wdiff draft-ietf-dice-profile-06.txt draft-ietf-dice-profile-07.txt

dice H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Internet-Draft ARM Ltd.
Intended status: Standards Track T. Fossati
Expires: June 11, 18, 2015 Alcatel-Lucent
December 8, 15, 2014

A Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) TLS/DTLS 1.2 Profile for the Internet of Things
draft-ietf-dice-profile-06.txt
draft-ietf-dice-profile-07.txt

Abstract

This document defines a DTLS 1.2 profile that is suitable for
Internet of Things applications and is reasonably implementable on
many constrained devices.

A common design pattern in IoT Internet of Things (IoT) deployments is
the use of a constrained device (typically providing sensor data)
that interacts
with the web infrastructure. makes data available for home automation, industrial control
systems, smart cities and other IoT deployments.

This document focuses on defines a Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
TLS 1.2 profile that offers communications security for this
particular pattern. data
exchange thereby preventing eavesdropping, tampering, and message
forgery.

Status of This Memo

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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 11, 18, 2015.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3
3. DTLS TLS/DTLS Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. The Communication Model Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. The Ciphersuite Concept
4.1. Constrained TLS/DTLS Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Constrained TLS/DTLS Servers . . . . . 7 . . . . . . . . . 12
5. The TLS/DTLS Ciphersuite Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Credential Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 13
6.1. Pre-Shared Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 13
6.2. Raw Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 15
6.3. Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 17
7. Signature Algorithm Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 20
8. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 20
9. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 21
10. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 22
11. Perfect Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 22
12. Keep-Alive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 23
13. Timeouts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 25
14. Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 25
15. Truncated MAC and Encrypt-then-MAC Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 26
16. Server Name Indication (SNI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 27
17. Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 27
18. TLS Session Hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 . . 27
19. Re-Negotiation Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 28
20. Downgrading Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 28
21. Crypto Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 29
22. Key Length Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 30
23. TLS False Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 . . 31
24. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 32
25. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 32
26. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 33
27. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 33
28. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 33
28.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 33
28.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 34
Appendix A. Conveying DTLS over SMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 38
A.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 38
A.2. Message Segmentation and Re-Assembly . . . . . . . . . . 33 39
A.3. Multiplexing Security Associations . . . . . . . . . . . 34 40
A.4. Timeout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 40

Appendix B. DTLS Record Layer Per-Packet Overhead . . . . . . . 41
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 42

1. Introduction

This document defines a DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] profile that offers
communication security for

An engineer developing an Internet of Things (IoT) applications and
is reasonably implementable on many constrained devices. The DTLS
1.2 protocol is based on Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2 [RFC5246]
and provides equivalent security guarantees. This document aims to
meet the following goals:

o Serves as a one-stop shop for implementers to know which pieces of
the specification jungle contain relevant details.

o Does not alter the TLS/DTLS specifications.

o Does not introduce any new extensions.

o Aligns with the DTLS security modes of the Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252].

DTLS is used to secure a number of applications run over an
unreliable datagram transport. CoAP [RFC7252] is one such protocol
and has been designed specifically for use in IoT environments. CoAP
can be secured a number of different ways, also called security
modes. These security modes are as follows, see Section 6.1,
Section 6.2, Section 6.3 for additional details:

No Security Protection at the Transport Layer: No DTLS is used but
instead application layer security functionality is assumed.

Shared Secret-based DTLS Authentication: DTLS supports the use of
shared secrets [RFC4279]. This mode is useful if the number of
communication relationships between the IoT device and servers is
small and for very constrained devices. Shared secret-based
authentication mechanisms offer good performance and require a
minimum of data to be exchanged.

DTLS Authentication using Asymmetric Cryptography: TLS supports
client and server authentication using asymmetric cryptography.
Two approaches for validating these public keys are available.
First, [RFC7250] allows raw public keys to be used in TLS without
the overhead of certificates. This approach requires out-of-band
validation of the public key. Second, the use of X.509
certificates [RFC5280] with TLS is common on the Web today (at
least for server-side authentication) and certain IoT environments
may also re-use those capabilities. Certificates bind an
identifier to the public key signed by a certification authority
(CA). A trust anchor store has to be provisioned on the device to
indicate what CAs are trusted. Furthermore, the certificate may
contain a wealth of other information used to make authorization
decisions.

As described in [I-D.ietf-lwig-tls-minimal], an application designer
developing an IoT device needs to consider
investigate the security threats and decide about the security
services that can be used to mitigate the these threats.

Enabling IoT devices to upload make data and retrieve configuration
information, inevitably available often requires that Internet-connected devices be
able to authenticate themselves to servers
authentication of the two endpoints and vice versa as well as
to ensure that the data ability to provide
integrity- and information confidentiality-protection of exchanged is integrity and
confidentiality protected. data. While
these security services can be provided at different layers in the
protocol stack the use of
communication security, as offered by DTLS, Transport Layer Security (TLS)/Datagram TLS
(DTLS) has been very popular on
the Internet with many application protocols and it
is likely to be useful for IoT scenarios as well.
In case

To make Internet protocols fit constrained devices can be difficult
but thanks to the communication security features offered by DTLS meet standardization efforts new profiles and protocols
are available, such as the
security requirements of your application Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
[RFC7252]. UDP is mainly used to carry CoAP messages but other
transports can be utilized, such as SMS or even TCP.

While this document is inspired by the remainder of desire to protect CoAP
messages using DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] the guidance in this document might offer useful guidance.

Not every IoT deployment will use is
not limited to CoAP but the discussion regarding
choice nor to DTLS itself.

Instead, this document defines a profile of credentials DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] and cryptographic algorithms will be very
similar. As such,
TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] that offers communication security for IoT
applications and is reasonably implementable on many constrained
devices. Profile thereby means that available configuration options
and protocol extensions are utilized to best support the content in IoT
environment. This document does not alter TLS/DTLS specifications
and does not introduce any new TLS/DTLS extensions.

The main target audience for this document is applicable beyond the use embedded system
developer configuring and using a TLS/DTLS stack. This document may,
however, also help those developing or selecting a suitable TLS/DTLS
stack for an Internet of the CoAP protocol. Things product development.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "MUST", "MUST NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Note that "Client" and "Server" in this document refer to TLS TLS/DTLS
roles, where the Client initiates the TLS TLS/DTLS handshake. This does
not restrict the interaction pattern of the protocols carried inside TLS as on top of TLS/
DTLS since the record layer allows bi-directional communication. In the case of
CoAP the "Client" can act as a CoAP Server or Client.
This aspect is further described in Section 4.

RFC 7228 [RFC7228] introduces the notion of constrained-node
networks, which are small devices with severe constraints on power,
memory, and processing resources. The terms constrained devices, and
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are used interchangeably.

3. DTLS TLS/DTLS Protocol Overview

The TLS protocol [RFC5246] provides authenticated, confidentiality-
and integrity-protected communication between two endpoints. The
protocol is composed of two layers: the Record Protocol and the
Handshake Protocol. At the lowest level, layered on top of a
reliable transport protocol (e.g., TCP), is the Record Protocol. It
provides connection security by using symmetric cryptography for
confidentiality, data origin authentication, and integrity
protection. The Record Protocol is used for encapsulation of various
higher-level protocols. One such encapsulated protocol, the TLS
Handshake Protocol, allows the server and client to authenticate each
other and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys
before the application protocol transmits or receives data.

The design of DTLS [RFC6347] is intentionally very similar to TLS.
Since DTLS operates on top of an unreliable datagram transport a few
enhancements to the TLS structure are, however necessary. RFC 6347
explains these differences in great detail. As a short summary, for
those not familiar with DTLS the differences are:

o An explicit sequence number and an epoch field is included in the
TLS
Record Layer. Protocol. Section 4.1 of RFC 6347 explains the processing
rules for these two new fields. The value used to compute the MAC
is the 64-bit value formed by concatenating the epoch and the
sequence number.

o Stream ciphers must not be used with DTLS. The only stream cipher
defined for TLS 1.2 is RC4 and due to cryptographic weaknesses it
is not recommended anymore even for use with TLS
[I-D.ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4].

o The TLS Handshake Protocol has been enhanced to include a
stateless cookie exchange for Denial of Service (DoS) resistance.
Furthermore, the header has been extended to deal with message
loss, reordering, and fragmentation. Retransmission timers have
been included to deal with message loss.
For DoS protection this purpose a new handshake message, the HelloVerifyRequest,
was added to DTLS. This handshake message is sent by the server
and includes a stateless cookie, which is returned in a
ClientHello message back to the server. Although the exchange is
optional for the server to execute, a client implementation has to
be prepared to respond to it. Furthermore, the handshake message
format has been extended to deal with message loss, reordering,
and fragmentation. Retransmission timers have been included to
deal with message loss.

4. The Communication Model Models

This document describes a profile of DTLS TLS/DTLS 1.2 and, to be useful,
it has to make assumptions about the envisioned communication
architecture.

Two communication architectures (and consequently two profiles) are
described in this document.

4.1. Constrained TLS/DTLS Clients

The communication architecture shown in Figure 1 assumes a unicast
communication interaction with an IoT device utilizing a DTLS client
and that constrained
TLS/DTLS client interacts interacting with one or multiple DTLS TLS/DTLS servers.

Before a client can initiate the DTLS TLS/DTLS handshake it needs to know
the IP address of that server and what credentials to use.
Application layer protocols, such as CoAP, conveyed on top of DTLS
may need additional information, such information about URLs of the
endpoints the CoAP needs to register and publish information to.
This configuration information (including credentials) may be
conveyed to clients as part of a firmware/software package or via a
configuration protocol. The following credential types are supported
by this profile:

o For PSK-based authentication (see Section 6.1), this includes the
paired "PSK identity" and shared secret to be used with each
server.

o For raw public key-based authentication (see Section 6.2), this
includes either the server's public key or the hash of the
server's public key.

o For certificate-based authentication (see Section 6.3), this
includes a pre-populated trust anchor store that allows the DTLS
stack to perform path validation for the certificate obtained
during the handshake with the server.

This document focuses on the description of the DTLS client-side
functionality but, quite naturally, the equivalent server-side
support has to be available.

Figure 1: Constrained DTLS Client Profile.

4.1.1. Examples of Constrained Client Exchanges

4.1.1.1. Network Access Authentication Example

Re-use is a recurring theme when considering constrained environments
and is behind a lot of the directions taken in developments for
constrained environments. The corollary of re-use is to not add
functionality if it can be avoided. An example relevant to the use
of TLS is network access authentication, which takes place when a
device connects to a network and needs to go through an
authentication and access control procedure before it is allowed to
communicate with other devices or connect to the Internet.

Figure 2 shows the network access architecture with the IoT device
initiating the communication to an access point in the network using
the procedures defined for a specific physical layer. Since
credentials may be managed and stored centrally, in the
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server, the
security protocol exchange may need to be relayed via the
Authenticator, i.e., functionality running on the access point, to
the AAA server. The authentication and key exchange protocol itself
is encapsulated within a container, the Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP), and messages are conveyed back and forth between the
EAP endpoints, namely the EAP peer located on the IoT device and the
EAP server located on the AAA server or the access point. To route
EAP messages from the access point, acting as a AAA client, to the
AAA server requires an adequate protocol mechanism, name RADIUS or
Diameter.

More details about the concepts and a description about the
terminology can be found in RFC 5247 [RFC5247].

<****>: Device-to-AAA Server Exchange
<---->: Device-to-Authenticator Exchange
<oooo>: AAA Client-to-AAA Server Exchange
<====>: Phyiscal layer like IEEE 802.11/802.15.4

Figure 2: Network Access Architecture..

One standardized EAP method is EAP-TLS, defined in RFC 5216
[RFC5216], which re-uses the TLS-based protocol exchange and
encapsulates it inside the EAP payload. In terms of re-use this
allows many components of the TLS protocol to be shared between the
network access security functionality and the TLS functionality
needed for securing application layer traffic. The EAP-TLS exchange
is shown in Figure 3 where it is worthwhile to point out that in EAP
the client / server roles are reversed but with the use of EAP-TLS
the IoT device acts as a TLS client.

Authenticating Peer Authenticator
------------------- -------------
<- EAP-Request/
Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS client_hello)->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS server_hello,
TLS certificate,
[TLS server_key_exchange,]
TLS certificate_request,
TLS server_hello_done)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS certificate,
TLS client_key_exchange,
TLS certificate_verify,
TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- EAP-Success

Figure 3: EAP-TLS Exchange.

The guidance in this document also applies to the use of EAP-TLS for
network access authentication. An IoT device using a network access
authentication solution based on TLS can re-use most parts of the
code for the use of DTLS/TLS at the application layer thereby saving
a significant amount of flash memory. Note, however, that the
credentials used for network access authentication and those used for
application layer security are very likely different.

4.1.1.2. CoAP-based Data Exchange Example

When a constrained client uploads sensor data to a server
infrastructure it may use CoAP by pushing the data via a POST to a
pre-configured endpoint on the server. In certain circumstances this
might be too limiting and additional functionality is needed, as
shown in Figure 4, where the IoT device itself runs a CoAP server
hosting the resource that is made accessible to other entities.
Despite running a CoaP server on the IoT device it is still the DTLS
client on the IoT device that initiates the interaction with the non-
constrained resource server in our scenario.

Figure 4 shows a sensor starting with a DTLS exchange with a resource
server to register available resources. The initial DTLS interaction
between the sensor, acting as a DTLS client, and the resource server,
acting as a DTLS server, will be a full DTLS handshake. Once this
handshake is complete both parties have established the DTLS record
layer, which can subsequently be used to secure the CoAP message
exchange, which starts with a the resource registration. Details
about the resource registry capabilities can be found in
[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

After some time (assuming that the client regularly refreshes its
registration) the resource server receives a request (not shown) from
an application to retrieve the temperature information from the
sensor. This request is relayed by the resource directory to the
sensor using a GET message exchange. The already established DTLS
record layer can be used to secure the message exchange.

Resource
Sensor Directory
------ ---------

+--- ///+
C| \ D
O| Req: POST coap://rd.example.com/rd?ep=node1 \ T
A| Payload: \ L
P| </temp>;ct=41; \ S
| rt="temperature-c";if="sensor", \
R| </light>;ct=41; \ R
D| rt="light-lux";if="sensor" \ E
| --------> \ C
R| \ O
E| \ R
G| Res: 2.01 Created \ D
.| <-------- Location: /rd/4521 \
| \ L
+--- \ A
\ Y
* \ E
* (time passes) \ R
* \
+--- \ P
C| \ R
O| Req: GET coaps://sensor.example.com/temp \ O
A| <-------- \ T
P| \ E
| Res: 2.05 Content \ C
G| Payload: \ T
E| 25.5 --------> \ E
T| \ D
+--- ///+

Figure 4: DTLS/CoAP exchange using Resource Directory.

4.2. Constrained TLS/DTLS Servers

TEXT TO BE DONE

5. The TLS/DTLS Ciphersuite Concept

TLS (and consequently DTLS) has the concept of ciphersuites and an
IANA registry [IANA-TLS] was created to register the suites. A
ciphersuite (and the specification that defines it) contains the
following information:

o Authentication and Key Exchange Algorithm key exchange algorithm (e.g., PSK)

o Cipher and Key Length key length (e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
with 128 bit keys [AES])

o Mode of operation (e.g., AES with Counter with Cipher Block Chaining -
Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) Mode (CCM)) (CCM) for AES)
[RFC3610]

o Hash Algorithm algorithm for Integrity Protection, integrity protection, such as the Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA) in combination with Keyed-Hashing for Message
Authentication (HMAC) (see [RFC2104] and [RFC4634])

o Hash Algorithm algorithm for use with the Pseudorandom Function pseudorandom function (e.g., HMAC
with the SHA-256)

o Misc information (e.g., length of authentication tags)

o Information whether the ciphersuite is suitable for DTLS or only
for TLS

The TLS ciphersuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, for example, uses a
pre-shared authentication and key exchange algorithm. RFC 6655
[RFC6655] defines this ciphersuite. It uses the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) encryption algorithm, which is a block cipher. Since
the AES algorithm supports different key lengths (such as 128, 192
and 256 bits) this information has to be specified as well and the
selected ciphersuite supports 128 bit keys. A block cipher encrypts
plaintext in fixed-size blocks and AES operates on fixed block size
of 128 bits. For messages exceeding 128 bits, the message is
partitioned into 128-bit blocks and the AES cipher is applied to
these input blocks with appropriate chaining, which is called mode of
operation.

TLS 1.2 introduced Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
(AEAD) ciphersuites (see [RFC5116] and [RFC6655]). AEAD is a class
of block cipher modes which encrypt (parts of) the message and
authenticate the message simultaneously. Examples of such modes
include the Counter with Cipher Block Chaining - Message
Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) Mode (CCM) mode, and the Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM) (see [RFC5288] and [RFC7251]).

Some AEAD ciphersuites have shorter authentication tags and are
therefore more suitable for networks with low bandwidth where small
message size matters. The TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 ciphersuite
that ends in "_8" has an 8-octet authentication tag, while the
regular CCM ciphersuites have, at the time of writing, 16-octet
authentication tags.

TLS 1.2 also replaced the combination of MD5/SHA-1 hash functions in
the TLS pseudo random function (PRF) used in earlier versions of TLS
with cipher-suite-specified PRFs. For this reason authors of more
recent TLS 1.2 ciphersuite specifications explicitly indicate the MAC
algorithm and the hash functions used with the TLS PRF.

6. Credential Types

6.1. Pre-Shared Secret

The use of pre-shared secret credentials is one of the most basic
techniques for DTLS TLS/DTLS since it is both computational efficient and
bandwidth conserving. Pre-shared secret based authentication was
introduced to TLS with RFC 4279 [RFC4279]. The exchange shown in
Figure 2 5 illustrates the DTLS exchange including the cookie exchange.
While the server is not required to initiate a cookie exchange with
every handshake, the client is required to implement and to react on
it when challenged. The cookie exchange allows the server to react
to flooding attacks.

Client Server
------ ------
ClientHello -------->

<-------- HelloVerifyRequest
(contains cookie)

ClientHello -------->
(with cookie)
ServerHello
*ServerKeyExchange
<-------- ServerHelloDone
ClientKeyExchange
ChangeCipherSpec
Finished -------->
ChangeCipherSpec
<-------- Finished

Application Data <-------> Application Data

Legend:

* indicates an optional message payload

Figure 2: 5: DTLS PSK Authentication including the Cookie Exchange.

[RFC4279] does not mandate the use of any particular type of
identity. Hence, client
identity and the TLS client and server clearly have to agree on the identities
and keys to be used. The mandated encoding of identities in
Section 5.1 of RFC 4279 aims to improve interoperability for those
cases where the identity is configured by a person using some
management interface. Many IoT devices do, however, not have a user
interface and most of their credentials are bound to the device
rather than the user. Furthermore, credentials are often provisioned
into trusted hardware modules or in the firmware by developers. As
such, the encoding considerations are not applicable to this usage
environment. For use with this profile the PSK identities SHOULD NOT
assume a structured format (as domain names, Distinguished Names, or
IP addresses have) and a bit-by-bit comparison operation can then be
used by the server-side infrastructure.

The client indicates which key it uses by including a "PSK identity"
in the ClientKeyExchange message. As described in Section 4 clients
may have multiple pre-shared keys with a single server and to help
the client in selecting which PSK identity / PSK pair to use, the
server can provide a "PSK identity hint" in the ServerKeyExchange
message. If the hint for PSK key selection is based on the domain
name of the server then servers SHOULD NOT send the "PSK identity
hint" in the ServerKeyExchange message. Hence, In general, servers SHOULD
NOT send the "PSK identity hint" in the ServerKeyExchange message and
client MUST ignore the message. This approach is inline with RFC
4279 [RFC4279]. Note: The TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) extension
allows the client to tell a server the name of the server it is
contacting, which is relevant for hosting environments. A server
using the identity hint needs to guide the selection based on a
received SNI value from the client.

RFC 4279 requires TLS implementations supporting PSK ciphersuites to
support arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and
arbitrary PSKs up to 64 octets in length. This is a useful
assumption for TLS stacks used in the desktop and mobile environment environments
where management interfaces are used to provision identities and
keys. For the IoT environment, however, many devices are not
equipped with displays and input devices (e.g., keyboards). Hence, keys are distributed as part of
hardware modules or are embedded into the firmware. As firmware and, as such,
these restrictions are not applicable to this profile.

Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] currently specifies
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 as the mandatory to implement ciphersuite
for use with shared secrets. This ciphersuite uses the AES algorithm
with 128 bit keys and CCM as the mode of operation. The label "_8"
indicates that an 8-octet authentication tag is used. This
ciphersuite makes use of the default TLS 1.2 Pseudorandom Function
(PRF), which uses an HMAC with the SHA-256 hash function. (Note that
all IoT implementations will need a SHA-256 implementation due to the
construction of the pseudo-random number function in TLS DTLS/TLS 1.2.)

A device compliant with the profile in this section MUST implement
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 and follow the guidance from this section.

6.2. Raw Public Key

The use of raw public keys with DTLS, TLS/DTLS, as defined in [RFC7250], is
the first entry point into public key cryptography without having to
pay the price of certificates and a PKI. public key infrastructure (PKI).
The specification re-uses the existing Certificate message to convey
the raw public key encoded in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure. To
indicate support two new TLS extensions had been defined, as shown in
Figure 3, 6, namely the server_certificate_type and the
client_certificate_type. To operate this mechanism securely it is
necessary to authenticate and authorize the public keys out-of-band.
This document therefore assumes that a client implementation comes
with one or multiple raw public keys of servers, it has to
communicate with, pre-provisioned. Additionally, a device will have
its own raw public key. To replace, delete, or add raw public key to
this list requires a software update, for example using a firmware
update mechanism.

Client Server
------ ------

ClientHello -------->
client_certificate_type
server_certificate_type

<------- HelloVerifyRequest

ClientHello -------->
client_certificate_type
server_certificate_type

ServerHello
client_certificate_type
server_certificate_type
Certificate
ServerKeyExchange
CertificateRequest
<-------- ServerHelloDone

Certificate
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished -------->

[ChangeCipherSpec]
<-------- Finished

Figure 3: 6: DTLS Raw Public Key Exchange including the Cookie Exchange.

The CoAP recommended ciphersuite for use with this credential type is
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC7251]. This elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) based AES-CCM TLS ciphersuite uses the Ephemeral
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) as the key establishment
mechanism and an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
for authentication. Due to the use of Ephemeral Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) the recently introduced named Diffie-Hellman
groups [I-D.ietf-tls-negotiated-dl-dhe] are not applicable to this
profile. This ciphersuite make use of the AEAD capability in DTLS
1.2 and utilizes an eight-octet authentication tag. The use of a
Diffie-Hellman key exchange adds perfect forward secrecy (PFS). More
details about PFS can be found in Section 11.

RFC 6090 [RFC6090] provides valuable information for implementing
Elliptic Curve Cryptography algorithms, particularly for choosing
methods that have been available in the literature for a long time
(i.e., 20 years and more).

A device compliant with the profile in this section MUST implement
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 and follow the guidance from this
section.

6.3. Certificates

The use of mutual certificate-based authentication is shown in
Figure 4, 7, which makes use of the cached info extension
[I-D.ietf-tls-cached-info]. Support of the cached info extension is
REQUIRED. Caching certificate chains allows the client to reduce the
communication overhead significantly since otherwise the server would
provide the end entity certificate, and the certificate chain.
Because certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
certificate authority is omitted from the chain. Client
implementations MUST be provisioned with a trust anchor store that
contains the root certificates. The use of the Trust Anchor
Management Protocol (TAMP) [RFC5934] is, however, not envisioned.
Instead IoT devices using this profile MUST rely on a software update
mechanism to provision these trust anchors.

Client Server
------ ------

ClientHello -------->
cached_information

<------- HelloVerifyRequest

ClientHello -------->
cached_information
ServerHello
cached_information
Certificate
ServerKeyExchange
CertificateRequest
<-------- ServerHelloDone

Certificate
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished -------->

[ChangeCipherSpec]
<-------- Finished

Figure 7: DTLS Mutual Certificate-based Authentication.

When DTLS is used to secure CoAP messages then the server provided
certificates MUST contain the fully qualified DNS domain name or
"FQDN" as dNSName. The coaps URI scheme is described in Section 6.2
of [RFC7252]. This FQDN is stored in the SubjectAltName or in the
leftmost CN component of subject name, as explained in
Section 9.1.3.3 of [RFC7252], and used by the client to match it
against the FQDN used during the look-up process, as described in RFC
6125 [RFC6125]. For the profile in this specification does not
assume dynamic discovery of local servers.

For client certificates the identifier used in the SubjectAltName or
in the CN MUST be an EUI-64 [EUI64], as mandated in Section 9.1.3.3
of [RFC7252].

For certificate revocation neither the Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) nor Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are used.
Instead, this profile relies on a software update mechanism. While
multiple OCSP stapling [RFC6961] has recently been introduced as a
mechanism to piggyback OCSP request/responses inside the DTLS/TLS
handshake to avoid the cost of a separate protocol handshake further
investigations are needed to determine its suitability for the IoT
environment.

Client Server
------ ------

ClientHello -------->
cached_information

<------- HelloVerifyRequest

ClientHello -------->
cached_information
ServerHello
cached_information
Certificate
ServerKeyExchange
CertificateRequest
<-------- ServerHelloDone

Certificate
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished -------->

[ChangeCipherSpec]
<-------- Finished

Figure 4: DTLS Mutual Certificate-based Authentication.

Regarding the ciphersuite choice the discussion in Section 6.2
applies. Further details about X.509 certificates can be found in
Section 9.1.3.3 of [RFC7252]. The TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
ciphersuite description in Section 6.2 is also applicable to this
section.

When using certificates, IoT devices MUST provide support for a
server certificate chain of at least 3 not including the trust anchor
and MAY reject connections from servers offering chains longer than
3. IoT devices MAY have client certificate chains of any length.
Obviously, longer chains require more resources to process, transmit
or receive.

A device compliant with the profile in this section MUST implement
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 and follow the guidance from this
section.

6.3.1. Client Certificate URLs

RFC 6066 [RFC6066] allows to avoid sending client-side certificates
and uses URLs instead. This reduces the over-the-air transmission.
Note that the TLS cached info extension does not provide any help
with caching client certificates.

Recommendation: Add support for client certificate URLs for those
environments where client-side certificates are used.

6.3.2. Trusted CA Indication

RFC 6066 [RFC6066] allows clients to indicate what trust anchor they
support. With certificate-based authentication a DTLS server conveys
its end entity certificate to the client during the DTLS exchange
provides. Since the server does not necessarily know what trust
anchors the client has stored it includes intermediate CA certs in
the certificate payload as well to facilitate with certification path
construction and path validation.

Today, in most IoT deployments there is a fairly static relationship
between the IoT device (and the software running on them) and the
server- side infrastructure and no such dynamic indication of trust
anchors is needed.

Recommendation: For IoT deployments where clients talk to a fixed,
pre-configured set of servers and where a software update mechanism
is available this extension is not recommended. Environments where
the client needs to interact with dynamically discovered DTLS TLS/DTLS
servers this extension may be useful to reduce the communication
overhead. Note, however, in that case the TLS cached info extension
may help to reduce the communication overhead for everything but the
first protocol interaction.

7. Signature Algorithm Extension

The "signature_algorithms" extension, defined in Section 7.4.1.4.1 of
RFC 5246 [RFC5246], allows the client to indicate to the server which
signature/hash algorithm pairs may be used in digital signatures.
The client MUST send this extension to select the use of SHA-256
since otherwise absent this extension RFC 5246 defaults to SHA-1 /
ECDSA for the ECDH_ECDSA and the ECDHE_ECDSA key exchange algorithms.

The "signature_algorithms" extension is not applicable to the PSK-
based ciphersuite described in Section 6.1.

8. Error Handling

DTLS

TLS/DTLS uses the Alert protocol to convey error messages and
specifies a longer list of errors. However, not all error messages
defined in the TLS TLS/DTLS specification are applicable to this profile.
In general, there are two categories of errors (as defined in
Section 7.2 of RFC 5246), namely fatal errors and warnings. Alert
messages with a level of fatal result in the immediate termination of
the connection. If possible, developers should try to develop
strategies to react to those fatal errors, such as re-starting the
handshake or informing the user using the (often limited) user
interface. Warnings may be ignored by the application since many IoT
devices will either have limited ways to log errors or no ability at
all. In any case, implementers have to carefully evaluate the impact
of errors and ways to remedy the situation since a commonly used
approach for delegating decision making to users is difficult (or
impossible) to accomplish in a timely fashion.

All error messages marked as RESERVED are only supported for
backwards compatibility with SSL and are therefore not applicable to
this profile. Those include decryption_failed_RESERVED,
no_certificate_RESERVE, and export_restriction_RESERVED.

A number of the error messages are applicable only for certificate-
based authentication ciphersuites. Hence, for PSK and raw public key
use the following error messages are not applicable:

o bad_certificate,
o unsupported_certificate,

o certificate_revoked,

o certificate_expired,

o certificate_unknown,

o unknown_ca, and

o access_denied.

Since this profile does not make use of compression at the TLS layer
the decompression_failure error message is not applicable either.

RFC 4279 introduced a new alert message unknown_psk_identity for PSK
ciphersuites. As stated in Section 2 of RFC 4279 the
decryption_error error message may also be used instead. For this
profile the TLS server MUST return the decryption_error error message
instead of the unknown_psk_identity. unknown_psk_identity since the two mechanisms exist
and provide the same functionality.

Furthermore, the following errors should not occur with devices and
servers supporting this specification but implementations MUST be
prepared to process these errors to deal with servers that are not
compliant to the profiles in this document:

protocol_version: While this document focuses only on one version of
the DTLS TLS/DTLS protocol, namely version 1.2, ongoing work on TLS/DTLS TLS/
DTLS 1.3 is taking place. in progress at the time of writing.

insufficient_security: This error message indicates that the server
requires ciphers to be more secure. This document specifies only
only one ciphersuite per profile but it is likely that additional
ciphtersuites get added over time.

user_canceled: Many IoT devices are unattended. unattended and hence this error
message is unlikely to occur.

9. Session Resumption

Session resumption is a feature of DTLS TLS/DTLS that allows a client to
continue with an earlier established session state. The resulting
exchange is shown in Figure 5. 8. In addition, the server may choose
not to do a cookie exchange when a session is resumed. Still,
clients have to be prepared to do a cookie exchange with every
handshake.

Client Server
------ ------

ClientHello -------->
ServerHello
[ChangeCipherSpec]
<-------- Finished
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished -------->
Application Data <-------> Application Data

Figure 5: 8: DTLS Session Resumption.

Clients MUST implement session resumption to improve the performance
of the handshake (in terms of reduced number of message exchanges,
lower computational overhead, and less bandwidth conserved).

Since the communication model described in Section 4 does not assume
that the server is constrained constrained, RFC 5077 [RFC5077] specifying TLS TLS/
DTLS session resumption without server-side state is not utilized by
this profile.

10. Compression

Section 3.3 of [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] recommends to always disable DTLS-level TLS/DTLS-
level compression due to attacks. attacks, such as CRIME. For IoT
applications compression at the
DTLS TLS/DTLS layer is not needed since
application layer protocols are highly optimized and the compression
algorithms at the DTLS layer increase increases code size and complexity.

Recommendation: This DTLS client TLS/DTLS profile does not include MUST NOT implement and use TLS/
DTLS layer compression.

11. Perfect Forward Secrecy

Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) is a property that preserves the
confidentiality of past conversations even in situations where the
long-term secret is compromised.

The PSK ciphersuite recommended in Section 6.1 does not offer this
property since it does not utilize a Diffie-Hellman exchange. New
ciphersuites that support PFS for PSK-based authentication, such as
proposed in [I-D.schmertmann-dice-ccm-psk-pfs], might become
available as standardized ciphersuite in the (near) future. The
recommended PSK-based ciphersuite offers excellent performance, a
very small memory footprint, and has the lowest on the wire overhead
at the expense of not using any public cryptography. For deployments
where public key cryptography is acceptable the raw public might
offer an acceptable middleground between the PSK ciphersuite in terms
of out-of-band validation and the functionality offered by asymmetric
cryptography.

The use of PFS is a trade-off decision since on one hand the
compromise of long-term secrets of embedded devices is more likely
than with many other Internet hosts but on the other hand a Diffie-
Hellman exchange requires ephemeral key pairs to be generated, which
is demanding from a performance point of view. For performance
reasons some implementations re-use key pairs over multiple exchanges
(rather than generating new keys for each exchange) for the obvious
performance improvement. Note, however, that such key re-use over
long periods voids the benefits of forward secrecy when an attack
gains access to this DH key pair.

The impact of the disclosure of past conversations and the desire to
increase the cost for pervasive monitoring (as demanded by [RFC7258])
has to be taken into account when making a deployment decision.

This specification recommends the use

Recommendation: Client implementations claiming support of this
profile MUST implement the ciphersuites listed in Section 6. 6 according
to the selected credential type.

12. Keep-Alive

RFC 6520 [RFC6520] defines a heartbeat mechanism to test whether the
other peer is still alive. The same mechanism can also be used to
perform Path Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) Discovery.

A recommendation about the use of RFC 6520 depends on the type of
message exchange an IoT device performs. There are three types of
exchanges that need to be analysed:

Client-Initiated, One-Shot Messages

This is a common communication pattern where IoT devices upload
data to a server on the Internet on an irregular basis. The
communication may be triggered by specific events, such as opening
a door.

Since the upload happens on an irregular and unpredictable basis
and due to renumbering and Network Address Translation (NAT) a new
DTLS session or the
DTLS session resumption can handshake may need to be used. re-started (ideally using session
resumption, if possible).

In this case there is no use for a keep-alive extension for this
scenario.

Client-Initiated, Regular Data Uploads

This is a variation of the previous case whereby data gets
uploaded on a regular basis, for example, based on frequent
temperature readings. If neither NAT bindings nor IP address
changes occurred then the DTLS record layer will not notice any
changes. For the case where the IP address and port number
changes, it is necessary to re-create the DTLS record layer using
session resumption.

In this scenario there is no use for a keep-alive extension. It
is also very likely that the device will enter a sleep cycle in
between data transmissions to keep power consumption low.

Server-Initiated Messages

In the two previous scenarios the client initiated the protocol
interaction but in this case we consider server-initiated
messages. Since messages to the client may get blocked by
intermediaries, such as NATs (including IPv4/IPv6 protocol
translators) and stateful packet filtering firewalls, the initial
connection setup is triggered by the client and then kept alive.
Since state at middleboxes expires fairly quickly (according to
measurements described in [HomeGateway]), regular heartbeats are
necessary whereby these keep-alive messages may be exchanged at
the application layer or within DTLS itself.

For this message exchange pattern the use of DTLS heartbeat
messages is quite useful. useful but may interfere with registrations kept
at the application layer (for example when the CoAP resource
directory is used). The MTU discovery mechanism, which is also
part of [RFC6520], is less likely to be relevant since for many
IoT deployments the most constrained link is the wireless
interface between the IoT device and the network itself (rather
than some links along the end-to-end path). Only in more complex
network topologies, such as multi-hop mesh networks, path MTU
discovery might be appropriate. It also has to be noted that DTLS
itself already provides a basic path discovery mechanism (see
Section 4.1.1.1 of RFC 6347 by using the situation
is. fragmentation capability
of the handshake protocol).

For server-initiated messages the heartbeat extension can be
RECOMMENDED.

13. Timeouts

To connect to the Internet a variety of wired and wireless
technologies are available. Many of the low power radio
technologies, such as IEEE 802.15.4 or Bluetooth Smart, only support
small frame sizes (e.g., 127 bytes in case of IEEE 802.15.4 as
explained in RFC 4919 [RFC4919]). Other radio technologies, such as
the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) using the short
messaging service (SMS) have similar constraints in terms of payload
sizes, such as 140 bytes without the optional segmentation and
reassembly scheme known as Concatenated SMS, but show higher latency.

The DTLS handshake protocol adds a fragmentation and reassembly
mechanism to the TLS handshake protocol since each DTLS record must
fit within a single transport layer datagram, as described in
Section 4.2.3 of [RFC6347]. Since handshake messages are potentially
bigger than the maximum record size, the mechanism fragments a
handshake message over a number of DTLS records, each of which can be
transmitted separately.

To deal with the unreliable message delivery provided by UDP, DTLS
adds timeouts and re-transmissions, as described in Section 4.2.4 of
[RFC6347]. Although the timeout values are implementation specific,
recommendations are provided in Section 4.2.4.1 of [RFC6347], with an
initial timer value of 1 second and twice the value at each
retransmission up to no less than 60 seconds. Due to the nature of
some radio technologies, these values are too aggressive and lead to
spurious failures when messages in flight need longer.

Note: If a round-trip time estimator (such as proposed in
[I-D.bormann-core-cocoa]) is available in the protocol stack of the
device, it could be used to dynamically update the setting of the
retransmit timeout.

Recommendation: Choosing appropriate timeout values is difficult with
infrequent data transmissions, changing network conditions, and large
variance in latency. This specification therefore RECOMMENDS an
initial timer value of 10 seconds with exponential back off up to no
less then 60 seconds.

14. Random Number Generation

The DTLS TLS/DTLS protocol requires random numbers to be available during
the protocol run. For example, during the ClientHello and the
ServerHello exchange the client and the server exchange random
numbers. Also, the use of the Diffie-Hellman exchange requires
random numbers during the key pair generation. Special care has to
be paid when generating random numbers in embedded systems as many
entropy sources available on desktop operating systems or mobile
devices might be missing, as described in [Heninger]. Consequently,
if not enough time is given during system start time to fill the
entropy pool then the output might be predictable and repeatable, for
example leading to the same keys generated again and again.

Recommendation: IoT devices using DTLS MUST offer ways to generate
quality random numbers. Guidelines and requirements for random
number generation can be found in RFC 4086 [RFC4086].

It is important to note that sources contributing to the randomness
pool on laptops, or desktop PCs are not available on many IoT device,
such as mouse movement, timing of keystrokes, air turbulence on the
movement of hard drive heads, etc. Other sources have to be found or
dedicated hardware has to be added.

The ClientHello and the ServerHello message messages contains the 'Random'
structure, which has two components: gmt_unix_time and a random
sequence of 28 random bytes. gmt_unix_time holds the current time
and date in standard UNIX 32-bit format (seconds since the midnight
starting Jan 1, 1970, GMT). [I-D.mathewson-no-gmtunixtime] argues
that the entire value the ClientHello.Random and ServerHello.Random
fields, including gmt_unix_time, value (including gmt_unix_time)
should be set to a cryptographically random sequence because of
privacy concerns (fingerprinting). regarding device fingerprinting. Since many IoT
devices do not have access to a real-time clock this recommendation
it is even more relevant RECOMMENDED to follow the guidance outlined in
[I-D.mathewson-no-gmtunixtime] regarding the embedded systems
environment. content of the
ClientHello.Random field. However, for the ServerHello.Random
structure it is RECOMMENDED to maintain the existing structure with
gmt_unix_time followed by a random sequence of 28 random bytes since
the client can use the received time information to securely obtain
time information.

Recommendation: IoT devices using TLS/DTLS MUST offer ways to
generate quality random numbers. Guidelines and requirements for
random number generation can be found in RFC 4086 [RFC4086].

15. Truncated MAC and Encrypt-then-MAC Extension

The truncated MAC extension was introduced with RFC 6066 [RFC6066]
with the goal to reduces reduce the size of the MAC used at the Record Layer.
This extension was developed for TLS ciphersuites that used older
modes of operation where the MAC and the encryption operation was
performed independently.

For CoAP, however, the

The recommended ciphersuites in this document use the newer
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) construct,
namely the CBC-MAC mode (CCM) with eight-octet authentication tags.
Furthermore, tags,
and are therefore not appliable to the extension truncated MAC extension.

RFC 7366 [RFC7366] introducing introduced the encrypt-then-MAC
security mechanism extension (instead
of the previously used MAC-then-encrypt) is since the MAC-then-encrypt
mechanism has been the subject of a number of security
vulnerabilities. RFC 7366 is, however, also not applicable for to the
AEAD ciphers recommended in this profile. document.

Recommendation: Since this profile only supports AEAD ciphersuites
this extension is
these two extensions are not applicable.

16. Server Name Indication (SNI)

This RFC 6066 extension defines a mechanism for a client to tell a
TLS
TLS/DTLS server the name of the server it wants to contact. This is
a useful extension for many hosting environments where multiple
virtual servers are run on single IP address.

Recommendation: Unless it is known that a DTLS TLS/DTLS client does not
interact with a server in a hosting environment that requires such an
extension we advice RECOMMEND clients
to offer support for implement the SNI extension in this
profile. extension.

17. Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation

This RFC 6066 extension lowers the maximum fragment length support
needed for the Record Layer from 2^14 bytes to 2^9 bytes.

This is a very useful extension that allows the client to indicate to
the server how much maximum memory buffers it uses for incoming
messages. Ultimately, the main benefit of this extension is it to
allows client implementations to lower their RAM requirements since
the client does not need to accept packets of large size (such as 16k
packets as required by plain TLS/DTLS).

Recommendation: Client implementations MUST support this extension.

18. TLS Session Hash

In order to begin connection protection, the Record Protocol requires
specification of a suite of algorithms, a master secret, and the
client and server random values. The TLS algorithm for computing the
master secret is defined in Section 8.1 of RFC 5246 but only includes
a small number of parameters exchanged during the handshake and does
not cryptographically bound to important
session include parameters such as like the client and server identities. This
can be utilized by an attacker to mount a man-in-the-middle attack
since the master secret is not guaranteed to be unique across
sessions.
sessions, as discovered in the 'Triple Handshake' attack
[Tripple-HS].

[I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash] defines a TLS extension that binds the
master secret to a log of the full handshake that computes it, thus
preventing such attacks.

Recommendation: Client implementations SHOULD implement this
extension even though the ciphersuites recommended by this profile
are not vulnerable to this attack. For Diffie-Hellman-based
ciphersuites the keying material is contributed by both parties and
in case of the pre-shared secret key ciphersuite both parties need to
be in possession of the shared secret to ensure that the handshake
completes successfully. It is, however, possible that some
application layer protocols will tunnel other authentication
protocols on top of DTLS making this attack relevant again.

19. Re-Negotiation Attacks

TLS and DTLS

TLS/DTLS allows a client and a server who already have a TLS TLS/DTLS
connection to negotiate new parameters, generate new keys, etc by
using a feature in TLS called re-negotiation. the re-negotiation feature. Renegotiation happens in the
existing TLS connection, with the new handshake packets being encrypted
along with application data. Upon completion of the re-
negotiation re-negotiation
procedure the new channel replaces the old channel.

As described in RFC 5746 [RFC5746] there is no cryptographic binding
between the two handshakes, although the new handshake is carried out
using the cryptographic parameters established by the original
handshake.

Recommendation: To prevent the TLS re-negotiation attack [RFC5746] this
specification RECOMMENDS not to use disable the TLS renegotigation feature.
Clients MUST respond to server-initiated re-negotiation attempts with
an Alert alert message (no_renegotiation) and clients MUST NOT initiate
them.

20. Downgrading Attacks

[Editor's Note: Additional text needed.]

This specification demands

When a client sends a ClientHello with a version 1.2 of DTLS higher than the
highest version known to be used the server, the server is supposed to reply
with ServerHello.version equal to the highest version known to the
server and DTLS the handshake can proceed. This behaviour is known as
version 1.1 tolerance. Version-intolerance is not supported. Unlike with TLS where many earlier
versions exist there when the server (or a
middlebox) breaks the handshake when it sees a ClientHello.version
higher than what it knows about. This is no risk of downgrading the behaviour that leads
some clients to re-run the handshake with lower version. As a
result, a potential security vulnerability is introduced when a
system is running an older old TLS/SSL version (e.g., because of
DTLS in context of the need
to integrate with legacy systems). In the worst case, this profile. allows an
attacker to downgrade the protocol handshake to SSL 3.0. SSL 3.0 is
so broken that there is no secure cipher available for it (see
[I-D.ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie]).

The work described in
[I-D.bmoeller-tls-downgrade-scsv] above-described downgrade vulnerability is solved by the TLS
Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV)
[I-D.ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv] extension. However, the solution is therefore also
not applicable appliable to implementations conforming to this environment profile since there is no legacy DTLS/TLS IoT server
infrastructure when the
version negotiation MUST use TLS/DTLS version 1.2 (or higher). More
specifically, this profiled implies:

o Clients MUST NOT send a TLS/DTLS version lower than version 1.2 in
the ClientHello.

o Clients MUST NOT retry a failed negotiation offering a TLS/DTLS
version lower than 1.2.

o Servers MUST fail the handshake by sending a protocol_version
fatal alert if a TLS/DTLS version >= 1.2 cannot be negotiated.
Note that the aborted connection is non-resumable.

If at some time in the future the TLS/DTLS 1.2 profile reaches the
quality of SSL 3.0 a software update mechanism is followed. needed since
constrained devices are unlikely to run multiple TLS/DTLS versions
due to memory size restrictions.

21. Crypto Agility

This document recommends software and chip manufacturers to implement
AES and the CCM mode of operation. This document references the CoAP
recommended ciphersuite choices, which have been selected based on
implementation and deployment experience from the IoT community.
Over time the preference for algorithms will, however, change. Not
all components of a ciphersuite are likely to change at the same
speed. Changes are more likely expected for ciphers, the mode of
operation, and the hash algorithms. The recommended key lengths have
to be adjusted over time. Some deployment environments will also be
impacted by local regulation, which might dictate a certain cipher
and key size. Ongoing discussions regarding the choice of specific
ECC curves will also likely to impact implementations.

The following recommendations can be made to chip manufacturers:

o Make any AES hardware-based crypto implementation accessible to
developers working on security implementations at higher layers.
Sometimes hardware implementatios are added to microcontrollers to
offer support for functionality needed at the link layer and are
only available to the on-chip link layer protocol implementation.

o Provide flexibility for the use of the crypto function with future
extensibility in mind. For example, making an AES-CCM
implementation available to developers is a first step but such an
implementation may not be usable due to parameter differences
between an AES-CCM implementations. AES-CCM in IEEE 802.15.4 and
Bluetooth Smart uses a nonce length of 13-octets while DTLS uses a
nonce length of 12-octets. Hardware implementations of AES-CCM
for IEEE 802.15.4 and Bluetooth Smart are therefore not re-usable
by a DTLS stack.

o Offer access to building blocks in addition (or as an alternative)
to the complete functionality. For example, a chip manufacturer
who gives developers access to an the AES crypto function can use
it in functions to build an efficient AES-GCM implementations.
Another example is to make a special instruction available that
increases the speed of speed-up carryless multiplications.

As a recommendation for developers and product architects we
recommend that sufficient headroom is provided to allow an upgrade to
a newer cryptographic algorithms over the lifetime of the product.
As an example, while AES-CCM is recommended thoughout this
specification future products might use the ChaCha20 cipher in
combination with the Poly1305 authenticator
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305]. The assumption is made that a
robust software update mechanism is offered.

22. Key Length Recommendations

RFC 4492 [RFC4492] gives approximate comparable key sizes for
symmetric- and asymmetric-key cryptosystems based on the best-known
algorithms for attacking them. While other publications suggest
slightly different numbers, such as [Keylength], the approximate
relationship still holds true. Figure 6 9 illustrates the comparable
key sizes in bits.

At the time of writing the key size recommendations for use with TLS-
based ciphers found in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] recommend DH key
lengths of at least 2048 bit, which corresponds to a 112-bit
symmetric key and a 233 bit ECC keys. These recommendations are
inline with those from other organizations, such as National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) or European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA). The authors of
[ENISA-Report2013] add that a symmetric 80-bit security level is
sufficient for legacy applications for the coming years, but a
128-bit security level is the minimum requirement for new systems
being deployed. The authors further note that one needs to also take
into account the length of time data needs to be kept secure for.
The use 80-bit encryption for transactional data may be acceptable
for the near future while one has to insist on 128-bit encryption for
long lived data.

Symmetric | ECC | DH/DSA/RSA
------------+---------+-------------
80 | 163 | 1024
112 | 233 | 2048
128 | 283 | 3072
192 | 409 | 7680
256 | 571 | 15360

Figure 6: 9: Comparable Key Sizes (in bits).

23. TLS False Start

A full TLS handshake as specified in [RFC5246] requires two full
protocol rounds (four flights) before the handshake is complete and
the protocol parties may begin to send application data.

An abbreviated handshake (resuming an earlier TLS session) is
complete after three flights, thus adding just one round-trip time if
the client sends application data first.

If the conditions outlined in [I-D.bmoeller-tls-falsestart] are met,
application data can be transmitted when the sender has sent its own
"ChangeCipherSpec" and "Finished" messages. This achieves an
improvement of one round-trip time for full handshakes if the client
sends application data first, and for abbreviated handshakes if the
server sends application data first.

The conditions for using the TLS False Start mechanism are met by the
public-key-based ciphersuites in this document. In summary, the
conditions are

o Modern symmetric ciphers with an effective key length of 128 bits,
such as AES-128-CCM

o Client certificate types, such as ecdsa_sign

o Key exchange methods, such as ECDHE_ECDSA

Based on the improvement over a full roundtrip for the full TLS/DTLS
exchange this specification RECOMMENDS the use of the TLS False Start
mechanism when clients send application data first.

24. Privacy Considerations

The DTLS handshake exchange conveys various identifiers, which can be
observed by an on-path eavesdropper. For example, the DTLS PSK
exchange reveals the PSK identity, the supported extensions, the
session id, algorithm parameters, etc. When session resumption is
used then individual TLS sessions can be correlated by an on-path
adversary. With many IoT deployments it is likely that keying
material and their identifiers are persistent over a longer period of
time due to the cost of updating software on these devices.

User participation with many IoT deployments poses a challenge since
many of the IoT devices operate unattended, even though they will
initially be provisioned by a human. The ability to control data
sharing and to configure preference will have to be provided at a
system level rather than at the level of the DTLS exchange itself,
which is the scope of this document. Quite naturally, the use of
DTLS with mutual authentication will allow a TLS server to collect
authentication information about the IoT device (likely over a long
period of time). While this strong form of authentication will
prevent mis-attribution it also allows strong identification.
Device-related data collection (e.g., sensor recordings) will be
associated with other data to be truly useful and this extra data
might include personal data about the owner of the device or data
about the environment it senses. Consequently, the data stored on
the server-side will be vulnerable to stored data compromise. For
the communication between the client and the server this
specification prevents eavesdroppers to gain access to the
communication content. While the PSK-based ciphersuite does not
provide PFS the asymmetric versions do. This prevents an adversary
from obtaining past communication content when access to a long-term
secret has been gained. Note that no extra effort to make traffic
analysis more difficult is provided by the recommendations made in
this document.

25. Security Considerations

This entire document is about security.

We would also like to point out that designing a software update
mechanism into an IoT system is crucial to ensure that both
functionality can be enhanced and that potential vulnerabilities can
be fixed. This software update mechanism is also useful for changing
configuration information, for example, trust anchors and other
keying related information.

26. IANA Considerations

This document includes no request to IANA.

27. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Paul Bakker, Robert Cragie, Russ Housley, Rene Hummen,
Matthias Kovatsch, Sandeep Kumar, Sye Loong Keoh, Alexey Melnikov,
Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard, Akbar Rahman, Eric Rescorla, Michael
Richardson, Zach Shelby, Michael StJohns, Rene Struik, and Sean
Turner for their helpful comments and discussions that have shaped
the document.

Big thanks also to Klaus Hartke, who wrote the initial version of
this document.

Finally, we would like to thank our area director (Stephen Farrell)
and our working group chairs (Zach Shelby and Dorothy Gellert) for
their support.

28. References

28.1. Normative References

[EUI64] "GUIDELINES FOR 64-BIT GLOBAL IDENTIFIER (EUI-64)
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY", April 2010,
<http://standards.ieee.org/regauth/oui/tutorials/
EUI64.html>.

[GSM-SMS] ETSI, "3GPP TS 23.040 V7.0.1 (2007-03): 3rd Generation
Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core
Network and Terminals; Technical realization of the Short
Message Service (SMS) (Release 7)", March 2007.

[I-D.ietf-tls-cached-info]
Santesson, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Cached Information Extension", draft-ietf-tls-
cached-info-17 (work in progress), November 2014.

[I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash]
Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A., Langley,
A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session
Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension", draft-ietf-
tls-session-hash-03 (work in progress), November 2014.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December
2005.

[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, February 2010.

[RFC6066] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.

[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.

[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

[RFC6520] Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520, February 2012.

[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Tschofenig, H., Gilmore, J., Weiler, S., and
T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", RFC 7250, June 2014.

[RFC7251] McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
TLS", RFC 7251, June 2014.

[WAP-WDP] Wireless Application Protocol Forum, "Wireless Datagram
Protocol", June 2001.

28.2. Informative References

[AES] NIST, "FIPS PUB 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)",
http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/
tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4, November 2001.

[ENISA-Report2013]
ENISA, "Algorithms, Key Sizes and Parameters Report -
2013", http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-
trust/library/deliverables/
algorithms-key-sizes-and-parameters-report, October 2013.

[Heninger]
Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and A.
Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread
Weak Keys in Network Devices", 21st USENIX Security
Symposium,
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/
technical-sessions/presentation/heninger, 2012.

[HomeGateway]
Eggert, L., "An experimental study of home gateway
characteristics, In Proceedings of the '10th annual
conference on Internet measurement'", 2010.

[I-D.bmoeller-tls-downgrade-scsv]
Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
Attacks", draft-bmoeller-tls-downgrade-scsv-02 (work in
progress), May 2014.

[I-D.bmoeller-tls-falsestart]
Langley, A., Modadugu, N., and B. Moeller, "Transport
Layer Security (TLS) False Start", draft-bmoeller-tls-
falsestart-01 (work in progress), November 2014.

[I-D.bormann-core-cocoa]
Bormann, C., Betzler, A., Gomez, C., and I. Demirkol,
"CoAP Simple Congestion Control/Advanced", draft-bormann-
core-cocoa-02 (work in progress), July 2014.

[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]
Shelby, Z. and C. Bormann, "CoRE Resource Directory",
draft-ietf-core-resource-directory-02 (work in progress),
November 2014.

[I-D.ietf-lwig-tls-minimal]
Kumar, S., Keoh, S., and H. Tschofenig, "A Hitchhiker's
Guide to the (Datagram) Transport Layer Security Protocol
for Smart Objects and Constrained Node Networks", draft-
ietf-lwig-tls-minimal-01 (work in progress), March 2014.

[I-D.ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv]
Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
Attacks", draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-02 (work in
progress), November 2014.

[I-D.ietf-tls-negotiated-dl-dhe]
Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Discrete Log Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral Parameters for TLS", draft-ietf-tls-negotiated-
dl-dhe-00 (work in progress), July 2014.

[I-D.ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4]
Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", draft-ietf-
tls-prohibiting-rc4-01 (work in progress), October 2014.

[I-D.ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie]
Barnes, R., Thomson, M., Pironti, A., and A. Langley,
"Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0", draft-
ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie-00 (work in progress), December
2014.

[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]
Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft-
ietf-uta-tls-bcp-07
ietf-uta-tls-bcp-08 (work in progress), November December 2014.

[I-D.irtf-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305]
Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF
protocols", draft-irtf-cfrg-chacha20-poly1305-03 (work in
progress), November 2014.

[I-D.mathewson-no-gmtunixtime]
Mathewson, N. and B. Laurie, "Deprecating gmt_unix_time in
TLS", draft-mathewson-no-gmtunixtime-00 (work in
progress), December 2013.

[I-D.schmertmann-dice-ccm-psk-pfs]
Schmertmann, L. and C. Bormann, "ECDHE-PSK AES-CCM Cipher
Suites with Forward Secrecy for Transport Layer Security
(TLS)", draft-schmertmann-dice-ccm-psk-pfs-01 (work in
progress), August 2014.

[IANA-TLS]
IANA, "TLS Cipher Suite Registry",
http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/
tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4, 2014.

[Keylength]
Giry, D., "Cryptographic Key Length Recommendations",
http://www.keylength.com, November 2014.

[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
1997.

[RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with
CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, September 2003.

[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.

[RFC4634] Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, July 2006.

[RFC4919] Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher, "IPv6
over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals", RFC
4919, August 2007.

[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, January 2008.

[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.

[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.

[RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
RFC 5247, August 2008.

[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
August 2008.

[RFC5934] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Management Protocol (TAMP)", RFC 5934, August 2010.

[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February 2011.

[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, July 2012.

[RFC6961] Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
June 2013.

[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228, May 2014.

[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, June 2014.

[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, May 2014.

[RFC7366] Gutmann, P., "Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", RFC 7366, September 2014.

[RFC7400] Bormann, C., "6LoWPAN-GHC: Generic Header Compression for
IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks
(6LoWPANs)", RFC 7400, November 2014.

[Tripple-HS]
Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, C., Pironti, A., and P.
Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters: Breaking and
Fixing Authentication over TLS", IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, pages 98-113, 2014.

Appendix A. Conveying DTLS over SMS

This section is normative for the use of DTLS over SMS. Timer
recommendations are already outlined in Section 13 and also
applicable to the transport of DTLS over SMS.

This section requires readers to be familiar with the terminology and
concepts described in [GSM-SMS], and [WAP-WDP].

The remainder of this section assumes Mobile Stations are capable of
producing and consuming 8-bit binary data encoded Transport Protocol
Data Units (TPDU).

A.1. Overview

DTLS adds an additional roundtrip to the TLS [RFC5246] handshake to
serve as a return-routability test for protection against certain
types of DoS attacks. Thus a full blown DTLS handshake comprises up
to 6 "flights" (i.e., logical message exchanges), each of which is
then mapped on to one or more DTLS records using the segmentation and
reassembly (SaR) scheme described in Section 4.2.3 of [RFC6347]. The
overhead for said scheme is 6 bytes per Handshake message which,
given a realistic 10+ messages handshake, would amount around 60
bytes across the whole handshake sequence.

Note that the DTLS SaR scheme is defined for handshake messages only.
In fact, DTLS records are never fragmented and MUST fit within a
single transport layer datagram.

SMS provides an optional segmentation and reassembly scheme as well,
known as Concatenated short messages (see Section 9.2.3.24.1 of
[GSM-SMS]). However, since the SaR scheme in DTLS cannot be
circumvented, the Concatenated short messages mechanism SHOULD NOT be
used during handshake to avoid redundant overhead. Before starting
the handshake phase (either actively or passively), the DTLS
implementation MUST be explicitly configured with the PMTU of the SMS
transport in order to correctly instrument its SaR function. The
PMTU SHALL be 133 bytes if WDP-based multiplexing is used (see
Appendix A.3), 140 bytes otherwise.

It is RECOMMENDED to use the established security context over the
longest possible period (possibly until a Closure Alert message is
received, or after a very long inactivity timeout) to avoid the
expensive re-establishment of the security association.

A.2. Message Segmentation and Re-Assembly

The content of an SMS message is carried in the TP-UserData field,
and its size may be up to 140 bytes. As already mentioned in
Appendix A.1, longer (i.e., up to 34170 bytes) messages can be sent
using Concatenated SMS.

This scheme consumes 6-7 bytes (depending on whether the short or
long segmentation format is used) of the TP-UserData field, thus
reducing the space available for the actual content of the SMS
message to 133-134 bytes per TPDU.

Though in principle a PMTU value higher than 140 bytes could be used,
which may look like an appealing option given its more efficient use
of the transport, there are disadvantages to consider. First, there
is an additional overhead of 7 bytes per TPDU to be paid to the SaR
function (which is in addition to the overhead introduced by the DTLS
SaR mechanism. Second, some networks only partially support the
Concatenated SMS function and others do not support it at all.

For these reasons, the Concatenated short messages mechanism SHOULD
NOT be used, and it is RECOMMENDED to leave the same PMTU settings
used during the handshake phase, i.e., 133 bytes if WDP- based
multiplexing is enabled, 140 bytes otherwise.

Note that, after DTLS handshake has completed, any fragmentation and
reassembly logic that pertains the application layer (e.g.,
segmenting CoAP messages into DTLS records and reassembling them
after the crypto operations have been successfully performed) needs
to be handled by the application that uses the established DTLS
tunnel.

A.3. Multiplexing Security Associations

Unlike IPsec ESP/AH, DTLS records do not contain any association
identifiers. Applications must arrange to multiplex between
associations on the same endpoint which, when using UDP/IP, is
usually done with the host/port number.

If the DTLS server allows more than one client to be active at any
given time, then the WAP User Datagram Protocol [WAP-WDP] can be used
to achieve multiplexing of the different security associations. (The
use of WDP provides the additional benefit that upper layer protocols
can operate independently of the underlying wireless network, hence
achieving application-agnostic transport handover.)

The total overhead cost for encoding the WDP source and destination
ports is 7 bytes out of the total available for the SMS content.

The receiving side of the communication gets the source address from
the originator address (TP-OA) field of the SMS-DELIVER TPDU. This
way an unique 4-tuple identifying the security association can be
reconstructed at both ends. (When replying to its DTLS peer, the
sender will swaps the TP-OA and TP-DA parameters and the source and
destination ports in the WDP.)

A.4. Timeout

If SMS-STATUS-REPORT messages are enabled, their receipt is not to be
interpreted as the signal that the specific handshake message has
been acted upon by the receiving party. Therefore, it MUST NOT be
taken into account by the DTLS timeout and retransmission function.

Handshake messages MUST carry a validity period (TP-VP parameter in a
SMS-SUBMIT TPDU) that is not less than the current value of the
retransmission timeout. In order to avoid persisting messages in the
network that will be discarded by the receiving party, handshake
messages SHOULD carry a validity period that is the same as, or just
slightly higher than, the current value of the retransmission
timeout.

Appendix B. DTLS Record Layer Per-Packet Overhead

Figure 10 shows the overhead for the DTLS record layer for protecting
data traffic when AES-128-CCM with an 8-octet Integrity Check Value
(ICV) is used.

DTLS Record Layer Header................13 bytes
Nonce (Explicit).........................8 bytes
ICV..................................... 8 bytes
------------------------------------------------
Overhead................................29 bytes
------------------------------------------------

Figure 10: AES-128-CCM-8 DTLS Record Layer Per-Packet Overhead.

The DTLS record layer header has 13 octets and consists of

o 1 octet content type field,

o 2 octet version field,

o 2 octet epoch field,

o 6 octet sequence number,

o 2 octet length field.

The "nonce" input to the AEAD algorithm is exactly that of [RFC5288],
i.e., 12 bytes long. It consists of a 4 octet salt and an 8 octet
nonce. The salt is the "implicit" part of the nonce and is not sent
in the packet. Since the nonce_explicit may be the 8 octet sequence
number and, in DTLS, it is the 8 octet epoch concatenated with the 6
octet sequence number.

RFC 6655 [RFC6655] allows the nonce_explicit to be a sequence number
or something else. This document makes this use more restrictive for
use with DTLS: the 64-bit none_explicit MUST be the 16-bit epoch
concatenated with the 48-bit seq_num. The sequence number component
of the nonce_explicit field at the AES-CCM layer is an exact copy of
the sequence number in the record layer header field. This leads to
a duplication of 8-bytes per record.

To avoid this 8-byte duplication RFC 7400 [RFC7400] provides help
with the use of the generic header compression technique for IPv6
over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs). Note that
this header compression technique is not available when DTLS is
exchanged over transports that do not use IPv6 or 6LoWPAN, such as
the SMS transport described in Appendix A.

Authors' Addresses

Hannes Tschofenig (editor)
ARM Ltd.
110 Fulbourn Rd
Cambridge CB1 9NJ
Great Britain

Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at

Thomas Fossati
Alcatel-Lucent
3 Ely Road
Milton, Cambridge CB24 6DD
UK

Email: thomas.fossati@alcatel-lucent.com