wdiff draft-ietf-oauth-resource-indicators-00.txt draft-ietf-oauth-resource-indicators-01.txt

OAuth Working Group B. Campbell
Internet-Draft J. Bradley Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track Ping Identity J. Bradley
Expires: February 4, April 22, 2019 Yubico
H. Tschofenig
Arm Limited
August 3,
October 19, 2018

Resource Indicators for OAuth 2.0
draft-ietf-oauth-resource-indicators-00
draft-ietf-oauth-resource-indicators-01

Abstract

This straw-man specification defines an

An extension to The the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework defining
request parameters that enables the enable a client and authorization
server to more explicitly signal to communicate an
authorization server about the location of the protected resource(s)
to be accessed. which it is requesting access.

Status of This Memo

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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 4, April 22, 2019.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Resource Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. IANA Considerations
2.1. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Access Token Request . . . 5
3.1. OAuth Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Registry Contents . 6
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration . . 9
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. OAuth Parameters Registration . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 6 10
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 13

1. Introduction

Several years of deployment and implementation experience with The
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] has uncovered a need, in
some circumstances, for the client to explicitly signal to the
authorization sever server where it intends to use the access token it is
requesting.

Knowing which the protected resource server (a.k.a. resource server, application,
API, etc.) that will process the access token enables the
authorization server to construct the token as necessary for that
entity. Properly encrypting the token (or content within the token)
to a particular resource server, resource, for example, requires knowing which
resource server will receive and decrypt the token. Furthermore, various resource servers
resources oftentimes have different requirements with respect to the
data contained in, or referenced by, the token and knowing the
resource server where the client intends to use the s token allows the the
authorization server to mint the token accordingly.

Specific knowledge of the intended recipient(s) of the access token
also helps facilitate improved security characteristics of the token
itself. Bearer tokens, currently the only defined most commonly utilized type of
OAuth access token, allow any party in possession of a token to get
access to the associated resources. To prevent misuse, two several
important security assumptions must hold: bearer tokens must be protected from
disclosure in storage and in transit and the hold, one of which is that an
access token must only be valid for use at a specific protected
resource server and for a specific
scope. scope of access. Section 5.2 of
[RFC6750], for example, prescribes including the token's intended
recipients within the token to prevent token redirect. When the
authorization server is informed of the resource
server that will process
the access token, it can restrict the intended audience of that token
to the given resource such that it the token cannot be used successfully
at other
resource servers. Section 5.2 of resources.

OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework:
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750] prescribes including the token's
intended recipients within the token to prevent token redirect.

Scope, scope, from Section 3.3 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], sometimes is sometimes overloaded
to convey the location or identity of the resource server, protected resource,
however, doing so isn't always feasible or desirable. Scope is
typically about what access is being requested rather than where that
access will be redeemed (e.g. "email", "user:follow", "admin:org", "user_photos",
"channels:read", and "channels:read" "channels:write" are a small sample of scope
values in use).

A use in the wild that convey only the type of access and not
the location).

In some circumstances and for some deployments, a means for the
client to signal to the authorization sever server where it intends to use
the access token it's requesting is important and useful. A number
of implementations and deployments of OAuth 2.0 have already employed
proprietary parameters toward that end. This Going forward, this
specification aims aspires to provide a standardized and interoperable
alternative to the proprietary approaches going forward. approaches.

1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119]. BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Terminology

This specification uses the terms "access token", "refresh token",
"authorization server", "resource server", "authorization endpoint",
"authorization request", "authorization response", "token endpoint",
"grant type", "access token request", "access token response", and
"client" defined by The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749].

2. Resource Parameter

The

In requests to the authorization server, a client may MAY indicate the
protected resource server(s) for (a.k.a. resource server, application, API, etc.)
to which it is requesting an access token by including the following parameter
in the request.

resource
OPTIONAL. The value
Indicates the location of the "resource" parameter indicates a target service or resource server where the requested
access token will be used. It is being requested. Its value MUST be an absolute URI, as
specified by Section 4.3 of[RFC3986],
and of [RFC3986], which MAY include a query
component but MUST NOT include a query or fragment component. If the
authorization server fails to parse the provided value or does not
consider the resource server acceptable, it MUST reject the
request and provide an error response with the error code
"invalid_resource". Multiple
"resource" parameters may MAY be used to indicate that the issued requested
token is intended to be used at multiple
resource servers.

When an access token will be returned from the authorization
endpoint, the "resource" parameter is used in the authorization
request to the authorization endpoint as defined in Section 4.2.1 of
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. An example of an authorization request where
the client tells the authorization server that it wants a token for
use at "https://rs.example.com/" is shown in Figure 1 below.

GET /as/authorization.oauth2?response_type=token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=laeb
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
&resource=https%3A%2F%2Frs.example.com%2F HTTP/1.1
Host: authorization-server.example.com

Figure 1: Protected Resource Request

When the access token is returned from the token endpoint, the
request parameter is included in the token request to the token
endpoint. Sections 4.1.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.2, 4.5 and 6 of OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] define requests to the token endpoint with different grant
types. An example of a token request, using a refresh token, where
the client tells the authorization server that it wants a token for
use at "https://rs.example.com/" is shown in Figure 2 below.

POST /as/token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
Host: authorization-server.example.com
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzpoc3FFelFsVW9IQUU5cHg0RlNyNHlJ
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=refresh_token
&refresh_token=4LTC8lb0acc6Oy4esc1Nk9BWC0imAwH
&resource=https%3A%2F%2Frs.example.com%2F

Figure 2: Protected Resource Request resources.

The "resource" parameter value indicates the physical location of resource
server, a protected resource,
typically as an https URL, where the client intends to use
the requested access token. is requesting access.
This enables the authorization server to apply policy as appropriate
for the resource, such as determining the type and content of the token tokens
to be issued, if and how the token is
to be tokens are encrypted, and applying
appropriate audience restrictions to
the token. restrictions.

The client SHOULD provide the most specific URI that it can for the
complete API or set of resources or API it intends to access. In practice a
client will know a base URI for the resource server application or resource that it
interacts with, which is appropriate to use as the value of the
"resource" parameter. The client SHOULD use the base URI for of the API
as the "resource" parameter value unless specific knowledge of the
resource server dictates the client use
a shorter path. otherwise. For example, the value "https://rs.example.com/"
"https://api.example.com/" would be used for a resource server that is the
exclusive application on that host, however, if the resource server is one
of many applications on that host, something like "https://rs.example.com/
application/"
"https://api.example.com/app/" would be used. used as a more specific
value. Another example, for an API like SCIM [RFC7644] that has
multiple endpoints such as
"https://rs.example.com/scim/Users", "https://rs.example.com/scim/
Groups", "https://apps.example.com/scim/Users",
"https://apps.example.com/scim/Groups", and "https://rs.example.com/scim/Schemas"
"https://apps.example.com/scim/Schemas" The client should would use "https://rs.example.com/scim/"
"https://apps.example.com/scim/" as the resource so that the issued
access token is valid for all the endpoints of the SCIM API.

The following error code is provided for an authorization server SHOULD audience restrict to
indicate problems with the requested resource(s) in response to an
authorization request or access token request. And can also be used
to inform the client that it has requested an invalid combination of
resource server(s) and scope.

invalid_target
The requested resource is invalid, unknown, or malformed.

The authorization server SHOULD audience restrict issued access
tokens to the resource(s) indicated by the "resource" parameter.
Audience restrictions can be communicated in JSON Web Tokens
[RFC7519] with the "aud" claim and the top-level member of the same
name provides the audience restriction information in a Token
Introspection [RFC7662] response. The authorization server may use
the exact "resource" value as the audience or it may map from that
value to a more general URI or abstract identifier for the given
resource.

2.1. Authorization Request

When the "resource" parameter is used in an authorization request to
the authorization endpoint, it indicates the location of the
protected resource(s) to which access is being requested. When an
access token will be returned directly from the authorization
endpoint via the implicit flow (Section 4.2 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]),
the requested resource
server.

The is applicable to that access token. In the
code flow (Section 4.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]) where an an
intermediate representation of the authorization grant (the
authorization code) is returned from the authorization endpoint, the
requested resource pertains is applicable to the full authorization grant.

For authorization requests sent as a JWTs, such as when using JWT
Secured Authorization Request [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq], a single
"resource" parameter value is represented as a JSON string while
multiple values are represented as an array of strings.

If the client omits the "resource" parameter when requesting
authorization, the authorization server MAY process the request with
no specific resource or by using a pre-defined default resource
value. Alternatively, the authorization server MAY require clients
to specify the resource(s) they intend to access token and MAY fail
requests that omit the parameter with an "invalid_target" error. The
authorization server might use this data to inform the user about the
resources the client is going to access on her behalf, to meet policy
decision (e.g. refuse the
expected result request due to unknown resources), and
determine the set of resources that can be used in subsequent access
token requests.

If the authorization server fails to parse the provided value(s) or
does not consider the resource(s) acceptable, it should reject the
request with an an error response using the error code
"invalid_target" as the value of the "error" parameter and not can
provide additional information regarding the reasons for the error
using the "error_description" and/or "error_uri" parameters.

An example of an authorization request where the client tells the
authorization server that it wants an access token for use at
"https://api.example.com/app/" is shown in Figure 1 below (extra line
breaks and indentation are for display purposes only).

GET /as/authorization.oauth2?response_type=token
&client_id=example-client
&state=XzZaJlcwYew1u0QBrRv_Gw
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Eorg%2Fcb
&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.example.com%2Fapp%2F HTTP/1.1
Host: authorization-server.example.com

Figure 1: Implicit Flow Authorization Request

Below in Figure 2 is an example of an authorization request using the
"code" response type where the the client is requesting access to the underlying
resource owner's contacts and calendar data at
"https://cal.example.com/" and "https://contacts.example.com/" (extra
line breaks and indentation are for display purposes only).

GET /as/authorization.oauth2?response_type=code
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&state=tNwzQ87pC6llebpmac_IDeeq-mCR2wLDYljHUZUAWuI
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Eorg%2Fcb
&scope=calendar%20contacts
&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fcal.example.com%2F
&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fcontacts.example.com%2F HTTP/1.1
Host: authorization-server.example.com

Figure 2: Code Flow Authorization Request

2.2. Access Token Request

When the "resource" parameter is used on an access
granted by token request made
to the token endpoint, for all grant types, it indicates the location
of the target service or protected resource owner.

3. IANA Considerations

3.1. OAuth Parameters Registration

This specification registers where the following value client intends
to use the requested access token.

The resource value(s) that are acceptable to an authorization server
in fulfilling an access token request are at its sole discretion
based on local policy or configuration. In the IANA "OAuth
Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established case of a
"refresh_token" or "authorization_code" grant type request, such
policy may limit the acceptable resources to those that were
originally granted by
[RFC6749].

3.1.1. Registry Contents

o Parameter name: the resource
o Parameter usage location: owner or a subset thereof. In the
"authorization_code" case where the requested resources are a subset
of the set of resources originally granted, the authorization request, server
will issue an access token based on that subset of requested
resources while any refresh token that is returned is bound to the
full original grant.

When requesting a token, the client can indicate the desired target
service(s) where it intends to use that token by way of the
"resource" parameter and can indicate the desired scope of the
requested token using the "scope" parameter. The semantics of such a
request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): Section 2 are that the client is asking for a token with the requested
scope that is usable at all the requested target services.
Effectively, the requested access rights of [[ this specification ]]

3.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration the token are the
cartesian product of all the scopes at all the target services. To
the extent possible, when issuing access tokens, the authorization
server should adapt the scope value associated with an access token
to the value the respective resource is able to process and needs to
know. This specification registers further improves privacy as scope values give an
indication of what services the following error resource owner uses and it improves
security as scope values may contain confidential data. As specified
in Section 5.1 of [RFC6749], the IANA "OAuth
Extensions Error Registry" [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established authorization server must indicate
the access token's effective scope to the client in the "scope"
response parameter value when it differs from the scope requested by
[RFC6749].

3.2.1. Registry Contents

o Error name: invalid_resource
o Error usage location: implicit
the client.

Following from the code flow authorization request shown in Figure 2,
the below examples show an "authorization_code" grant error response, type access
token error request and response
o Related protocol extension: resource parameter
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]

4. where the client tells the authorization
server that it wants the access token for use at
"https://cal.example.com/" (extra line breaks and indentation are for
display purposes only).

POST /as/token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
Host: authorization-server.example.com
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzpoc3FFelFsVW9IQUU5cHg0RlNyNHlJ
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=authorization_code
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Eorg%2Fcb
&code=10esc29BWC2qZB0acc9v8zAv9ltc2pko105tQauZ
&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fcal.example.com%2F

Figure 3: Access Token Request

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store

{
"access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ijc3In0.eyJpc3MiOi
JodHRwOi8vYXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbi1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJzdWI
iOiJfX2JfYyIsImV4cCI6MTU4ODQyMDgwMCwic2NvcGUiOiJjYWxlbmRhciIs
ImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vY2FsLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tLyJ9.nNWJ2dXSxaDRdMUK
lzs-cYIj8MDoM6Gy7pf_sKrLGsAFf1C2bDhB60DQfW1DZL5npdko1_Mmk5sUf
zkiQNVpYw",
"token_type":"Bearer",
"expires_in":3600,
"refresh_token":"4LTC8lb0acc6Oy4esc1Nk9BWC0imAwH7kic16BDC2",
"scope":"calendar"
}

Figure 4: Access Token Response

A subsequent access token request, using the refresh token, where the
client tells the authorization server that it wants an access token
for use at "https://contacts.example.com/" is shown in Figure 5 below
with the response shown in Figure 6 (extra line breaks and
indentation are for display purposes only).

POST /as/token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
Host: authorization-server.example.com
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzpoc3FFelFsVW9IQUU5cHg0RlNyNHlJ
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=refresh_token
&refresh_token=4LTC8lb0acc6Oy4esc1Nk9BWC0imAwH7kic16BDC2
&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fcontacts.example.com%2Fapp%2F

Figure 5: Access Token Request

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store

{
"access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ijc3In0.eyJpc3MiOi
JodHRwOi8vYXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbi1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJzdWI
iOiJfX2JfYyIsImV4cCI6MTU4ODQyMDgyNiwic2NvcGUiOiJjb250YWN0cyIs
ImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vY29udGFjdHMuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vIn0.5f4yhqazc
OSlJw4y94KPeWNEFQqj2cfeO8x4hr3YbHtIl3nQXnBMw5wREY5O1YbZED-GfH
UowfmtNaA5EikYAw",
"token_type":"Bearer",
"expires_in":3600,
"scope":"contacts"
}

Figure 6: Access Token Response

3. Security Considerations

An access token that is audience restricted to a protected resource server,
which
that obtains the that token legitimately, legitimately cannot be used to access
resources on behalf of the resource owner at other resource servers. protected
resources. The "resource" parameter enables a client to indicate the resource
server
protected resources where the requested access token will be used,
which in turn enables the authorization server to apply the
appropriate audience restrictions to the token.

Some Resource servers may host user content or be multi-tenant. In order to
avoid attacks that might confuse a client into sending a AT an access
token to a resource that is user controlled resource or is owned by a
different tenant, it is important to use the a specific resource URI
including path and not use just a host with no path. path component. This will cause any AT access token issued
for accessing the user controlled resource to have a invalid audience
if replayed against the legitimate resource API.

Although multiple occurrences of the "resource" parameter may be
included in a request, using only a single "resource" parameter is
encouraged. A bearer token that has multiple intended recipients
(audiences) can be used by any one of those recipients at any other.
Thus, a high degree of trust between the involved parties is needed
when using access tokens with multiple audiences. Furthermore an
authorization server may be unwilling or unable to fulfill a token
request with multiple resources.

[[TODO: I continue to question

4. IANA Considerations

4.1. OAuth Parameters Registration

This specification registers the following value of allowing multiple
resources vs in the functional IANA "OAuth
Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by
[RFC6749].

o Parameter name: resource
o Parameter usage location: authorization request, token request
[[TODO: draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange will have already
registered this for 'token request' and security complexity this draft has a more
generalized usage and needs to somehow either update that comes with
doing so. Writing
registration or do a partial registration and reference]]
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): [[ this specification ]]

4.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration

This specification registers the preceding paragraph just underscores that
concern. So just noting it here.]] following error in the IANA "OAuth
Extensions Error Registry" [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by
[RFC6749].

o Error name: invalid_target
o Error usage location: implicit grant error response, token error
response [[TODO: draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange will have already
registered this for 'token error response' and this draft has a
more generalized usage and needs to somehow either update that
registration or do a partial registration and reference]]
o Related protocol extension: resource parameter
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): [[ this specification ]]

5. References

5.1. Normative References

[IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

5.2. Informative References

[I-D.draft-tschofenig-oauth-audience]
Tschofenig, H., "OAuth 2.0: Audience Information", draft-
tschofenig-oauth-audience

[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq]
Sakimura, N. and J. Bradley, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)",
draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-16 (work in progress), February
2013. April 2018.

[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.

[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

[RFC7644] Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.

[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

The

This specification was developed within the OAuth Working Group under
the chairmanship of Hannes Tschofenig and Rifaat Shekh-Yusef with
Eric Rescorla and Benjamin Kaduk serving as Security Area Directors.
Additionally, the following individuals contributed to discussions relating to ideas, feedback,
and
giving rise to wording that helped shape this draft specification:

Sergey Beryozkin, William Denniss, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, George
Fletcher, Hans Zandbelt, Justin Richer, Dick Hardt, Phil Hunt, Michael Jones, Torsten Lodderstedt,
Anthony Nadalin, Justin Richer, Nat Sakimura, Phil Hunt, Sergey Beryozkin, Filip Skokan, and Anthony "no go" Nadalin. Hans
Zandbelt.

Appendix B. Document History

[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]

-00

draft-ietf-oauth-resource-indicators-01

o Significant rework of the main section of the document attempting
to clarify a number of things that came up at, around and after
IETF 102 and the call for adoption.
o Change the "invalid_resource" error to "invalid_target" to align
with draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange, which has some overlap in
functionality.
o Allow the "resource" parameter value to have a query component
(aligning with draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange).
o Moved the Security Considerations section to before the IANA
Considerations.
o Other editorial updates.
o Rework the Acknowledgements section.
o Use RFC 8174 boilerplate.

draft-ietf-oauth-resource-indicators-00

o First version of the working group document. A replica of draft-
campbell-oauth-resource-indicators-02.

draft-campbell-oauth-resource-indicators-02

o No changes.

draft-campbell-oauth-resource-indicators-01

o Move Hannes Tschofenig, who wrote https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-tschofenig-oauth-audience in '13, from Acknowledgements to
Authors.
o Added IANA Considerations to register the "resource" parameter and
"invalid_resource" error code.

draft-campbell-oauth-resource-indicators-00

o Initial draft to define a resource parameter for OAuth 2.0.

Authors' Addresses

Brian Campbell
Ping Identity

Email: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com

John Bradley
Ping Identity
Yubico

Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com

Hannes Tschofenig
Arm Limited

Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net