IPSec Working Group                                   Hyanjin Lee (KISA)
Internet Draft                                          Jaeil                                     Hyangjin Lee (KISA)
draft-lee-ipsec-cipher-seed-00.txt                             June 2004
draft-lee-ipsec-cipher-seed-01.txt                   Jaeho Yoon (KISA)
Expires December 2004                   Target category : Standard Track August 2005                                 Seoklae Lee (KISA)
                                                      Jaeil Lee (KISA)
                                                         February 2005

            The SEED Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPSec

                  <draft-lee-ipsec-cipher-seed-00.txt>

                  <draft-lee-ipsec-cipher-seed-01.txt>

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft

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   patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   This document describes the use of the SEED block cipher algorithm in
   Cipher Block Chaining Mode, with an explicit IV, as a confidentiality
   mechanism within the context of the IPsec Encapsulating Security
   Payload (ESP).

1. Introduction

   This document describes the use of the SEED block cipher algorithm in
   Cipher Block Chaining Mode, with an explicit IV, as a confidentiality
   mechanism within the context of the IPsec Encapsulating Security
   Payload (ESP).

1.1 SEED

   SEED is a national industrial association standard [TTASSEED] and is
   widely used in South Korea for electronic commerce and financial
   services operated on wired & wireless communications.

   SEED is a 128-bit symmetric encryption algorithm key block cipher that had has been developed
   by KISA (Korea Information Security Agency) and a group of experts
   since 1998.  The input/output block size of SEED is 128-bit and the
   key length is also 128-bit. SEED has the 16-round Feistel structure.
   A 128-bit input is divided into two 64-bit blocks and the right
   64-bit block is an input to the round function with a 64-bit subkey
   generated from the key scheduling.

   SEED is easily implemented in various software and hardware because
   it is designed to increase the efficiency of memory storage and the
   simplicity in generating keys without degrading the security of the
   algorithm. In particular, it
   can be effectively adopted to a computing environment with a
   restricted resources such as a mobile devices, smart cards and so on.

   SEED is robust against known attacks including Differential
   cryptanalysis, Linear cryptanalysis DC (Differential
   cryptanalysis), LC (Linear cryptanalysis), and related key attacks, etc. attacks.
   SEED has gone through wide public scrutinizing procedures.
   Especially, it It has
   been evaluated and also is considered cryptographically secure by trustworhty credible
   organizations such as ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 and Japan CRYTEC CRYPTREC
   (Cryptography Reasearch Research and Evaluation
   Comittees) [ISOSEED][CRYPTEC]. SEED has been submitted to other
   several standardization bodies such as ISO (ISO/IEC 18033-3), IETF
   S/MIME Mail Security [SEED-SMIME] and it is under consideration.

   SEED is a national industrial association standard [TTASSEED] and is
   widely used in South Korea for electronic commerce and financial
   services operated on wired & wireless PKI. Committees)[ISOSEED][CRYPTREC].

   The remainder of this document specifies the use of SEED within the
   context of IPsec ESP.  For further information on how the various
   pieces of ESP fit together to provide security services, please refer
   to [ARCH], [ESP], and [ROAD].

1.2 Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
   "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in uppercase,
   as shown) are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. RFC2119.

2. The SEED Cipher Algorithm

   All symmetric block cipher algorithms share common characteristics
   and variables, including mode, key size, weak keys, block size, and
   rounds.  The following sections contain descriptions of the relevant
   characteristics of SEED.

   The algorithm specification and object identifiers are described in
   [SEED-ID].
   [ISOSEED, SEED]. The SEED homepage,
   http://www.kisa.or.kr/seed/seed_eng.html, contains a wealth of
   information about SEED, including detailed specification, evaluation
   report, test vectors, and so on.

2.1 Mode

   NIST has defined 5 modes of operation for AES and other FIPS-approved
   ciphers [MODES]: CBC (Cipher Block Chaining), ECB (Electronic
   CodeBook),
   Codebook), CFB (Cipher FeedBack), OFB (Output FeedBack) and CTR
   (Counter).  The CBC mode is well-defined and well-understood for
   symmetric ciphers, and is currently required for all other ESP
   ciphers.  This document specifies the use of the SEED cipher in CBC
   mode within ESP.  This mode requires an Initialization Vector (IV)
   that is the same size as the block size.  Use of a randomly generated
   IV prevents generation of identical ciphertext from packets which
   have identical data that spans the first block of the cipher
   algorithm's block size

   The IV is XOR'd with the first plaintext block before it is
   encrypted.  Then for successive blocks, the previous ciphertext block
   is XOR'd with the current plaintext, before it is encrypted.

   More information on CBC mode can be obtained in [MODES, CRYPTO-S].
   For the use of CBC mode in ESP with 64-bit ciphers, please see [CBC].

2.2 Key Size and Numbers of Rounds

   SEED supports 128-bit key and has the 16-round Feistel structure.

2.3 Weak Keys

   At the time of writing this document there are no known weak keys for
   SEED.

2.4 Block Size and Padding

   SEED uses a block size of sixteen octets (128 bits).

   Padding is required by the SEED to maintain a 16-octet (128-bit)
   blocksize.  Padding MUST be added, as specified in [ESP], such that
   the data to be encrypted (which includes the ESP Pad Length and Next
   Header fields) has a length that is a multiple of 16 octets.

   Because of the algorithm specific padding requirement, no additional
   padding is required to ensure that the ciphertext terminates on a 4-
   octet
   4-octet boundary (i.e. maintaining a 16-octet blocksize guarantees guarantee
   that the ESP Pad Length and Next Header fields will be right aligned
   within a 4-octet word). Additional padding MAY be included, as
   specified in [ESP], as long as the 16-octet blocksize is maintained.

2.5 Performance

   Performance figures of SEED are available at
   http://www.kisa.or.kr/seed/seed_eng.html. It also includes
   performance comparision with the AES and Camellia cipher.
   http://www.kisa.or.kr/seed/seed_eng.html

3. ESP Payload

   SEED was designed to follow

   The ESP Payload is made up of the same API as Initialization Vector(IV) of 16
   octets followed by encrypted payload. Thus the AES cipher.
   Therefore, any consideration related to ESP payload field, as
   define in [ESP], is broken down according to the following diagram :

   +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
   |                                                               |
   +               Initialization Vector (16 octets)               +
   |                                                               |
   +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
   |                                                               |
   ~ Encrypted Payload (variable length, a multiple of 16 octets)  ~
   |                                                               |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+

   The IV field MUST be the same size as
   that the block size of the AES cipher. Details cipher
   algorithm being used.  The IV MUST be chosen at random, and MUST be
   unpredictable.

   Including the IV in each datagram ensures that decryption of each
   received datagram can be found performed, even when some datagrams are
   dropped, or datagrams are re-ordered in [AES-IPSEC]. transit.

   To avoid CBC encryption of very similar plaintext blocks in different
   packets, implementations MUST NOT use a counter or other low-Hamming
   distance source for IVs.

4. Interaction with IKE

   SEED was designed to follow Test Vectors

   The first 2 test cases test SEED-CBC encryption. Each test case
   includes key, the same API as plaintext, and the AES cipher.
   Therefore, this section defines only Phase resulting ciphertext.  All data
   are hexadecimal numbers(not prefixed by "0x").

   The last 4 test cases illustrate sample ESP packets using SEED-CBC
   for encryption. All data are hexadecimal numbers(not prefixed by
   "0x").

   Case #1    : Encrypting 32 bytes (2 blocks) using SEED-CBC with
                128-bit key
   Key        : ed2401ad  22fa2559  91bafdb0  1fefd697
   IV         : 93eb149f  92c9905b  ae5cd34d  a06c3c8e
   PlainText  : b40d7003  d9b6904b  35622750  c91a2457
                5bb9a632  364aa26e  3ac0cf3a  9c9d0dcb
   CipherText : f072c5b1  a0588c10  5af8301a  dcd91dd0
                67f68221  55304bf3  aad75ceb  44341c25

   Case #2    : Encrypting 64 bytes (4 blocks) using SEED-CBC with
                128-bit key
   Key        : 88e34f8f  081779f1  e9f39437  0ad40589
   IV         : 268d66a7  35a81a81  6fbad9fa  36162501
   PlainText  : d76d0d18  327ec562  b15e6bc3  65ac0c0f
                8d41e0bb  938568ae  ebfd92ed  1affa096
                394d20fc  5277ddfc  4de8b0fc  e1eb2b93
                d4ae40ef  4768c613  b50b8942  f7d4b9b3
   CipherText : a293eae9  d9aebfac  37ba714b  d774e427
                e8b706d7  e7d9a097  228639e0  b62b3b34
                ced11609  cef2abaa  ec2edf97  9308f379
                c31527a8  267783e5  cba35389  82b48d06

   Case #3  : Sample transport-mode ESP packet (ping 192.168.123.100)
   Key                 : 90d382b4 10eeba7a  d938c46c ec1a82bf
   SPI                 : 4321
   Source address      : 192.168.123.3
   Destination address : 192.168.123.100
   Sequence number     : 1 Identifier
   IV                  : e96e8c08  ab465763  fd098d45  dd3ff893

   Original packet :
   IP header (20 bytes) : 45000054 08f20000 4001f9fe  c0a87b03  c0a87b64
   Data (64 bytes) :
   08000ebd  a70a0000  8e9c083d  b95b0700
   08090a0b  0c0d0e0f  10111213  14151617
   18191a1b  1c1d1e1f  20212223  24252627
   28292a2b  2c2d2e2f  30313233  34353637

   Augment data with :
   Padding     : 01020304  05060708  090a0b0c  0d0e
   Pad length  : 0e
   Next header : 01 (ICMP)

   Pre-encryption Data with padding, pad length and Phase next header(80
   bytes):
   08000ebd  a70a0000  8e9c083d  b95b0700
   08090a0b  0c0d0e0f  10111213  14151617
   18191a1b  1c1d1e1f  20212223  24252627
   28292a2b  2c2d2e2f  30313233  34353637
   01020304  05060708  090a0b0c  0d0e0e01

   Post-encryption packet with SPI, Sequence number, IV :
   IP Header : 45000054 08f20000 4001f9fe  c0a87b03  c0a87b64
   SPI/Seq # : 00004321 00000001
   IV        : e96e8c08  ab465763  fd098d45  dd3ff893
   Encrypted Data (80 bytes) :
   e7ebaa03  cf45ef09  021b3011  b40d3769
   be96ebae  cd4222f6  b6f84ce5  b2d5cdd1
   60eb6b0e  5a47d16a  501a4d10  7b2d7cc8
   ab86ba03  9a000972  66374fa8  f87ee0fb
   ef3805db  faa144a2  334a34db  0b0f81ca

   Case #4 : Sample transport-mode ESP packet
   (ping -p 77 -s 20 192.168.123.100)
   Key : 90d382b4 10eeba7a d938c46c ec1a82bf
   SPI                 : 4321
   Source address      : 192.168.123.3
   Destination address : 192.168.123.100
   Sequence number     : 8
   IV : 69d08df7 d203329d b093fc49 24e5bd80

   Original packet:
   IP header (20 bytes) : 45000030 08fe0000 4001fa16 c0a87b03 c0a87b64
   Data (28 bytes) :
   0800b5e8 a80a0500 a69c083d 0b660e00 77777777 77777777 77777777

   Augment data with :
   Padding     : 0102
   Pad length  : 02
   Next header : 01 (ICMP)

   Pre-encryption Data with padding, pad length and
   next header(32 bytes):
   0800b5e8 a80a0500 a69c083d 0b660e00
   77777777 77777777 77777777 01020201

   Post-encryption packet with SPI, Sequence number, IV  :
   IP header : 4500004c 08fe0000 4032f9c9 c0a87b03 c0a87b64
   SPI/Seq # : 00004321 00000008
   IV        : 69d08df7 d203329d b093fc49 24e5bd80
   Encrypted Data (32 bytes) :
   b9ad6e19  e9a6a2fa  02569160  2c0af541
   db0b0807  e1f660c7  3ae2700b  5bb5efd1

   Case #5 : Sample tunnel-mode ESP packet (ping 192.168.123.200)
   Key     : 01234567  89abcdef  01234567  89abcdef
   SPI     : 8765
   Source address      : 192.168.123.3
   Destination address : 192.168.123.200
   Sequence number     : 2
   Identifier.  Any other consideration related to interaction
   IV      : f4e76524  4f6407ad  f13dc138  0f673f37
   Original packet :
   IP header (20 bytes) : 45000054 09040000 4001f988 c0a87b03 c0a87bc8
   Data (64 bytes) :
   08009f76  a90a0100  b49c083d  02a20400
   08090a0b  0c0d0e0f  10111213  14151617
   18191a1b  1c1d1e1f  20212223  24252627
   28292a2b  2c2d2e2f  30313233  34353637

   Augment data with :
   Padding     : 01020304 05060708 090a
   Pad length  : 0a
   Next header : 04 (IP-in-IP)

   Pre-encryption Data with original IP header, padding, pad length and
   next header (96 bytes) :
   45000054  09040000  4001f988  c0a87b03
   c0a87bc8  08009f76  a90a0100  b49c083d
   02a20400  08090a0b  0c0d0e0f  10111213
   14151617  18191a1b  1c1d1e1f  20212223
   24252627  28292a2b  2c2d2e2f  30313233
   34353637  01020304  05060708  090a0a04

   Post-encryption packet with SPI, Sequence number, IV :
   IP header : 4500008c  09050000  4032f91e  c0a87b03  c0a87bc8
   SPI/Seq # : 00008765  00000002
   IV : f4e76524  4f6407ad  f13dc138  0f673f37
   Encrypted Data (96 bytes):
   2638aa7b  05e71b54  9348082b  67b47b26
   c565aed4  737f0bcb  439c0f00  73e7913c
   3c8a3e4f  5f7a5062  003b78ed  7ca54a08
   c7ce047d  5bec14e4  8cba1005  32a12097
   8d7f5503  204ef661  729b4ea1  ae6a9178
   59a5caac  46e810bd  7875bd13  d6f57b3d

   Case #6 : Sample tunnel-mode ESP packet
   (ping -p ff -s 40 192.168.123.200)
   Key : 01234567  89abcdef  01234567  89abcdef
   SPI : 8765
   Source address      : 192.168.123.3
   Destination address : 192.168.123.200
   Sequence number     : 5
   IV : 85d47224  b5f3dd5d  2101d4ea  8dffab22

   Original packet :
   IP header (20 bytes) :
   45000044  090c0000  4001f990  c0a87b03  c0a87bc8
   Data (48 bytes) :
   0800d63c  aa0a0200  c69c083d  a3de0300
   ffffffff  ffffffff  ffffffff  ffffffff
   ffffffff  ffffffff  ffffffff  ffffffff

   Augment data with :
   Padding     : 01020304  05060708  090a
   Pad length  : 0a
   Next header : 04 (IP-in-IP)

   Pre-encryption Data with original IP header, padding, pad length and
   next header (80 bytes):
   45000044  090c0000  4001f990  c0a87b03
   c0a87bc8  0800d63c  aa0a0200  c69c083d
   a3de0300  ffffffff  ffffffff  ffffffff
   ffffffff  ffffffff  ffffffff  ffffffff
   ffffffff  01020304  05060708  090a0a04

   Post-encryption packet with SPI, Sequence number, IV :
   IP header : 4500007c  090d0000  4032f926  c0a87b03  c0a87bc8
   SPI/Seq # : 00008765  00000005
   IV : 85d47224  b5f3dd5d  2101d4ea  8dffab22
   Encrypted Data (80 bytes) :
   311168e0  bc36ac4e  59802bd5  192c5734
   8f3d29c8  90bab276  e9db4702  91f79ac7
   79571929  c170f902  ffb2f08b  d448f782
   31671414  ff29b7e0  168e1c87  09ba2b67
   a56e0fbc  4ff6a936  d859ed57  6c16ef1b

5. Interaction with IKE
   is the same as that of the AES cipher.  Details can be found in
   [AES-IPSEC].

4.1

5.1 Phase 1 Identifier

   For Phase 1 negotiations, IANA has assigned an Encryption Algorithm
   ID the object identifier of (TBD) for SEED-CBC.

4.2 SEED-CBC is
   defined in [SEED].

   algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) korea(410)
   kisa(200004) algorithm(1) }

   id-seedCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { algorithm seedCBC(4) }

5.2 Phase 2 Identifier

   For Phase 2 negotiations, IANA has assigned an ESP Transform
   Identifier of (TBD) for ESP_SEED.

4.3 ESP_SEED_CBC.

5.3 Key Length Attribute

   Since the SEED supports 128 bit key lengths, the Key Length attribute
   is set with 128 bits.

4.4

5.4 Hash Algorithm Considerations

   HMAC-SHA-1[HMAC-SHA] and HMAC-MD5 [HMAC-MD5] are currently considered
   of sufficient strength to serve both as IKE generators of 128-bit
   SEED keys and as ESP authenticators for SEED encryption using 128-bit
   keys.

5.

6. Security Considerations

   No security problem has been found on SEED. SEED is secure against
   all known attacks including Differential cryptanalysis, Linear
   cryptanalysis and related key attacks, etc. The best known attack is
   only exhaustive search for the key (by [CRYPTEC]). [CRYPTREC]). For further
   security considerations,  the reader is encouraged to read [CRYPTEC],
   [CRYPTREC], [ISOSEED] and [SEED-EVAL].

6. Intellectual Property Statement

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it

7. IANA Considerations

   IANA has made any effort assigned ESP Transform Identifier (TBD) to identify any such rights.  Information on the
   IETF's procedures with respect ESP_SEED_CBC.

8. Acknowledgments

   The authors want to rights thank Ph.D Haesuk Kim in standards-track FuturSystems and
   standards-related documentation can be found Brian
   Kim in BCP-11. Copies of
   claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
   licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
   obtain a general license or permission OULLIM for the use of such
   proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
   be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
   this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
   Director.

7. providing expert advice on Test Vector examples.

9. References

9.1 Normative References

   [TTASSEED]  Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA),
               South Korea, "128-bit Symmetric Block Cipher (SEED)",
               TTAS.KO-12.0004, September, 1998 (In Korean)
               http://www.tta.or.kr/English/new/main/index.htm

   [CBC]       Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
               Algorithms," RFC 2451, November 1998.

   [ESP]       Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
               Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.

   [IKE]       Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
               (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [SEED]      Jongwook Park, Sungjae Lee, Jeeyeon Kim, Jaeil Lee,
               "The SEED Encryption Algorithm", RFC4009, February 2005.

9.2 Informative Reference

   [AES]       NIST, FIPS PUB 197, "Advanced Encryption Standard(AES),
               November 2001.
               http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.{ps,pdf}
               http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.
               {ps,pdf}

   [AES-IPSEC] Frankel, S., S. Kelly, and R. Glenn, "The AES Cipher
               Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec," RFC 3602,
               September, 2003.

   [SEED]      Jongwook Park, Sungjae Lee, Jeeyeon Kim, Jaeil Lee,
               "The SEED Encryption Algorithm", draft-park-seed-00.txt

   [RFC2119]   S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [ARCH]      Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for
               the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [CBC]       Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
               Algorithms," RFC 2451, November 1998.

   [CRYPTO-S]  Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography Second Edition",
               John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, 1995, ISBN
               0-471-12845-7.

   [CRYPTREC]  Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan,
               CRYPTREC. "SEED Evaluation Report", February, 2002
               http://www.kisa.or.kr/seed/seed_eng.html

   [DOI]       Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of
               Interpretation for ISAKMP," RFC 2407, November 1998.

   [ESP]       Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
               Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.

   [HMAC-MD5]  Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within
               ESP and AH", RFC 2403, November 1998.

   [HMAC-SHA]  Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96
               within ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.

   [IKE]       Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
               (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [ISOSEED]   ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, "National Body contributions on NP 18033
               "Encryption Algorithms" in Response to SC 27 N2563
               (ATT.3 Korea Contribution)", ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 N2656r1
               (n2656_3.zip), October, 2000 N3979, "IT Security techniques -
               Encryption Algorithms - Part3 : Block ciphers", June
               2004.

   [MODES]     Symmetric Key Block Cipher Modes of Operation,
               http://www.nist.gov/modes/.

   [RFC2026]  Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process --
               Revision 3", RFC2026, October 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", RFC-2119, March 1997.

   [ROAD]      Thayer, R., N. Doraswamy and R. Glenn, "IP Security
               Document Roadmap", RFC 2411, November 1998.

   [SEED]      KISA, "SEED Algorithm Specification",
               http://www.kisa.or.kr/seed/seed_eng.html"

   [SEED-EVAL] KISA, "Self Evaluation Report",
               http://www.kisa.or.kr/seed/seed_eng.html"

   [SEED-ID] Jongwook Park, Sungjae Lee, Jeeyeon Kim, Jaeil Lee,
               "The SEED Encryption Algorithm",
               draft-park-seed-01.txt, April, 2004.

   [SEED-SMIME] Jongwook Park, Sungjae Lee, Jeeyeon Kim,
               http://www.kisa.or.kr/seed/data/Document_pdf/
               SEED_Self_Evaluation.pdf"

10. Authors' Address

    Hyangjin Lee
    Korea Information Security Agency
    Phone: +82-2-405-5446
    FAX  : +82-2-405-5419
    Email : jiinii@kisa.or.kr
    Jaeho Yoon
    Korea Information Security Agency
    Phone: +82-2-405-5434
    FAX  : +82-2-405-5219
    Email : jhyoon@kisa.or.kr

    Seoklae Lee
    Korea Information Security Agency
    Phone: +82-2-405-5230
    FAX  : +82-2-405-5219
    Email : sllee@kisa.or.kr

    Jaeil Lee,
               "Use of the SEED Encryption Algorithm in CMS",
               draft-ietf-smime-cms-01.txt, April, 2004.

8. Full Copyright Lee
    Korea Information Security Agency
    Phone: +82-2-405-5300
    FAX  : +82-2-405-5419
    Email: jilee@kisa.or.kr

Intellectual Property Statement

   Copyright (C)

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9. Authors' Address

    Hyangjin Lee
    Korea Information Security Agency
    Phone: +82-2-405-5446
    FAX  : +82-2-405-5419
    Email : jiinii@kisa.or.kr

    Jaeil Lee
    Korea Information Security Agency
    Phone: +82-2-405-5300
    FAX  : +82-2-405-5419
    Email: jilee@kisa.or.kr PURPOSE.

Copyright Statement

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Acknowledgment

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