< draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy-01.txt   draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy-02.txt >
Network Working Group S. Bortzmeyer Network Working Group S. Bortzmeyer
Internet-Draft AFNIC Internet-Draft AFNIC
Intended status: Informational December 17, 2013 Intended status: Informational April 27, 2014
Expires: June 20, 2014 Expires: October 29, 2014
DNS privacy problem statement DNS privacy considerations
draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy-01 draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-dns-privacy-02
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of
the DNS by Internet users. It is intended to be mostly a problem the DNS by Internet users. It is intended to be mostly an analysis
statement and it does not prescribe solutions. of the present situation, in the spirit of section 8 of [RFC6973] and
it does not prescribe solutions.
Discussions of the document should take place on the dnsop mailing Discussions of the document should take place on the dns-privacy
list [dnsop]. mailing list [dns-privacy].
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 20, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 29, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Data in the DNS request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. The alleged public nature of DNS data . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. On the wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Data in the DNS request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. In the servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Cache snooping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.1. In the resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4. On the wire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.2. In the authoritative name servers . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.5. In the servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.3. Rogue servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.5.1. In the resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Actual "attacks" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.5.2. In the authoritative name servers . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Legalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.5.3. Rogue servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Actual "attacks" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Legalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Domain Name System is specified in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035]. It The Domain Name System is specified in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035]. It
is one of the most important infrastructure components of the is one of the most important infrastructure components of the
Internet and one of the most often ignored or misunderstood. Almost Internet and one of the most often ignored or misunderstood. Almost
every activity on the Internet starts with a DNS query (and often every activity on the Internet starts with a DNS query (and often
several). Its use has many privacy implications and we try to give several). Its use has many privacy implications and we try to give
here a comprehensive and accurate list. here a comprehensive and accurate list.
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amount of data they can see. amount of data they can see.
Another important point to keep in mind when analyzing the privacy Another important point to keep in mind when analyzing the privacy
issues of DNS is the mix of many sort of DNS requests received by a issues of DNS is the mix of many sort of DNS requests received by a
server. Let's assume the eavesdropper want to know which Web page is server. Let's assume the eavesdropper want to know which Web page is
visited by an user. For a typical Web page displayed by the user, visited by an user. For a typical Web page displayed by the user,
there are three sorts of DNS requests: there are three sorts of DNS requests:
Primary request: this is the domain name that the user typed or Primary request: this is the domain name that the user typed or
selected from a bookmark or choosed by clicking on an hyperklink. selected from a bookmark or choosed by clicking on an hyperklink.
Presulably, this is what is of interest for the eavesdropper. Presumably, this is what is of interest for the eavesdropper.
Secondary requests: these are the requests performed by the user Secondary requests: these are the requests performed by the user
agent (here, the Web browser) without any direct involvment or agent (here, the Web browser) without any direct involvment or
knowledge of the user. For the Web, they are triggered by knowledge of the user. For the Web, they are triggered by
included content, CSS sheets, JavaScript code, embedded images, included content, CSS sheets, JavaScript code, embedded images,
etc. In some cases, there can be dozens of domain names in a etc. In some cases, there can be dozens of domain names in a
single page. single page.
Tertiary requests: these are the requests performed by the DNS Tertiary requests: these are the requests performed by the DNS
system itself. For instance, if the answer to a query is a system itself. For instance, if the answer to a query is a
referral to a set of name servers, and the glue is not returned, referral to a set of name servers, and the glue is not returned,
the resolver will have to do tertiary requests to turn name the resolver will have to do tertiary requests to turn name
servers' named into IP addresses. servers' named into IP addresses.
For privacy-related terms, we will use here the terminology of For privacy-related terms, we will use here the terminology of
[RFC6973]. [RFC6973].
2. Risks 2. Risks
This draft is limited to the study of privacy risks for the end-user This draft focuses mostly on the study of privacy risks for the end-
(the one performing DNS requests). Privacy risks for the holder of a user (the one performing DNS requests). Privacy risks for the holder
zone (the risk that someone gets the data) are discussed in [RFC5936] of a zone (the risk that someone gets the data) are discussed in
and in [I-D.koch-perpass-dns-confidentiality]. Non-privacy risks [RFC5936]. Non-privacy risks (such as cache poisoning) are out of
(such as cache poisoning) are out of scope. scope.
2.1. Data in the DNS request 2.1. The alleged public nature of DNS data
It has long been claimed that "the data in the DNS is public". While
this sentence makes sense for an Internet wide lookup system, there
are multiple facets to data and meta data that deserve a more
detailed look. First, access control lists and private name spaces
nonwithstanding, the DNS operates under the assumption that public
facing authoritative name servers will respond to "usual" DNS queries
for any zone they are authoritative for without further
authentication or authorization of the client (resolver). Due to the
lack of search capabilities, only a given qname will reveal the
resource records associated with that name (or that name's non
existence). In other words: one needs to know what to ask for to
receive a response. The zone transfer qtype [RFC5936] is often
blocked or restricted to authenticated/authorized access to enforce
this difference (and maybe for other, more dubious reasons).
Another differentiation to be applied is between the DNS data as
mentioned above and a particular transaction, most prominently but
not limited to a DNS name lookup. The fact that the results of a DNS
query are public within the boundaries described in the previous
paragraph and therefore might have no confidentiality requirements
does not imply the same for a single or a sequence of transactions.
A typical example from outside the DNS world: the Web site of
Alcoholics Anonymous is public, the fact that you visit it should not
be.
2.2. Data in the DNS request
The DNS request includes many fields but two of them seem specially The DNS request includes many fields but two of them seem specially
relevant for the privacy issues, the qname and the source IP address. relevant for the privacy issues, the qname and the source IP address.
"source IP address" is used in a loose sense of "source IP address + "source IP address" is used in a loose sense of "source IP address +
may be source port", because the port is also in the request and can may be source port", because the port is also in the request and can
be used to sort out several users sharing an IP address (CGN for be used to sort out several users sharing an IP address (CGN for
instance). instance).
The qname is the full name sent by the original user. It gives The qname is the full name sent by the original user. It gives
information about what the user does ("What are the MX records of information about what the user does ("What are the MX records of
example.net?" means he probably wants to send email to someone at example.net?" means he probably wants to send email to someone at
example.net, which may be a domain used by only a few persons and example.net, which may be a domain used by only a few persons and
therefore very revealing). Some qnames are more sensitive than therefore very revealing). Some qnames are more sensitive than
others. For instance, querying the A record of google-analytics.com others. For instance, querying the A record of google-analytics.com
reveals very little (everybody visits Web sites which use Google reveals very little (everybody visits Web sites which use Google
Analytics) but querying the A record of www.verybad.example where Analytics) but querying the A record of www.verybad.example where
verybad.example is the domain of an illegal or very offensive verybad.example is the domain of an illegal or very offensive
organization may create more problems for the user. Another example organization may create more problems for the user. Another example
is when the qname embeds the software one uses. For instance, some is when the qname embeds the software one uses. For instance,
BitTorrent clients query a SRV record for _bittorrent- _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.gc._msdcs.example.org. Or
some BitTorrent clients that query a SRV record for _bittorrent-
tracker._tcp.domain.example. tracker._tcp.domain.example.
Another important thing about the privacy of the qname is the future
usages. Today, the lack of privacy is an obstacle to putting
interesting data in the DNS. At the moment your DNS traffic might
reveal that you are doing email but not who with. If your MUA starts
looking up PGP keys in the DNS [I-D.wouters-dane-openpgp] then
privacy becomes a lot more important. And email is just an example,
there will be other really interesting uses for a more secure (in the
sense of privacy) DNS.
For the communication between the stub resolver and the resolver, the For the communication between the stub resolver and the resolver, the
source IP address is the one of the user's machine. Therefore, all source IP address is the one of the user's machine. Therefore, all
the issues and warnings about collection of IP addresses apply here. the issues and warnings about collection of IP addresses apply here.
For the communication between the resolver and the authoritative name For the communication between the resolver and the authoritative name
servers, the source IP address has a different meaning, it does not servers, the source IP address has a different meaning, it does not
have the same status as the source address in a HTTP connection. It have the same status as the source address in a HTTP connection. It
is now the IP address of the resolver which, in a way "hides" the is now the IP address of the resolver which, in a way "hides" the
real user. However, it does not always work. Sometimes real user. However, it does not always work. Sometimes
[I-D.vandergaast-edns-client-subnet] is used. Sometimes the end user [I-D.vandergaast-edns-client-subnet] is used. Sometimes the end user
has a personal resolver on her machine. In that case, the IP address has a personal resolver on her machine. In that case, the IP address
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source addresses. For a number of reasons their assignment and source addresses. For a number of reasons their assignment and
utilization characteristics are different, which may have utilization characteristics are different, which may have
implications for details of information leakage associated with the implications for details of information leakage associated with the
collection of source addresses. (For example, a specific IPv6 source collection of source addresses. (For example, a specific IPv6 source
address seen on the public Internet is less likely than an IPv4 address seen on the public Internet is less likely than an IPv4
address to originate behind a CGN or other NAT.) However, for both address to originate behind a CGN or other NAT.) However, for both
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, it's important to note that source addresses IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, it's important to note that source addresses
are propagated with queries and comprise metadata about the host, are propagated with queries and comprise metadata about the host,
user, or application that originated them. user, or application that originated them.
2.2. On the wire 2.3. Cache snooping
The content of resolvers can reveal data about the clients using it.
This information can sometimes be examined by sending DNS queries
with RD=0 to inspect cache content, particularly looking at the DNS
TTLs. Since this also is a reconnaissance technique for subsequent
cache poisoning attacks, some counter measures have already been
developed and deployed.
2.4. On the wire
DNS traffic can be seen by an eavesdropper like any other traffic. DNS traffic can be seen by an eavesdropper like any other traffic.
It is typically not encrypted. (DNSSEC, specified in [RFC4033] It is typically not encrypted. (DNSSEC, specified in [RFC4033]
explicitely excludes confidentiality from its goals.) So, if an explicitely excludes confidentiality from its goals.) So, if an
initiator starts a HTTPS communication with a recipient, while the initiator starts a HTTPS communication with a recipient, while the
HTTP traffic will be encrypted, the DNS exchange prior to it will not HTTP traffic will be encrypted, the DNS exchange prior to it will not
be. When the other protocols will become more or more privacy-aware be. When the other protocols will become more or more privacy-aware
and secured against surveillance, the DNS risks to become "the and secured against surveillance, the DNS risks to become "the
weakest link" in privacy. weakest link" in privacy.
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The resolver can be a public DNS service. Some end users may be The resolver can be a public DNS service. Some end users may be
configured to use public DNS resolvers such as those operated by configured to use public DNS resolvers such as those operated by
Google Public DNS or OpenDNS. The end user may have configured their Google Public DNS or OpenDNS. The end user may have configured their
machine to use these DNS resolvers themselves - or their IAP may machine to use these DNS resolvers themselves - or their IAP may
choose to use the public DNS resolvers rather than operating their choose to use the public DNS resolvers rather than operating their
own resolvers. In this case the attack surface is the entire public own resolvers. In this case the attack surface is the entire public
Internet between the end user's connection and the public DNS Internet between the end user's connection and the public DNS
service. service.
2.3. In the servers 2.5. In the servers
Using the terminology of [RFC6973], the DNS servers (resolvers and Using the terminology of [RFC6973], the DNS servers (resolvers and
authoritative servers) are enablers: they facilitate communication authoritative servers) are enablers: they facilitate communication
between an initiator and a recipient without being directly in the between an initiator and a recipient without being directly in the
communications path. As a result, they are often forgotten in risk communications path. As a result, they are often forgotten in risk
analysis. But, to quote again [RFC6973], "Although [...] enablers analysis. But, to quote again [RFC6973], "Although [...] enablers
may not generally be considered as attackers, they may all pose may not generally be considered as attackers, they may all pose
privacy threats (depending on the context) because they are able to privacy threats (depending on the context) because they are able to
observe, collect, process, and transfer privacy-relevant data." In observe, collect, process, and transfer privacy-relevant data." In
[RFC6973] parlance, enablers become observers when they start [RFC6973] parlance, enablers become observers when they start
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data itself or it can be part of a surveillance program like PRISM data itself or it can be part of a surveillance program like PRISM
[prism] and pass data to an outside attacker. [prism] and pass data to an outside attacker.
Sometimes, these data are kept for a long time and/or distributed to Sometimes, these data are kept for a long time and/or distributed to
third parties, for research purposes [ditl], for security analysis, third parties, for research purposes [ditl], for security analysis,
or for surveillance tasks. Also, there are observation points in the or for surveillance tasks. Also, there are observation points in the
network which gather DNS data and then make it accessible to third- network which gather DNS data and then make it accessible to third-
parties for research or security purposes ("passive DNS parties for research or security purposes ("passive DNS
[passive-dns]"). [passive-dns]").
2.3.1. In the resolvers 2.5.1. In the resolvers
The resolvers see the entire traffic since there is typically no The resolvers see the entire traffic since there is typically no
caching before them. They are therefore well situated to observe the caching before them. They are therefore well situated to observe the
traffic. To summarize: your resolver knows a lot about you. The traffic. To summarize: your resolver knows a lot about you. The
resolver of a large IAP, or a large public resolver can collect data resolver of a large IAP, or a large public resolver can collect data
from many users. You may get an idea of the data collected by from many users. You may get an idea of the data collected by
reading the privacy policy of a big public resolver [1]. reading the privacy policy of a big public resolver [1].
2.3.2. In the authoritative name servers 2.5.2. In the authoritative name servers
Unlike the resolvers, they are limited by caching. They see only a Unlike the resolvers, they are limited by caching. They see only a
part of the requests. For aggregated statistics ("what is the part of the requests. For aggregated statistics ("what is the
percentage of LOC queries?"), it is sufficient but it may prevent an percentage of LOC queries?"), it is sufficient but it may prevent an
observer to observe everything. Nevertheless, the authoritative name observer to observe everything. Nevertheless, the authoritative name
servers sees a part of the traffic and this sample may be sufficient servers sees a part of the traffic and this sample may be sufficient
to defeat some privacy expectations. to defeat some privacy expectations.
Also, the end user has typically some legal/contractual link with the Also, the end user has typically some legal/contractual link with the
resolver (he has chosen the IAP, or he has chosen to use a given resolver (he has chosen the IAP, or he has chosen to use a given
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is junk (errors on the TLD name), it gives an idea of the amount of is junk (errors on the TLD name), it gives an idea of the amount of
big data which pours into name servers. big data which pours into name servers.
Many domains, including TLD, are partially hosted by third-party Many domains, including TLD, are partially hosted by third-party
servers, sometimes in a different country. The contracts between the servers, sometimes in a different country. The contracts between the
domain manager and these servers may or may not take privacy into domain manager and these servers may or may not take privacy into
account. But it may be surprising for an end-user that requests to a account. But it may be surprising for an end-user that requests to a
given ccTLD may go to servers managed by organisations outside of the given ccTLD may go to servers managed by organisations outside of the
country. country.
2.3.3. Rogue servers 2.5.3. Rogue servers
A rogue DHCP server can direct you to a rogue resolver. Most of the A rogue DHCP server can direct you to a rogue resolver. Most of the
times, it seems to be done to divert traffic, by providing lies for times, it seems to be done to divert traffic, by providing lies for
some domain names. But it could be used just to capture the traffic some domain names. But it could be used just to capture the traffic
and gather information about you. Same thing for malwares like and gather information about you. Same thing for malwares like
DNSchanger[dnschanger] which changes the resolver in the machine's DNSchanger[dnschanger] which changes the resolver in the machine's
configuration. configuration.
3. Actual "attacks" 3. Actual "attacks"
A very quick examination of DNS traffic may lead to the false A very quick examination of DNS traffic may lead to the false
conclusion that extracting the needle from the haystack is difficult. conclusion that extracting the needle from the haystack is difficult.
"Interesting" primary DNS requests are mixed with useless (for the "Interesting" primary DNS requests are mixed with useless (for the
eavesdropper) second and tertiary requests (see the terminology in eavesdropper) second and tertiary requests (see the terminology in
Section 1). But, in this time of "big data" processing, powerful Section 1). But, in this time of "big data" processing, powerful
techniques now exist to get from the raw data to what you're actually techniques now exist to get from the raw data to what you're actually
interested in. interested in.
Many research papers about malware detection use DNS traffic to Many research papers about malware detection use DNS traffic to
detect "abnormal" behaviour that can be traced back to the activity detect "abnormal" behaviour that can be traced back to the activity
of malware on infected machines. Yes, this reasearch was done for of malware on infected machines. Yes, this research was done for the
the good but, technically, it is a privacy attack and it demonstrates good but, technically, it is a privacy attack and it demonstrates the
the power of the observation of DNS traffic. See [dns-footprint], power of the observation of DNS traffic. See [dns-footprint],
[dagon-malware] and [darkreading-dns]. [dagon-malware] and [darkreading-dns].
Passive DNS systems [passive-dns] allow reconstruction of the data of
sometimes an entire zone. It is used for many reasons, some good,
some bad. It is an example of privacy issue even when no source IP
address is kept.
4. Legalities 4. Legalities
To our knowledge, there are no specific privacy laws for DNS data. To our knowledge, there are no specific privacy laws for DNS data.
Interpreting general privacy laws like [data-protection-directive] Interpreting general privacy laws like [data-protection-directive]
(European Union) in the context of DNS traffic data is not an easy (European Union) in the context of DNS traffic data is not an easy
task and it seems there is no court precedent here. task and it seems there is no court precedent here.
5. Security considerations 5. Security considerations
This document is entirely about security, more precisely privacy. This document is entirely about security, more precisely privacy.
Possible solutions to the issues described here are discussed in Possible solutions to the issues described here are discussed in
[I-D.bortzmeyer-dnsop-privacy-sol] or in [I-D.bortzmeyer-dnsop-privacy-sol] (qname minimization, local caching
[I-D.wijngaards-dnsop-confidentialdns]. resolvers), [I-D.hzhwm-start-tls-for-dns] (encryption of traffic) or
in [I-D.wijngaards-dnsop-confidentialdns] (encryption also).
Attempts have been made to encrypt the resource record data
[I-D.timms-encrypt-naptr].
6. Acknowledgments 6. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Nathalie Boulvard and to the CENTR members for the original Thanks to Nathalie Boulvard and to the CENTR members for the original
work which leaded to this draft. Thanks to Ondrej Sury for the work which leaded to this draft. Thanks to Ondrej Sury for the
interesting discussions. Thanks to Mohsen Souissi for proofreading. interesting discussions. Thanks to Mohsen Souissi for proofreading.
Thanks to Dan York, Suzanne Woolf and Frank Denis for good written Thanks to Dan York, Suzanne Woolf, Tony Finch, Peter Koch and Frank
contributions. Denis for good written contributions.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
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[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
4033, March 2005. 4033, March 2005.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5936] Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol [RFC5936] Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol
(AXFR)", RFC 5936, June 2010. (AXFR)", RFC 5936, June 2010.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.
[I-D.koch-perpass-dns-confidentiality]
Koch, P., "Confidentiality Aspects of DNS Data,
Publication, and Resolution", draft-koch-perpass-dns-
confidentiality-00 (work in progress), November 2013.
[I-D.vandergaast-edns-client-subnet] [I-D.vandergaast-edns-client-subnet]
Contavalli, C., Gaast, W., Leach, S., and E. Lewis, Contavalli, C., Gaast, W., Leach, S., and E. Lewis,
"Client Subnet in DNS Requests", draft-vandergaast-edns- "Client Subnet in DNS Requests", draft-vandergaast-edns-
client-subnet-02 (work in progress), July 2013. client-subnet-02 (work in progress), July 2013.
[I-D.bortzmeyer-dnsop-privacy-sol] [I-D.bortzmeyer-dnsop-privacy-sol]
Bortzmeyer, S., "Possible solutions to DNS privacy Bortzmeyer, S., "Possible solutions to DNS privacy
issues", draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-privacy-sol-00 (work in issues", draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-privacy-sol-00 (work in
progress), December 2013. progress), December 2013.
[I-D.wijngaards-dnsop-confidentialdns] [I-D.wijngaards-dnsop-confidentialdns]
Wijngaards, W., "Confidential DNS", draft-wijngaards- Wijngaards, W., "Confidential DNS", draft-wijngaards-
dnsop-confidentialdns-00 (work in progress), November dnsop-confidentialdns-00 (work in progress), November
2013. 2013.
[I-D.timms-encrypt-naptr]
Timms, B., Reid, J., and J. Schlyter, "IANA Registration
for Encrypted ENUM", draft-timms-encrypt-naptr-01 (work in
progress), July 2008.
[I-D.hzhwm-start-tls-for-dns]
Zi, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., and D.
Wessels, "Starting TLS over DNS", draft-hzhwm-start-tls-
for-dns-00 (work in progress), February 2014.
[I-D.wouters-dane-openpgp]
Wouters, P., "Using DANE to Associate OpenPGP public keys
with email addresses", draft-wouters-dane-openpgp-02 (work
in progress), February 2014.
[dns-privacy]
IETF, , "The dns-privacy mailing list", March 2014.
[dnsop] IETF, , "The dnsop mailing list", October 2013. [dnsop] IETF, , "The dnsop mailing list", October 2013.
[dagon-malware] [dagon-malware]
Dagon, D., "Corrupted DNS Resolution Paths: The Rise of a Dagon, D., "Corrupted DNS Resolution Paths: The Rise of a
Malicious Resolution Authority", 2007. Malicious Resolution Authority", 2007.
[dns-footprint] [dns-footprint]
Stoner, E., "DNS footprint of malware", October 2010. Stoner, E., "DNS footprint of malware", October 2010.
[darkreading-dns] [darkreading-dns]
skipping to change at page 10, line 46 skipping to change at page 12, line 15
[dnscrypt] [dnscrypt]
Denis, F., "DNSCrypt", . Denis, F., "DNSCrypt", .
[dnscurve] [dnscurve]
Bernstein, D., "DNScurve", . Bernstein, D., "DNScurve", .
[packetq] , "PacketQ, a simple tool to make SQL-queries against [packetq] , "PacketQ, a simple tool to make SQL-queries against
PCAP-files", 2011. PCAP-files", 2011.
[dnsmezzo] [dnsmezzo]
Bortzmeyer, S., "PacketQ, a simple tool to make SQL- Bortzmeyer, S., "DNSmezzo", 2009.
queries against PCAP-files", 2009.
[prism] NSA, , "PRISM", 2007. [prism] NSA, , "PRISM", 2007.
[crime] Rizzo, J. and T. Dong, "The CRIME attack against TLS", [crime] Rizzo, J. and T. Dong, "The CRIME attack against TLS",
2012. 2012.
[ditl] , "A Day in the Life of the Internet (DITL)", 2002. [ditl] , "A Day in the Life of the Internet (DITL)", 2002.
[data-protection-directive] [data-protection-directive]
, "European directive 95/46/EC on the protection of , "European directive 95/46/EC on the protection of
 End of changes. 25 change blocks. 
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