TLS WG J. Salowey
Internet-Draft Tableau Software
Updates: 3749, 5077, 4680, 5246, 5878, S. Turner
6520, 7301 (if approved) sn3rd
Intended status: Standards Track January 02, April 28, 2017
Expires: July 6, October 30, 2017
D/TLS IANA Registry Updates
draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-00
draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-01
Abstract
This document changes the IANA registry policy for a number of
registries related to DTLS and TLS, renames some of the registries
for consistency, and adds notes to many of the registries. As a
result, this document updates many RFCs (see updates header).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 6, October 30, 2017.
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Table of Contents
1. Process Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Add "TLS" to Registry Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Aligning with RFC 5226 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Session Ticket TLS Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. TLS ExtensionType Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.
7. TLS Cipher Suite Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.
8. TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers Supported Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. New Session Ticket TLS Handshake Message Type . . . . . . . . 8
9. Session Ticket TLS Extension ClientCertificateType Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. New Session Ticket TLS Handshake Message Type . . . . . . . . 8
10.
11. TLS Exporter Label Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. 9
12. Add Missing Item to TLS Alert Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. 9
13. TLS Certificate Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
14. Orphaned Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
13. 10
15. Orphaned Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
14. 10
16. Designated Expert Pool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
17. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
15. 11
18. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
16. 11
19. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
16.1. 11
19.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
16.2. 11
19.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 13
1. Process Note
As the authors of this draft are also the WG chairs, the responsible
Area Director has agreed to judge consensus.
RFC EDITOR: Please delete section prior to publication.
2. Introduction
This document requests that IANA make changes to a number of DTLS-
and TLS-related IANA registries.
In this document, we use the term "(D)TLS" to refer to registries
that apply to both TLS and DTLS.
o Add "TLS" to registries' names for consistency with other TLS-
related amongst TLS-related
registries.
o Change the IANA registry policy [RFC5226] for the TLS
ExtensionType Values, TLS Cipher Suite, and TLS
ClientCertificateType Identifiers registries. These changes
register a small part of these code spaces for experimentation and
private use.
o Add the designated expert intructions instructions as a note to notes in the TLS
ExtensionType Values, TLS Cipher Suite, and TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers
Identifiers, and TLS Exporter Label registries to inform users of
about what to expect from the registry. designated expert.
o Add notes to indicate whether an extension, certain values of an
extension, or an entire registry is only applicable pre-(D)TLS
1.3.
o Rename the NewSessionTicket TLS HandshakeType message registry
entry [RFC5077] to new_session_ticket to match the naming
nomenclature for the other Handshake type names and to match with
existing implementations.
o Rename the SessionTicket TLS extension to session_ticket to match
the nomenclature for the other extensions' names.
o Add missing entry to the TLS Alert Registry for the
no_application_protocol alert defined in [RFC7301] [RFC7301].
o Added "Recommended" column to TLS ExtensionType Values, TLS Cipher
Suite, TLS Certificate Types, TLS Supported Groups, and TLS
Exporters Label registries. Initial values marked "Yes" are
specified in IETF Standards Track documents; all others are marked
"No". This new column is intended to alter the incorrect
perception that getting a code point somehow legitimizes the
extension, cipher suite/algorithm, or exporter.
o Establish Designated Expert pool rules for Specification Required
registries.
This document proposes no changes to the registration policies for
TLS Alert [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], TLS ContentType [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13],
TLS HandshakeType, [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] and TLS Certificate Status
Types [RFC6961]; the existing policies (Standards Action for the
first three; IETF Review for the last), are appropriate for these
one-byte code points because of their scarcity.
This document proposes no changes to the EC Curve Type, EC Point
Format, and Supported Groups Registries (see
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis]).
3. Add "TLS" to Registry Names
IANA is to update the names of the following registries to add "TLS"
to for consistency with the other TLS-related extensions:
o Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs,
o ExtensionType Values,
o Heartbeat Message Types,
o Heartbeat Modes, and
o Supported Groups.
IANA is also to add a reference to this document for the registry
whose names have been updated as a result of the above change. The
remainder of this document will use the registry names with the "TLS"
prefix.
4. Aligning with RFC 5226
Many of the TLS-related IANA registries were defined prior to
[RFC5226] where "IETF Consensus" was used instead of the
RFC5226-defined "IETF Review". To align with the new terminology,
IANA is to update to use "IETF Review" in place of "IETF Consensus"
in the following registries:
o TLS Authorization Data Formats
o TLS Supplemental Data Formats (SupplementalDataType)
This is not a universal change as some registries originally defined
with "IETF Consensus" are undergoing other changes either as a result
of this document or [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis].
5. Session Ticket TLS Extension
The nomenclature for the registry entries in the TLS ExtensionType
Values registry correspond to the presentation language field name
except for entry 35. To ensure that the values in the registry are
consistently identified in the registry, IANA is to rename entry 35
to "session_ticket (renamed from "SessionTicket TLS")".
6. TLS ExtensionType Values
IANA is to update the TLS ExtensionType Values registry as follows:
o Change the registry policy to:
Values with the first byte in the range 0-254 (decimal) are
assigned via Specification Required [RFC5226]. Values with the
first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use [RFC5226].
o Update the "References" to also refer to this document.
o Add the following note:
Note: Experts are to verify that there is in fact a publicly
available standard.
o Add a "Recommended" column with the contents as listed below.
This table has been generated by marking Standards Track RFCs as
"Yes" and all others as "No". Future extensions MUST define the
value of this column. A Standards Track document [RFC5226] is
required to register an extension with the value "Yes".
+----------------------------------------+-------------+
| Extension | Recommended |
+----------------------------------------+-------------+
| server_name | Yes |
| | |
| max_fragment_length | Yes |
| | |
| client_certificate_url | Yes |
| | |
| trusted_ca_keys | Yes |
| | |
| truncated_hmac | Yes |
| | |
| status_request | Yes |
| | |
| user_mapping | Yes |
| | |
| client_authz | No |
| | |
| server_authz | No |
| | |
| cert_type | Yes |
| | |
| supported_groups | Yes |
| | |
| ec_point_formats | Yes |
| | |
| srp | No |
| | |
| signature_algorithms | Yes |
| | |
| use_srtp | Yes |
| | |
| heartbeat | Yes |
| | |
| application_layer_protocol_negotiation | Yes |
| | |
| status_request_v2 | Yes |
| | |
| signed_certificate_timestamp | No |
| | |
| client_certificate_type | Yes |
| | |
| server_certificate_type | Yes |
| | |
| padding | Yes |
| | |
| encrypt_then_mac | Yes |
| | |
| extended_master_secret | Yes |
| | |
| SessionTicket TLS session_ticket | Yes |
| | |
| renegotiation_info | Yes |
+----------------------------------------+-------------+
6.
7. TLS Cipher Suite Registry
IANA is to update the TLS Cipher Suite registry as follows:
o Change the registry policy to:
Values with the first byte in the range 0-254 (decimal) are
assigned via Specification Required [RFC5226]. Values with the
first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use [RFC2434].
o Add a "Recommended" column to the cipher suite registry. The
cipher suites that follow in the two tables are marked as "Yes".
All other cipher suites are marked as "No". Future cipher suites
MUST define the value of the Recommended column. A Standards
Track document [RFC5226] is required to register a cipher suite
with the value "Yes".
o Update the reference for this registry to also point to this
document.
The cipher suites that follow are standards track server-
authenticated (and optionally client-authenticated) cipher suites
which are currently available in TLS 1.2. The notable exception are
the ECDHE AES GCM cipher suites which are not yet standards track
prior to the publication of this specification, but this document
promotes those 4 cipher suites to standards track (see TO-DO insert
reference).
RFC EDITOR: Please delete the sentence beginning with "The notable
exception ..." after RFC 5289 has been promoted to Proposed Standard.
Cipher Suite Name | Value
----------------------------------------------+------------
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0x00,0x9E}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0x00,0x9F}
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0xC0,0x2B}
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0xC0,0x2C}
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0xC0,0x2F}
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0xC0,0x30}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | {0xC0,0x9E}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | {0xC0,0x9F}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | {0xC0,0xA2}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 | {0xC0,0xA3}
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xA8}
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xA9}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xAA}
The cipher suites that follow are standards track ephemeral pre-
shared key cipher suites which are available in TLS 1.2. [RFC6655]
is inconsistent with respect to the ordering of components within PSK
AES CCM cipher suite names; those names are used here without
modification.
Cipher Suite Name | Value
----------------------------------------------+------------
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {0x00,0xAA}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {0x00,0xAB}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM | {0xC0,0xA6}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM | {0xC0,0xA7}
TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | {0xC0,0xAA}
TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 | {0xC0,0xAB}
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | {TBD}
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | {TBD}
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 | {TBD}
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | {TBD}
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_SHA384 | {TBD}
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xAC}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | {0xCC,0xAD}
o Add the following:
WARNING: Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over
time. Blindly implementing cipher suites listed here is not
advised. Implementers and users need to check that the
cryptographic algorithms listed continue to provide the expected
level of security.
Note(1): Although TLS 1.3 uses the same cipher suite space as
previous versions of TLS, TLS 1.3 cipher suites are defined
differently, only specifying the symmetric ciphers, and cannot it be
used for TLS 1.2. Similarly, TLS 1.2 and lower cipher suites
cannot be used with TLS 1.3.
Note(2): Cipher suites marked as "Yes" are those allocated via
Standards Track RFCs. Cipher suites marked as "No" are not;
cipher suites marked "No" range from "good" to "bad" from a
cryptographic standpoint.
Note(3): The designated expert [RFC5226] only ensures that the
specification is publically publicly available.
7.
8. TLS Supported Groups
Add a "Recommended" column with a "Yes" for secp256r1, secp384r1,
x25519, and x448 while all others are "No". These "Yes" groups are
taken from Standards Track RFCs. Not all groups from
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis], which is standards track, are not marked
as "Yes"; these groups apply to TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] and
previous versions of TLS [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. A Standards Track
document [RFC5226] is required to register an entry with the value
"Yes".
9. TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers
IANA is to update the TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers registry
as follows:
o Change the registry policy to:
Values in the range 0-223 are assigned via Specification Required
[RFC5226]. Values 224-255 are are reserved for Private Use.
o Add the following:
Note: The designated expert [RFC5226] only ensures that the
specification is publically publicly available.
8.
10. New Session Ticket TLS Handshake Message Type
To align with TLS implementations and to align the naming
nomenclature for other Handshake message types, IANA is to rename
entry 4 in the TLS HandshakeType registry to "new_session_ticket
(renamed from NewSessionTicket)". IANA is to also add a reference to
this document in the Reference column for entry 4 in the TLS
HandshakeType registry.
9. Session Ticket TLS Extension
The nomenclature for the registry entries in the TLS ExtensionType
Values registry correspond to the presentation language field name
except for entry 35. To ensure that the values in the registry are
consistently identified in the registry, IANA is to rename entry 35
to "session_ticket (renamed from "SessionTicket TLS")".
10.
11. TLS Exporter Label Registry
IANA is to add the following note to the TLS Exporter Label Registry:
Note: {{RFC5705}} defines keying material exporters for TLS in terms of the TLS PRF. {{I-D.ietf-tls-tls13}} replaced the PRF with HKDF, thus requiring a new construction. The exporter interface remains the same, however the value is computed different.
11.
IANA is to also to add a "Recommended" column to the TLS Exporter
Label registry. The table that follows has been generated by marking
Standards Track RFCs as "Yes" and all others as "No". Future
exporters MUST define the value of this column. A Standards Track
document [RFC5226] is required to register an extension with the
value "Yes".
IANA is also to add the following note:
Note: The designated expert {{RFC5226}} ensures that the specification is publicly available. The expert also verifies that the label is a string consisting of printable ASCII characters beginning with "EXPORTER". IANA MUST also verify that one label is not a prefix of any other label. For example, labels "key" or "master secretary" are forbidden.
Exporter Value
-------------------------------
client finished
server finished
master secret
key expansion
client EAP encryption
ttls keying material
ttls challenge
EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp
EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP
EXPORTER: teap session key seed
12. Add Missing Item to TLS Alert Registry
IANA is to add the following entry to the TLS Alert Registry (the
entry was omitted from the IANA instructions in [RFC7301]):
120 no_application_protocol Y [RFC7301]
12.
13. TLS Certificate Types
Add a "Recommended" column to the registry. X.509 and Raw Public Key
are "Yes". All others are "No". A Standards Track document
[RFC5226] is required to register a certificate type with the value
"Yes".
14. Orphaned Extensions
To make it clear that (D)TLS 1.3 has orphaned certain extensions
(i.e., they are only applicable to version of (D)TLS prior to 1.3),
IANA is to add the following to the TLS ExtensionType Values
registry:
Note: The following extensions are only applicable to (D)TLS protocol vesions prior to 1.3: trusted_ca_keys, truncated_hmac, ec_point_formats, srp, status_request_v2, encrypt_then_mac, extended_master_secret, session_ticket, and renegotiation_info. These are not applicable to DTLS 1.3.
13.
15. Orphaned Registries
To make it clear that (D)TLS 1.3 has orphaned certain registries
(i.e., they are only applicable to version of (D)TLS protocol
versions prior to 1.3), IANA is to:
o Add the following to the TLS Compression Method Identifiers
registry [RFC3749]:
Note: Value 0 (NULL) is the only value in this registry applicable
to (D)TLS protocol version 1.3 or later.
o Add the following to the TLS Hash Algorithm HashAlgorithm [RFC5246] and TLS
SignatureAlgorithm registries [RFC5246]:
Note: The values in this registry are only applicable to (D)TLS
protocol versions prior to 1.3.
o Update the "References" in the TLS Compression Method Identifiers,
TLS Hash Algorithm HashAlgorithm [RFC5246] and TLS SignatureAlgorithm registries
to also refer to this document.
14.
IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the TLS HashAlgorithm Registry to
list values 7-223 as "Reserved" and the TLS SignatureAlgorithm
registry to list values 4-223 as "Reserved".
16. Designated Expert Pool
Specification Required [RFC5226] registry requests are registered
after a three-week review period on the (tbd but maybe tls-reg-
review@ietf.org) mailing list, on the advice of one or more
Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values
prior to publication, the Designated Experts may approve registration
once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review SHOULD use
an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register value in TLS bar
registry").
Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve
or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the
review list and IANA. Denials SHOULD include an explanation and, if
applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than
21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
Criteria that SHOULD be applied by the Designated Experts includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or
useful only for a single application, and whether the registration
description is clear.
IANA MUST only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and SHOULD direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list.
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert SHOULD defer to the judgment of the other
Experts.
17. Security Considerations
The authors are fairly certain that there are no security
considerations for this document.
15.
18. IANA Considerations
This document is entirely about changes to TLS-related IANA
registries.
16.
19. References
16.1.
19.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18 draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19 (work in progress),
October 2016.
March 2017.
[RFC3749] Hollenbeck, S., "Transport Layer Security Protocol
Compression Methods", RFC 3749, DOI 10.17487/RFC3749, May
2004, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3749>.
[RFC4680] Santesson, S., "TLS Handshake Message for Supplemental
Data", RFC 4680, DOI 10.17487/RFC4680, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4680>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
[RFC5878] Brown, M. and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Authorization Extensions", RFC 5878, DOI 10.17487/RFC5878,
May 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5878>.
[RFC6520] Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6520>.
[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
16.2.
19.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis]
Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", draft-ietf-tls-
rfc4492bis-09
rfc4492bis-16 (work in progress), October 2016. March 2017.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 2434,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2434, October 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2434>.
[RFC6961] Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6961>.
Authors' Addresses
Joe Salowey
Tableau Software
Email: joe@salowey.net
Sean Turner
sn3rd
Email: sean@sn3rd.com