wdiff draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-18.txt draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-19.txt

SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans
Expires: November 20, 2010 April 17, 2011 APNIC
May 19,
October 14, 2010

A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-18
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-19

Abstract

This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use"
of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
Numbers). This Resources (INRs). The certificates issued under this profile is are
used to convey the Issuer's authorisation of the Subject to be
regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-
use" "right-of-use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers INRs that
are described in the
issued certificate. This document contains the
normative specification of Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
The document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate
requests. The document also specifies the Relying Party RPKI
certificate path validation procedure.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on November 20, 2010. April 17, 2011.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. End-Entity (EE) Certificates and Signing Functions in the
RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5
3.1. Single-Use EE Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Multi-Use EE Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6
4. Resource Certificate Fields Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 . . . 6
4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6
4.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6
4.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7
4.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7
4.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7
4.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8
4.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8
4.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields Extensions . . . . . 9 . . . . . . . . 8
4.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8
4.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9
4.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9
4.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9
4.9.5. Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9
4.9.6. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9
4.9.7. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10
4.9.8. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 11
4.9.9. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 12
4.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 12
4.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 13
5. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.6. Revoked 13
6. Resource Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Requests . . . . . . . . 17
6. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 14
6.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 14
6.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 14
6.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 15
6.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 19 15
6.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 20 16
6.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 16
7. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 17
7.1. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 17
7.2. Resource Certification Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . 24 18
8. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 20
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 22
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 23
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 23
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 23
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 23
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 24
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 25
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 33 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 28

1. Introduction

This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates
[X.509] for use in the context of certification of Internet Number
Resources (INRs), i.e., IP Addresses and
AS Autonomous System (AS)
Numbers. Such certificates are termed here "Resource Certificates". A
Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates Certificate is a certificate that
conform conforms to the PKIX
profile [RFC5280], and also conform that conforms to the constraints specified in
this profile. A Resource Certificates attest Certificate attests that the Issuer has
granted the Subject a "right-of-use" for a listed set of IP addresses and
and/or Autonomous System numbers.

A Resource Certificate describes an action

This document is referenced by a certificate Issuer
that binds a list Section 7 of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the Subject
of Certificate Policy
(CP) for the issued certificate. The binding Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [ID.sidr-cp].
It is identified by the
association an integral part of that policy and the Subject's private key with the Subject's public
key contained normative specification
for certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) syntax used in
the Resource Certificate, as signed by the private
key of the certificate's Issuer.

In RPKI. The document also specifies profiles for the context format of the public Internet,
certificate requests, and the use of public number
resources within this context, it is intended that Relying Party (RP) RPKI certificate
path validation procedure.

Resource Certificates are to be used in a manner that is explicitly consistent
with the RPKI Certificate Policy [ID.sidr-cp]. They are issued by
entities that assign and/or allocate public INRs, and thus the RPKI
is aligned to with the public number resource INR distribution function. Specifically, when a
number resource When an INR is
allocated or assigned by a number registry to an entity, this
allocation is can be described by an associated Resource Certificate.
This certificate is issued by the number registry, and it binds the Subject Public Key that is certified by the Issuer corresponds to
the public part of a key pair for which the private
certificate subject's key is associated
with the entity who is to the recipient of INRs enumerated in the number assignment certificate.
One or
allocation. A two critical extension to the certificate enumerates extensions, the IP Resources Address Delegation or AS
Identifier Delegation Extensions [RFC3779], enumerate the INRs that
were allocated or assigned by the Issuer to the
entity. In the context Subject.

RP validation of the public number distribution function,
this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI structure, where Resource
Certificates are issued in only one 'direction' and there Certificate is a unique
path of certificates from a certification authority operating at performed in the
apex of a resource distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate. manner
specified in Section 7.1. This PKI structure is termed here a "Resource PKI" (RPKI).

Validation of a Resource Certificate validation procedure differs from
that described in section 6 of [RFC5280], such a hierarchical PKI can
be undertaken by establishing a valid Issuer-Subject certificate
chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor certification
authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the that:
o additional
constraint of ensuring that each Subject's listed resources are fully
encompassed validation processing imposed by those of the Issuer at each step in the Issuer-Subject
certificate chain. Validation therefore logically corresponds to
validation of an associated set of assignment or allocation actions INR extensions is
required,
o a conformation of IP number resources.

Resource Certificates may be used in a public key match between the context of CRL issuer and
the operation of
secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-of-use of an
IP number resource that Resource Certificate issuer is being passed within required, and
o the routing protocol,
allowing relying parties Resource Certificate is required to verify legitimacy and correctness of
routing information. Related use contexts include validation of
Internet Routing Registry objects, validation of routing requests,
and detection of unauthorised use of IP addresses. conform to this profile.

This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid.
Relying Parties SHOULD check
Any extensions not explicitly mentioned MUST be absent. The same
applies to the CRLs used in the RPKI, that a Resource Certificate conforms are also profiled in this
document. A CA conforming to the RPKI CP MUST issue certificates and
CRLs consistent with this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. profile.

1.1. Terminology

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], and "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet
Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines"
[RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management
policy documents. [RFC3779].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

2. Describing Resources in Certificates

The framework for describing an association between the Subject of a
certificate and the resources INRs currently under the Subject's control is
described in [RFC3779].

There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in
this profile:

1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL
extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate profile further specifies that the use of this certificate
extension MUST be used in all requires that:

o Every Resource Certificates and Certificate MUST contain either the IP Address
Delegation or the Autonomous System Identifier Delegation
extension, or both.

o These extensions MUST be marked as CRITICAL.

2. RFC 3779 defines a

o The sorted canonical form of format describing a
resource set, INRs, with maximal spanning
ranges and maximal spanning prefix masks masks, as appropriate. All valid certificates defined in this profile [RFC3779],
MUST use this sorted canonical form of
resource description in the resource extension field.

3. A test of be used for the resource extension in the context of certificate
validity includes field, except where the condition
"inherit" construct is used instead.

When validating a Resource Certificate, a RP MUST verify that the resources
INRs described in the immediate parent CA certificate in the PKI (the
certificate where this certificate's Issuer is the Subject)
has a resource set (called here the "Issuer's resource set")
that MUST Issuer's Resource Certificate encompass the resource set
INRs of the issued
certificate. Resource Certificate being validated. In this context
"encompass" allows for the Issuer's resource set INRs to be the same as, or a
strict superset
of, any Subject's resource set.

Certificate validation entails the construction of a sequence of
valid certificates in an Issuer-Subject chain (where the Subject
field of one certificate appears as the Issuer in the next
certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor to the certificate
being validated. Moreover, the resource extensions in this
certificate sequence from the first CA under the trust anchor to the
certificate being validated form a sequence of encompassing
relationships in terms of the resources described in the resource
extension. Subject's INRs.

3. End-Entity (EE) Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI

As noted in [ID.sidr-arch], the primary function of End-Entity (EE)
certificates in the RPKI is the verification of signed objects that
relate to the usage of the resources INRs described in the certificate, e.g., ROAs
Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) and manifests. There are type two
types of EE certificates defined within the RPKI framework, described in the following
sections. framework: single-
use and multi-use.

3.1. Single-Use EE Certificates

A signing party can exercise control over the validity of the signed
object through control of the validity of the

The private key associated with a "single-use" EE certificate as long as there is used
to sign a 1:1 relationship between the single RPKI signed
object and the EE certificate, or, in other words, assuming the
private key of the key pair whose public key is the Subject Public
Key of object, i.e., the single-use EE
certificate is used to sign exactly one object, and
each such object is signed with validate only one private key. This property
allows for the RPKI itself to be used to control object. The certificate is
embedded in the validity object as part of
these signed objects, rather than creating a novel object-specific
validation control mechanism. Upon revocation Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS) signed data structure [ID.sidr-signed-object].Because of the corresponding
EE certificate,
one-to-one relationship between the signature on that object will be considered
invalid, single-use EE certificate and any attestations made in the context of the
signed
object can no longer be considered valid, assuming that a RP's
assessment of validity object, revocation of a signed object is based upon a verifiable
signature.

EE certificates that are used to control the validity of a single certificate effectively revokes the
corresponding signed object in this manner are termed "single-use" EE certificates
in this specification. object.

3.2. Multi-Use EE Certificates

It is not a requirement that all EE certificates in the RPKI be used
in the context of "single-use" as described in

If the previous section.
The private key of a key pair whose public key is the Subject Public
Key of associated with an EE certificate may is intended to
be used to sign multiple objects, either
simultaneously or serially. In such a context the validity of the validate more than one RPKI signed object may need to be specified by an alternate mechanism,
unless it is the explicit intent of the signer that the validity of object, then the collection of all objects signed with a particular private key
certificate is
controlled by the validity of the associated termed a "multi-use" EE certificate.

When keys are used in a manner All objects that allows for the signing of
multiple objects, the associated
can be verified under a multi-use EE certificates certificate are termed "muti-
use" EE certificates in this specification. revoked when the
certificate is revoked.

4. Resource Certificate Fields Certificates

A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate,
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields
listed in this section. Only the differences from [RFC5280] are
noted below.

Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, all the fields listed
here MUST be present, and any other field MUST NOT appear in a
conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value is specified here
here, this value MUST be used in conforming Resource Certificates.

4.1. Version

As Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field
MUST be present, and certificates, the Version
version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this field is 2).

RPs need not process version 1 or version 2 certificates (in contrast
to [RFC5280]).

4.2. Serial number

The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique for each
certificate issued by a given CA.

4.3. Signature Algorithm

This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
this certificate.

The algorithm used in this profile is specified in
[ID.sidr-rpki-algs].

4.4. Issuer

This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
certificate.

The value of this field is a valid X.501 distinguished name.

If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue

An Issuer name MUST contain one instance of the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then Common Name attribute
and MAY contain one instance of the
Issuer name Serial Number attribute. If both
attributes are present, it is RECOMMENDED that they appear as a set.
The Common Name attribute MUST correspond be encoded as a printable string.
Issuer names are not intended to be descriptive of the Subject name as contained identity of
Issuer.

The RPKI does not rely on Issuer names being globally unique, for
reasons of security. However, it is RECOMMENDED that Issuer names be
generated in a fashion that minimizes the
immediate superior certificate. likelihood of collisions.
See Section 8 for (non-normative) suggested name generation
mechanisms that fulfil this recommendation.

4.5. Subject

This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been
allocated / assigned.

The value of this field is a valid X.501 distinguished name, and is
subject to the same constraints as the Issuer name.

In this profile the RPKI the Subject name is determined by the Issuer, and
each not
proposed by the subject [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. Each distinct
subordinate CA and EE certified by the Issuer MUST be identified
using a Subject name that is unique per Issuer. In this context
"distinct" is defined as an entity and a given public key. An Issuer
SHOULD use a different Subject name if the Subject entity
or the Subject entity's Subject's key pair has changed.

As noted in [ID.sidr-arch], RPKI certificates do not attest to
changed (i.e., when the
identity CA issues a certificate as part of rekeying
the Subject, inferring that the Subject.) Subject names used in
certificates are not intended to be descriptive of
the identity of Subject.

4.6. Valid From

The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this
profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of
certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280],
Certification Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST
always encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year
2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as
GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC5280].

In this profile, the RPKI it is valid for a certificate to have a value for this
field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior
certificate. Relying Parties should not SHOULD NOT attempt to infer from this
time information that a certificate was valid at a time in the past,
or will be valid at a time in the future, as the scope of a relying
party's test of validity of a certificate refers specifically to
validity at the current time.

4.7. Valid To

The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the
certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime of the current
resource allocation / or assignment arrangement between the Issuer and
the Subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280], CAs
conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's
"Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050
or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats
are defined in [RFC5280].

As noted above, it

It is valid for a certificate to have a value for this field that
post-dates the same field value in any superior certificate. The
same caveats apply to Relying Party's RP's assumptions relating to the certificate's
validity at any time other than the current time.

While a CA is typically advised against issuing a certificate with a
validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's
certificate that will be used to validate the issued certificate, in
the context of this profile, it is anticipated that a CA may MAY have valid grounds to issue a
certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity
interval of its certificate.

4.8. Subject Public Key Info

This field specifies the Subject's public key and the algorithm with
which the key is used.

The algorithm used in this profile is specified in
[ID.sidr-rpki-algs].

4.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields

As noted Extensions

The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in Section 4.2 of [RFC5280], each a conforming
Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise. Each
extension in a resource certificate is designated as either critical
or non-critical. A certificate-
using certificate-using system MUST reject the
certificate if it encounters a critical extension it does not
recognise; however, a non-critical extension MAY be ignored if it is
not recognised [RFC5280].

The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise.

4.9.1. Basic Constraints

The Basic Constraints extension identifies whether the Subject of the
certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
paths that include this certificate.

The Issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit
is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue
resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the
Subject is a CA).

The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST
NOT be present.

The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the
Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the Subject is
a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise.

4.9.2. Subject Key Identifier

The Issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set.

The Path Length Constraint is not specified for RPKI certificates,
and MUST NOT be present.

4.9.2. Subject Key Identifier extension provides a means of identifying
certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate
certification path construction, this

This extension MUST appear in all Resource Certificates. This
extension is non-critical.

The value of the Subject Key Identifier MUST be the value placed in
the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of
all certificates issued by this Subject.

The Key Identifier used here for resource certificates is the 160-bit
SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the
Subject Public Key, as described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280].

4.9.3. Authority Key Identifier

The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying certificates that are signed by the Issuer's private key,
by providing a hash value of the Issuer's public key. To facilitate
path construction, this

This extension MUST appear in all Resource
Certificates. The keyIdentifier MUST be present in all Resource Certificates, with the
exception of a CA who issues a "self-signed" certificate. The
authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber fields MUST NOT be
present. This extension is non-critical.

The Key Identifier used here for resource certificates is the 160-bit
SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the
Issuer's public key, as described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280].

4.9.4. Key Usage

This describes the purpose of the certificate. This extension is a critical
extension, extension and it MUST be present.

In certificates issued to Certification Authorities only the
keyCertSign and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE TRUE, and these MUST be the
only bits set to TRUE.

In EE certificates the digitalSignature bit MUST be set to TRUE and
MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.

4.9.5. Extended Key Usage

The Extended Key Usage Extension indicates one or more purposes for
which the public key in a certificate may be used. The uses are
specified via a SEQUENCE of one or more object identifiers (OIDs).
The EKU (EKU) extension MUST NOT appear in any Certification Authority CA
certificate in the RPKI. This extension also MUST NOT appear in EE
certificates used to verify RPKI objects such as (e.g., ROAs or manifests.
The extension MUST NOT be marked critical.

The EKU extension MAY appear in EE certificates issued to routers or
other devices. The extension MUST NOT be marked critical. Permitted values for the EKU OIDs will be specified
in Standards Track RFCs issued by other IETF working groups that
adopt the RPKI profile and that identify application-specific
requirements that motivate the use of such EKUs.

4.9.6. CRL Distribution Points

This field extension MUST be present, except in "self-signed" certificates,
and it is non-critical. In a self-signed certificate this extension
MUST be omitted.

In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all
certificates issued by this CA Issuer.

The CRL Distribution Points (CRLDP) extension identifies the
location(s) of the CRL(s) associated with certificates issued by this
Issuer. This profile The RPKI uses the URI form of object identification. The
preferred URI access mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://")
[RFC5781] that references a single inclusive CRL for each Issuer.

In this profile the certificate Issuer is also the CRL Issuer,
implying that the CRLIssuer field MUST be omitted, and the
distributionPoint field MUST be present. The Reasons field MUST be
omitted.

The distributionPoint MUST contain GeneralNames, the fullName field, and MUST NOT
contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The form of the generalName MUST
be of type URI.

In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all
certificates issued by this CA Issuer.

The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single
DistributionPointName set.
DistributionPoint. The DistributionPointName set DistributionPoint MAY contain more than one
URI value. An RSYNC URI [RFC5781]MUST [RFC5781] MUST be present in the DistributionPointName set,
DistributionPoint, and reference the most recent instance of this
Issuer's certificate revocation list. CRL. Other access form URIs MAY be used in addition to the
RSYNC URI.

This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. There is one
exception, namely where a CA distributes its public key in the form
of a "self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted. URI, representing alternate access mechanisms for this CRL.

4.9.7. Authority Information Access

This

In the context of the RPKI, this extension (AIA) identifies the point of publication
point of the certificate that is issued by of the Issuer's immediate superior CA,
where this certificate's Issuer is issuer of the Subject. certificate in which
the extension appears. In this profile a single reference object to the
publication location point of the immediate superior certificate MUST be
present, except in the case where a CA
distributes its public key in the form of for a "self-signed" certificate, in which case the AIA field SHOULD
extension MUST be omitted. This extension is non-critical.

This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred
URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI [RFC5781] MUST be
specified with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI
MUST reference the point of publication of the certificate where this
Issuer is the Subject (the Issuer's immediate superior certificate).
Other accessMethod URIs referencing the same object MAY also be
included in the value sequence of this extension.

When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate
certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA
field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re-
issuance necessarily implies a requirement to re-issue all
subordinate certificates,

A CA Certificate Issuers SHOULD MUST use a persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. CA certificates that
it issues [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. This implies that a re-issued certificates overwrite
certificate overwrites a previously issued certificates
to certificate (to the same Subject
Subject) in the publication repository, and use the same
publication name as previously issued certificates. repository. In this way
subordinate certificates
subordinate to the re-issued (CA) certificate can maintain a constant AIA field value
Authority Information Access (AIA) extension pointer and thus need
not be re-issued due solely to a re-issue of the superior
certificate. The Issuers' policy with respect to the persistence of
name objects of issued certificates MUST be specified in when the Issuer's
Certification Practice Statement.

This extension parent certificate is non-critical. re-issued.

4.9.8. Subject Information Access

This

In the context of the RPKI, this extension (SIA) identifies the location
publication point of information and
services relating to products signed by the Subject of the certificate in which the
certificate.

4.9.8.1. SIA for CAs

This extension appears. Where the Subject MUST be present, and is non-critical.

This extension MUST have an instance of an accessMethod of id-ad-
caRepository, with an accessLocation form of a CA in this profile, URI that MUST specify
an RSYNC URI [RFC5781]. This URI points to the directory containing
all material issued by this
information and service collection will include CA. i.e., all current valid CA certificates,
multi-use EE certificates, the current CRL, manifest and signed
objects signed by single-use EE certificates that have been issued by
this Subject that are signed
with the Subject's corresponding private key.

This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The
preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI [RFC5781]
MUST be specified, CA [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. Other accessDescription elements
with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caRepository
when the Subject of MAY be present. In such
cases, the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC accessLocation values describe alternate supported URI MUST
reference an object collection rather than an individual object and
MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI.

Other accessMethod URIs that reference
access mechanisms for the same location MAY also be
included in the value sequence of this extension. directory. The ordering of URIs in
this accessDescription sequence reflect the Subject's CA's relative preferences
for access methods to be used by parties for retrieval of objects from
the associated repository publication point, relying parties, with the he first method in
element of the accessMethod sequence being the most preferred. preferred by the CA.

This extension MUST be present when the Subject is a CA, and is non-
critical.

For EE certificates, where the Subject is not a CA, this extension
MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it either
references the location where objects signed by the private key
associated with the EE certificate can be accessed, or, in the case
of single-use EE certificates it references the location have an instance of the
single object that has been signed by the corresponding private key.

When the Subject is an End-Entity, and it publishes objects signed AccessDescription with the matching private key in a repository publication point, the
URI of the directory where these signed objects are published is used
as the value an
accessMethod of the id-ad-signedObjectRepository element. id-ad-rpkiManifest,

id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }

id-ad-signedObjectRepository

id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 10 }

When the Subject is an End-Entity, and it publishes a single object
signed

with the matching private key, the an RSYNC URI [RFC5781] form of accessLocation. The URI points
to the location where
this signed object is CA's manifest of published is used objects [ID.sidr-rpki-manifests] as
an object URL. Other accessDescription elements MAY exist for the
id-ad-rpkiManifest accessMethod, where the accessLocation value of
indicates alternate access mechanisms for the same manifest object.

4.9.8.2. SIA for Multi-use EEs

This extension MUST be present, and is non-critical.

This extension MUST have an instance of an accessMethod of id-ad-
signedObject element.

id-ad-signedObject
signedObjectRepository,
id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 9 }

This profile requires the use of repository publication manifests
[ID.sidr-manifests] to list all signed objects that are deposited in
the repository publication point associated

with a CA or an EE. The
publication point of the manifest for a CA or EE is placed in the SIA
extension of the CA or EE certificate. This profile uses a URI accessLocation form of manifest identification for the accessLocation. The preferred a URI
access mechanisms is "rsync", and that MUST specify an RSYNC URI [RFC5781] MUST be
specified.
[RFC5781]. This URI points to the directory containing all signed
objects that are verified using this EE certificate
[ID.sidr-repos-struct]. Other accessDescription fields may elements MAY exist
for the id-ad-
rpkiManifest id-ad-signedObjectRepository accessMethod, where the
accessLocation value indicates alternate URI supported access mechanisms
for the same manifest object.

id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 }

CA certificates MUST include directory, ordered in the SIA an accessMethod OID terms of id-ad-
rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to the
Subject's published manifest object as an object URL.

When an EE certificate is intended EE's relative
preference for use in verifying multiple
objects, EE certificate supported access mechanisms.

This extension MUST include in the SIA have an instance of an AccessDescription with an
accessMethod OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to with the EE's published manifest object same specification as an object URL.

When an EE certificate is used to verify a single published object,
the EE certificate MUST include in
the CA's manifest.

4.9.8.3. SIA for Single-use EEs

This extension MUST be present, and is non-critical.

This extension MUST have an instance of an accessMethod OID of id-
ad-signedObject, where the associated id-ad-
signedObject,

id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 }

with an accessLocation refers to the
publication point form of a URI that MUST include a RSYNC URI
[RFC5781]. This URI points to the single signed object that is verified
using this EE
certificate. In this case, certificate [ID.sidr-repos-struct]. Other
accessDescription elements may exist for the SIA MUST NOT include id-ad-signedObject
accessMethod, where the accessMethod
OID accessLocation value indicates alternate URI
access mechanisms for the same object, ordered in terms of id-ad-rpkiManifest. the EE's
relative preference for supported access mechanisms.

Other AccessMethods MUST NOT be used for a single-use EE's SIA.

4.9.9. Certificate Policies

This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using
the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field
MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource
Certificates.

No PolicyQualifiers are defined for use with this policy, present, and MUST
NOT be included marked critical. It MUST
include exactly one policy, as specified in this extension.

This extension the RPKI CP [ID.sidr-cp]

4.9.10. IP Resources

Either the IP Resources extension, or the AS Resources extension, or
both, MUST be present in all RPKI certificates, and it is if present, MUST
be marked critical.

4.9.10. IP Resources

This extension contains the list of IP address resources as per
[RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a
particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates
describing public number resources for use in the public Internet,
the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates

This extension MUST
include an either specify a non-empty set IP Resources extension, an address
records, or use the "inherit" setting to indicate that the IP address
resource set of this certificate is inherited from that of the
certificate's issuer.

4.9.11. AS Resources extension, or both
extensions.

This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.

Either the IP AS Resources extension, or the AS IP Resources extension, or
both, MUST be present in all RPKI certificates.

4.9.11. AS Resources certificates, and if present, MUST
be marked critical.

This extension contains the list of AS number resources as per
[RFC3779], or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT
supported in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource
Certificates

This extension MUST include an IP Resources extension, an either specify a non-empty set AS Resources
extension, number records,
or both extensions.

This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.

Either use the IP Resources extension, or "inherit" setting to indicate that the AS Resources extension, or
both, MUST be present in all RPKI certificates. number resource
set of this certificate is inherited from that of the certificate's
issuer.

5. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile Lists

Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
consistent with [RFC5280]. RPs are NOT required to process version 1
CRLs (in contrast to [RFC5280]). The CRL Issuer is the CA, and no indirect CA. CRLs are supported in
conforming to this profile.

An entry profile MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one
regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's
validity period, as required in [RFC5280].

This profile does not allow issuance of include Indirect or Delta CRLs.
The scope of the each CRL MUST be "all all certificates issued by this CA".
The contents of the CRL are a list of all non-expired certificates
that have been revoked by the CA.

No CRL fields other than those listed here are permitted in CRLs
issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields
MUST be present

The Issuer name is as in the CRL. Section 4.4 above.

Where two or more CRLs issued by a
single CA with the same scope, CA, the CRL with the
highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs
issued by this CA.

5.1. Version

Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the
integer value of this field is 1).

5.2. Issuer Name

The value of algorithm used in CRLs issued under this field profile is the X.501 name specified in
[ID.sidr-rpki-algs].

The contents of the issuing CA who is
also the signer CRL are a list of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in
the Resource Certificates all non-expired certificates
that are issued have been revoked by this Issuer.

5.3. This Update

This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The
value of this field CA.

An RPKI CA MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through include the
year 2049, two extensions Authority Key Identifier
and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates CRL Number in the
year 2050 or later.

5.4. Next Update

This is the date and time by which the next every CRL SHOULD be issued.
The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through
the year 2049, and that it issues. RPs MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in
the year 2050 or later.

5.5. Signature

This field contains the algorithm used prepared to sign this CRL. The
algorithm used in this profile is specified in [ID.sidr-rpki-algs].

5.6. Revoked Certificate List

When there
process CRLs with these extensions. No other CRL extensions are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate
list MUST be absent.
allowed.

For each revoked resource certificate only the following two fields MUST
be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile,
and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.

5.6.1. Serial
Number

The serial number of the revoked certificate.

5.6.2. and Revocation Date

The time the certificate was revoked. This time MUST NOT be a future
date (i.e., a date later than ThisUpdate). The value of this field
MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049, present, and all other fields MUST
NOT be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year 2050 or later.

5.7. CRL Extensions

The X.509 v2 present. No CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The
following entry extensions are supported in this
profile, and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.

5.7.1. Authority Key Identifier

The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
sign a CRL. Conforming CRL Issuers MUST use the key identifier
method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section
4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280].

This extension is non-critical.

5.7.2. CRL Number

The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence
number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension
allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes
another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs
issued by the CA with the same scope.

This extension is non-critical.

6. Resource Certificate Request Profile Requests

A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF). A CA Issuer MUST support
certificate issuance in PKCS#10 and a CA Issuer MAY, with mutual consent of the Subject, MAY support CRMF. CRMF requests.

Note that there is no certificate response defined in this profile.
For CA certificate and multi-use EE certificate requests, the CA
places the Resource Certificate in the repository, as per
[ID.sidr-cp]. No response is defined for single-use EE Certificate
requests.

6.1. PCKS#10 Profile

This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to
Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object,
formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a CA as the initial step
in issuing a certificate.

This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a Subject.

With the exception of the public key related fields, SubjectPublicKeyinfo and the SIA extension
request, the CA is permitted to alter any requested field in the request when
issuing a corresponding certificate.

6.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields

This profile applies the following additional constraints requirements to fields
that may MAY appear in a CertificationRequestInfo:

Version
This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0.

Subject
This field is optional. MAY be omitted. If present, the value of this field
SHOULD be empty, empty (i.e., NULL), in which case the Issuer CA MUST
generate a Subject name that is unique in the context of
certificates issued by this Issuer. If the value of this field is non-
empty, then the CA MAY consider the value of this CA. This field as the
Subject's suggested Subject name, but the CA is NOT bound allowed to
honour this suggestion, as the Subject name MUST be unique per
subordinate CA
non-empty only for a rekey/reissuance request, and EE only if the
CA has adopted a policy (in its Certificate Practice Statement
(CPS)) that permits name reuse in certificates issued by this Issuer. these circumstances.

SubjectPublicKeyInfo
This field specifies the Subject's public key and the algorithm
with which the key is used. The algorithm used in this profile
is specified in [ID.sidr-rpki-algs].

Attributes
[RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where
the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key.

The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest
attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains
X509v3 Certificate
certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in
certificate requests is specified in Section 6.3.

This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object:

signatureAlgorithm
The algorithm used in this profile signatureAlgorithm value is specified in
[ID.sidr-rpki-algs].

6.2. CRMF Profile

This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates.
A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the
CRMF, is passed to a CA as the initial step in issuing a certificate.

This request MAY be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. certificate issuance.

With the exception of the public key related fields, SubjectPublicKeyinfo and the SIA extension
request, the CA is permitted to alter any requested field when
issuing a corresponding the certificate.

6.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields

This profile applies the following additional constraints requirements to fields
that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:

Version

version
This field MAY SHOULD be absent, or MAY omitted. If present, it MUST specify the a
request of for a Version 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted.

SerialNumber
As per [RFC4211], this

serialNumber
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
omitted in this profile.

SigningAlgorithm
As per [RFC4211], this omitted.

signingAlgorithm
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
omitted in this profile.

Issuer omitted.

issuer
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this profile.

Validity
This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a
Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If
specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with
dates as determined by the CA.

Subject
This field is optional. MAY be omitted. If present, the value of this field
SHOULD be empty, empty (i.e., NULL), in which case the Issuer CA MUST
generate a Subject name that is unique in the context of
certificates issued by this Issuer. If the value of this field is non-
empty, then the CA MAY consider the value of this CA. This field as the
subject's suggested subject name, but the CA is NOT bound allowed to
honour this suggestion, as be
non-empty only for a rekey/reissuance request, and only if the subject
CA has adopted a policy (in its CPS) that permits name MUST be unique per
Issuer reuse in certificates issued by this Issuer.
these circumstances.

PublicKey
This field MUST be present.

extensions
This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions.
The profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified
in Section 6.3.

6.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields

The following control fields are supported in this profile:

Authenticator Control
It is noted that the
'The intended model of authentication of the Subject is a "long
term" model, and the advice as guidance offered in [RFC4211] is that the
Authenticator Control field be used.

6.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests

The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate
Request. Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate
Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on
these extensions:

BasicConstraints
If this is omitted then the CA will issue an EE certificate
with the
(hence no BasicConstraints extension not present in the issued
certificate. will be included).

The Path Length Constraint pathLengthConstraint is not supported in this Resource
Certificate Profile, profile, and
this field MUST be omitted in this
profile. omitted.

The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit cA boolean if set to on. true (CA certificate
request). If this bit is set, then it indicates that the
Subject is allowed to
issue resource certificates within this overall framework. requesting a CA certificate.

The CA MUST honour the SubjectType CA cA bit if set to off false (EE certificate
request), in which case the corresponding end
entity EE certificate will
not contain a BasicConstraints Basic Constraints extension.

SubjectKeyIdentifier
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.

AuthorityKeyIdentifier
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.

KeyUsage
The CA MAY honour KeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign and
cRLSign if present, as long as this is consistent with the
BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified.

ExtendedKeyUsage
The CA MAY honour ExtendedKeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign
and cRLSign if present, as long as this is consistent with the
BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified.

SubjectInformationAccess
This field MUST be present when the Subject is a CA, present, and the field value SHOULD be
honoured by the CA. If the CA is not
able to honour the requested field value, then the CA MUST
reject the Certificate Request.

This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and
services relating if it conforms to the Subject of the certificate in which
the SIA extension appears.

Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information and
service collection will include all current valid certificates
that have been issued by this Subject that are signed with the
Subject's corresponding private key.

This profile uses a URI form of location identification. An
RSYNC URI [RFC5781] MUST be specified, with an accessMethod
value of id-ad-caRepository when the Subject of the certificate
is a CA. The RSYNC URI MUST reference an object collection
rather than an individual object and MUST use a trailing '/' in
the URI. Other accessMethod URIs that reference the same
location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this
extension. The ordering of URIs in this sequence reflect the
Subject's relative preferences for access methods, with the
first method in the sequence being the most preferred by the
Subject.

A request for a CA certificate MUST include in the SIA of the
request the id-ad-caRepository accessMethod, and also MUST
include requirements set forth
in the SIA of the request the accessMethod OID of id-
ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to
the Subject's published manifest object as an object URL.

This field MAY be present when the Subject is a EE. If it is
present the field value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. Section 4.9.8. If the CA is not able unable to honour the requested field value, then the CA
MUST reject the Certificate Request. If it is not present the
CA SHOULD honour
value for this request and omit the SIA from the issued
certificate. If the CA is not able to honour the request to
omit the SIA, field, then the CA MUST reject the Certificate
Request.

When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying
multiple objects, the certificate request for the EE
certificate MUST include in the SIA of the request an
accessMethod OID of id-ad-signedObjectRepository, and also MUST
include in the SIA of the request an accessMethod OID of id-ad-
rpkiManifest, where the associated access location refers to
the publication point of the manifest object describing all
objects that are verified using this EE certificate.

When an EE certificate is used to sign a single published
object, the certificate request for the EE certificate MUST
include in the SIA of the request an accessMethod OID of id-ad-
signedObject, where the associated accessLocation refers to the
publication point of the single object that is verified using
this EE certificate, and MUST NOT include an id-ad-rpkiManifest
accessMethod OID in the SIA of the request.

In the case when the EE certificate is to be used exclusively
to sign one or more unpublished objects, such that the all
signed objects will not be published in any RPKI repository,
then the SIA SHOULD be omitted from the request.

CRLDistributionPoints
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.

AuthorityInformationAccess
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.

CertificatePolicies
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.

With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the
SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any
requested field.

7. Resource Certificate Validation

This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of
[RFC5280].

To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
certificates) satisfies the following conditions:

1. for all 'x' in {1, ..., n-1}, the Subject of certificate 'x'
is the Issuer of certificate ('x' + 1);

2. certificate '1' is issued by a trust anchor;

3. certificate 'n' is the certificate to be validated; and

4. for all 'x' in {1, ..., n}, certificate 'x' is valid.

7.1. Resource Extension Validation

The IP Resources and AS Resources extensions definitions [RFC3779]
defines
define critical extensions for Internet number resources. INRs. These are ASN.1 encoded
representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range
(either as a prefix/length, or start-end pair) and an AS number
set.

Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS
number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource
Certificate the resource extension MUST also be validated. This
validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource
sets:

more specific
Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, A
is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP addresses
or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is larger
than range A.

equal
Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, A
is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same
collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range
B. The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779] is equivalent
to this "equality" comparison.

encompass
Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X
"encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses
or AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either
more specific
"more specific" than or equal "equal" to a contiguous range element
within the set X.

Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an
ordered certificate sequence numbered {1,2, ... , n} where
certificate '1' is issued by a trust anchor and certificate 'n' is
the target certificate, and where the Subject
Certification Path (see Section 7.2 entails that for every adjacent
pair of certificate 'x' is certificates in the Issuer of certificate ('x certification path (certificates 'x' and
'x + 1'), includes verification that that the number resources described in certificate 'x'
"encompass" the number resources described in certificate ('x 'x + 1'), 1',
and the resources described in the trust anchor information
"encompass" the resources described in the first certificate '1'. in the
certification path.

7.2. Resource Certification Path Validation

Validation of signed resource data using a target resource
certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or
'Certification Path') verifying that the digital signature of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' the
signed resource data is a valid, using the public key of the target
resource certificate, and also validating the resource certificate in
the context of the RPKI, using the path validation process. This
path validation process verifies, among other things, that has been a
prospective certification path (a sequence of n certificates)
satisfies the following conditions:

1. for all 'x' in {1, ..., n-1}, the Subject of certificate 'x'
is the Issuer of certificate ('x' + 1);

2. certificate '1' is issued by a trust anchor, and anchor;

3. certificate 'n' is the
target certificate) certificate to be validated; and

4. for all 'x' in {1, ..., n}, certificate 'x' is valid.

Certificate validation entails verifying that all of the following
conditions
hold: hold, in addition to the Certification Path Validation
criteria specified in Section 6 of [RFC5280]:

1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key
and the signature algorithm

2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From
and To values.

3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present present, as
defined by this specification, and contains field values as specified in this profile for all
field values
selected fields that MUST be present. are defined as allowable values by this
specification.

4. No field, or field value value, that this specification defines as
MUST NOT be present in this profile is
present used in the certificate.

5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate. A revoked
certificate is identified by placing the certificate's serial number
being listed on the Issuer's current
Certificate Revocation List, and CRL, as identified by the Certificate Revocation
List
CRLDP of the certificate, the CRL is itself valid. valid, and the
public key used to verify the signature on the CRL is the same
public key used to verify the certificate itself.

6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the
resource extension data contained in a valid certificate where
this Issuer is the Subject (the previous certificate in the
context of the ordered sequence) sequence defined by the Certification
Path).

7. The Certification Path originates with a certificate issued by
a trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the
Certification Path where the Subject of Certificate 'x' in the
Certification Path matches the Issuer in Certificate ('x' 'x + 1) 1'
in the Certification Path. Path, and the public key in Certificate
'x' can verify the signature value in Certificate 'x+1'.

A certificate validation algorithm may MAY perform these tests in any
chosen order.

Certificates and CRLs used in this process may MAY be found in a locally
maintained cache, maintained by a regular synchronisation across the
distributed publication repository structure. structure [ID.sidr-repos-struct].

There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
means of creating a potential DOS attack on a relying party. Some RP. A RP executing
this procedure MAY apply further heuristics may be required to halt guide halting the
certification path validation process in order to avoid some of the
issues associated with attempts to validate such malformed
certification path structures. It is suggested that
implementations Implementations of Resource
Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if the
certification path length exceeds a locally defined configuration
parameter.

8. Design Notes

The following notes provide some additional commentary on the
considerations that lie behind some of the design choices that were
made in the design of this certificate profile. These notes do are non-
normative, i.e. this section of the document does not constitute a
formal part of the profile specification, and the interpretation of
key words as defined in RFC2119 are not applicable in this section of
the document.

Certificate Extensions:
This profile does not permit the use of any other critical or
non-critical extensions. The rationale for this restriction is
that the resource certificate profile is intended for a
specific use, and in define use. In this context it is not seen as being
appropriate to be in the position of having certificates with
additional non-critical extensions that relying parties RPs may see as valid
certificates without understanding the extensions, but were the relying party
RP in a position to understand the extensions, would contradict
or qualify in some way this original judgment of validity.
This profile takes the position of minimalism over
extensibility. The specific goal for the associated Resource Public Key Infrastructure RPKI is to
precisely match the IP number resource INR allocation structure through an aligned
certificate structure that describes the allocation and its
context within the number resource INR distribution hierarchy. The profile
defines a resource certificate that is structured to meet these
requirements.

Certification Authorities and Key Values:
This profile uses a definition of an instance of a CA as a
combination of a named entity and a key pair. Within this
definition a CA instance cannot rollover a key pair. However,
the entity can generate a new instance of a CA with a new key
pair and roll over all the signed subordinate products to the
new CA. CA [ID.sidr-keyroll].

This has a number of implications in terms of Subject name
management, CRL Scope and repository publication point
management.

Subject name:
For Subject names the Issuer should ensure that when an
entity requests a certificate with a new key pair, the CA
issues a certificate with a new Subject name. One way to
achieve this is to use a commonName field value that is
unique per subordinate entity, using an algorithm of the
CA's devising to ensure this uniqueness, and for the CA
to include the serialNumber field value of the X.501
distinguished name structure, with a serial number value
that is derived from the hash of the subject public key
value. Using an informal description of an ASN.1 data
structure, a Subject name can be constructed in this
manner as a Subject consisting of a SET whose elements
are a SEQUENCE of a single serialNumber and a SEQUENCE of
a single commonName.

It should also be noted that conventions are imposed on
Subject names used in resource certificates, as described
in [ID.sidr-arch], and that any name scheme should comply
with these conventions.

CRL Scope: Scope and Key Values:
For CRL Scope this profile specifies that a CA issues a single
CRL sequence, at a time, and the scope of the CRL is all certificates
issued by this CA. Because the CA instance is bound to a
single key pair this implies that the CA's public key, the key
used to validate the CA's CRL, and the key used to validate the
certificates revoked by that CRL are all the same. same key value.

Repository Publication Point:
The definition of a CA affects the design of the repository
publication system. In order to minimize the amount of forced
re-certification on key rollover events, a repository
publication regime that uses the same repository publication
point for all CA instances that refers to the same entity, but
with different key values will minimize the extent of re-generation re-
generation of certificates to only immediate subordinate
certificates.

In order for two or more CA instances to share a single
repository publication point there needs to be a regime
of key management into OLD, CURRENT and FUTURE keys and a
similar regime of OLD, CURRENT and FUTURE CAs. An OLD CA
should regularly publish its CRL for as long as the OLD
CA instance is still valid, and issue EE certificates as
necessary to maintain a current manifest of all OLD CA
published products, but it should not sign any other
products. The CURRENT CA should publish its CRL, and
should publish all subordinate products, as well as
issuing EE certificates as necessary to maintain a
current manifest of all CURRENT CA published products.
FUTURE CAs should publish no products at all in the
repository publication point. It would be consistent
with this repository object name framework for the CRL
and manifest to be published using object names derived
from the hash of the public key value of the CA instance.

Key Rollover:
As a CA instance is associated with a single key pair, there
are some considerations regarding the procedure that should be
followed by an entity performing a key rollover function. The
entity will need to create a new CA instance and then use this
new CA instance to re-issue all subordinate products with the
new CA instance.

To perform a key rollover operation the entity will need to:

1. Generate a NEW key pair.

2. Generate a certificate request with the NEW key
pair and pass the request to the entity's immediate
superior CA as the certificate Issuer.

3. Request the entity's Issuer to generate and publish
a NEW CA certificate, with an issuer-selected
Subject name that This is distinct from the Subject name
used described in conjunction with the previous [ID.sidr-keyroll].

Subject name
value for this entity.

4. Mark the CURRENT CA as OLD and the NEW CA as
CURRENT.

5. The CURRENT CA will generate new certificates for
all existing subordinate CA and EE certificates,
and publish those products in the same repository
publication point and with the same repository
publication point name as the previous OLD
subordinate CA and EE certificates. The keys in
these reissued certificates must not change.

6. Where the signing structure uses a packaging format
that includes the EE certificate within the signed
data, signed objects that included OLD EE
certificates in their signed data will need to be
re-signed using an EE certificate issued by the
CURRENT CA. In the case where the OLD EE
certificate is a "single use" EE certificate and
the associate private key has been destroyed this
will entail the generate of a new key pair, the
issuing of an EE certificate by the CURRENT CA. In
the case of a "multi-use" EE certificate, the EE
certificate should be issued using the CURRENT CA.
The object, together with the issued EE
certificate, should be signed with the associated
private key, and published in the same repository
publication point, using the same repository
publication point name, as the previously signed
object that it replaces (i.e. overwrite the old
signed object).

7. Generate a certificate revocation request for the
OLD CA certificate and pass it to the entity's
Issuer.

8. Remove all published OLD CA products and destroy
the OLD private key.

Name Uniqueness: Name:
This profile specifies that Subject names must be unique per
Issuer, and does not specify that Subject names must be
globally unique.

Given that unique (in terms of assured uniqueness). This is due
to the nature of the RPKI is as a distributed PKI, implying that
there is no inherent ready ability for Certification authorities to
coordinate PKI-wide a simple RPKI-wide unique Subject names. CA's should name space without
resorting to additional critical external dependencies. CAs
are advised to use multi-attribute,
structured Subject names in their RPKI certificates. This
advice name generation procedures that
minimize the potential for name clashes.

One way to achieve this is motivated by for a desire CA to include within this
specification use a CA's Subject naming name
practice that uses a
distinguished name the CommonName component that is of the
Distinguished Name as a constant value for any given entity
that is the Subject of CA-issued certificates (the
CommonName certificates, and set the
serialNumber component of the Distinguished Name), yet still
ensure Name to a value
that is derived from the structures Subject name changes whenever
Subject hash of the subject public key rollover occurs (the serial number value.

If the CA elects not to use the serialNumber component of the
Distinguished Name). Also,
DistinguishedName, then it is considered beneficial that a CA
generates CommonNames that have themselves a random component
that includes significantly more than 40 bits of entropy in the
name. Some non-normative recommendations to achieve this
include:

1) Hash of the subject public key (encoded as ASCII HEX).
example: cn="999d99d564de366a29cd8468c45ede1848e2cc14"

2) A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) [RFC4122]
example: cn="6437d442-6fb5-49ba-bbdb-19c260652098"

3) A randomly generated ASCII HEX encoded string of length
20 or greater:
example: cn="0f8fcc28e3be4869bc5f8fa114db05e1">
(A string of 20 ASCII HEX digits would have 80-bits of
entropy)

4) An internal database key or subscriber ID combined with
one of the publication repository is
distributed, above
example: cn="<DBkey1> (6437d442-6fb5-49ba-bbdb-
19c2606520980)"
(The issuing CA may wish to be able to extract the
database key or subscriber ID from the commonName. Since
only the issuing CA would need to be able to parse the
commonName, the database key and distinct entities use distinct repository
publication points the source of entropy
(e.g., a UUID) could be separated in any potential ambiguity is resolved by way that the
distinct publication point. CA
wanted, as long as it conformed to the rules for
PrintableString. The separator could be a space
character, parenthesis, hyphen, slash, question mark,
etc.

9. Security Considerations

The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] and [RFC3779] apply to
Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, Certificates. The Security Considerations of [RFC2986] and their use.
[RFC4211] apply to Resource Certificate certification requests.

A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms
of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in
the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same
resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the
status of resource allocations and assignments then the information
conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the
allocation and assignment databases.

This profile requires that the key used to sign an issued certificate
is the same key used to sign the CRL that can revoke the certificate,
implying that the certificate path used to validate a signature on a
certificates is the same as that used to validate a signatures the
CRL that revokes the certificate. It is noted that this is a higher
constraint than required in X.509 PKIs, and there may be a risk in
using a path validation implementation that is capable of using
separate validation paths for a certificate and the corresponding
CRL. If there are subject name collisions in the RPKI as a result of
CAs not following the guidelines provided here relating to ensuring
sufficient entropy in constructing subject names, and this is
combined with the situation that an RP uses an implementation of
validation path construction that is not in conformance with this
RPKI profile, then it is possible that the subject name collisions
can cause an RP to conclude that an otherwise valid certificate has
been revoked.

10. IANA Considerations

[Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
considerations stated in this document.]

11. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to particularly acknowledge the valued
contribution from Stephen Kent in reviewing this document and
proposing numerous sections of text that have been incorporated< incorporated into
the text. The authors also acknowledge the contributions of Sandy
Murphy, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo Patara
and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of this
document. The document also reflects review comments received from
Roque Gagliano, Sean Turner and David Cooper.

12. References

12.1. Normative References

[ID.sidr-cp]
Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", Work in
progress: Internet Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-c-13.txt,
September 2010.

[ID.sidr-rpki-algs]
Huston, G., "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", Work in
progress: Internet
Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs-00.txt, August 2009.

[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981.

[RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D.,

[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and
J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",
BCP 12, B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2050, 2986,
November 1996. 2000.

[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
September 2005.

[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.

[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

[X.509] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
Authentication Framework", 2000.

12.2. Informative References

[ID.sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", Work in progress: Internet
Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-arch-04.txt, November 2008.

[ID.sidr-manifests]

[ID.sidr-keyroll]
Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "CA Key Rollover
in the RPKI", draft-ietf-sidr-keyroll-02.txt (work in
progress), October 2010.

[ID.sidr-repos-struct]
Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaleson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-04.txt (work in progress),
May 2010.

[ID.sidr-rpki-manifests]
Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
Work in progress: Internet
Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests-04.txt,
October 2008.

[ID.sidr-signed-object]
Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-sidr-signed-object-01.txt (work in progress),
October 2010.

[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000.

[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
November 2000.

[RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse,

[RFC4122] Leach, P., Joseph, S., Mealling, M., and R.
Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Certification Path Building", Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4158, September 4122,
July 2005.

[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.

Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate

The following is an example Resource Certificate.

Certificate Name: 9JfgAEcq7Q-47IwMC5CJIJr6EJs.cer

Data:
Version: 3 (0x2( (0x2)
Serial: 1500 (0x5dc)
Signature Algorithm: SHA256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN=APNIC Production-CVPQSgUkLy7pOXdNeVWGvnFX_0s
Validity
Not Before: Oct 25 12:50:00 2008 GMT
Not After : Jan 31 00:00:00 2010 GMT
Subject: CN=A91872ED
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus (2048 bit):
00:bb:fb:4a:af:a4:b9:dc:d0:fa:6f:67:cc:27:39:
34:d1:80:40:37:de:88:d1:64:a2:f1:b3:fa:c6:7f:
bb:51:df:e1:c7:13:92:c3:c8:a2:aa:8c:d1:11:b3:
aa:99:c0:ac:54:d3:65:83:c6:13:bf:0d:9f:33:2d:
39:9f:ab:5f:cd:a3:e9:a1:fb:80:7d:1d:d0:2b:48:
a5:55:e6:24:1f:06:41:35:1d:00:da:1f:99:85:13:
26:39:24:c5:9a:81:15:98:fb:5f:f9:84:38:e5:d6:
70:ce:5a:02:ca:dd:61:85:b3:43:2d:0b:35:d5:91:
98:9d:da:1e:0f:c2:f6:97:b7:97:3e:e6:fc:c1:c4:
3f:30:c4:81:03:25:99:09:4c:e2:4a:85:e7:46:4b:
60:63:02:43:46:51:4d:ed:fd:a1:06:84:f1:4e:98:

32:da:27:ee:80:82:d4:6b:cf:31:ea:21:af:6f:bd:
70:34:e9:3f:d7:e4:24:cd:b8:e0:0f:8e:80:eb:11:
1f:bc:c5:7e:05:8e:5c:7b:96:26:f8:2c:17:30:7d:
08:9e:a4:72:66:f5:ca:23:2b:f2:ce:54:ec:4d:d9:
d9:81:72:80:19:95:57:da:91:00:d9:b1:e8:8c:33:
4a:9d:3c:4a:94:bf:74:4c:30:72:9b:1e:f5:8b:00:
4d:e3
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
F4:97:E0:00:47:2A:ED:0F:B8:EC:8C:0C:0B:90:89:
20:9A:FA:10:9B

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:09:53:D0:4A:05:24:2F:2E:E9:39:77:4D:79:
55:86:BE:71:57:FF:4B

X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE

X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
URI:rsync://rpki.apnic.net/repository/A3C38A24
D60311DCAB08F31979BDBE39/CVPQSgUkLy7pOXdNe
VWGvnFX_0s.crl

Authority Information Access:
CA Issuers - URI:rsync://rpki.apnic.net/repos
itory/8BDFC7DED5FD11DCB14CF4B1A703F9B7/CVP
QSgUkLy7pOXdNeVWGvnFX_0s.cer

X509v3 Certificate Policies: critical
Policy: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2

Subject Information Access:
CA Repository - URI:rsync://rpki.apnic.net/mem
ber_repository/A91872ED/06A83982887911DD81
3F432B2086D636/
Manifest - URI:rsync://rpki.apnic.net/member_r
epository/A91872ED/06A83982887911DD813F432
B2086D636/9JfgAEcq7Q-47IwMC5CJIJr6EJs.mft

sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical
Autonomous System Numbers:
24021
38610
131072
131074

sbgp-ipAddrBlock: critical
IPv4:
203.133.248.0/22
203.147.108.0/23

Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
51:4c:77:e4:21:64:80:e9:35:30:20:9f:d8:4b:88:60:b8:1f:
73:24:9d:b5:17:60:65:6a:28:cc:43:4b:68:97:ca:76:07:eb:
dc:bd:a2:08:3c:8c:56:38:c6:0a:1e:a8:af:f5:b9:42:02:6b:
77:e0:b1:1c:4a:88:e6:6f:b6:17:d3:59:41:d7:a0:62:86:59:
29:79:26:76:34:d1:16:2d:75:05:cb:b2:99:bf:ca:c6:68:1b:
b6:a9:b0:f4:43:2e:df:e3:7f:3c:b3:72:1a:99:fa:5d:94:a1:
eb:57:9c:9a:2c:87:d6:40:32:c9:ff:a6:54:b8:91:87:fd:90:
55:ef:12:3e:1e:2e:cf:c5:ea:c3:4c:09:62:4f:88:00:a0:7f:
cd:67:83:bc:27:e1:74:2c:18:4e:3f:12:1d:ef:29:0f:e3:27:
00:ce:14:eb:f0:01:f0:36:25:a2:33:a8:c6:2f:31:18:22:30:
cf:ca:97:43:ed:84:75:53:ab:b7:6c:75:f7:2f:55:5c:2e:82:
0a:be:91:59:bf:c9:06:ef:bb:b4:a2:71:9e:03:b1:25:8e:29:
7a:30:88:66:b4:f2:16:6e:df:ad:78:ff:d3:b2:9c:29:48:e3:
be:87:5c:fc:20:2b:df:da:ca:30:58:c3:04:c9:63:72:48:8c:
0a:5f:97:71

Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List

The following is an example Certificate Revocation List.

CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl
Data:
Version: 2
Signature Algorithm:
Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
E=ca@apnic.net
This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT
Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:
07:02:51:c2:a9:1c
Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
CRLNumber: 4
Revoked Certificates: 1
Serial Number: 1
Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT
Serial Number: 2
Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT
Serial Number: 4
Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT
Signature:
b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46:
0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12:
f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27:
17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a:
f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09:
d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e:
b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54:
66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29:
6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2:
d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12:
cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8:
c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c:
d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a:
09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da:
02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d:
59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f:
34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02:
d9

Authors' Addresses

Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
APNIC

Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net

George Michaelson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
APNIC

Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net

Robert Loomans
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
APNIC

Email: robertl@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net