< draft-erdtman-ace-rpcc-01.txt		draft-erdtman-ace-rpcc-02.txt >
	ACE Working Group L. Seitz		ACE Working Group L. Seitz
	Internet-Draft RISE SICS		Internet-Draft RISE SICS
	Intended status: Informational S. Erdtman		Intended status: Informational S. Erdtman
	Expires: February 17, 2018 Spotify AB		Expires: May 3, 2018 Spotify AB
	August 16, 2017		October 30, 2017
	Raw-Public-Key and Pre-Shared-Key as OAuth client credentials		Raw-Public-Key and Pre-Shared-Key as OAuth client credentials
	draft-erdtman-ace-rpcc-01		draft-erdtman-ace-rpcc-02
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication		This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication
	using Raw-Public-Key and Pre-Shared-Key as new mechanisms for OAuth		using Raw-Public-Key and Pre-Shared-Key as new mechanisms for OAuth
	client authentication. Although defined for TLS the mechanisms are		client authentication. Although defined for TLS the mechanisms are
	equally applicable for DTLS.		equally applicable for DTLS.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on February 17, 2018.		This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2018.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Pre-Shared-Key for Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 2		2. Pre-Shared-Key for Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Raw-Public-Key for Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Raw-Public-Key for Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		4. Dynamic Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	5.1. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration . . . . 4		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	5.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		6.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration . 4
	5.1.2. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		6.2. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration . . . . 5
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		6.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
			8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication		This document describes Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication
	using Raw-Public-Key and Pre-Shared-Key as the mechanism for OAuth		using Raw-Public-Key and Pre-Shared-Key as the mechanism for OAuth
	client authentication. Examples of endpoint requiering client		client authentication. Examples of endpoint requiring client
	authentication are token and introspection.		authentication are token and introspection.
	The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] defines a shared		The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] defines a shared
	secret method of client authentication but also allows for the		secret method of client authentication but also allows for the
	definition and use of additional client authentication mechanisms		definition and use of additional client authentication mechanisms
	when interacting with the authorization server's token endpoint.		when interacting with the authorization server's token endpoint.
	This document describes two additional mechanisms of client		This document describes two additional mechanisms of client
	authentication utilizing Raw-Public-Key [RFC7250] and Pre-Shared-Key		authentication utilizing Raw-Public-Key [RFC7250] and Pre-Shared-Key
	TLS [RFC4279], which provide better security characteristics than		TLS [RFC4279], which provide better security characteristics than
	shared secrets.		shared secrets.
			To get most bennefits and improved security with these new client
			credential types it is recomended to use the 'one credential per
			Client Software Instance' paradigm. This can be achived by letting
			the client dynamicly register as described in [RFC7591].
	1.1. Requirements Language		1.1. Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
	2. Pre-Shared-Key for Client Authentication		2. Pre-Shared-Key for Client Authentication
	The following section defines, as an extension of OAuth 2.0,		The following section defines, as an extension of OAuth 2.0,
	Section 2.3 [RFC6749], using Pre-Shared-Key with TLS [RFC4279] to		Section 2.3 [RFC6749], using Pre-Shared-Key with TLS [RFC4279] to
	authenticate the client. This method is registered as		authenticate the client. This method is registered as
	'tls_client_psk' in "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods"		'tls_client_psk' in "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods"
	registry.		registry. If this method is to be used, the client and the
			Authorization Server MUST share a secret key, and they MUST agree on
			an identifier for this key.
	The (D)TLS handshake MUST be done according to [RFC4279], with the		The (D)TLS handshake MUST be done according to [RFC4279], with the
	client indicating support for one or more Pre-Shared-Key cipher		client indicating support for one or more Pre-Shared-Key cipher
	suites and authorization server selecting a Pre-Shared-Key cipher		suites and authorization server selecting a Pre-Shared-Key cipher
	suite. In order to enable authorization server to select the correct		suite. In order to enable the authorization server to select the
	pre-shared-key the client MUST send its client identifier in the psk-		correct pre-shared-key the client MUST send the key identifier in the
	identity field of the ClientKeyExchange message. How the		psk-identity field of the ClientKeyExchange message. How the
	authorization server maps a client identifier to the pre-shared-key		authorization server maps the identifier to a pre-shared-key, and to
	is out of scope for this specification.		a specific client is out of scope for this specification.
	Note that the client identity MUST be 2^16 bytes or shorter, in order		Note that the key identifier MUST be 2^16 bytes or shorter, in order
	to fit into the psk-identity field.		to fit into the psk-identity field.
	3. Raw-Public-Key for Client Authentication		3. Raw-Public-Key for Client Authentication
	The following section defines, as an extension of OAuth 2.0,		The following section defines, as an extension of OAuth 2.0,
	Section 2.3 [RFC6749], the use of Raw-Public-Key with (D)TLS		Section 2.3 [RFC6749], the use of Raw-Public-Key with (D)TLS
	[RFC7250] to authenticate the client. This method is registered		[RFC7250] to authenticate the client. This method is registered as
	as'tls_client_rpk' in "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods"		'tls_client_rpk' in "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods"
	registry.		registry.
	The (D)TLS handshake MUST be done according to [RFC7250], with the		The (D)TLS handshake MUST be done according to [RFC7250], with the
	client indicating support for Raw-Public-Key certificates and the		client indicating support for Raw-Public-Key certificates and the
	authorization server asking client send its Raw Public Key		authorization server asking client send its Raw Public Key
	certificate. Since the client cannot send an explicit client		certificate. Since the client cannot send an explicit client or key
	identifier in the handshake, the authorization server MUST the derive		identifier in the handshake, the authorization server MUST derive a
	a client identifier from RPK that the client uses.		client identifier from RPK that the client uses.
	Authorization servers MAY use the following method to map a Raw		Note to implementers: Authorization servers can use the following
	Public Key to a client identifier: The client identifier is generated		method to map a Raw Public Key to a client identifier: The client
	from the Raw Public Key using the procedure specified in section 3 of		identifier is generated from the Raw Public Key using the procedure
	[RFC6920]. The digest is calculated on the Raw Public Key only (not		specified in section 3 of [RFC6920]. The digest is calculated on the
	on the SubjectPublicKeyInfo used in the handshake). An example is		Raw Public Key only (not on the SubjectPublicKeyInfo used in the
	shown in Figure 1.		handshake). An example is shown in Figure 1.
	Raw Public Key (Base64 encoded):		Raw Public Key (Base64 encoded):
	MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEEtboxNKPgxEKV9JTNzy		MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEEtboxNKPgxEKV9JTNzy
	tUvAbxEfkCTVB9kOzheF5wRAoOz2NKP+ln+XLVAQSp1D6jfo09tppvN		tUvAbxEfkCTVB9kOzheF5wRAoOz2NKP+ln+XLVAQSp1D6jfo09tppvN
	poQA1nnBNH6A==";		poQA1nnBNH6A==";
	Encoding:		Encoding:
	ni:///sha-256;xzLa24yOBeCkos3VFzD2gd83Urohr9TsXqY9nhdDN0		ni:///sha-256;xzLa24yOBeCkos3VFzD2gd83Urohr9TsXqY9nhdDN0
	Figure 1: Example encoding of a raw public key in the Named		Figure 1: Example encoding of a raw public key in the Named
	Information URI Format		Information URI Format
	4. Acknowledgements		4. Dynamic Registration
			For dynamic registration of a RPK this specification registers the
			new parameter 'rpk' to the Client Registration Metadata Registry.
			When used this parameter MUST contain a JSON Web Key representing the
			public key of the client. When 'rpk' is present in the registration
			request 'token_endpoint_auth_method' MUST include 'tls_client_rpk'.
			For dynamic registration of a PSK this specification registers the
			new parameter 'psk' to the Client Registration Metadata Registry.
			When used this parameter MUST contain a JSON Web Key representing the
			key of the client. When registering the client can include the key
			in the registrations request or the authorisation can generate the
			key and return it. If the 'psk' attribute is present in a request
			'token_endpoint_auth_method' MUST include 'tls_client_psk'. To
			request the authorisation server to generate the key the client
			includes 'tls_client_psk' in 'token_endpoint_auth_method' but does
			not send 'psk' attribute.
			The 'jwks' and 'jwks_uri' is not used to avoid conflict and confusion
			with application layer keys.
			5. Acknowledgements
	This document is highly inspired by [I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls] written by		This document is highly inspired by [I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls] written by
	B. Campbell, J. Bradley, N. Sakimura and T. Lodderstedt.		B. Campbell, J. Bradley, N. Sakimura and T. Lodderstedt.
	5. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	5.1. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration		6.1. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration
			This specification requests registration of the following value in
			the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry
			[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591].
			6.1.1. Registry Contents
			o Client Metadata Name: "rpk"
			o Client Metadata Description: JWK for client Raw-Public-Key, can be
			included in request.
			o Change Controller: IESG
			o Specification Document(s): [[ this specification ]]
			o Client Metadata Name: "psk"
			o Client Metadata Description: JWK for client Pre-Shared-Key, can be
			included both in request and response.
			o Change Controller: IESG
			o Specification Document(s): [[ this specification ]]
			6.2. Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration
	This specification requests registration of the following value in		This specification requests registration of the following value in
	the IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry		the IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry
	[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591].		[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591].
	5.1.1. Registry Contents		6.2.1. Registry Contents
	o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "tls_client_rpk"		o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "tls_client_rpk"
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): [[ this specification ]]		o Specification Document(s): [[ this specification ]]
	5.1.2. Registry Contents
	o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "tls_client_psk"		o Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: "tls_client_psk"
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): [[ this specification ]]		o Specification Document(s): [[ this specification ]]
	6. Security Considerations		7. Security Considerations
	TBD		TBD
	7. References		8. References
	7.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key		[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
	Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",		Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
	RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,		RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.
	[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",		[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
	RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,		RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
	[RFC6920] Farrell, S., Kutscher, D., Dannewitz, C., Ohlman, B.,		[RFC6920] Farrell, S., Kutscher, D., Dannewitz, C., Ohlman, B.,
	Keranen, A., and P. Hallam-Baker, "Naming Things with		Keranen, A., and P. Hallam-Baker, "Naming Things with
	Hashes", RFC 6920, DOI 10.17487/RFC6920, April 2013,		Hashes", RFC 6920, DOI 10.17487/RFC6920, April 2013,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6920>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6920>.
	[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,		[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
	Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in		Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
	Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport		Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
	Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,		Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
	June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.		June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
	[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and		[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
	P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",		P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
	RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,		RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
	7.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-mtls]
	Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.		Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
	Lodderstedt, "Mutual TLS Profile for OAuth 2.0", draft-		Lodderstedt, "Mutual TLS Profile for OAuth 2.0", draft-
	ietf-oauth-mtls-03 (work in progress), July 2017.		ietf-oauth-mtls-04 (work in progress), October 2017.
	[IANA.OAuth.Parameters]		[IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
	IANA, "OAuth Parameters",		IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
	<http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.		<http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Ludwig Seitz		Ludwig Seitz
	RISE SICS		RISE SICS
	Scheelevaegen 17		Scheelevaegen 17
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