wdiff draft-ietf-teep-architecture-00.txt draft-ietf-teep-architecture-01.txt

TEEP M. Pei
Internet-Draft Symantec
Intended status: Informational H. Tschofenig
Expires: January 3, April 26, 2019 Arm Ltd. Limited
D. Wheeler
Intel
A. Atyeo
Intercede
D. Liu
L. Dapeng
Alibaba Group
July 2,
October 23, 2018

Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Architecture
draft-ietf-teep-architecture-00.txt
draft-ietf-teep-architecture-01

Abstract

A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) was is designed to provide a
hardware-isolation mechanism to separate a regular operating system
from security- sensitive applications. security-sensitive application components.

This architecture document motivates the design and standardization
of a protocol for managing the lifecyle lifecycle of trusted applications
running inside a TEE.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, April 26, 2019.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.

This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5
3. Scope and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7
4. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8
4.1. Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8
4.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8
4.3. Internet of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9
4.4. Confidential Cloud Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9
5. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9
5.1. System Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9
5.2. Different Renditions of TEEP Architecture . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. Entity Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. 12
5.4. Trust Anchors in TEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. 15
5.5. Trust Anchors in TAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.5. 15
5.6. Keys and Certificate Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.6. 15
5.7. Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.7. 18
5.8. Message Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.8. 18
5.9. Security Domain Hierarchy and Ownership . . . . . . . . . 15
5.9. 18
5.10. SD Owner Identification and TAM Certificate Requirements 16
5.10. 19
5.11. Service Provider Container . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.11. 20
5.12. A Sample Device Setup Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 20
6. Agent . . . TEEP Broker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 21
6.1. Role of the Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 22
6.2. Agent Implementation Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . 19 22
6.2.1. Agent Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 22
6.2.2. Number of Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 23
7. Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 23
7.1. Attestation Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 23
7.1.1. Attestation Hierarchy Establishment: Manufacture . . 20 23
7.1.2. Attestation Hierarchy Establishment: Device Boot . . 20 24
7.1.3. Attestation Hierarchy Establishment: TAM . . . . . . 21 24
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . Algorithm and Attestation Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 24
9. Security Consideration Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 25
9.1. TA Trust Check at TEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 25
9.2. One TA Multiple SP Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 25
9.3. Agent Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 25
9.4. Data Protection at TAM and TEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 26
9.5. Compromised CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 26
9.6. Compromised TAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 26
9.7. Certificate Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 26
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10.1. 27
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10.2. 27
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 27
Appendix A. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 28

1. Introduction

Applications executing in a device are exposed to many different
attacks intended to compromise the execution of the application, or
reveal the data upon which those applications are operating. These
attacks increase with the number of other applications on the device,
with such other applications coming from potentially untrustworthy
sources. The potential for attacks further increase with the
complexity of features and applications on devices, and the
unintended interactions among those features and applications. The
danger of attacks on a system increases as the sensitivity of the
applications or data on the device increases. As an example,
exposure of emails from a mail client is likely to be of concern to
its owner, but a compromise of a banking application raises even
greater concerns.

The Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) concept has been is designed to
separate a regular operating system, also referred as
execute applications in a Rich
Execution Environment (REE), from security- sensitive applications.
A TEE provides hardware-enforcement so protected environment that any data separates
applications inside the TEE
cannot be read by code outside of from the TEE. Compromising a REE regular operating system and
normal
from other applications in on the REE do not affect code device. This separation reduces the
possibility of a successful attack on application components and the
data contained inside the TEE,
which TEE. Typically, application components are
chosen to execute inside a TEE because those application components
perform security sensitive operations or operate on sensitive data.

An application component running inside a TEE is called referred to as a
Trusted Application (TA), while a normal application running inside in the TEE.

In
regular operating system is referred to as an Untrusted Application
(UA).

The TEE ecosystem, uses hardware to enforce protections on the TA and its data,
but also presents a Trusted Application Manager (TAM) more limited set of services to applications
inside the TEE than is commonly
used normally available to manage keys and TAs that run UA's running in a device. Different device the
normal operating system.

But not all TEEs are the same, and different vendors may use have
different TEE implementations. Different application
providers or device administrators implementations of TEEs with different security properties,
different features, and different control mechanisms to operate on
TAs. Some vendors may choose themselves market multiple different TEEs with
different properties attuned to use different TAM
providers. markets. A device vendor
may integrate one or more TEEs into their devices depending on market
needs.

To simplify the life of developers and service providers interacting
with TAs in a TEE, an interoperable protocol for managing TAs running
in different TEEs of various devices is needed.

The In this TEE
ecosystem, there often arises a need for an external trusted party to
verify the identity, claims, and rights of Service Providers(SP),
devices, and their TEEs. This trusted third party is the Trusted
Application Manager (TAM).

This protocol addresses the following problems.

1. problems:

- A Device Administrator (DA) or Service Provider (SP) intending to provide services through a TA
to users of the a device users needs to determine security-relevant
information of a device before provisioning the their TA to the device with a TEE. TEE
within the device. Examples include the verification of the
device 'root of trust' and the type of TEE included in a device.

- A TEE in a device needs to determine whether a Device
Administrator (DA) or a Service Provider
(SP) that wants to manage an a TA in the device is authorized to
manage applications TAs in the TEE, and what TAs the SP is permitted to manage.

- The parties involved in the protocol must be able to attest that a
TEE is genuine and capable of providing the security protections
required by a particular TA.

- A Service Provider (SP) must be able to deterine if a TA exists
(is installed) on a device (in the TEE), and if not, install the
TA in the TEE.

3. Attestation

- A Service Provider (SP) must be able to ensure check whether a TA in a
device's TEE is genuine. the most up-to-date version, and if not, update
the TA in the TEE.

- A Service Provider (SP) must be able to remove a TA in a device's
TEE if the SP is no longer offering such services or the services
are being revoked from a particular user (or device). For
example, if a subscription or contract for a particular service
has expired, or a payment by the user has not been completed or
has been recinded.

- A Service Provider (SP) must be able to define the relationship
between cooperating TAs under the SP's control, and specify
whether the TAs can communicate, share data, and/or share key
material.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

The following terms are used:

- Client Application: An application running on in a rich OS, Rich Execution
Environment, such as an Android, Windows, or iOS application.

- Device: A physical piece of hardware that hosts a TEE along with a
rich OS.

Agent: An application running in
Rich Execution Environment. A Device contains a default list of
Trust Anchors that identify entities (e.g., TAMs) that are trusted
by the rich OS allowing Device. This list is normally set by the message
protocol exchange between a TAM Device
Manufacturer, and a TEE in a device. A TEE may be governed by the Device's network carrier.
The list of Trust Anchors is
responsible to processing relayed messages normally modifiable by the Device's
owner or Device Administrator. However the Device manufacturer
and network carrier may restrict some modifications, for returning an
appropriate reponse. example,
by not allowing the manufacturer or carrier's Trust Anchor to be
removed or disabled.

- Rich Execution Environment (REE) (REE): An environment that is provided
and governed by a typical OS (Linux, (e.g., Linux, Windows, Android, iOS, etc.), iOS),
potentially in conjunction with other supporting operating systems
and hypervisors; it is outside of the TEE. This environment and
applications running on it are considered un-
trusted.

Secure Boot Module (SBM): A firmware in a device that delivers
secure boot functionality. It is generally signed and can be
verified whether it can be trusted. un-trusted.

- Service Provider (SP): An entity that wishes to supply provide a service
on Devices that requires the use of one or more Trusted
Applications to remote devices.
Applications. A Service Provider requires the help of a TAM in
order to provision the Trusted Applications to
the remote devices.

- Device Administrator: An entity that owns or is responsible for
administration of a Device. A Device Administrator has privileges
on the Device to install and remove applications and TAs, approve
or reject Trust Anchors, and approve or reject Service Providers,
among possibly other privileges on the Device. A device owner can
manage the list of allowed TAMs by modifying the list of Trust
Anchors on the Device. Although a Device Administrator may have
privileges and Device-specific controls to locally administer a
device, the Device Administrator may choose to remotely
administrate a device through a TAM.

- Trust Anchor: A root public key in a device whose corresponding private
key is held by an entity implicitly trusted by the device. The
Trust Anchor may be a certificate that can or it may be used to validate its
children certificates. It a raw public key.
The trust anchor is usually embedded normally stored in a device location that resists
unauthorized modification, insertion, or
configured replacement.
The trust anchor private key owner can sign certificates of other
public keys, which conveys trust about those keys to the device.
A certificate signed by a TAM for validating the trust anchor communicates that the
private key holder of a remote entity's
certificate. the signed certificate is trusted by the
trust anchor holder, and can therefore be trusted by the device.

- Trusted Application (TA): An Application application component that runs in a
TEE.

- Trusted Execution Environment (TEE): An execution environment that
runs alongside of, but is isolated from, an REE. A TEE has
security capabilities and meets certain security-related
requirements. It protects TEE assets from general software
attacks, defines rigid safeguards as to data and functions that a
program can access, and resists a set of defined threats. It
should have at least the following three properties:

(a) A device unique credential that cannot be cloned;

(b) Assurance that only authorized code can run in the TEE;

There are multiple technologies that can be used to implement a
TEE, and the level of security achieved varies accordingly.

- Root-of-Trust (RoT): A hardware or software component in a device
that is inherently trusted to perform a certain security-critical
function. A RoT should be secure by design, small, and protected
by hardware against modification or interference. Examples of
RoTs include software/firmware measurement and verification using
a trust anchor (RoT for Verification), provide signed assertions
using a protected attestation key (RoT for Reporting), or protect
the storage and/or use of cryptographic keys (RoT for Storage).
Other RoTs are possible, including RoT for Integrity, and RoT for
Measurement. Reference: NIST SP800-164 (Draft).

- Trusted Firmware (TFW): A signed SBM firmware in a device that can be
verified
and with a trust anchor by RoT for Verification.

- Bootloader key: This symmetric key is trusted protected by
electronic fuse (eFUSE) technology. In this context it is used to
decrypt a TEE in
TFW private key, which belongs to a device. device-unique private/public
key pair. Not every device is equipped with a bootloader key.

This document uses the following abbreviations:

- CA: Certificate Authority

REE

- REE: Rich Execution Environment

- RoT: Root of Trust

- SD: Security Domain

- SP: Service Provider

SBM Secure Boot Module

- TA: Trusted Application

TEE

- TAM: Trusted Application Manager

- TEE: Trusted Execution Environment

TFW

- TFW: Trusted Firmware

TAM Trusted Application Manager

3. Scope and Assumptions

This specification assumes that an applicable device is equipped with
one or more TEEs and each TEE is pre-provisioned with a device-unique
public/private key pair, which is securely stored. This key pair is
referred to as the 'root of trust' for remote attestation of the
associated TEE in a device by an TAM.

New note: SD is for managing keys for TAs
A Security Domain (SD) concept is used as the security boundary
inside a TEE for trusted applications. Each SD is typically
associated with one TA provider as the owner, which is a logical
space that contains a an SP's TAs. One TA provider may request to have
multiple SDs in a TEE. One SD may contain multiple TAs. Each
Security Domain requires the management operations of TAs in the form
of installation, update and deletion.

Each TA binary and configuration data can be from either of two
sources:

1. A TAM supplies the signed and encrypted TA binary and any
required configuration data

2. A Client Application supplies the TA binary

The architecture covers the first case where the TA binary and
configuration data are delivered from a TAM. The second case calls
for an extension when a TAM is absent.

Messages exchange with a TAM require some transport and HTTPS is one
commonly used transport.

4. Use Cases

4.1. Payment

A payment application in a mobile device requires high security and
trust about the hosting device. Payments initiated from a mobile
device can use a Trusted Application running inside TEE in the device to provide strong identification
and proof of transaction.

For a mobile payment application, some biometric identification
information could also be stored in the a TEE. The mobile payment
application can use such information for authentication.

A secure user interface (UI) may be used in a mobile device to
prevent malicious software from stealing sensitive user input data.
Such an application implementation often relies on a TEE for user
input protection.

4.2. Authentication

For better security of authentication, a devices device may store its
sensitive authentication keys inside a TEE of the device, TEE, providing
hardware-protected hardware-
protected security key strength and trusted execution code. code execution.

4.3. Internet of Things

The Internet of Things (IoT) has been posing threats to networks and
national infrastructures because of existing weak security in
devices. It is very desirable that IoT devices can prevent a malware
from manipulating actuators (e.g., unlocking a door), or stealing or
modifying sensitive data such as authentication credentials in the
device. A TEE can be the best way to implement such IoT security
functions.

TEEs could be used to store variety of sensitive data for IoT
devices. For example, a TEE could be used in smart door locks to
store a user's biometric information for identification, and for
protecting access the locking mechanism. Bike-sharing is another
example that shares a similar usage scenario.

4.4. Confidential Cloud Computing

A tenant can store sensitive data in a TEE in a cloud computing
server such that only the tenant can access the data, preventing the
cloud host hosting provider from accessing the data. A tenant can run TAs
inside a server TEE for secure operation and enhanced data security.
This provides benefits not only to tenants with better data security
but also to cloud host hosting provider for reduced liability and
increased cloud adoption.

5. Architecture

5.1. System Components

The following are the main components in the system. Full
descriptions of components not previously defined are provided below.
Interactions of all components are further explained in the following
paragraphs.

+-------------------------------------------+
| Device |
| +--------+ | Service Provider
| | |----------+ |
| +-------------+ | TEEP |---------+| |
| | TEE-1 |<------| Broker | | || +--------+ |
| | | | |<---+ | |+-->| |<-+
| | | | | | | | +-| TAM-1 |
| | | | |<-+ | | +->| | |<-+
| | +---+ +---+ | +--------+ | | | | +--------+ |
| | |TA1| |TA2| | | | | | TAM-2 | |
| +-->| | | | | +-------+ | | | +--------+ |
| | | | | | |<---------| App-2 |--+ | | |
| | | +---+ +---+ | +-------+ | | | Device Administrator
| | +-------------+ | App-1 | | | |
| | | | | | |
| +--------------------| |---+ | |
| | |--------+ |
| +-------+ |
+-------------------------------------------+

Figure 1: Notional Architecture of TEEP

- Service Providers and Device Administrators utilize the services
of a TAM to manage TAs on Devices. SPs do not directly interact
with devices. DAs may elect to use a TAM for remote
administration of TAs instead of managing each device directly.

- TAM: A TAM is responsible for originating and coordinating performing lifecycle management
activity on a particular TEE TA's and SD's on behalf of a Service
Provider or a Providers and
Device Administrator. For example, a payment
application provider, which also provides payment service as a
Service Provider using its payment TA, Administrators. This includes creation and deletion of
TA's and SD's, and may choose include, for example, over-the-air updates
to use keep an SP's TAs up-to-date and clean up when a TAM version should
be removed. TAMs may provide services that make it runs easier for SPs
or a third party TAM DAs to use the TAM's service to distribute and
update manage multiple devices,
although that is not required of a TAM.

The TAM performs its payment TA application management of TA's and SD's through an
interaction with a Device's TEEP Broker. As shown in payment user devices. The
payment SP isn't
#notionalarch, the TAM cannot directly contact a Device, but must
wait for a device administrator of the user devices. A
user who chooses TEEP Broker or a Client Application to download the payment TA into its devices acts
as the device administrator, authorizing the TA installation via
the downloading consent. The device manufacturer is typically
responsible for embedding contact the
TAM trust verification capability requesting a particular service. This architecture is
intentional in its device TEE. order to accommodate network and application
firewalls that normally protect user and enterprise devices from
arbitrary connections from external network entities.

A TAM may be used publically available for use by one SP or many SPs where SPs, or a TAM
may be private, and accessible by only one or a limited number of
SPs. It is expected that manufacturers and carriers will run as
their own private TAM. Another example of a
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). A private TAM may provide Security Domain
management and TA management in is a device for the SD and TAs that TAM
running as a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) within an SP.

A SP owns. In particular, or Device Administrator chooses a particular TAM typically offers over-the-air
update to keep based on
whether the TAM is trusted by a SP's TAs up-to-date and clean up when Device or set of Devices. The TAM
is trusted by a version
should be removed. device if the TAM's public key is an authorized
Trust Anchor in the Device. A TEE administrator SP or device administrator Device Administrator may decide TAMs that it trusts run
their own TAM, however the Devices they wish to manage its devices.

Certification Authority (CA): Certificate-based credentials used for
authenticating a device, a TAM and an SP. must
include this TAM's pubic key in the Trust Anchor list.

A device embeds SP or Device Administrator is free to utilize multiple TAMs.
This may be required for a list SP to manage multiple different types
of root certificates (trust anchors), devices from trusted CAs that different manufacturers, or devices on different
carriers, since the Trust Anchor list on these different devices
may contain different TAMs. A Device Administrator may be able to
add their own TAM's public key or certificate to the Trust Anchor
list on all their devices, overcoming this limitation.

Any entity is free to operate a TAM. For a TAM
will to be validated against. successful,
it must have its public key or certificate installed in Devices
Trust Anchor list. A TAM will remotely attest a device
by checking whether may set up a device comes relationship with device
manufacturers or carriers to have them install the TAM's keys in
their device's Trust Anchor list. Alternatively, a TAM may
publish its certificate from and allow Device Administrators to install
the TAM's certificate in their devices as an after-market-action.

- TEEP Broker: The TEEP Broker is an application running in a CA Rich
Execution Environment that enables the message protocol exchange
between a TAM trusts. The CAs do not need to be the same;
different CAs can be chosen by each TAM, and different device CAs
can be used by different device manufacturers.

TEE: A a TEE in a device device. The TEEP Broker does not
process messages on behalf of a TEE, but merely is responsible for protecting applications
relaying messages from attack, enabling the application TAM to perform secure
operations.

REE: The REE in a device is responsible the TEE, and for enabling off-device
communications returning the
TEE's responses to be established between a TEE and TAM. The
architecture does not assume or require that the REE or Client
Applications is secure.

Agent: TAM.

A Client Application is expected to communicate with a TAM to
request TAs that it needs to use. The Client Application needs to
pass the messages from the TAM to TEEs in the device. This calls
for a component in the REE that the Client Application Applications can use to
pass messages to TEEs. An Agent is this component to fill the
role. In other words, an Agent is thus an application in the REE
or software library that can simply relays relay messages from a Client
Application to a TEE in the device. A device usually comes with
only one active TEE. A TEE that supports may provide such an Agent to the
device manufacturer to be bundled in devices. Such a compliant TEE must
also include an Agent counterpart, namely, a processing module
inside the TEE, to parse TAM messages sent through the Agent. An
Agent is generally acting as a dummy relaying box with just the
TEE interacting capability; it doesn't need and shouldn't parse
protocol messages.

Device Administrator:

- Certification Authority (CA): Certificate-based credentials used
for authenticating a device, a TAM and an SP. A device owner or administrator may want to
manage what TAs allowed to run in its devices. A default embeds a
list of
allowed TA trust root CA certificates is included in (trust anchors), from trusted CAs that a device by
the device's manufacturer, which may be governed by the device
carriers sometimes. There may
TAM will be needs to expose overriding
capability for validated against. A TAM will remotely attest a
device owner to decide the list of allowed TAs by updating the list of trusted CA certificates.

Secure Boot: Secure boot must enable authenticity checking of TEEs
by the TAM. Note whether a device comes with a certificate from
a CA that some TEE implementations the TAM trusts. The CAs do not require
secure boot functionality. need to be the same;
different CAs can be chosen by each TAM, and different device CAs
can be used by different device manufacturers.

5.2. Different Renditions of TEEP Architecture

5.3. Entity Relations

This architecture leverages asymmetric cryptography to authenticate a
device towards to a TAM. Additionally, a TEE in a device authenticates a TAM provider
and TA signer. The provisioning of trust anchors to a device may
different from one use case to the other. The A device administrator may
want to have the capability to control what TAs are allowed. A
device manufacturer enables verification of the TA signers and TAM
providers; it may embed a list of default trust anchors that the
signer of an allowed TA's signer certificate should chain to. A
device administrator may choose to accept a subset of the allowed TAs
via consent or action of downloading.

PKI CA -- CA CA --
| | |
| | |
| | |
Device | | --- Agent / Client App --- |
SW | | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| -- TEE TAM-------
|
|
FW

Figure 1: 2: Entities

(App Developer) (App Store) (TAM) (Device with TEE) (CAs)
| |
| --> (Embedded TEE cert) <--
| |
| <------------------------------ Get an app cert ----- |
| | <-- Get a TAM cert ------ |
|
1. Build two apps:
Client App
TA
|
|
Client App -- 2a. --> | ----- 3. Install -------> |
TA ------- 2b. Supply ------> | 4. Messaging-->|
| | | |

Figure 2: 3: Developer Experience

Figure 2 3 shows an application developer building two applications: 1)
a rich Client Application; 2) a TA that provides some security
functions to be run inside a TEE. At step 2, the application
developer uploads the Client Application (2a) to an Application
Store. The Client Application may optionally bundle the TA binary.
Meanwhile, the application developer may provide its TA to a TAM
provider that will be managing the TA in various devices. 3. A user
will go to an Application Store to download the Client Application.
The Client Application will trigger TA installation by calling initiating
communication with a TAM. This is the step 4. The Client
Application will get messages from TAM, and interacts with device TEE
via an Agent.

The following diagram will show shows a system diagram about the entity
relationships between CAs, TAM, SP TAMs, SPs and devices.

------- Message Protocol -----
| |
| |
-------------------- --------------- ----------
| REE | TEE | | TAM | | SP |
| --- | --- | | --- | | -- |
| | | | | | |
| Client | SD (TAs)| | SD / TA | | TA |
| Apps | | | Mgmt | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | List of | | List of | | |
| | Trusted | | Trusted | | |
| Agent | TAM/SP | | FW/TEE | | |
| | CAs | | CAs | | |
| | | | | | |
| |TEE Key/ | | TAM Key/ | |SP Key/ |
| | Cert | | Cert | | Cert |
| | FW Key/ | | | | |
| | Cert | | | | |
-------------------- --------------- ----------
| | |
| | |
------------- ---------- ---------
| TEE CA | | TAM CA | | SP CA |
------------- ---------- ---------

Figure 3: 4: Keys

In the previous diagram, different CAs can be used for different
types of certificates. Messages are always signed, where the signer
key is the message originator's private key such as that of a TAM,
the private key of a trusted firmware (TFW), or a TEE's private key.

The main components consist of a set of standard messages created by
a TAM to deliver device SD and TA management commands to a device,
and device attestation and response messages created by a TEE that
responds to a TAM's message.

It should be noted that network communication capability is generally
not available in TAs in today's TEE-powered devices. The networking
functionality must be delegated to a rich Client Application. Client
Applications will need to rely on an agent in the REE to interact
with a TEE for message exchanges. Consequently, a TAM generally
communicates with a Client Application about how it gets messages
that originates originate from a TEE inside a device. Similarly, a TA or TEE
generally gets messages from a TAM via some Client Application,
namely, an agent in this protocol architecture, not directly from the
internet.
network.

It is imperative to have an interoperable protocol to communicate
with different TAMs and different TEEs in different devices that a Client Application
needs to run and access a TA inside a TEE. devices. This is
the role of the agent, which is a software component that bridges
communication between a TAM and a TEE. The agent does not need to
know the actual content of messages except for the TEE routing
information.

5.3.

5.4. Trust Anchors in TEE

Each TEE comes with a trust store that contains a whitelist of root
CA certificates that are used to validate a TAM's certificate. A TEE
will accept a TAM to create new Security Domains and install new TAs
on behalf of a an SP only if the TAM's certificate is chained to one of
the root CA certificates in the TEE's trust store.

A TEE's trust store is typically preloaded at manufacturing time. It
is out of the scope in this document to specify how the trust store
should be updated when a new root certificate should be added or
existing one should be updated or removed. A device manufacturer is
expected to provide its TEE trust store live update or out-of-band
update to devices.

Before a TAM can begin operation in the marketplace to support TEE-
powered devices a
device with a particular TEE, it must obtain a TAM certificate from a
CA that is listed in the trust store of the TEE.

5.4.

5.5. Trust Anchors in TAM

The trust anchor store in a TAM consists of a list of CA certificates
that sign various device TEE certificates. A TAM decides what
devices it will trust the TEE in.

5.5.

5.6. Keys and Certificate Types

This architecture leverages the following credentials, which allow
delivering end-to-end security without relying on any transport
security.

Table 1:

Figure 5: Key and Certificate Types

1. TFW key pair and certificate: A key pair and certificate for
evidence of secure boot and trustworthy firmware in a device. This key pair is
optional for TEEP architecture. Some TEE may present its trusted
attributes to a TAM using signed attestation with a TFW key. For
example, a platform that uses a hardware based TEE can have
attestation data signed by a hardware protected TFW key.

o Location: Device secure storage

o Supported Key Type: RSA and ECC

o Issuer: OEM CA

o Checked Against: A white list whitelist of FW root CA trusted by TAMs

o Cardinality: One per device

2. TEE key pair and certificate: It is used for device attestation
to a remote TAM and SP.

o This key pair is burned into the device at by the device
manufacturer. The key pair and its certificate are valid for
the expected lifetime of the device.

o Location: Device TEE

o Supported Key Type: RSA and ECC

o Issuer: A CA that chains to a TEE root CA

o Checked Against: A white list whitelist of TEE root CA CAs trusted by TAMs

o Cardinality: One per device

3. TAM key pair and certificate: A TAM provider acquires a
certificate from a CA that a TEE trusts.

o Location: TAM provider

o Supported Key Type: RSA and ECC.

o Supported Key Size: RSA 2048-bit, ECC P-256 and P-384. Other
sizes should be anticipated in future.

o Issuer: TAM CA that chains to a root CA

o Checked Against: A white list whitelist of TAM root CA CAs embedded in a TEE

o Cardinality: One or multiple can be used by a TAM

4. SP key pair and certificate: an An SP uses its own key pair and
certificate to sign a TA.

o Location: SP

o Supported Key Type: RSA and ECC

o Supported Key Size: RSA 2048-bit, ECC P-256 and P-384. Other
sizes should be anticipated in future.

o Issuer: an An SP signer CA that chains to a root CA

o Checked Against: A An SP uses a TAM. A TEE trusts an SP by
validating trust against a TAM that the SP uses. A TEE trusts
a TAM to ensure that a TA from the TAM is trustworthy.

o Cardinality: One or multiple can be used by an SP

5.6.

5.7. Scalability

This architecture uses a PKI. Trust anchors exist on the devices to
enable the TEE to authenticate TAMs, and TAMs use trust anchors to
authenticate TEEs. Since a PKI is used, many intermediate CAs CA
certificates can chain to a root certificate, each of which can issue
many certificates. This makes the protocol highly scalable. New
factories that produce TEEs can join the ecosystem. In this case,
such a factory can get an intermediate CA certificate from one of the
existing roots without requiring that TAMs are updated with
information about the new device factory. Likewise, new TAMs can
join the ecosystem, providing they are issued a TAM certificate that
chains to an existing root whereby existing TEEs will be allowed to
be personalized by the TAM without requiring changes to the TEE
itself. This enables the ecosystem to scale, and avoids the need for
centralized databases of all TEEs produced or all TAMs that exist.

5.7.

5.8. Message Security

Messages created by a TAM are used to deliver device SD and TA
management commands to a device, and device attestation and response messages
created by the device TEE to respond to TAM messages.

These messages are signed end-to-end and are typically encrypted such
that only the targeted device TEE or TAM is able to decrypt and view
the actual content.

5.8.

5.9. Security Domain Hierarchy and Ownership

The primary job of a TAM is to help an SP to manage its trusted
applications. A TA is typically installed in an SD. An SD is
commonly created for an SP.

When an SP delegates its SD and TA management to a TAM, an SD is
created on behalf of a TAM in a TEE and the owner of the SD is
assigned to the TAM. An SD may be associated with an SP but the TAM
has full privilege to manage the SD for the SP.

Each SD for an SP is associated with only one TAM. When an SP
changes TAM, a new SP SD must be created to associate with the new
TAM. The TEE will maintain a registry of TAM ID and SP SD ID
mapping.

From an SD ownership perspective, the SD tree is flat and there is
only one level. An SD is associated with its owner. It is up to the
TEE implementation how it maintains SD binding information for a TAM
and different SPs under the same TAM.

It is an important decision in this protocol specification architecture that a TEE doesn't
need to know whether a TAM is authorized to manage the SD for an SP.
This authorization is implicitly triggered by an SP Client
Application, which instructs what TAM it wants to use. An SD is
always associated with a TAM in addition to its SP ID. A rogue TAM
isn't able to do anything on an unauthorized SP's SD managed by
another TAM.

Since a TAM may support multiple SPs, sharing the same SD name for
different SPs creates a dependency in deleting an SD. An SD can be
deleted only after all TAs associated with this the SD is are deleted. An SP
cannot delete a Security Domain on its own with a TAM if a TAM
decides to introduce such sharing. There are cases where multiple
virtual SPs belong to the same organization, and a TAM chooses to use
the same SD name for those SPs. This is totally up to the TAM
implementation and out of scope of this specification.

5.9.

5.10. SD Owner Identification and TAM Certificate Requirements

There is a need of cryptographically binding proof about the owner of
an SD in a device. When an SD is created on behalf of a TAM, a
future request from the TAM must present itself as a way that the TEE
can verify it is the true owner. The certificate itself cannot
reliably used as the owner because TAM may change its certificate.

** need to handle the normal key roll-over case, as well as the less
frequent key compromise case

To this end, each TAM will be associated with a trusted identifier
defined as an attribute in the TAM certificate. This field is kept
the same when the TAM renew its certificates. A TAM CA is
responsible to vet the requested TAM attribute value.

This identifier value must not collide among different TAM providers,
and one TAM shouldn't be able to claim the identifier used by another
TAM provider.

The certificate extension name to carry the identifier can initially
use SubjectAltName:registeredID. A dedicated new extension name may
be registered later.

One common choice of the identifier value is the TAM's service URL.
A CA can verify the domain ownership of the URL with the TAM in the
certificate enrollment process.

A TEE can assign this certificate attribute value as the TAM owner ID
for the SDs that are created for the TAM.

An alternative way to represent an SD ownership by a TAM is to have a
unique secret key upon SD creation such that only the creator TAM is
able to produce a proof-of-possession (PoP) data with the secret.

5.10.

5.11. Service Provider Container

A sample Security Domain hierarchy for the TEE is shown in Figure 4. 6.

----------
| TEE |
----------
|
| ----------
|----------| SP1 SD1 |
| ----------
| ----------
|----------| SP1 SD2 |
| ----------
| ----------
|----------| SP2 SD1 |
----------

Figure 4: 6: Security Domain Hiearchy Hierarchy

The architecture separates SDs and TAs such that a TAM can only
manage or retrieve data for SDs and TAs that it previously created
for the SPs it represents.

5.11.

5.12. A Sample Device Setup Flow

Step 1: Prepare Images for Devices

1. [TEE vendor] Deliver TEE Image (CODE Binary) to device OEM

1. [CA] Deliver root CA Whitelist

1. [Soc] Deliver TFW Image

Step 2: Inject Key Pairs and Images to Devices
-

1. [OEM] Generate Secure Boot TFW Key Pair (May be shared among multiple
devices)

1. [OEM] Flash signed TFW Image and signed TEE Image onto devices
(signed by Secure Boot TFW Key)

Step 3: Setup Set up attestation key pairs in devices

1. [OEM] Flash Secure Boot TFW Public Key and eFuse Key (eFuse key is
unique per device)

2. a bootloader key.

1. [TFW/TEE] Generate a unique attestation key pair and get a
certificate for the device.

Step 4: Setup Set up trust anchors in devices

1. [TFW/TEE] Store the key and certificate encrypted with the eFuse
bootloader key

1. [TEE vendor or OEM] Store trusted CA certificate list into
devices

6. Agent TEEP Broker

A TEE and TAs do not generally have the capability to communicate to
the outside of the hosting device. For example, the Global Platform GlobalPlatform
[GPTEE] specifies one such architecture. This calls for a software
module in the REE world to handle the network communication. Each
Client Application in the REE may might carry this communication
functionality but it such functionality must also interact with the TEE
for the message exchange. The TEE interaction will vary according to
different TEEs. In order for a Client Application to transparently
support different TEEs, it is imperative to have a common interface
for a Client Application to invoke for exchanging messages with TEEs.

A shared agent comes to meed meet this need. An agent is an application
running in the REE of the device or a an SDK that facilitates
communication between a TAM and a TEE. It also provides interfaces
for TAM SDK or Client Applications to query and trigger TA
installation that the application needs to use.

This interface for Client Applications may be commonly an Android OS service
call for an Android powered device. REE OS. A Client Application interacts with a TAM, and
turns around to pass messages received from TAM to agent.

In all cases, a Client Application needs to be able to identify an
agent that it can use.

6.1. Role of the Agent

An agent abstracts the message exchanges with the TEE in a device.
The input data is originated from a TAM that to which a Client Application
connects. A Client Application may also directly call an Agent for
some TA query functions.

The agent may internally process a request message from a TAM. At least, it
needs to know where to route a message, e.g., TEE instance. It does
not need to process or verify message content.

The agent returns TEE / TFW generated response messages to the
caller. The agent is not expected to handle any network connection
with an application or TAM.

The agent only needs to return an agent error message if the TEE is
not reachable for some reason. Other errors are represented as
response messages returned from the TEE which will then be passed to
the TAM.

6.2. Agent Implementation Consideration

A Provider should consider methods of distribution, scope and
concurrency on device devices and runtime options when implementing an
agent. Several non-exhaustive options are discussed below.
Providers are encouraged to take advantage of the latest
communication and platform capabilities to offer the best user
experience.

6.2.1. Agent Distribution

The agent installation is commonly carried out at OEM time. A user
can dynamically download and install an agent on-demand.

It is important to ensure a legitimate agent is installed and used.
If an agent is compromised it may drop messages and thereby
introducing introduce
a denial of service.

6.2.2. Number of Agents

We anticipate only one shared agent instance in a device. The
device's TEE vendor will most probably supply one aent. agent.

With one shared agent, the agent provider is responsible to allow
multiple TAMs and TEE providers to achieve interoperability. With a
standard agent interface, each TAM can implement its own SDK for its
SP Client Applications to work with this agent.

Multiple independent agent providers can be used as long as they have
standard interface to a Client Application or TAM SDK. Only one
agent is expected in a device.

TAM providers are generally expected to provide an SDK for SP
applications to interact with an agent for the TAM and TEE
interaction.

7. Attestation

7.1. Attestation Hierarchy

The attestation hierarchy and seed required for TAM protocol
operation must be built into the device at manufacture. Additional
TEEs can be added post-manufacture using the scheme proposed, but it
is outside of the current scope of this document to detail that.

It should be noted that the attestation scheme described is based on
signatures. The only encryption decryption that takes place may be take place is through the
use of a
so-called eFuse to release the SBM signing key and later during the
protocol lifecycle management interchange with the TAM.

SBM bootloader key.

A boot module generated attestation can be optional in TEEP architecture where the
starting point of device attestion attestation can be at TEE certfificates. certificates. A
TAM can define its policies on what kind kinds of TEE it trusts if TFW
attestation isn't is not included during the TEE attestation.

7.1.1. Attestation Hierarchy Establishment: Manufacture

During manufacture the following steps are required:

1. A device-specific TFW key pair and certificate are burnt into the
device, encrypted by eFuse.
device. This key pair will be used for signing operations
performed by the SBM. boot module.

2. TEE images are loaded and include a TEE instance-specific key
pair and certificate. The key pair and certificate are included
in the image and covered by the code signing hash.

3. The process for TEE images is repeated for any subordinate TEEs,
which are additional TEEs after the root TEE that some devices
have.

7.1.2. Attestation Hierarchy Establishment: Device Boot

During device boot the following steps are required:

1. Secure The boot module releases the TFW private key by decrypting it
with
eFuse. the bootloader key.

2. The SBM boot module verifies the code-signing signature of the active
TEE and places its TEE public key into a signing buffer, along
with its identifier for later access. For a TEE non-compliant to
this architecture, the SBM boot module leaves the TEE public key
field blank.

3. The SBM boot module signs the signing buffer with the TFW private
key.

4. Each active TEE performs the same operation as the SBM, boot module,
building up their own signed buffer containing subordinate TEE
information.

7.1.3. Attestation Hierarchy Establishment: TAM

Before a TAM can begin operation in the marketplace to support
devices of a given TEE, marketplace, it must obtain a
TAM certificate from a CA that is registered in the trust store of devices with that TEE.
devices. In this way, the TEE can check the intermediate and root CA
and verify that it trusts this TAM to perform operations on the TEE.

8. Acknowledgements

The authors thank Dave Thaler Algorithm and Attestation Agility

RFC 7696 [RFC7696] outlines the requirements to migrate from one
mandatory-to-implement algorithm suite to another over time. This
feature is also known as crypto agility. Protocol evolution is
greatly simplified when crypto agility is already considered during
the design of the protocol. In the case of Open Trust Protocol
(OTrP) the diverse range of use cases, from trusted app updates for his very thorough review
smart phones and many
important suggestions. Most content tablets to updates of this document are split code on higher-end IoT
devices, creates the need for different mandatory-to-implement
algorithms already from
a previously combined the start.

Crypto agility in the OTrP protocol document
[I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol]. We thank concerns the former co-authors
Nick Cook and Minho Yoo use of symmetric as well as
asymmetric algorithms. Symmetric algorithms are used for encryption
of content whereas the initial document content, and
contributors Brian Witten, Tyler Kim, and Alin Mutu. asymmetric algorithms are mostly used for
signing messages.

In addition to the use of cryptographic algorithms in OTrP there is
also the need to make use of different attestation technologies. A
Device must provide techniques to inform a TAM about the attestation
technology it supports. For many deployment cases it is more likely
for the TAM to support one or more attestation techniques whereas the
Device may only support one.

9. Security Consideration Considerations

9.1. TA Trust Check at TEE

A TA binary is signed by a TA signer certificate. This TA signing
certificate/private key belongs to the SP, and may be self-signed
(i.e., it need not participate in a trust hierarchy). It is the
responsibility of the TAM to only allow verified TAs from trusted SPs
into the system. Delivery of that TA to the TEE is then the
responsibility of the TEE, using the security mechanisms provided by
the protocol.

We allow a way for an (untrusted) application to check the
trustworthiness of a TA. An agent has a function to allow an
application to query the information about a TA.

An application in the Rich O/S may perform verification of the TA by
verifying the signature of the TA. The GetTAInformation function is
available to return the TEE supplied TA signer and TAM signer
information to the application. An application can do additional
trust checks on the certificate returned for this TA. It might trust
the TAM, or require additional SP signer trust chaining.

9.2. One TA Multiple SP Case

A TA for multiple SPs must have a different identifier per SP. A TA
will be installed in a different SD for each respective SP.

9.3. Agent Trust Model

An agent could be malware in the vulnerable Rich OS. REE. A Client
Application will connect its TAM provider for required TA
installation. It gets command messages from the TAM, and passes the
message to the agent.

The architecture enables the TAM to communicate with the device's TEE
to manage SDs and TAs. All TAM messages are signed and sensitive
data is encrypted such that the agent cannot modify or capture
sensitive data.

9.4. Data Protection at TAM and TEE

The TEE implementation provides protection of data on the device. It
is the responsibility of the TAM to protect data on its servers.

9.5. Compromised CA

A root CA for TAM certificates might get compromised. Some TEE trust
anchor update mechanism is expected from device OEM. OEMs. A compromised
intermediate CA is covered by OCSP stapling and OCSP validation check
in the protocol. A TEE should validate certificate revocation about
a TAM certificate chain.

If the root CA of some TEE device certificates is compromised, these
devices might be rejected by a TAM, which is a decision of the TAM
implementation and policy choice. Any intermediate CA for TEE device
certificates SHOULD be validated by TAM with a Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) or Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) method.

9.6. Compromised TAM

The TEE SHOULD use validation of the supplied TAM certificates and
OCSP stapled data to validate that the TAM is trustworthy.

Since PKI is used, the integrity of the clock within the TEE
determines the ability of the TEE to reject an expired TAM
certificate, or revoked TAM certificate. Since OCSP stapling
includes signature generation time, certificate validity dates are
compared to the current time.

9.7. Certificate Renewal

TFW and TEE device certificates are expected to be long lived, longer
than the lifetime of a device. A TAM certificate usually has a
moderate lifetime of 2 to 5 years. A TAM should get renewed or
rekeyed certificates. The root CA certificates for a TAM, which are
embedded into the trust anchor store in a device, should have long
lifetimes that don't require device trust anchor update. On the
other hand, it is imperative that OEMs or device providers plan for
support of trust anchor update in their shipped devices.

10. IANA Considerations

This document does not require actions by IANA.

11. Acknowledgements

The authors thank Dave Thaler for his very thorough review and many
important suggestions. Most content of this document is split from a
previously combined OTrP protocol document
[I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol]. We thank the former co-authors
Nick Cook and Minho Yoo for the initial document content, and
contributors Brian Witten, Tyler Kim, and Alin Mutu.

12. References

10.1.

12.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.

[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web
2119 Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", Words", BCP 14, RFC 7518, 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2015, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7518>.

10.2. 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

12.2. Informative References

[GPTEE] Global Platform, "Global Platform, GlobalPlatform "GlobalPlatform Device Technology: TEE
System Architecture, v1.0", 2013.

[GPTEECLAPI] v1.1", Global Platform, "Global Platform, GlobalPlatform Device
Technology: TEE Client API Specification, v1.0", 2013. Platform GPD_SPE_009,
January 2017, <https://globalplatform.org/specs-library/
tee-system-architecture-v1-1/>.

[I-D.ietf-teep-opentrustprotocol]
Pei, M., Atyeo, A., Cook, N., Yoo, M., and H. Tschofenig,
"The Open Trust Protocol (OTrP)", draft-ietf-teep-
opentrustprotocol-00
opentrustprotocol-01 (work in progress), May July 2018.

[RFC7696] Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm
Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms",
BCP 201, RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7696>.

Appendix A. History

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION

IETF Drafts

draft-00: - Initial working group document

Authors' Addresses

Mingliang Pei
Symantec
350 Ellis St
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA

Email:

EMail: mingliang_pei@symantec.com

Hannes Tschofenig
Arm Ltd.
Absam, Tirol 6067
Austria

Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com Limited

EMail: hannes.tschofenig@arm.com

David Wheeler
Intel

EMail: david.m.wheeler@intel.com

Andrew Atyeo
Intercede
St. Mary's Road, Lutterworth
Leicestershire, LE17 4PS
Great Britain

Email:

EMail: andrew.atyeo@intercede.com

Liu Dapeng
Alibaba Group
Wangjing East Garden 4th Area,Chaoyang District
Beijing 100102
China

Email:

EMail: maxpassion@gmail.com