DNSEXT Working Group Olafur Gudmundsson (NAI Labs)
INTERNET-DRAFT 2001/January/25
<draft-ietf-dnsext-message-size-03.txt>
Updates:A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC 2535, libraries.
RFC 2874 3226
Title: DNSSEC and IPv6 A6 aware server/resolver message
size requirements
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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Comments should be sent to the authors or the DNSEXT WG mailing list
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This draft expires on July 20, 2001.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001). All rights reserved.
Abstract
Author(s): O. Gudmundsson
Status: Standards Track
Date: December 2001
Mailbox: ogud@ogud.com
Pages: 6
Characters: 12078
Updates: 2874, 2535
I-D Tag: draft-ietf-dnsext-message-size-04.txt
URL: ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3226.txt
This document mandates support for EDNS0 (Extension Mechanisms for
DNS) in DNS entities claiming to support either DNS Security
Extensions or A6 records. This requirement is necessary because these
new features increase the size of DNS messages. If EDNS0 is not
supported fall back to TCP will happen, having a detrimental impact on
query latency and DNS server load.
1 - Introduction
Familiarity with the DNS[RFC1034, RFC1035], DNS Security
Extensions[RFC2535], EDNS0[RFC2671] and A6[RFC2874] is helpful. This document updates RFC 1035[RFC1035] Section 2.3.4 requires that DNS messages over UDP
have a data payload of 512 octets or less. Most DNS software today
will not accept larger UDP datagrams. Any answer that requires more
than 512 octets, results in a partial and sometimes useless reply
with the Truncation Bit set; in most cases the requester will then
retry using TCP. Furthermore, server delivery of truncated responses
varies widely 2535
and resolver handling of these responses also varies,
leading to additional inefficiencies in handling truncation.
Compared to UDP, TCP is an expensive protocol to use for a simple
transaction like DNS: a TCP connection requires 5 packets for setup
and tear down, excluding data packets, thus requiring at least 3
round trips on top of the one for the original UDP query. The DNS
server also needs to keep a state of the connection during this
transaction. Many DNS servers answer thousands of queries per
second, requiring them to use TCP will cause significant overhead and
delays.
1.1 - Requirements
The key words ``MUST'' ``REQUIRED'', ``SHOULD'', ``RECOMMENDED'',
and ``MAY'' in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
2 Motivating factors
2.1 - DNSSEC motivations
DNSSEC[RFC2535] secures DNS 2874, by adding new requirements.
This document is a Public Key signature on each
RR set. These signatures range in size from about 80 octets to 800
octets, most are going to be in the range product of 80 to 200 octets. The
addition of signatures on each or most RR sets in an answer
significantly increases the size of DNS answers from secure zones.
For performance reasons and to reduce load on DNS servers, it is
important that security aware servers and resolvers get all the data
in Answer and Authority section in one query without truncation.
Sending Additional Data in the same query is helpful when Extensions Working Group of the server
IETF.
This is authorative for the data, and this reduces round trips.
DNSSEC OK[OK] specifies how now a client can, using EDNS0, indicate that
it is interested in receiving DNSSEC records. The OK bit does not
eliminate the need for large answers for DNSSEC capable clients.
2.1.1 Message authenticaion or TSIG motivation
TSIG[RFC2845] allows for the light weight authentication of DNS
messages, but increases the size of the messages by at least 70
octets. DNSSEC Proposed Standard Protocol.
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for computationally expensive message
authentication SIG(0) using a standard public key signature. As only
one TSIG or SIG(0) can be attached to each DNS answer
the size
increase of message authentication is not significant, but may still
lead to a truncation.
2.2 - IPv6 Motivations
IPv6 addresses[RFC2874] are 128 bits Internet community, and are represented in the DNS
by multiple A6 records, each consisting of a domain name requests discussion and a bit
field. The domain name refers to an address prefix that may require
additional A6 RRs suggestions
for improvements. Please refer to be included in the answer. Answers where the
queried name has multiple A6 addresses may overflow a 512-octet UDP
packet size.
2.3 Root server and TLD server motivations
The current number edition of root servers is limited to 13 as that is the
maximum number of name servers and their address records that fit in
one 512-octet answer for a SOA record. If root servers start
advertising A6 or KEY records then the answer for the root NS records
will not fit in a single 512-octet DNS message, resulting in a large
number of TCP query connections to the root servers. Even if all
client resolver query their local name server
"Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for information, there
are millions of these servers. Each name server must periodically
update its information about the high level servers.
For redundancy, latency
standardization state and load balancing reasons, large numbers status of
DNS servers are required for some zones. Since the root zone this protocol. Distribution
of this memo is used
by the entire net, it unlimited.
This announcement is important sent to have as many servers as
possible. Large TLDs (and many high-visibility SLDs) often have
enough servers that either A6 or KEY records would cause the NS
response to overflow IETF list and the 512 byte limit. Note that these zones with
large numbers of servers are often exactly those zones that are
critical RFC-DIST list.
Requests to be added to network operation and that already sustain fairly high
loads.
2.4 UDP vs TCP for DNS messages
Given all these factors, it is essential that any implementation that
supports DNSSEC and or A6 deleted from the IETF distribution list
should be able sent to use larger DNS messages than 512
octets.
The original 512 restriction was put in place IETF-REQUEST@IETF.ORG. Requests to avoid fragmentation
of DNS responses. A fragmented UDP message that suffers a loss of
one of the fragments renders the answer useless and the query must be
retried. A TCP connection requires a larger number of round trips
for establishment, data transfer and tear down, but only the lost
data segments are retransmitted.
In the early days a number of IP implementations did not handle
fragmentation well, but all modern operating systems have overcome
that issue thus sending fragmented messages is fine
added to or deleted from that
standpoint. The open issue is the effect of losses RFC-DIST distribution list should
be sent to RFC-DIST-REQUEST@RFC-EDITOR.ORG.
Details on fragmented
messages. If connection has high loss ratio only TCP will allow
reliable transfer of DNS data, most links have low loss ratios thus obtaining RFCs via FTP or EMAIL may be obtained by sending fragmented UDP packet in one round trip is better than
establishing a TCP connection to transfer a few thousand octets.
2.5 EDNS0 and large UDP messages
EDNS0[RFC2671] allows clients to declare the maximum size of UDP
an EMAIL message they are willing to handle. Thus, if the expected answer is
between 512 octets and the maximum size that the client can accept, rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG with the additional overhead of a TCP connection can be avoided.
3 - Protocol changes:
This document updates [RFC2535] and [RFC2874], by adding new
requirements.
All RFC2535-compliant servers and resolvers MUST support EDNS0 and
advertise message size of at least 1220 octets, but SHOULD advertise
message size of 4000. This value might be too low to get full
answers body
help: ways_to_get_rfcs. For example:
To: rfc-info@RFC-EDITOR.ORG
Subject: getting rfcs
help: ways_to_get_rfcs
Requests for high level servers and successor of this document may
require a larger value.
All RFC2874-compliant servers and resolver MUST support EDNS0 and
advertise message size of at least 1024 octets, but SHOULD advertise
message size of 2048. The IPv6 datagrams special distribution should be 1024 octets,
unless addressed to either the MTU
author of the path is known.
All RFC2535 and RFC2874 compliant entities MUST be able to handle
fragmented IP and IPv6 UDP packets.
All hosts supporting both RFC2535 and RFC2874 MUST use the larger
required value in EDNS0 advertisements.
4 Acknowledgments
Harald Alvestrand, Rob Austein, Randy Bush, David Conrad, Andreas
Gustafsson, Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino, Bob Halley, Edward Lewis
Michael Patton and Kazu Yamamoto were instrumental in motivating and
shaping this document.
4 - Security Considerations:
There are no additional security considerations other than those in
RFC2671.
5 - IANA Considerations:
None
References:
[RFC1034] P. Mockapetris, ``Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities''
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC1035] P. Mockapetris, ``Domain Names - Implementation and
Specification'', STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC2535] D. Eastlake, ``Domain Name System Security Extensions'', RFC
2535, March 1999.
[RFC2671] P. Vixie, ``Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)'', RFC
2671, August 1999.
[RFC2845] P. Vixie, O. Gudmundsson, D. Eastlake, B. Wellington,
``Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)'', RFC
2845, May 2000.
[RFC2874] M. Crawford, C. Huitema, ``DNS Extensions to Support IPv6
Address Aggregation and Renumbering'', RFC2874, July 2000.
[OK] D. Conrad, ``Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC'', Work in
progress, draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-okbit-xx.txt, November
2000.
Author Address
Olafur Gudmundsson
NAI Labs/Network Associates
3060 Washington Road (Rt. 97)
Glenwood, MD 21738
USA
<ogud@tislabs.com>
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