wdiff draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-split-00.txt draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-split-01.txt

MIP6 WG G. Giaretta, Editor
Internet Draft Tilab
Expires: December 22, 2005 April 21, 2006 J. Kempf
DoCoMo Labs USA
V. Devarapalli
Nokia
June 22,
October 21, 2005

Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping in split scenario
draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-split-00.txt
draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-split-01.txt

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Abstract

A Mobile IPv6 node requires a Home Agent address, a home address,
and IPsec security associations with its Home Agent before it can
start utilizing Mobile IPv6 service. RFC 3775 requires that some
or all of these are statically configured. This document defines
how a Mobile IPv6 node can bootstrap this information from non-topological non-
topological information and security credentials preconfigured on
the Mobile Node. The solution defined in this document solves the boostrapping
bootstrapping problem from draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-ps-02
when the Mobile Node's mobility service is authorized by a
different service provider than basic network access, and is
therefore generically applicable to any bootstrapping case.

Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL"
in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119
[1].

Table of Contents

1. Introduction...................................................4
2. Terminology....................................................5
3. Split scenario.................................................6
4. Components of the solution.....................................8 solution.....................................9
5. Protocol Operations...........................................10 Operations...........................................11
5.1. Home Agent Address Discovery.............................10 Discovery.............................11
5.1.1. DNS lookup by Home Agent Name.......................10 Name.......................11
5.1.2. DNS lookup by service name..........................11 name..........................12
5.2. IPsec Security Associations setup........................12 setup........................13
5.3. Home Address assignment..................................12 assignment..................................13
5.3.1. Home Address assignment by the Home Agent...........12 Agent...........13
5.3.2. Home Address auto-configuration by the Mobile Node..12 Node..13
5.4. Authorization and Authentication with MSA................14 MSA................15
6. Home Address registration in the DNS..........................16 DNS..........................17
7. Summary of Bootstrapping Protocol Flow........................18 Flow........................19
8. Option and Attribute Format...................................20 Format...................................21
8.1. DNS Update mobility option...............................20 option...............................21
8.2. MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute...............................21 attribute...............................22
9. Security Considerations.......................................23
9.1. HA Address Discovery.....................................23
9.2. Home Address Assignment through IKEv2....................24
9.3. SA Establishment Using EAP Through IKEv2.................25
9.4. Back End Security Between the HA and AAA Server..........25
9.5. Dynamic DNS Update.......................................25
10. IANA Considerations..........................................27
11. Contributors.................................................28
12. References...................................................29
12.1. Acknowledgments..............................................29
13. References...................................................30
13.1. Normative References....................................29
12.2. References....................................30
13.2. Informative References..................................29 References..................................30
Authors' Addresses...............................................31 Addresses...............................................32
Intellectual Property Statement..................................32 Statement..................................33
Disclaimer of Validity...........................................32 Validity...........................................33
Copyright Statement..............................................32
Acknowledgment...................................................32 Statement..............................................33
Acknowledgment...................................................33

1. Introduction

Mobile IPv6 [2] requires the Mobile Node to know its Home Agent
Address, its own Home Address and the cryptographic materials
(e.g. shared keys or certificates) needed to set-up IPsec security
associations with the Home Agent in order to protect MIPv6
signaling. This is generally referred to as the Mobile IPv6
bootstrapping problem [4].

Mobile IPv6 base protocol does not specify any method to
automatically acquire this information, which means that network
administrators are normally required to manually set configuration
data on MNs and HAs. However, in real deployments, manual
configuration does not scale as the Mobile Nodes increase in
number.

As discussed in [4], several bootstrapping scenarios can be
identified depending on the relationship between the network
operator that authenticates a mobile host for granting network
access service (Access Service Authorizer, ASA) and the service
provider that authorizes Mobile IPv6 service (Mobility Service
Authorizer, MSA). This document describes a solution to the
bootstrapping problem that is applicable in a scenario where the
MSA and the ASA are different entities (i.e. split scenario).

2. Terminology

General mobility terminology can be found in [8]. The following
additional terms are used here:

ASA
Access Service Authorizer. A network operator that
authenticates a mobile host and establishes the mobile host's
authorization to receive Internet service.

ASP
Access Service Provider. A network operator that provides
direct IP packet forwarding to and from the end host.

MSA
Mobility Service Authorizer. A service provider that
authorizes Mobile IPv6 service.

MSP
Mobility Service Provider. A service provider that provides
Mobile IPv6 service. In order to obtain such service, the
mobile host must be authenticated and prove authorization to
obtain the service.

Split scenario
A scenario where mobility service and network access service
are authorized by different entities. This implies that MSA is
different from ASA.

3. Split scenario

In the problem statement draft [4] there is a clear assumption
that mobility service and network access service can be separate.
This assumption implies that mobility service and network access
service may be authorized by different entities. As an example,
the service model defined in [4] allows an enterprise network to
deploy a Home Agent and offer Mobile IPv6 service to a user, even
if the user is accessing the Internet independent of its
enterprise account (e.g., by using his personal WiFi hotspot
account at a coffee shop).

Therefore, in this document it is assumed that network access and
mobility service are authorized by different entities, which means
that authentication and authorization for mobility service and
network access will be considered separately. This scenario is
called split scenario.

Moreover, the model defined in [4] separates the entity providing
the service from the entity that authenticates and authorizes the
user. This is similar to the roaming model for network access.
Therefore, in the split scenario, two different cases can be
identified depending on the relationship between the entity that
provides the mobility service (i.e. Mobility Service Provider,
MSP) and the entity that authenticates and authorizes the user
(i.e. Mobility Service Authorizer, MSA).

Figure 1 depicts the split scenario when the MSP and the MSA are
the same entity. This means that the network operator that
provides the Home Agent authenticates and authorizes the user for
mobility service.

Mobility Service
Provider and Authorizer
+-------------------------------------------+
| |
| +-------------+ +--+ |
| | MSA/MSP AAA | <-------------> |HA| |
| | server | AAA protocol +--+ |
| +-------------+ |
| |
+-------------------------------------------+

+--+
|MN|
+--+

Figure 1 - Split Scenario (MSA == MSP)

Figure 2 shows the split scenario in case the MSA and the MSP are
two different entities. This might happen if the Mobile Node is
far from its MSA network and is assigned a closer HA to optimize
performance or if the MSA cannot provide any Home Agent and relies
on a third party (i.e. the MSP) to grant mobility service to its
users. Notice that the MSP might be or might not be also the
network operator that is providing network access (i.e. ASP,
Access Service Provider).

Mobility Service
Authorizer
+-------------+
| MSA AAA |
| server |
+-------------+
^
|
AAA protocol |
| Mobility Service
| Provider
+--------|----------------------------------+
| V |
| +-------------+ +--+ |
| | MSP AAA | <-------------> |HA| |
| | server | AAA protocol +--+ |
| +-------------+ |
| |
+-------------------------------------------+

+--+
|MN|
+--+

Figure 2 - Split Scenario (MSA != MSP)

Note that Figure 1 and Figure 2 assume the use of an AAA protocol
to authenticate and authorize the MN for mobility service. If,
instead, a PKI is used, the MN and HA exchange certificates and
there is no AAA server involved. This is conceptually similar to
Figure 1, since the MSP == MSA, except the HA may require a
certificate revocation list check (CRL check) with the Certificate
Authority (CA). The CA may be either internal or external to the
MSP. Figure 3 illustrates.

Certificate
Authority
+-------------+
| CA |
| server |
+-------------+
^
|
CRL Check |
| Mobility Service
| Provider and Authorizer
+--------|----------+
| V |
| +-------------+ |
| | HA | |
| | | |
| +-------------+ |
| |
+-------------------+

+--+
|MN|
+--+

Figure 3 - Split Scenario with PKI

The split scenario is the simplest model that can be identified,
since no assumptions about the access network are made. This
implies that the mobility service is bootstrapped independently
from the authentication protocol for network access used (e.g.
PANA, EAP). For this reason, the solution described in this
document and developed for this scenario could also be applied to
the integrated access network deployment model [4], even if it
might not be optimized . optimized.

4. Components of the solution

The bootstrapping problem is composed of different sub-problems
that can be solved independently in a modular way. The components
identified and a brief overview of their solution follow.

o HA address discovery. The Mobile Node needs to discover the
address of its Home Agent. The main objective of a
bootstrapping solution is to minimize the data pre-configured
on the Mobile Node. For this reason, the DHAAD defined in [2]
may not be applicable in real deployments since it is required
that the Mobile Node is pre-configured with the home network
prefix and it does not allow an operator to load balance by
having Mobile Nodes dynamically assigned to Home Agents located
in different subnets. This document defines a solution for Home
Agent address discovery that is based on Domain Name Service
(DNS), introducing a new DNS SRV record [5]. The unique
information that needs to be pre-
configured pre-configured on the Mobile Node
is the domain name of the MSP.

o IPsec Security Associations setup. MIPv6 requires that a Mobile
Node and its Home Agent share an IPsec SA in order to protect
binding updates and other MIPv6 signaling. This document
provides a solution that is based on IKEv2 and follows what is
specified in [6]. The IKEv2 peer authentication can be
performed both using certificates and using EAP, depending on
the network operator's deployment model.

o HoA assignment. The Mobile Node needs to know its Home Address
in order to bootstrap Mobile IPv6 operation. The Home Address
is assigned by the Home Agent during the IKEv2 exchange (as
described in [6]). The solution defined in this draft also
allows the Mobile Node to auto-configure its Home Address based
on stateless auto-
configuration auto-configuration ([20]), Cryptographically
Generated Addresses ([9]) or privacy addresses ([10]).

o Authentication and Authorization with MSA. The user must be
authenticated in order for the MSA MSP to grant the service. Since
the user credentials can be verified only by the MSA, this
authorization step is performed by the MSA. Moreover, the
mobility service must be explicitly authorized by the MSA based
on the user's profile. These operations are performed in
different ways depending on the credentials used by the Mobile
Node during the IKEv2 peer authentication and on the backend
infrastructure (PKI or AAA).

An optional part of bootstrapping involves providing a way for the
Mobile Node to have its FQDN updated in the DNS with a dynamically
assigned home address. While not all applications will require
this service, many networking applications use the FQDN to obtain
an address for a node prior to starting IP traffic with it. The
solution defined in this document specifies that the dynamic DNS
update is performed by the Home Agent or through the AAA
infrastructure, depending on the trust relationship in place.

5. Protocol Operations

This section describes in detail the procedures needed to perform
Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping based on the components identified in
the previous section.

5.1. Home Agent Address Discovery

Once a Mobile Node has obtained network access, it can perform
Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping. For this purpose, the Mobile Node
queries the DNS server to request information on Home Agent
service. As mentioned before in the document, the only information
that needs to be auto-
configured pre-configured on the Mobile Node is the domain
name of the Mobility Service Provider.

The Mobile Node needs to obtain the IP address of the DNS server
before it can send a DNS request. This can be pre-configured on
the Mobile Node or obtained through DHCPv6 from the visited link
[11]. In any case, it is assumed that there is some kind of
mechanism by which the Mobile Node is configured with a DNS server
since a DNS server is needed for many other reasons.

Two options for DNS lookup for a Home Agent address are identified
in this document: DNS lookup by Home Agent Name and DNS lookup by
service name.

This document does not provide a specific mechanism to load
balance different Mobile Nodes among Home Agents. It is possible
for an MSP to achieve coarse-grained load balancing by dynamically
updating the SRV RR priorities to reflect the current load on the
MSP's collection of Home Agents. Mobile Nodes then use the
priority mechanism to preferentially select the least loaded HA.
The effectiveness of this technique depends on how much of a load
it will place on the DNS servers, particularly if dynamic DNS is
used for frequent updates.

While this document specifies a Home Agent Address Discovery
solution based on DNS, when the ASP and the MSP are the same
entity DHCP may be used. See [15] for details.

5.1.1. DNS lookup by Home Agent Name

In this case, the Mobile Node is configured with the Fully
Qualified Domain Name of the Home Agent. As an example, the Mobile
Node could be configured with the name "ha1.example.com", where
"example.com" is the domain name of the MSP granting the mobility
service.

The Mobile Node constructs a DNS request, by setting the QNAME to
the name of the Home Agent. The request has QTYPE set to 'AAAA',
so that the DNS server sends the IPv6 address of the Home Agent.
Once the DNS server replies to this query, the Mobile Node knows
its Home Agent address and can run IKEv2 in order to set up an the
IPsec SA SAs and get a Home Address.

Additionally, it could be useful to provide an ability for the Mobile
Node ability to discover provide a Home Agent placed in mobile node with a particular location
localized home agent (e.g. on the visited link). In order to achieve this, the Mobile Node must
be able link) can help to construct
optimize handover signaling and improve routing efficiency in bi-
directional tunneling mode. There are a DNS request such that the DNS server will variety of ways this can
be
able achieved in an interoperable way. One way is to reply provision the
mobile node with an FQDN for a Home Agent from local home agent when it configures
for the requested location. This can
be accomplished by using a specific local link. Another way is to specify an interoperable
naming convention for the constructing home agent FQDNs
of the Home Agents. As an based on
location. For example, an operator might assign the FQDN
"ha.locationA.operator.com" to the Home Agent located in "location
A" and the FQDN "ha.locationB.operator.com" to the Home Agent
located in "location B". If the Mobile Node wants to use a Home
Agent located in "location A", it will set the QNAME to
"ha.locationA.operator.com" in the DNS request. The exact way in
which localized Home Agents are configured is out of scope for
this draft.

5.1.2. DNS lookup by service name

RFC 2782 [5] defines the service resource record (SRV RR), that
allows an operator to use several servers for a single domain, to
move services from host to host, and to designate some hosts as
primary servers for a service and others as backups. Clients ask
for a specific service/protocol for a specific domain and get back
the names of any available servers.

RFC 2782 [5] 2782[5] describes also the policies to choose a service agent
based on the preference and weight values. The DNS SRV record may
contain the preference and weight values for multiple Home Agents
available to the Mobile Node in addition to the Home Agent FQDNs.
If multiple Home Agents are available in the DNS SRV record then
Mobile Node is responsible for processing the information as per
policy and for picking one Home Agent. If the Home Agent of choice
does not respond for some reason or the IKEv2 authentication
fails, the Mobile Node SHOULD try other Home Agents on the list.

The service name for Mobile IPv6 Home Agent service as required by
RFC 2782 is "mip6" and the protocol name is "ipv6". Note that a
transport name cannot be used here because Mobile IPv6 does not
run over a transport protocol.

The SRV RR has a DNS type code of 33. As an example, the Mobile
constructs a request with QNAME set to "mip6.example.com" "_mip6_ipv6.example.com"
and QTYPE to SRV. The reply contains the FQDNs of one or more
servers, that can then be resolved in a separate DNS transaction
to the IP addresses. However, it is RECOMMENDED that the DNS
server also return the IP addresses of the Home Agents in AAAA
records as part of the additional data section in order to avoid
requiring an additional DNS round trip to resolve the FQDNs, if
there is room in the SRV reply.

5.2. IPsec Security Associations setup

As soon as the Mobile Node has discovered the Home Agent Address,
it establishes an IPsec Security Association with the Home Agent
itself through IKEv2. The detailed description of this procedure
is provided in [6]. If the Mobile Node wants the HA to register
the Home Address in the DNS, it MUST use the FQDN as the initiator
identity in IKE_AUTH step of the IKEv2 exchange (IDi). This is
needed because the Mobile Node has to provide it is the owner of
the FQDN provided in the subsequent DNS Update Option. See section
6 and section 9 for a more detailed analysis on this issue.

The IKEv2 Mobile Node to Home Agent authentication can be
performed using either IKEv2 public key signatures or the
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). The details about how
IKEv2 authentication is done are described in [6] and [7]. Choice
of an IKEv2 peer authentication method depends on the deployment.
However, IKEv2 restricts the Home Agent to Mobile Node
authentication to use public key signature based authentication.

5.3. Home Address assignment

Home Address assignment is performed during the IKEv2 exchange.
The Home Address can be assigned directly by the Home Agent or can
be auto-configured by the Mobile Node.

5.3.1. Home Address assignment by the Home Agent

When the Mobile Node runs IKEv2 with its Home Agent, it can
request a HoA through the Configuration Payload in the IKE_AUTH
exchange by including an INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS attribute. When the
Home Agent processes the message, it allocates a HoA and sends it
a CFG_REPLY message. The Home Agent could consult a DHCP server on
the home link for the actual home address allocation. This is
explained in detail in [6].

5.3.2. Home Address auto-configuration by the Mobile Node

With the type of assignment described in the previous section, the
Home Address cannot be generated based on Cryptographically
Generated Addresses (CGAs) [9] or based on the privacy extensions
for stateless autoconfiguration [10]. However, the Mobile Node
might want to have an auto-configured HoA based on these
mechanisms. It is worthwhile to mention that the auto-configuration auto-
configuration procedure described in this section cannot be used
in some possible deployment, since the Home Agents might be
provisioned with pools of allowed Home Addresses.

In the simplest case, the Mobile Node is provided with a pre-
configured home prefix and home prefix length. In this case the
Mobile Node creates a Home Address based on the pre-configured
prefix and sends it to the Home Agent including an
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS attribute in a Configuration Payload of type
CFG_REQUEST. If the Home Address is valid, the Home Agent replies
with a CFG_REPLY, including an INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS with the same
address. If the Home Address provided by the Mobile Node is not
valid, the Home Agent assigns a different Home Address including
an INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS attribute with a new value. According to
[7] the Mobile Node MUST use the address sent by the Home Agent.
Later, if the Mobile Node wants to use an auto-configured Home
Address (e.g. based on CGA), it can run Mobile Prefix Discovery,
obtain a prefix, auto-configure a new Home Address and then
perform a new CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange.

If the Mobile Node is not provided with a pre-configured Home
Prefix, the Mobile cannot simply propose an auto-configured HoA in
the Configuration Payload since the Mobile Node does not know the
home prefix before the start of the IKEv2 exchange. The Mobile
Node must obtain the home prefix and the home prefix length before
it can configure a home address.

One simple solution would be for the Mobile Node to just assume
that the prefix length on the home link is 64 bits and extract the
home prefix from the Home Agent's address. The disadvantage with
this solution is that the home prefix cannot be anything other
than /64. Moreover, this ties the prefix on the home link and the
Home Agent's address, but, in general, a Home Agent with a
particular address should be able to serve a number of prefixes on
the home link, not just the prefix from which its address is
configured.

Another solution would be for the Mobile Node to assume that the
prefix length on the home link is 64 bits and send its interface
identifier to the Home Agent in the IP6_INTERNAL_ADDRESS attribute
within the CFG_REQ payload. Even though this approach does not tie
the prefix on the home link and the Home Agent's address, it still
requires that the home prefix length is 64 bits.

For this reason the Mobile Node needs to obtain the home link
prefixes through the IKEv2 exchange. In the Configuration Payload
during the IKE_AUTH exchange, the Mobile Node includes the
MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute in the CFG_REQUEST message. The Home
Agent, when it processes this message, should include in the
CFG_REPLY payload prefix information for one prefix on the home
link. This prefix information includes the prefix length (see
section 8.2). The Mobile Node auto-configures a Home Address from
the prefix returned in the CFG_REPLY message and runs a
CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to create security associations for the
new Home Address.

As mentioned before in this document, there are deployments where
auto-configuration of the Home Address cannot be used. In this
case, when the Home Agent receives a CFG_REQUEST including a
MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute, in the subsequent IKE response it
includes a Notify Payload type "USE_ASSIGNED_HoA" and the related
Home Address in a INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS attribute. If the Mobile
Node gets a "USE_ASSIGNED_HoA" Notify Payload in response to the
Configuration Payload containing the MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute,
it looks for an INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS attribute and MUST use the
address contained in it in the subsequent CREATE_CHILD_SA
exchange.

When the Home Agent receives a Binding Update for the Mobile Node,
it performs proxy DAD for the auto-configured Home Address. If DAD
fails, the Home Agent rejects the Binding Update. If the Mobile
Node receives a Binding Acknowledgement with status 134 (DAD
failed), it MUST stop using the current Home Address, configure a
new HoA, and then run IKEv2 CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to create
security associations based on the new HoA. The Mobile Node does
not need to run IKE_INIT and IKE_AUTH exchanges again. Once the
necessary security associations are created, the Mobile Node sends
a Binding Update for the new Home Address.

It is worth noting that with this mechanism, the prefix
information carried in MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute includes only
one prefix and does not carry all the information that is
typically present when received through a IPv6 router
advertisement. Mobile Prefix Discovery, specified in RFC 3775 [2],
is the mechanism through which the Mobile Node can get all
prefixes on the home link and all related information. That means
that MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute is only used for Home Address
auto-configuration and does not replace the usage of Mobile Prefix
Discovery for the purposes detailed in RFC 3775.

5.4. Authorization and Authentication with MSA

In a scenario where the Home Agent is discovered dynamically by
the Mobile Node, it is very likely that the Home Agent is not able
to verify by its own the credentials provided by the Mobile Node
during the IKEv2 exchange. Moreover, the mobility service needs to
be explicitly authorized based on the user's profile. As an
example, the Home Agent might not be aware if the mobility service
can be granted at a particular time of the day or if the credit of
the Mobile Node is going to expire.

Due to all these reasons, the Home Agent may need to contact the
MSA in order to authenticate the Mobile Node and authorize
mobility service. This can be accomplished based on a Public Key
Infrastructure if certificates are used and a PKI is deployed by
the MSP and MSA. On the other hand, if the Mobile Node is provided
with other types of credentials, the AAA infrastructure must be
used.

The definition of this backend communication is out of the scope
of this document. In [12] a list of goals for such a communication
is provided.

6. Home Address registration in the DNS

In order that the Mobile Node is reachable through its dynamically
assigned Home Address, the DNS needs to be updated with the new
Home Address. Since applications make use of DNS lookups on FQDN
to find a node, the DNS update is essential for providing IP
reachability to the Mobile Node, which is the main purpose of the
Mobile IPv6 protocol. The need of DNS update is not discussed in
RFC 3775 since it assumes that the Mobile Node is provisioned with
a static home address. However, when a dynamic Home Address is
assigned to the Mobile Node, any existing DNS entry becomes
invalid and the Mobile Node becomes unreachable unless a DNS
update is performed.

Since the DNS update must be performed securely in order to
prevent attacks or modifications from malicious nodes, the node
performing this update must share a security association with the
DNS server. Having all possible Mobile Nodes sharing a security
association with the DNS servers of the MSP might be cumbersome
from an administrative perspective. Moreover, even if a Mobile
Node has a security association with a DNS server of its MSP, an
address authorization issue comes into the picture. A detailed
analysis of possible threats against DNS update is provided in
section 9.5.

Therefore, due to security and administrative reasons, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Home Agent perform DNS entry update for the
Mobile Node. For this purpose the Mobile Node MAY include a new
mobility option, the DNS Update option, with the flag R not set in
the Binding Update. This option is defined in section 8 and
includes the FQDN that needs to be updated. After receiving the
Binding Update, the Home Agent MUST update the DNS entry with the
identifier provided by the Mobile Node and the Home Address
included in the Home Address Option. The procedure for sending a
dynamic DNS update message is specified in [14]. The dynamic DNS
update SHOULD be performed in a secure way; for this reason, the
usage of TKEY and TSEC or DNSSEC is recommended (see section 9.5 9.5.
for details). As soon as the Home Agent has updated the DNS, it
MUST send a Binding Acknowledgement message to the Mobile Node
including the DNS Update mobility option with the correct value in
the Status field (see section 8.1).

This procedure can be performed directly by the Home Agent if the
Home Agent has a security association with the domain specified in
the Mobile Node's FQDN.

On the other hand, if the Mobile Node wants to be reachable
through a FQDN that belongs to the MSA, the Home Agent and the DNS
server that must be updated belong to different administrative
domain. In this case the Home Agent may not share a security
association with the DNS server and the DNS entry update can be
performed by the AAA server of the MSA. In order to accomplish
this, the Home Agent sends to the AAA server the FQDN-HoA pair
through the AAA protocol. This message is proxied by the AAA
infrastructure of the MSP and is received by the AAA server of the
MSA. The AAA server of the MSA perform the DNS update based on
[14]. The detailed description of the communication between Home
Agent and AAA is out of the scope of this draft. More details are
provided in [12].

A mechanism to remove stale DNS entries is needed. A DNS entry
becomes stale when the related Home Address is no more used by the
Mobile Node. To remove a DNS entry, the MN includes the DNS Update
mobility option, with the flag R set in the Binding Update. After
receiving the Binding Update, the Home Agent MUST remove the DNS
entry identified by the FQDN provided by the Mobile Node and the
Home Address included in the Home Address Option. The procedure
for sending a dynamic DNS update message is specified in [14]. As
mentioned above, the dynamic DNS update SHOULD be performed in a
secure way; for this reason, the usage of TKEY and TSEC or DNSSEC
is recommended (see section 9.5 9.5. for details).

This approach does not work if the Mobile Node stops using the
Home Address without sending a Binding Update message (e.g. in
case of crash). In this case, an additional mechanism to trigger
the DNS entry removal is needed. For this purpose, the Home Agent
has a timer related to the DNS entry of the Mobile Node. This
timer is initialized when the Mobile Node sends a Binding Update
with R==0 (i.e. when the MN asks the Home Agent to bind the FQDN
to the Home Address). The initial value of this timer is
configurable by the network operator.

If the Home Agent receives a Binding Update with R==1, it removes
the DNS entry as described in the previous paragraph and removes
the timer associated to that entry. If the timer expires without
receiving a Binding Update with R==1, the HA checks the Binding
Cache. If there is an existing Binding Cache entry for the HoA,
the HA does not remove the DNS entry and re-initialize the timer.
If there is not a Binding Cache entry, it sends a Neighbor Soliciation
Solicitation message to check if the MN is at home and is using
the HoA. If the HA gets a Neighbor Advertisement message, it does
not remove the DNS entry and re-initialize the timer. If it does
not receive a NA, it removes the DNS entry and the timer
associated to it.

7. Summary of Bootstrapping Protocol Flow

The message flow of the whole bootstrapping procedure when the
dynamic DNS update is performed by the Home Agent is depicted in
Figure 3.

+----+ +----+ +-----+
| MN | | HA | | DNS |
+----+ +----+ +-----+

IKEv2 exchange
(HoA configuration)
<======================>

BU (DNS update option)
----------------------->
DNS update
<------------------->
BU (DNS update option)
<-----------------------

Figure 3 - Dynamic DNS update by the HA

Figure 4 shows the message flow of the whole bootstrapping
procedure when the dynamic DNS update is performed by the AAA
server of the MSA.

+----+ +----+ +---+ +---+
| MN | | HA | |AAA| |DNS|
+----+ +----+ +---+ +---+

IKEv2 exchange
(HoA configuration)
<======================>

BU (DNS update option)
----------------------->

AAA request
(FQDN, HoA)
<-------------->

DNS update
<----------->
AAA answer
(FQDN, HoA)
<-------------->
BU (DNS update option)
<-----------------------

Figure 4 - Dynamic DNS update by the AAA

Notice that, even in this last case, the Home Agent is always
required to perform a DNS update for the reverse entry, since this
is always performed in the DNS server of the MSP. This is not
depicted in Figure 4.

8. Option and Attribute Format

8.1. DNS Update mobility option

o Option Type - DNS-UPDATE-TYPE to be defined by IANA

o Option Length - 8 bit unsigned integer indicating the length of
the option excluding the type and length fields

o Status - 8 bit unsigned integer indicating the result of the
dynamic DNS update procedure. This field MUST be set to 0 and
ignored by the receiver when the DNS Update mobility option is
included in a Binding Update message. When the DNS Update
mobility option is included in the Binding Acknowledgement
message, values of the Status field less than 128 indicate that
the dynamic DNS update was performed successfully by the Home
Agent. Values greater than or equal to 128 indicate that the
dynamic DNS update was not completed by the HA. The following
Status values are currently defined:

0 DNS update performed

128 Reason unspecified

129 Administratively prohibited

130 DNS Update Failed

o R flag - if set the MN is requesting the HA to remove the DNS
entry identified by the FQDN specified in this option and the
HoA of the MN. If not set, the MN is requesting the HA to
create or update a DNS entry with its HoA and the FQDN
specified in the option.

o Reserved - these bits are reserved for future purposes and MUST
be set to 0.

o MN identity - the identity of the Mobile Node to be used by the
Home Agent to send a Dynamic DNS update. It is a variable
length field.

8.2. MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute

The MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute is included in the IKEv2
CFG_REQUEST by the Mobile Node to ask the Home Agent for the home
prefix and is included in the CFG_REPLY by the Home Agent to
provide the Mobile Node with home prefix and home prefix length.
The format of this attribute is equal to the format of the
Configuration Attributes defined in [7] and is depicted below.

1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
!R| Attribute Type ! Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| home prefix |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Prefix Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

o Reserved (1 bit) - This bit MUST be set to zero and MUST be
ignored on receipt.

o Attribute Type (7 bits) - A unique identifier for the
MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute. To be assigned by IANA.

o Length (2 octets) - Length in octets of Value field (home
prefix and Prefix Length). This is multi-valued and can be 0 or
17.

o Home Prefix (16 octets) - The prefix of the home link through
which the Mobile Node must auto-configure its Home Address.

o Prefix Length (1 octet) - The length of the home prefix
specified in the field Home Prefix.

When the MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute is included by the Mobile Node
in the CFG_REQUEST payload, the value of the Length field is 0. On
the other hand, when the MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute is included in
the CFG_REPLY payload by the Home Agent, the value of the Length
field is 17 and the attribute contains also the Home Prefix and
the Prefix Length fields.

9. Security Considerations

9.1. HA Address Discovery

Use of DNS for address discovery carries certain security risks.
DNS transactions in the Internet are typically done without any
authentication of the DNS server by the client or of the client by
the server. There are two risks involved:

1) A legitimate client obtains a bogus Home Agent address from a
bogus DNS server. This is sometimes called a "pharming" attack,

2) An attacking client obtains a legitimate Home Agent address
from a legitimate server.

The risk in Case 1 is mitigated because the Mobile Node is
required to conduct an IKE transaction with the Home Agent prior
to performing a Binding Update to establish Mobile IPv6 service.
According to the IKEv2 specification [7], the responder must
present the initiator with a valid certificate containing the
responder's public key, and the responder to initiator IKE_AUTH
message must be protected with an authenticator calculated using
the public key in the certificate. Thus, an attacker would have to
set up both a bogus DNS server and a bogus Home Agent, and
provision the Home Agent with a certificate that a victim Mobile
Node could verify. If the Mobile Node can detect that the
certificate is not trustworthy, the attack will be foiled when the
Mobile Node attempts to set up the IKE SA.

The risk in Case 2 is limited for a single Mobile Node to Home
Agent transaction if the attacker does not possess proper
credentials to authenticate with the Home Agent. The IKE SA
establishment will fail when the attacking Mobile Node attempts to
authenticate itself with the Home Agent. Regardless of whether the
Home Agent utilizes EAP or host-side certificates to authenticate
the Mobile Node, the authentication will fail unless the Mobile
Node has valid credentials.

Another risk exists in Case 2 because the attacker may be
attempting to propagate a DoS attack on the Home Agent. In that
case, the attacker obtains the Home Agent address from the DNS,
then propagates the address to a network of attacking hosts that
bombard the Home Agent with traffic. This attack is not unique to
the bootstrapping solution, however, it is actually a risk that
any Mobile IPv6 Home Agent installation faces. In fact, the risk
is faced by any service in the Internet that distributes a unicast
globally routable address to clients. Since Mobile IPv6 requires
that the Mobile Node communicate through a globally routable
unicast address of a Home Agent, it is possible that the Home
Agent address could be propagated to an attacker by various means
(theft of the Mobile Node, malware installed on the Mobile Node,
evil intent of the Mobile Node owner him/herself, etc.) even if
the home address is manually configured on the Mobile Node.
Consequently, every Mobile IPv6 Home Agent installation will
likely be required to mount anti-DoS measures. Such measures
include overprovisioning of links to and from Home Agents and of
Home Agent processing capacity, vigilant monitoring of traffic on
the Home Agent networks to detect when traffic volume increases
abnormally indicating a possible DoS attack, and hot spares that
can quickly be switched on in the event an attack is mounted on an
operating collection of Home Agents. DoS attacks of moderate
intensity should be foiled during the IKEv2 transaction. IKEv2
implementations are expected to generate their cookies without any
saved state, and to time out cookie generation parameters
frequently, with the timeout value increasing if a DoS attack is
suspected. This should prevent state depletion attacks, and should
assure continued service to legitimate clients until the practical
limits on the network bandwith and processing capacity of the Home
Agent network are reached.

Explicit security measures between the DNS server and host, such
DNSSEC [16] or TSIG/TKEY [17] [18] can mitigate the risk of 1) and
2), but these security measures are not widely deployed on end
nodes. These security measures are not sufficient to protect the
Home Agent address against DoS attack, however, because a node
having a legitimate security association with the DNS server could
nevertheless intentionally or inadvertently cause the Home Agent
address to become the target of DoS.

Finally notice that assignment of an home agent from the serving
network access provider's (local home agent) or a home agent from
a nearby network (nearby home agent) may set up the potential to
compromise a MN's location privacy. However, since a standardized
mechanism of assigning local or nearby home agents is out of scope
for this document, it is not possible to present detailed security
considerations. Please see other drafts that contain detailed
mechanisms for localized home agent assignment, such as [15], for
information on the location privacy properties of particular home
agent assignment mechanisms.

Security considerations for discovering HA using DHCP are covered
in draft-jang-dhc-haopt-01 [15].

9.2. Home Address Assignment through IKEv2

Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping assigns the home address through the
IKEv2 transaction. The Mobile Node can either choose to request an
address, similar to DHCP, or the Mobile Node can request a prefix
on the home link then autoconfigure an address.

RFC 3775 [2] and 3776 [3] require that a Home Agent check
authorization on a home address received during a Binding Update.

The Home Agent MUST set up authorization by linking the home
address to the identity of the IPsec SAs used to authenticate the
Binding Update message. The linking MUST be done either during the
IKE_AUTH phase or CREATE_CHILD_SA phase when the IPsec SAs are
constructed.

If the address is autoconfigured, RFC 3775 requires the Home Agent
to proxy-defend the address on the home link after the Mobile Node
performs the initial Binding Update. Since it is not currently
possible to securely proxy CGAs using SEND, attacks on address
resolution for Neighbor Discovery listed in RFC 3756 are possible
on dynamically assigned home addresses that are proxied by the
Home Agent.

9.3. SA Establishment Using EAP Through IKEv2

Security considerations for authentication of the IKE transaction
using EAP are covered in draft-ietf-mip6-ikev2-ipsec [6].

9.4. Back End Security Between the HA and AAA Server

Some deployments of Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping may use an AAA
server to handle authorization for mobility service. This process
has its own security requirements, but the back end protocol for
Home Agent to AAA server interface is not covered in this draft.
Please see draft-ietf-mip6-aaa-ha-goals [12] for a discussion of
this interface.

9.5. Dynamic DNS Update

Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping recommends the Home Agent to update the
Mobile Node's FQDN with a dynamically assigned home address rather
than have the Mobile Node itself do it (see Section 6 above). This
choice was motivated by a concern for preventing redirection-based
flooding attacks (see draft-ietf-mip6-ro-sec [19] for more
information about redirection-based flooding attacks and the role
preventing them played in the design of Mobile IPv6 route
optimization security). Exactly as for route optimization, it is
possible for a node that is the legitimate owner of a DNS FQDN -
in the sense that it has a security association with the DNS
server allowing it to perform dynamic DNS update of its FQDN - to
bind its FQDN to the address of a victim, then redirect large
volumes of traffic at the victim. The attack may be propagated
without the owner's knowledge, for example, if the node is
compromised by malware, or it may be intentional if the node
itself is the attacker.

While it is possible to prevent redirection attacks through
ingress filtering on access routers, ISPs have little or no
incentive to deploy ingress filtering. In some cases, if an attack
could result in substantial financial gain, it is even possible
that a corrupt ISP may have an incentive not to deploy ingress
filters such as has been the case for spam. Consequently, the
security for dynamic Mobile Node FQDN update has been assigned to
the Home Agent, where active network administration and vigilant
defense measures are more likely to (but are not assured of)
mitigating problems, and the owner of the Mobile Node is more
likely to detect a problem if it occurs.

If a Home Agent performs dynamic DNS update on behalf of the
Mobile Node directly with the DNS server, the Home Agent MUST have
a security association of some type with the DNS server. The
security association MAY be established either using DNSSEC [16]
or TSIG/TKEY [17][18]. A security association is required even if
the DNS server is in the same administrative domain as the Home
Agent. The security association SHOULD be separate from the
security associations used for other purposes, such as AAA.

In the case where the Mobility Service Provider is different from
the Mobility Service Authorizer, the network administrators may
want to limit the number of cross-administrative domain security
associations. If the Mobile Node's FQDN is in the Mobility Service
Authorizer's domain, since a security association for AAA
signaling involved in mobility service authorization is required
in any case, the Home Agent can send the Mobile Node's FQDN to the
AAA server under the HA-AAA server security association, and the
AAA server can perform the update. In that case, a security
association is required between the AAA server and DNS server for
the dynamic DNS update. See draft-ietf-mip6-aaa-ha-goals [12] for
a deeper discussion of the Home Agent to AAA server interface.

Regardless of whether the AAA server or Home Agent performs DNS
update, the authorization of the Mobile Node to update a FQDN MUST
be checked prior to the performance of the update. It is an
implementation issue as to how authorization is determined.
However, in order to allow this authorization step, the Mobile
Node MUST use a FQDN as the IDi in IKE_AUTH step of the IKEv2
exchange. The FQDN MUST be the same that will be provided by the
MN in the DNS Update Option. This allows the Home Agent to get
authorization information about the Mobile Node's FQDN via the AAA
back end communication performed during IKEv2 exchange. The
outcome of this step will give the Home Agent the necessary
information to authorize the DNS update request of the Mobile
Node. See draft-ietf-mip6-aaa-ha-goals [12] for details about the
communication between the AAA server and the Home Agent needed to
perform the authorization. Notice that if certificates are used in
IKEv2, the authorization information about the FQDN for DNS update
MUST be present in the certificate provided by the Mobile Node.

10. IANA Considerations

This document defines a new Mobility Option and a new IKEv2
Configuration Attribute Type.

The following values should be assigned:

o from "Mobility Option" namespace ([2]): DNS-UPDATE-TYPE
(section 8.1)

o from "IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types" namespace
([7]): MIP6_HOME_PREFIX attribute (section 8.2)

o from "IKEv2 Notify Payload Error Types" namespace ([7]):
USE_ASSIGNED_HoA error type (section 5.3.2)

11. Contributors

This contribution is a joint effort of the bootstrapping solution
design team of the MIP6 WG. The contributors include Basavaraj
Patil, Alpesh Patel, Jari Arkko, James Kempf, Yoshihiro Ohba,
Gopal Dommety, Alper Yegin, Junghoon Jee, Vijay Devarapalli,
Kuntal Chowdury, Julien Bournelle.

The design team members can be reached at:

Gerardo Giaretta gerardo.giaretta@tilab.com

Basavaraj Patil basavaraj.patil@nokia.com

Alpesh Patel alpesh@cisco.com

Jari Arkko jari.arkko@kolumbus.fi

James Kempf kempf@docomolabs-usa.com

Yoshihiro Ohba yohba@tari.toshiba.com

Gopal Dommety gdommety@cisco.com

Alper Yegin alper.yegin@samsung.com

Vijay Devarapalli vijayd@iprg.nokia.com

Kuntal Chowdury kchowdury@starentnetworks.com

Junghoon Jee jhjee@etri.re.kr

Julien Bournelle julien.bournelle@int-evry.fr

12. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Rafa Lopez, Francis Dupont,
Basavaraj Patil, Jari Arkko, Kilian Weniger for their valuable
comments.

13. References

12.1.

13.1. Normative References

[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[2] Johnson, D., Perkins, C. and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

[3] Arkko, J., Devarapalli, V., Dupont, F., "Using IPsec to
Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling between Mobile Nodes and
Home Agents", RFC 3776, June 2004

[4] Patel, A., "Problem Statement for bootstrapping Mobile
IPv6", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrap-ps-02, March draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrap-ps-
03, July 2005.

[5] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P. and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
February 2000.

[6] Devarapalli, V., " Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the
revised IPsec Architecture", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-mip6-
ikev2-ipsec-01, February
ikev2-ipsec-03, September 2005.

[7] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",

12.2.

13.2. Informative References

[8] Manner, J., Kojo, M. "Mobility Related Terminology", RFC
3753, June 2004.

[9] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", RFC
3972, March 2005.

[10] Narten, T., Draves, R., Krishnan, S., "Privacy Extensions
for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", Internet-Draft
draft-ietf-ipv6-privacy-addrs-v2-03, April Internet-
Draft draft-ietf-ipv6-privacy-addrs-v2-04, May 2005.

[11] Droms, R., Ed., "DNS Configuration options for Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3646,
December 2003.

[12] Giaretta, G., Ed. "Goals for AAA-HA interface", Internet-Draft Internet-
Draft draft-ietf-mip6-aaa-ha-goals-00, April 2005.

[13] Koodli, R., Devarapalli, V., Perkins, C., Flinck, H.,
"Solutions for IP Address Location Privacy in the presence
of IP Mobility", Internet-Draft, draft-koodli-mip6-location-
privacy-solutions-00, February 2005.

[14] P. Vixie, Ed., S. Thomson, Y. Rekhter, and J. Bound.
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, April 1997.

[15] Jang, H.J., Chowdhury, K., Yegin, A., Choi, J., "DHCP Option "MIP6-bootstrapping via
DHCPv6 for Home Agent
Discovery in MIPv6", the Integrated Scenario", Internet-Draft, draft-jang-dhc-haopt-01,
April draft-
ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-integrated-dhc-00, October 2005.

[16] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., Rose, S.,
"DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,
March 2005.

[17] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., Wellington,
B., "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)",
RFC 2845, May 2000.

[18] Eastlake 3rd, D., " Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY
RR)", RFC 2930, September 2000.

[19] Nikander, P., Arkko, J., Aura, T., Montenegro, G.,
Nordmark, E., "Mobile IP version 6 Route Optimization
Security Design Background", Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-mip6-ro-sec-02, draft-ietf-
mip6-ro-sec-02, October 2004.

[20] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., Soliman, H.,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)"`, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-ipv6-2461bis-03, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-ipv6-2461bis-03, May 2005.

Authors' Addresses

Gerardo Giaretta
Telecom Italia Lab
via Reiss Romoli 274
10148 Torino
Italy

Phone: +39 011 228 6904
Email: gerardo.giaretta@tilab.com

James Kempf
DoCoMo Labs USA
181 Metro Drive
Suite 300
San Jose, CA, 95110
USA

Phone: +1 408 451 4711
Email: kempf@docomolabs-usa.com

Vijay Devarapalli
Nokia Research Center
313 Fairchild Drive
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA

Email: vijay.devarapalli@nokia.com

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