< draft-ietf-6lo-plc-01.txt   draft-ietf-6lo-plc-02.txt >
6Lo Working Group J. Hou 6Lo Working Group J. Hou
Internet-Draft B. Liu Internet-Draft B. Liu
Intended status: Standards Track Huawei Technologies Intended status: Standards Track Huawei Technologies
Expires: May 6, 2020 Y-G. Hong Expires: September 10, 2020 Y-G. Hong
ETRI ETRI
X. Tang X. Tang
SGEPRI SGEPRI
C. Perkins C. Perkins
November 3, 2019 March 9, 2020
Transmission of IPv6 Packets over PLC Networks Transmission of IPv6 Packets over PLC Networks
draft-ietf-6lo-plc-01 draft-ietf-6lo-plc-02
Abstract Abstract
Power Line Communication (PLC), namely using the electric-power lines Power Line Communication (PLC), namely using the electric-power lines
for indoor and outdoor communications, has been widely applied to for indoor and outdoor communications, has been widely applied to
support Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), especially smart support Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), especially smart
meters for electricity. The inherent advantage of existing meters for electricity. The inherent advantage of existing
electricity infrastructure facilitates the expansion of PLC electricity infrastructure facilitates the expansion of PLC
deployments, and moreover, a wide variety of accessible devices deployments, and moreover, a wide variety of accessible devices
raises the potential demand of IPv6 for future applications. This raises the potential demand of IPv6 for future applications. This
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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4.3. Unicast Address Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.3. Unicast Address Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.1. Unicast Address Mapping for IEEE 1901.1 . . . . . . . 8 4.3.1. Unicast Address Mapping for IEEE 1901.1 . . . . . . . 8
4.3.2. Unicast Address Mapping for IEEE 1901.2 and ITU-T 4.3.2. Unicast Address Mapping for IEEE 1901.2 and ITU-T
G.9903 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 G.9903 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.4. Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5. Header Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.5. Header Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.6. Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.6. Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Internet Connectivity Scenarios and Topologies . . . . . . . 12 5. Internet Connectivity Scenarios and Topologies . . . . . . . 12
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The idea of using power lines for both electricity supply and The idea of using power lines for both electricity supply and
communication can be traced back to the beginning of the last communication can be traced back to the beginning of the last
century. With the advantage of existing power grid, Power Line century. With the advantage of existing power grid, Power Line
Communication (PLC) is a good candidate for supporting various Communication (PLC) is a good candidate for supporting various
service scenarios such as in houses and offices, in trains and service scenarios such as in houses and offices, in trains and
vehicles, in smart grid and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). vehicles, in smart grid and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI).
The data acquisition devices in these scenarios share common features The data acquisition devices in these scenarios share common features
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There are no IANA considerations related to this document. There are no IANA considerations related to this document.
7. Security Consideration 7. Security Consideration
Due to the high accessibility of power grid, PLC might be susceptible Due to the high accessibility of power grid, PLC might be susceptible
to eavesdropping within its communication coverage, e.g. one to eavesdropping within its communication coverage, e.g. one
apartment tenant may have the chance to monitor the other smart apartment tenant may have the chance to monitor the other smart
meters in the same apartment building. For security consideration, meters in the same apartment building. For security consideration,
link layer security is guaranteed in every PLC technology. link layer security is guaranteed in every PLC technology.
Malicious PLC devices could paralyze the whole network via DOS
attacks, e.g., keep joining and leaving the network frequently, or
multicast routing messages containing fake metrics. The security can
be enhanced by using DTLS to authenticate a PLC device when it
enrolles itself. If the PLC device is not direct neighbor to the
PANC, where the authenticate is conducted, another PLC device which
has joined the network can act as a proxy to help exchange the
authenticate messages. The key used for encryption can also be
negociated via DTLS.
IP addresses may be used to track devices on the Internet; such IP addresses may be used to track devices on the Internet; such
devices can in turn be linked to individuals and their activities. devices can in turn be linked to individuals and their activities.
Depending on the application and the actual use pattern, this may be Depending on the application and the actual use pattern, this may be
undesirable. To impede tracking, globally unique and non-changing undesirable. To impede tracking, globally unique and non-changing
characteristics of IP addresses should be avoided, e.g., by characteristics of IP addresses should be avoided, e.g., by
frequently changing the global prefix and avoiding unique link-layer frequently changing the global prefix and avoiding unique link-layer
derived IIDs in addresses. [RFC3315], [RFC3972], [RFC4941], derived IIDs in addresses. [RFC3315], [RFC3972], [RFC4941],
[RFC5535], [RFC7217], and [RFC8065] provide valuable information for [RFC5535], [RFC7217], and [RFC8065] provide valuable information for
IID formation with improved privacy, and are RECOMMENDED for IPv6 IID formation with improved privacy, and are RECOMMENDED for IPv6
networks. networks.
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