: signingTime (1.2.840.113549.1.9.5) value.set: UTCTIME:Jul 3 08:53:30 2019 GMT object: messageDigest (1.2.840.113549.1.9.4) value.set: OCTET STRING: 0000 - d4 b0 5c dd c8 b4 91 28-4a 18 ca 25 9d 000d - be d0 60 23 cf ad a0 aa-c2 95 ac e9 3f 001a - 0b 4f 44 9e 25 0020 - <SPACES/NULS> signatureAlgorithm: algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2) parameter: <ABSENT> signature: 0000 - 30 46 02 21 00 e5 e1 7f-23 c3 aa 14 9f 35 64 000f - 1e c4 4a 0f 68 fe b0 16-3b e6 7c 06 51 af bf 001e - 5a a0 99 59 e0 28 1f 02-21 00 b4 07 2f 7c c4 002d - f9 26 0c 6d 47 a7 93 56-de b8 da f7 23 f0 af 003c - 2b 59 16 cc 36 63 e7 91-89 39 df df unsignedAttrs: <EMPTY>hexadecimal. {"version": "1", "Status": 1, "Reason": "Informative human readable message", "reason-context": "Additional information"}<CODE ENDS> AppendixC.B. COSE examples These examples are generated on a pie 4 and a PC running BASH. Keys and Certificates have been generated with openssl with the following shell script: #!/bin/bash #try-cert.sh export dir=./brski/intermediate export cadir=./brski export cnfdir=./conf export format=pem export default_crl_days=30 sn=8 DevID=pledge.1.2.3.4 serialNumber="serialNumber=$DevID" export hwType=1.3.6.1.4.1.6715.10.1 export hwSerialNum=01020304 # Some hex export subjectAltName="otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4;SEQ:hmodname" echo $hwType - $hwSerialNum echo $serialNumber OPENSSL_BIN="openssl" # remove all files rm -r ./brski/* # # initialize file structure # root level cd $cadir mkdir certs crl csr newcerts private chmod 700 private touch index.txt touch serial echo 11223344556600 >serial echo 1000 > crlnumber # intermediate level mkdir intermediate cd intermediate mkdir certs crl csr newcerts private chmod 700 private touch index.txt echo 11223344556600 >serial echo 1000 > crlnumber cd ../.. # file structure is cleaned start filling echo "#############################" echo "create registrar keys and certificates " echo "#############################" echo "create root registrar certificate using ecdsa withsha256" opensslsha 256 key" $OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey \ -noout -out $cadir/private/ca-regis.keyopenssl$OPENSSL_BIN req -new -x509 \ -config $cnfdir/openssl-regis.cnf \ -key $cadir/private/ca-regis.key \ -out $cadir/certs/ca-regis.crt \ -extensions v3_ca\ -days 365 \ -subj"/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok\ "/OU=consultancy/CN=registrar.stok.nl""/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/OU=consultancy \ /CN=registrar.stok.nl" # Combine authority certificate and key echo "Combine authority certificate and key"openssl$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet\-passoutpass:watnietweet \pass:watnietweet\ -inkey $cadir/private/ca-regis.key \ -in $cadir/certs/ca-regis.crt -export \ -out $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.pfx # converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem echo "converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem"openssl$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\ -in $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.pfx\\\ -out $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.crt -nodes #show certificate in registrar combined certificateopenssl$OPENSSL_BIN x509 -in $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.crt -text # # Certificate Authority for MASA # echo "#############################" echo "create MASA keys and certificates " echo "#############################" echo "create root MASA certificate using ecdsa with sha 256 key"openssl$OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout \ -out $cadir/private/ca-masa.keyopenssl$OPENSSL_BIN req -new -x509 \ -config $cnfdir/openssl-masa.cnf \ -days3651000 -key $cadir/private/ca-masa.key \ -out $cadir/certs/ca-masa.crt \ -extensions v3_ca\ -subj"/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/\ OU=manufacturer/CN=masa.stok.nl""/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/OU=manufacturer\ /CN=masa.stok.nl" # Combine authority certificate and key echo "Combine authority certificate and key for masa"openssl$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet\-passout pass:watnietweet\ -inkey $cadir/private/ca-masa.key \ -in $cadir/certs/ca-masa.crt -export \ -out $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.pfx # converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem for masa echo "converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem for masa"openssl$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet\-passout pass:watnietweet\ -in $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.pfx \ -out $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.crt -nodes #show certificate in pledge combined certificateopenssl$OPENSSL_BIN x509 -in $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.crt -text # # Certificate for Pledge derived from MASA certificate # echo "#############################" echo "create pledge keys and certificates " echo "#############################" # Pledge derived Certificate echo "create pledge derived certificate using ecdsa withsha256" opensslsha 256 key" $OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey\-noout \ -out $dir/private/pledge.key echo "create pledge certificate request"openssl$OPENSSL_BIN req -nodes -new -sha256 \ -key $dir/private/pledge.key -out $dir/csr/pledge.csr \ -subj\"/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/OU=manufacturing\ /CN=uuid:$DevID/$serialNumber" # Sign pledge derived Certificate echo "sign pledge derived certificate "openssl$OPENSSL_BIN ca -config $cnfdir/openssl-pledge.cnf \ -extensions 8021ar_idevid\ -days 365 -in $dir/csr/pledge.csr \ -out $dir/certs/pledge.crt # Add pledge key and pledge certificate to pkcs12 file echo "Add derived pledge key and derived pledge \ certificate to pkcs12 file"openssl$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passinpass:watnietweet\pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\ -inkey $dir/private/pledge.key \ -in $dir/certs/pledge.crt -export \ -out $dir/certs/pledge-comb.pfx # converteer pledge pkcs12 file to pem echo "converteer pledge pkcs12 file to pem"openssl$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet\-passout pass:watnietweet\ -in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.pfx \ -out $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -nodes #show certificate in pledge-comb.crtopenssl$OPENSSL_BIN x509 -in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -text #show private key in pledge-comb.crtopenssl$OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -nameprime256v1 \prime256v1\ -in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -text <CODE ENDS> The xxxx-comb certificates have been generated as required by libcoap for the DTLS connection generation.C.1.B.1. Pledge, Registrar and MASA keys This first section documents the public and private keys used in the subsequent test vectors below. These keys come from test code and are not used in any production system, and should only be used only to validate implementations.C.1.1.B.1.1. Pledge private key-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgIpP20ud7muTl460b xFzupPkaMoaCIIIFwSOf0hvhQByhRANCAASKnIauvAtx6ZFWQniQOqvP0Zpdaudy Ve6Vrc80AjyWRGnN3oyQ0rnr5dXynfG2xq8+cY+uGwTrAJYp9OyoZCAs -----END PRIVATE KEY-----Private-Key: (256 bit) priv:22:93:f6:d2:e7:7b:9a:e4:e5:e3:ad:1b:c4:5c:ee: a4:f9:1a:32:86:82:20:82:05:c1:23:9f:d2:1b:e1: 40:1c9b:4d:43:b6:a9:e1:7c:04:93:45:c3:13:d9:b5:f0: 41:a9:6a:9c:45:79:73:b8:62:f1:77:03:3a:fc:c2: 9c:9a pub:04:8a:9c:86:ae:bc:0b:71:e9:91:56:42:78:90:3a: ab:cf:d1:9a:5d:6a:e7:72:55:ee:95:ad:cf:34:02: 3c:96:44:69:cd:de:8c:90:d2:b9:eb:e5:d5:f2:9d: f1:b6:c6:af:3e:71:8f:ae:1b:04:eb:00:96:29:f4: ec:a8:64:20:2c04:d6:b7:6f:74:88:bd:80:ae:5f:28:41:2c:72:02: ef:5f:98:b4:81:e1:d9:10:4c:f8:1b:66:d4:3e:5c: ea:da:73:e6:a8:38:a9:f1:35:11:85:b6:cd:e2:04: 10:be:fe:d5:0b:3b:14:69:2e:e1:b0:6a:bc:55:40: 60:eb:95:5c:54 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 NIST CURVE: P-256C.1.2.<CODE ENDS> B.1.2. Registrar private key-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgHCCOKLhln+l8pLnx gWtMUm7zRY4ugkznuFimYDKbrNihRANCAARqJKniS+I00XrUfnYMlLXh3E7hFa2J ESrUpqZLsb9o+Rd9cOkQnLSMmw3H3yZBGZ0MLb/yHtWEA4rIP0eBvhOO -----END PRIVATE KEY-----Private-Key: (256 bit) priv:1c:20:8e:28:b8:65:9f:e9:7c:a4:b9:f1:81:6b:4c: 52:6e:f3:45:8e:2e:82:4c:e7:b8:58:a6:60:32:9b: ac:d881:df:bb:50:a3:45:58:06:b5:56:3b:46:de:f3:e9: e9:00:ae:98:13:9e:2f:36:68:81:fc:d9:65:24:fb: 21:7e pub:04:6a:24:a9:e2:4b:e2:34:d1:7a:d4:7e:76:0c:94: b5:e1:dc:4e:e1:15:ad:89:11:2a:d4:a6:a6:4b:b1: bf:68:f9:17:7d:70:e9:10:9c:b4:8c:9b:0d:c7:df: 26:41:19:9d:0c:2d:bf:f2:1e:d5:84:03:8a:c8:3f: 47:81:be:13:8e04:50:7a:c8:49:1a:8c:69:c7:b5:c3:1d:03:09:ed: 35:ba:13:f5:88:4c:e6:2b:88:cf:30:18:15:4f:a0: 59:b0:20:ec:6b:eb:b9:4e:02:b8:93:40:21:89:8d: a7:89:c7:11:ce:a7:13:39:f5:0e:34:8e:df:0d:92: 3e:d0:2d:c7:b7 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 NIST CURVE: P-256C.1.3.<CODE ENDS> B.1.3. MASA private key-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgQODnSgB7xR/aa3Ea JrPGz9lZhJ1aEc/56OEPiBr86SKhRANCAASB9HLsnEeyjtHrODNBANNi9khQ2gLQ VrIie8hLgFmVdwfQw1iMPPI8WwCDeVTaDdGwr6HC6M0sO9CGRZ+JcwrL -----END PRIVATE KEY-----Private-Key: (256 bit) priv:40:e0:e7:4a:00:7b:c5:1f:da:6b:71:1a:26:b3:c6: cf:d9:59:84:9d:5a:11:cf:f9:e8:e1:0f:88:1a:fc: e9:22c6:bb:a5:8f:b6:d3:c4:75:28:d8:d3:d9:46:c3:31: 83:6d:00:0a:9a:38:ce:22:5c:e9:d9:ea:3b:98:32: ec:31 pub:04:81:f4:72:ec:9c:47:b2:8e:d1:eb:38:33:41:00: d3:62:f6:48:50:da:02:d0:56:b2:22:7b:c8:4b:80: 59:95:77:07:d0:c3:58:8c:3c:f2:3c:5b:00:83:79: 54:da:0d:d1:b0:af:a1:c2:e8:cd:2c:3b:d0:86:45: 9f:89:73:0a:cb04:59:80:94:66:14:94:20:30:3c:66:08:85:55:86: db:e7:d4:d1:d7:7a:d2:a3:1a:0c:73:6b:01:0d:02: 12:15:d6:1f:f3:6e:c8:d4:84:60:43:3b:21:c5:83: 80:1e:fc:e2:37:85:77:97:94:d4:aa:34:b5:b6:c6: ed:f3:17:5c:f1 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 NIST CURVE: P-256C.2.<CODE ENDS> B.2. Pledge, Registrar and MASA certificates Below the certificates that accompany the keys. The certificate description is followed by the hexadecimal DER of the certificateC.2.1.B.2.1. Pledge IDevID certificate Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 4822678189204992 (0x11223344556600) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=manufacturer, CN=masa.stok.nl Validity Not Before:SepDec 907:42:0310:02:36 2020 GMT Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=manufacturing, CN=uuid:pledge.1.2.3.4/serialNumber=pledge.1.2.3.4 Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-Key: (256 bit) pub:04:8a:9c:86:ae:bc:0b:71:e9:91:56:42:78:90:3a: ab:cf:d1:9a:5d:6a:e7:72:55:ee:95:ad:cf:34:02: 3c:96:44:69:cd:de:8c:90:d2:b9:eb:e5:d5:f2:9d: f1:b6:c6:af:3e:71:8f:ae:1b:04:eb:00:96:29:f4: ec:a8:64:20:2c04:d6:b7:6f:74:88:bd:80:ae:5f:28:41:2c:72:02: ef:5f:98:b4:81:e1:d9:10:4c:f8:1b:66:d4:3e:5c: ea:da:73:e6:a8:38:a9:f1:35:11:85:b6:cd:e2:04: 10:be:fe:d5:0b:3b:14:69:2e:e1:b0:6a:bc:55:40: 60:eb:95:5c:54 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 NIST CURVE: P-256 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE X509v3Subject Key Identifier: 59:B1:E1:19:F4:68:53:E9:0E:7C:9F:29:D0:FB:5B:1F:AC:C3:82:49 X509v3Authority Key Identifier: keyid:22:BC:B8:20:D9:C5:6D:2D:5B:B3:BB:64:8B:E0:8B:A7:86:5E:CE:B4 X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key EnciphermentE4:03:93:B4:C3:D3:F4:2A:80:A4:77:18:F6:96:49:03:01:17:68:A3 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA25630:45:02:20:4d:fd:a8:83:78:31:d2:62:a4:e5:48:a2:e0:a7: 3b:c5:14:e9:7e:46:13:45:bc:30:fd:1d:e5:d6:63:3e:d8:f4: 02:21:00:a8:e5:1e:c2:79:77:90:fc:40:a8:7a:bf:b1:bd:81: 8b:ee:d7:56:1a:04:4d:8f:c8:3d:76:5f:4d:6e:36:a2:c230:46:02:21:00:d2:e6:45:3b:b0:c3:00:b3:25:8d:f1:83:fe: d9:37:c1:a2:49:65:69:7f:6b:b9:ef:2c:05:07:06:31:ac:17: bd:02:21:00:e2:ce:9e:7b:7f:74:50:33:ad:9e:ff:12:4e:e9: a6:f3:b8:36:65:ab:7d:80:bb:56:88:bc:03:1d:e5:1e:31:6f <CODE ENDS> This is the hexadecimal representation in (request-)voucher examples referred to as pledge-cert-hex.30820254308201faa003020102020711223344556600300a06082a8648ce3d0430820226308201cba003020102020711223344556600300a06082a8648ce3d04 0302306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110 300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e6465 7273746f6b31153013060355040b0c0c6d616e7566616374757265723115301306035504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c3020170d323030393039303734 3230335a180f39393939313233313233353935395a308190310b30090603550406035504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c3020170d323031323039313030 3233365a180f39393939313233313233353935395a308190310b300906035504 0613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c 6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31163014060355 040b0c0d6d616e75666163747572696e67311c301a06035504030c1375756964 3a706c656467652e312e322e332e34311730150603550405130e706c65646765 2e312e322e332e343059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107034200048a9c86aebc0b71e991564278903aabcfd19a5d6ae77255ee95adcf3402 3c964469cdde8c90d2b9ebe5d5f29df1b6c6af3e718fae1b04eb009629f4eca8 64202ca35d305b30090603551d1304023000301d0603551d0e0416041459b1e1 19f46853e90e7c9f29d0fb5b1facc38249301f0603551d2304183016801422bc b820d9c56d2d5bb3bb648be08ba7865eceb4300e0603551d0f0101ff04040302 05a0300a06082a8648ce3d040302034800304502204dfda8837831d262a4e548 a2e0a73bc514e97e461345bc30fd1de5d6633ed8f4022100a8e51ec2797790fc 40a87abfb1bd818beed7561a044d8fc83d765f4d6e36a2c2 C.2.2.420004d6b76f7488bd80ae5f28412c7202ef5f98b481e1d9104cf81b66d43e5c eada73e6a838a9f1351185b6cde20410befed50b3b14692ee1b06abc554060eb 955c54a32e302c30090603551d1304023000301f0603551d23041830168014e4 0393b4c3d3f42a80a47718f6964903011768a3300a06082a8648ce3d04030203 49003046022100d2e6453bb0c300b3258df183fed937c1a24965697f6bb9ef2c 05070631ac17bd022100e2ce9e7b7f745033ad9eff124ee9a6f3b83665ab7d80 bb5688bc031de51e316f<CODE ENDS> B.2.2. Registrar Certificate Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number:39:73:74:f3:fa:81:2a:0d:37:10:3b:68:c1:84:81:c5:01:bc:7c:fe70:56:ea:aa:30:66:d8:82:6a:55:5b:90:88:d4:62:bf:9c:f2:8c:fd Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=consultancy, CN=registrar.stok.nl Validity Not Before:SepDec 907:42:0310:02:36 2020 GMT Not After :SepDec 907:42:0310:02:36 2021 GMT Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=consultancy, CN=registrar.stok.nl Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-Key: (256 bit) pub:04:6a:24:a9:e2:4b:e2:34:d1:7a:d4:7e:76:0c:94: b5:e1:dc:4e:e1:15:ad:89:11:2a:d4:a6:a6:4b:b1: bf:68:f9:17:7d:70:e9:10:9c:b4:8c:9b:0d:c7:df: 26:41:19:9d:0c:2d:bf:f2:1e:d5:84:03:8a:c8:3f: 47:81:be:13:8e04:50:7a:c8:49:1a:8c:69:c7:b5:c3:1d:03:09:ed: 35:ba:13:f5:88:4c:e6:2b:88:cf:30:18:15:4f:a0: 59:b0:20:ec:6b:eb:b9:4e:02:b8:93:40:21:89:8d: a7:89:c7:11:ce:a7:13:39:f5:0e:34:8e:df:0d:92: 3e:d0:2d:c7:b7 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 NIST CURVE: P-256 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:25:CD:93:71:B5:A1:5F:6D:1E:E8:C3:7A:51:13:BE:0B:8F:13:2C:C208:C2:BF:36:88:7F:79:41:21:85:87:2F:16:A7:AC:A6:EF:B3:D2:B3 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:25:CD:93:71:B5:A1:5F:6D:1E:E8:C3:7A:51:13:BE:0B:8F:13:2C:C208:C2:BF:36:88:7F:79:41:21:85:87:2F:16:A7:AC:A6:EF:B3:D2:B3 X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:TRUE X509v3 Extended Key Usage: CMC Registration Authority, TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA25630:46:02:21:00:a6:6d:9e:24:f9:de:08:b7:f0:cf:43:c3:c0: ee:57:cc:b6:60:de:ae:2e:70:cc:61:a1:a2:b3:35:35:02:5b: ba:02:21:00:bf:fd:74:6a:99:eb:da:01:77:fc:6c:37:95:75: 8a:f4:a0:9f:99:8e:bc:4a:90:62:49:f0:7a:c9:65:96:dc:7530:44:02:20:74:4c:99:00:85:13:b2:f1:bc:fd:f9:02:1a:46: fb:17:4c:f8:83:a2:7c:a1:d9:3f:ae:ac:f3:1e:4e:dd:12:c6: 02:20:11:47:14:db:f5:1a:5e:78:f5:81:b9:42:1c:6e:47:02: ab:53:72:70:c5:ba:fb:2d:16:c3:de:9a:a1:82:c3:5f <CODE ENDS> This the hexadecimal representation, in (request-)voucher examples referred to as regis-cert-hex30820239308201dea0030201020214397374f3fa812a0d37103b68c18481c501 bc7cfe300a06082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b308202753082021ca00302010202147056eaaa3066d8826a555b9088d462bf9c f28cfd300a06082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b 300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e64311330 11060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e 73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c301e170d3230303930393037343230335a170d323130393039303734 3230335a3073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e426b2e6e6c301e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d323131323039313030 3233365a3073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e42 3110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e 64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a30 1806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107034200046a24a9e24be234d17ad47e76 0c94b5e1dc4ee115ad89112ad4a6a64bb1bf68f9177d70e9109cb48c9b0dc7df 2641199d0c2dbff21ed584038ac83f4781be138ea350304e301d0603551d0e04 16041425cd9371b5a15f6d1ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2301f0603551d230418 3016801425cd9371b5a15f6d1ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2300c0603551d1304 0530030101ff300a06082a8648ce3d0403020349003046022100a66d9e24f9de 08b7f0cf43c3c0ee57ccb660deae2e70cc61a1a2b33535025bba022100bffd74 6a99ebda0177fc6c3795758af4a09f998ebc4a906249f07ac96596dc75 C.2.3.8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004507ac8491a8c69c7b5c31d03 09ed35ba13f5884ce62b88cf3018154fa059b020ec6bebb94e02b8934021898d a789c711cea71339f50e348edf0d923ed02dc7b7a3818d30818a301d0603551d 0e0416041408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3301f0603551d23 04183016801408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3300f0603551d 130101ff040530030101ff30270603551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c 06082b0601050507030106082b06010505070302300e0603551d0f0101ff0404 030201f6300a06082a8648ce3d04030203470030440220744c99008513b2f1bc fdf9021a46fb174cf883a27ca1d93faeacf31e4edd12c60220114714dbf51a5e 78f581b9421c6e4702ab537270c5bafb2d16c3de9aa182c35f<CODE ENDS> B.2.3. MASA Certificate Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number:70:5a:34:7e:67:d2:4d:70:b0:c6:ca:60:ff:fb:75:d9:46:82:e6:0e14:26:b8:1c:ce:d8:c3:e8:14:05:cb:87:67:0d:be:ef:d5:81:25:b4 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=manufacturer, CN=masa.stok.nl Validity Not Before:SepDec 907:42:0310:02:36 2020 GMT Not After : Sep9 07:42:03 20215 10:02:36 2023 GMT Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=manufacturer, CN=masa.stok.nl Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-Key: (256 bit) pub:04:81:f4:72:ec:9c:47:b2:8e:d1:eb:38:33:41:00: d3:62:f6:48:50:da:02:d0:56:b2:22:7b:c8:4b:80: 59:95:77:07:d0:c3:58:8c:3c:f2:3c:5b:00:83:79: 54:da:0d:d1:b0:af:a1:c2:e8:cd:2c:3b:d0:86:45: 9f:89:73:0a:cb04:59:80:94:66:14:94:20:30:3c:66:08:85:55:86: db:e7:d4:d1:d7:7a:d2:a3:1a:0c:73:6b:01:0d:02: 12:15:d6:1f:f3:6e:c8:d4:84:60:43:3b:21:c5:83: 80:1e:fc:e2:37:85:77:97:94:d4:aa:34:b5:b6:c6: ed:f3:17:5c:f1 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 NIST CURVE: P-256 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:22:BC:B8:20:D9:C5:6D:2D:5B:B3:BB:64:8B:E0:8B:A7:86:5E:CE:B4E4:03:93:B4:C3:D3:F4:2A:80:A4:77:18:F6:96:49:03:01:17:68:A3 X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:22:BC:B8:20:D9:C5:6D:2D:5B:B3:BB:64:8B:E0:8B:A7:86:5E:CE:B4E4:03:93:B4:C3:D3:F4:2A:80:A4:77:18:F6:96:49:03:01:17:68:A3 X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:TRUE X509v3 Extended Key Usage: CMC Registration Authority, TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA25630:45:02:20:04:ac:8d:48:62:a2:a5:04:4f:61:fd:38:83:53: 9f:00:e7:d6:4b:4d:30:1b:84:29:d4:2d:35:58:b0:a0:0c:7d: 02:21:00:8c:f1:f4:f9:a2:11:fe:64:46:a9:87:9f:58:ca:ea: da:4f:0a:42:32:c2:6a:e8:c5:9d:62:c0:67:f0:b8:44:4330:44:02:20:2e:c5:f2:24:72:70:20:ea:6e:74:8b:13:93:67: 8a:e6:fe:fb:8d:56:7f:f5:34:18:a9:ef:a5:0f:c3:99:ca:53: 02:20:3d:dc:91:d0:e9:6a:69:20:01:fb:e4:20:40:de:7c:7d: 98:ed:d8:84:53:61:84:a7:f9:13:06:4c:a9:b2:8f:5c <CODE ENDS> This is the hexadecimal representation, in (request-)voucher examples referred to as masa-cert-hex.30820230308201d6a0030201020214705a347e67d24d70b0c6ca60fffb75d946 82e60e300a06082a8648ce3d040302306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b3082026d30820214a00302010202141426b81cced8c3e81405cb87670dbeefd5 8125b4300a06082a8648ce3d040302306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b 300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e64311330 11060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31153013060355040b0c0c6d616e 7566616374757265723115301306035504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c301e170d3230303930393037343230335a170d3231303930393037343230335a301e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d3233303930353130303233365a 306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e 06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273 746f6b31153013060355040b0c0c6d616e756661637475726572311530130603 5504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000481f472ec9c47b28ed1eb38334100d362f64850da 02d056b2227bc84b8059957707d0c3588c3cf23c5b00837954da0dd1b0afa1c2 e8cd2c3bd086459f89730acba350304e301d0603551d0e0416041422bcb820d9 c56d2d5bb3bb648be08ba7865eceb4301f0603551d2304183016801422bcb820 d9c56d2d5bb3bb648be08ba7865eceb4300c0603551d13040530030101ff300a 06082a8648ce3d0403020348003045022004ac8d4862a2a5044f61fd3883539f 00e7d64b4d301b8429d42d3558b0a00c7d0221008cf1f4f9a211fe6446a9879f 58caeada4f0a4232c26ae8c59d62c067f0b84443 C.3.2a8648ce3d0301070342000459809466149420303c6608855586dbe7d4d1d77a d2a31a0c736b010d021215d61ff36ec8d48460433b21c583801efce237857797 94d4aa34b5b6c6edf3175cf1a3818d30818a301d0603551d0e04160414e40393 b4c3d3f42a80a47718f6964903011768a3301f0603551d23041830168014e403 93b4c3d3f42a80a47718f6964903011768a3300f0603551d130101ff04053003 0101ff30270603551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c06082b0601050507 030106082b06010505070302300e0603551d0f0101ff0404030201f6300a0608 2a8648ce3d040302034700304402202ec5f224727020ea6e748b1393678ae6fe fb8d567ff53418a9efa50fc399ca5302203ddc91d0e96a692001fbe42040de7c 7d98edd884536184a7f913064ca9b28f5c<CODE ENDS> B.3. COSE signed voucher request frompledgePledge to Registrar In this example the voucher request has been signed by thepledge,Pledge, and has been sent to the JRC over CoAPS.This exampleThe Pledge uses theproximity-registrar-cert mechanismproximity assertion together with an included proximity-registrar- cert field to inform MASA about its proximity torequest a voucher that pins the certificate oftheregistrar.specific Registrar. POST coaps://registrar.example.com/est/rv (Content-Format: application/voucher-cose+cbor) signed_request_voucher The payload signed_request_voucher is shown as hexadecimal dump (with lf added):d28444a101382ea1045820f8926f5ba385b7bccf23592b97a73c1b00bffc01023 0f647f06960870b1fd6ee5902aca11909c5a61909c77818323032302d31302d35 5431333a34363a31332d30303a30301909c97818323032322d31302d355431333 a34363a31332d30303a30301909c6021909cc5029c7bafb81a2c6160d3357d229 11f5101909d26e706c656467652e312e322e332e341909cf59023d30820239308 201dea0030201020214397374f3fa812a0d37103b68c18481c501bc7cfe300a06 082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b3009060355040 80c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c 0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e637 9311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c301e170d 3230303930393037343230335a170d3231303930393037343230335a3073310b3 009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e0603550407 0c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143 012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265 676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a864 8ce3d030107034200046a24a9e24be234d17ad47e760c94b5e1dc4ee115ad8911 2ad4a6a64bb1bf68f9177d70e9109cb48c9b0dc7df2641199d0c2dbff21ed5840 38ac83f4781be138ea350304e301d0603551d0e0416041425cd9371b5a15f6d1e e8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2301f0603551d2304183016801425cd9371b5a15f6d1 ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2300c0603551d13040530030101ff300a06082a8648 ce3d0403020349003046022100a66d9e24f9de08b7f0cf43c3c0ee57ccb660dea e2e70cc61a1a2b33535025bba022100bffd746a99ebda0177fc6c3795758af4a0 9f998ebc4a906249f07ac96596dc7558473045022100fc28be418e5f25152590e 872b4bbdbe334cd31d1ebb0a806e7a172cad5cff604022056ee414ddac438e7f5 1dda9ddf6ec6e31a78cdde6574717fe46dd3a7c60f5bb5d28444a101382ea104582097113db094eee8eae48683e7337875c0372164be89d023a5f3d f52699c0fbfb55902d2a11909c5a60274323032302d31322d32335431323a30353a32325a 0474323032322d31322d32335431323a30353a32325a01020750684ca83e27230aff97630 cf2c1ec409a0d6e706c656467652e312e322e332e340a590279308202753082021ca00302 010202147056eaaa3066d8826a555b9088d462bf9cf28cfd300a06082a8648ce3d0403023 073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e0603550407 0c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b3114301206035 5040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e 73746f6b2e6e6c301e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d323131323039313030323 3365a3073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e0603 5504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b3114301 2060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c1172656769737472 61722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0301070342000 4507ac8491a8c69c7b5c31d0309ed35ba13f5884ce62b88cf3018154fa059b020ec6bebb9 4e02b8934021898da789c711cea71339f50e348edf0d923ed02dc7b7a3818d30818a301d0 603551d0e0416041408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3301f0603551d2304 183016801408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3300f0603551d130101ff040 530030101ff30270603551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c06082b06010505070301 06082b06010505070302300e0603551d0f0101ff0404030201f6300a06082a8648ce3d040 30203470030440220744c99008513b2f1bcfdf9021a46fb174cf883a27ca1d93faeacf31e 4edd12c60220114714dbf51a5e78f581b9421c6e4702ab537270c5bafb2d16c3de9aa182c 35f58473045022063766c7bbd1b339dbc398e764af3563e93b25a69104befe9aac2b3336b 8f56e1022100cd0419559ad960ccaed4dee3f436eca40b7570b25a52eb60332bc1f299148 4e9 <CODE ENDS> The representiation of signed_voucher_request in CBOR diagnostic format is: Diagnose(signed_request_voucher) = 18([ h'A101382E', # {"alg": -47}{4:h'F8926F5BA385B7BCCF23592B97A73C1B00BFFC010230F647F06960870B1F D6EE'}, h'request_voucher' h'3045022100FC28BE418E5F25152590E872B4BBDBE334CD31D1EBB0A806E7A17 2CAD5CFF604022056EE414DDAC438E7F51DDA9DDF6EC6E31A78CDDE6574717FE4 6DD3A7C60F5BB5']){4: h'97113DB094EEE8EAE48683E7337875C0372164BE89D023A5F3DF52699C0FBFB5'}, h'request_voucher', h'3045022063766C7BBD1B339DBC398E764AF3563E93B25A69104BEFE9AAC2B3336B8F56E 1022100CD0419559AD960CCAED4DEE3F436ECA40B7570B25A52EB60332BC1F2991484E9' ]) Diagnose(request_voucher) = {2501:{2503: "2020-10-5T13:46:13-00:00", 2505: "2022-10-5T13:46:13-00:00", 2502:{2: "2020-12-23T12:05:22Z", 4: "2022-12-23T12:05:22Z", 1: 2,2508: h'29C7BAFB81A2C6160D3357D22911F510', 2514:7: h'684CA83E27230AFF97630CF2C1EC409A', 13: "pledge.1.2.3.4",2511: h'regis-cert-hex'}}, C.4.10: h'regis-cert-hex'}} <CODE ENDS> B.4. COSE signed voucher request from Registrar to MASA In this example the voucher request has been signed by the JRC using the private key from AppendixC.1.2.B.1.2. Contained within this voucher request is the voucher request from thepledgePledge to JRC. POST coaps://masa.example.com/est/rv (Content-Format: application/voucher-cose+cbor) signed_masa_request_voucher The payload signed_masa_voucher_request is shown as hexadecimal dump (with lf added):d28444a101382ea1045820b86ae808f79af17e5948cbda731f158d04bd091c73f 485f2409eac08ee7ddb5c5903fea11909c5a61909c77818323032302d31302d35 5431333a34363a31332d30303a30301909c97818323032322d31302d355431333 a34363a31332d30303a30301909cc5029c7bafb81a2c6160d3357d22911f51019 09d26e706c656467652e312e322e332e341909ca586b433d4e4c2c2053543d4e4 22c204c3d48656c6d6f6e642c204f3d76616e64657273746f6b2c204f553d6d61 6e75666163747572696e672c20434e3d757569643a706c656467652e312e322e3 32e342c2073657269616c4e756d6265723d706c656467652e312e322e332e3419 09ce590323d28444a101382ea1045820f8926f5ba385b7bccf23592b97a73c1b0 0bffc010230f647f06960870b1fd6ee5902aca11909c5a61909c7781832303230 2d31302d355431333a34363a31332d30303a30301909c97818323032322d31302 d355431333a34363a31332d30303a30301909c6021909cc5029c7bafb81a2c616 0d3357d22911f5101909d26e706c656467652e312e322e332e341909cf59023d3 0820239308201dea0030201020214397374f3fa812a0d37103b68c18481c501bc 7cfe300a06082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300 906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e643113301106 0355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756 c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e 6c301e170d3230303930393037343230335a170d3231303930393037343230335 a3073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e 06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e646572737 46f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504 030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020 106082a8648ce3d030107034200046a24a9e24be234d17ad47e760c94b5e1dc4e e115ad89112ad4a6a64bb1bf68f9177d70e9109cb48c9b0dc7df2641199d0c2db ff21ed584038ac83f4781be138ea350304e301d0603551d0e0416041425cd9371 b5a15f6d1ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2301f0603551d2304183016801425cd937 1b5a15f6d1ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2300c0603551d13040530030101ff300a 06082a8648ce3d0403020349003046022100a66d9e24f9de08b7f0cf43c3c0ee5 7ccb660deae2e70cc61a1a2b33535025bba022100bffd746a99ebda0177fc6c37 95758af4a09f998ebc4a906249f07ac96596dc7558473045022100fc28be418e5 f25152590e872b4bbdbe334cd31d1ebb0<<a806e7a172cad5cff604022056ee41 4ddac438e7f51dda9ddf6ec6e31a78cdde6574717fe46dd3a7c60f5bb55847304 5022047b5314c72cbb2d1212e51198061167c79e1002874cd2665a5b643fa6436 3c30022100ce49ac309f760bd0e75660a7e29edee82f0251724c124150f5326b9 b2654927cd28444a101382ea1045820e8735bc4b470c3aa6a7aa9aa8ee584c09c11131b205efec5d03 13bad84c5cd05590414a11909c5a60274323032302d31322d32385431303a30333a33355a 0474323032322d31322d32385431303a30333a33355a07501551631f6e0416bd162ba53ea 00c2a050d6e706c656467652e312e322e332e3405587131322d32385431303a30333a3335 5a07501551631f6e0416bd162ba53ea00c2a050d6e706c656467652e312e322e332e34055 87131322d32385431303a300000000000000000000000000416bd162ba53ea00c2a050d6e 706c656467652e312e322e332e3405587131322d32385431303a09590349d28444a101382 ea104582097113db094eee8eae48683e7337875c0372164be89d023a5f3df52699c0fbfb5 5902d2a11909c5a60274323032302d31322d32385431303a30333a33355a0474323032322 d31322d32385431303a30333a33355a010207501551631f6e0416bd162ba53ea00c2a050d 6e706c656467652e312e322e332e340a590279308202753082021ca00302010202147056e aaa3066d8826a555b9088d462bf9cf28cfd300a06082a8648ce3d0403023073310b300906 0355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6 f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f 6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6 c301e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d3231313230393130303233365a3073310b 3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c07486 56c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c 0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6 b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004507ac8491a8c 69c7b5c31d0309ed35ba13f5884ce62b88cf3018154fa059b020ec6bebb94e02b89340218 98da789c711cea71339f50e348edf0d923ed02dc7b7a3818d30818a301d0603551d0e0416 041408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3301f0603551d2304183016801408c 2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3300f0603551d130101ff040530030101ff30 270603551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c06082b0601050507030106082b0601050 5070302300e0603551d0f0101ff0404030201f6300a06082a8648ce3d0403020347003044 0220744c99008513b2f1bcfdf9021a46fb174cf883a27ca1d93faeacf31e4edd12c602201 14714dbf51a5e78f581b9421c6e4702ab537270c5bafb2d16c3de9aa182c35f5847304502 2063766c7bbd1b339dbc398e764af3563e93b25a69104befe9aac2b3336b8f56e1022100c d0419559ad960ccaed4dee3f436eca40b7570b25a52eb60332bc1f2991484e95847304502 2100e6b45558c1b806bba23f4ac626c9bdb6fd354ef4330d8dfb7c529f29cca934c802203 c1f2ccbbac89733d17ee7775bc2654c5f1cc96afba2741cc31532444aa8fed8 <CODE ENDS> The representiation of signed_masa_voucher_request in CBOR diagnostic format is:Diagnose(signed_masa_request_voucher) =Diagnose(signed_registrar_request-voucher) 18([ h'A101382E', # {"alg": -47}{4:h'B86AE808F79AF17E5948CBDA731F158D04BD091C73F485F2409EAC08EE7D DB5C'}, h'masa_request_voucher', h'3045022047B5314C72CBB2D1212E51198061167C79E1002874CD2665A5B643F A64363C30022100CE49AC309F760BD0E75660A7E29EDEE82F0251724C124150F5 326B9B2654927C']) Diagnose(masa_request_voucher) =h'E8735BC4B470C3AA6A7AA9AA8EE584C09C11131B205EFEC5D0313BAD84C5CD0 5'}, h'registrar_request_voucher', h'3045022100E6B45558C1B806BBA23F4AC626C9BDB6FD354EF4330D8DFB7C529 F29CCA934C802203C1F2CCBBAC89733D17EE7775BC2654C5F1CC96AFBA2741CC3 1532444AA8FED8' ]) Diagnose(registrar_request_voucher) {2501:{2503: "2020-10-5T13:46:13-00:00", 2505: "2022-10-5T13:46:13-00:00", 2508: h'29C7BAFB81A2C6160D3357D22911F510', 2514:{2: "2020-12-28T10:03:35Z", 4: "2022-12-28T10:03:35Z", 7: h'1551631F6E0416BD162BA53EA00C2A05', 13: "pledge.1.2.3.4",2506:h'433D4E4C2C2053543D4E422C204C3D48656C6D6F6E642C 204F3D76616E64657273746F6B2C204F553D6D616E75666163747572696E672C2 0434E3D757569643A706C656467652E312E322E332E342C2073657269616C4E75 6D6265723D706C656467652E312E322E332E34', 2510: h'request_voucher'}}, C.5.5: h'31322D32385431303A30333A33355A07501551631F6E0416BD162BA53EA00C2 A050D6E706C656467652E312E322E332E3405587131322D32385431303A300000 000000000000000000000416BD162BA53EA00C2A050D6E706C656467652E312E3 22E332E3405587131322D32385431303A', 9: h'signed_request_voucher'}} <CODE ENDS> B.5. COSE signed voucher from MASA to Pledge via Registrar The resulting voucher is created by the MASA and returned via the JRC to the Pledge. It is signed by the MASA's private key AppendixC.1.3B.1.3 and can be verified by thepledgePledge using the MASA's public key contained within the MASA certificate. This is the raw binary signed_voucher, encoded in hexadecimal (with lf added):d28444a101382ea1045820ab59b0679fcf65d5223d4ce4266a27a9c7432702466 ff5f3648e822a64d61b145902b0a1190993a71909957818323032302d31302d35 5431333a34363a31342d30303a30301909977818323032322d31302d355431333 a34363a31342d30303a30301909940319099a5029c7bafb81a2c6160d3357d229 11f51019099e6e706c656467652e312e322e332e3419099b59023d30820239308 201dea0030201020214397374f3fa812a0d37103b68c18481c501bc7cfe300a06 082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b3009060355040 80c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c 0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e637 9311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c301e170d 3230303930393037343230335a170d3231303930393037343230335a3073310b3 009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e0603550407 0c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143 012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265 676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a864 8ce3d030107034200046a24a9e24be234d17ad47e760c94b5e1dc4ee115ad8911 2ad4a6a64bb1bf68f9177d70e9109cb48c9b0dc7df2641199d0c2dbff21ed5840 38ac83f4781be138ea350304e301d0603551d0e0416041425cd9371b5a15f6d1e e8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2301f0603551d2304183016801425cd9371b5a15f6d1 ee8c37a5113be0b8f132cc2300c0603551d13040530030101ff300a06082a8648 ce3d0403020349003046022100a66d9e24f9de08b7f0cf43c3c0ee57ccb660dea e2e70cc61a1a2b33535025bba022100bffd746a99ebda0177fc6c3795758af4a0 9f998ebc4a906249f07ac96596dc751909960058483046022100d07cadc5c2836 e7845d6d2e2652527386bd40258d20ab24b6bbce5515df915e9022100aba68a07 b2295c4b49d53f73ea370ca66f761ad5d8d8c11c19a2d505729285cbd28444a101382ea104582039920a34ee92d3148ab3a729f58611193270c9029f7784daf11 2614b19445d5158cfa1190993a70274323032302d31322d32335431353a30333a31325a04 74323032302d31322d32335431353a32333a31325a010007506508e06b2959d5089d7a316 9ea889a490b6e706c656467652e312e322e332e340858753073310b300906035504061302 4e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e643113301 1060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c7461 6e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c03f45847304 5022022515d96cd12224ee5d3ac673237163bba24ad84815699285d9618f463ee73fa0221 00a6bff9d8585c1c9256371ece94da3d26264a5dfec0a354fe7b3aef58344c512f <CODE ENDS> The representiation of signed_voucher in CBOR diagnostic format is:Diagnose (signed_voucher)Diagnose(signed_voucher) = 18([ h'A101382E', # {"alg": -47} {4:h'AB59B0679FCF65D5223D4CE4266A27A9C7432702466FF5F3648E822A64D61 B14'},h'39920A34EE92D3148AB3A729F58611193270C9029F7784DAF112614B194 45D51'}, h'voucher',h'3046022100D07CADC5C2836E7845D6D2E2652527386BD40258D20AB24B6BBCE 5515DF915E9022100ABA68A07B2295C4B49D53F73EA370CA66F761AD5D8D8C11C 19A2D505729285CB']) Diagnose (voucher)h'3045022022515D96CD12224EE5D3AC673237163BBA24AD84815699285D9618F 463EE73FA022100A6BFF9D8585C1C9256371ECE94DA3D26264A5DFEC0A354FE7B 3AEF58344C512F' ]) Diagnose(voucher) = {2451:{2453: "2020-10-5T13:46:14-00:00", 2455: "2022-10-5T13:46:14-00:00", 2452: 3, 2458: h'29C7BAFB81A2C6160D3357D22911F510', 2462:{2: "2020-12-23T15:03:12Z", 4: "2020-12-23T15:23:12Z", 1: 0, 7: h'6508E06B2959D5089D7A3169EA889A49', 11: "pledge.1.2.3.4",2459:8: h'regis-cert-hex',2454: 0}}3: false}} <CODE ENDS> Authors' Addresses Michael Richardson Sandelman Software Works Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca Peter van der Stok vanderstok consultancy Email: consultancy@vanderstok.org Panos Kampanakis Cisco Systems Email: pkampana@cisco.com Esko Dijk IoTconsultancy.nl Email: esko.dijk@iotconsultancy.nl