Network Working Group                                           S. Kanno
Internet-Draft                                  NTT Software Corporation
Intended status: Informational                                  M. Kanda
Expires: October 7, 2009                  Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
                                                             Corporation
                                                           April 5, 2009 July 31, 2010                                               NTT
                                                        January 27, 2010

 Addition of Camellia Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-1 and SHA-2
                  draft-kanno-tls-camellia-ecc-sha-00
                  draft-kanno-tls-camellia-ecc-sha-01

Abstract

   This document specifies a set of elliptic curve cipher suites for the
   Transport Security Layer (TLS) protocol to support the Camellia
   encryption algorithm as a block cipher.  This document describes
   sixteen new cipher suites for TLS that specify HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-
   SHA2.

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 7, 2009. July 31, 2010.

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Abstract

   This  Code Components extracted from this document specifies a set must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of elliptic curve cipher suites for
   the
   Transport Security Layer (TLS) protocol to support the Camellia
   encryption algorithm as a block cipher.  This document describes
   sixteen new cipher suites for TLS that specify HMAC-SHA1 Trust Legal Provisions and HMAC-
   SHA2. are provided without warranty as
   described in the BSD License.

1.  Introduction

   This document specifies a set of elliptic curve cipher suites for the
   Transport Security Layer (TLS) protocol to support the Camellia
   encryption algorithm as a block cipher.  This document describes
   sixteen new cipher suites for TLS that specify HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-
   SHA2.

   The Camellia algorithm specification and object identifiers its properties are described in [RFC3713].

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Cipher Suites

   This document defines sixteen new cipher suites to be added to TLS.
   All use Elliptic Curve Cryptography for key exchange and digital
   signature, as defined in [RFC4492].

   The sixteen cipher suites use Camellia [RFC3713] in Cipher Block
   Chaining (CBC) mode with HMAC-based MAC.

   The cipher suites defined here have the following identifiers:

     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA    = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA    = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA   = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA   = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA      = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA      = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = {TBD,TBD}

     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     = {TBD,TBD};

3.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to allocate the following numbers in the TLS Cipher
   Suite Registry:

     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA    = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA    = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA   = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA   = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA      = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA      = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA     = {TBD,TBD}
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA     = {TBD,TBD}

     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     = {TBD,TBD};
     CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     = {TBD,TBD};

4.  Security Considerations

   At the time of writing of this document, document there are no known weak keys
   for Camellia. Camellia and no security problems have been found with Camellia
   (see [NESSIE], [CRYPTREC], and [Research]).

   The security considerations in RFC 5289 [RFC5289] apply to this
   document as well.

5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3713]  Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description of
              the Camellia Encryption Algorithm", RFC 3713, April 2004.

   [RFC4492]  Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
              Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.

   [RFC5289]  Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
              256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289,
              August 2008.

5.2.  Informative

   [CRYPTREC]
              Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA),
              "Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees",
              <http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/index-e.html>.

   [NESSIE]   "The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures,
              Integrity and Encryption)",
              <http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie/>.

   [Research]
              Mala, H., Shakiba, M., and M. Dakhil-alian, "New Results
              on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round
              Camellia-128", November 2009,
              <http://www.springerlink.com/content/e55783u422436g77/>.

Authors' Addresses

   Satoru Kanno
   NTT Software Corporation

   Phone: +81-45-212-7577 +81-45-212-9803
   Fax:   +81-45-212-9800
   Email: kanno-s@po.ntts.co.jp kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp

   Masayuki Kanda
   Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
   NTT

   Phone: +81-422-59-3456
   Fax:   +81-422-59-4015
   Email: kanda.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jp