< draft-ietf-6lo-plc-03.txt   draft-ietf-6lo-plc-04.txt >
6Lo Working Group J. Hou 6Lo Working Group J. Hou
Internet-Draft B. Liu Internet-Draft B. Liu
Intended status: Standards Track Huawei Technologies Intended status: Standards Track Huawei Technologies
Expires: October 31, 2020 Y-G. Hong Expires: December 5, 2020 Y-G. Hong
ETRI ETRI
X. Tang X. Tang
SGEPRI SGEPRI
C. Perkins C. Perkins
April 29, 2020 June 3, 2020
Transmission of IPv6 Packets over PLC Networks Transmission of IPv6 Packets over PLC Networks
draft-ietf-6lo-plc-03 draft-ietf-6lo-plc-04
Abstract Abstract
Power Line Communication (PLC), namely using the electric-power lines Power Line Communication (PLC), namely using the electric-power lines
for indoor and outdoor communications, has been widely applied to for indoor and outdoor communications, has been widely applied to
support Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), especially smart support Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), especially smart
meters for electricity. The inherent advantage of existing meters for electricity. The inherent advantage of existing
electricity infrastructure facilitates the expansion of PLC electricity infrastructure facilitates the expansion of PLC
deployments, and moreover, a wide variety of accessible devices deployments, and moreover, a wide variety of accessible devices
raises the potential demand of IPv6 for future applications. This raises the potential demand of IPv6 for future applications. This
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 31, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 5, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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The Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of the MAC layer determines The Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of the MAC layer determines
whether fragmentation and reassembly are needed at the adaptation whether fragmentation and reassembly are needed at the adaptation
layer of IPv6 over PLC. IPv6 requires an MTU of 1280 octets or layer of IPv6 over PLC. IPv6 requires an MTU of 1280 octets or
greater; thus for a MAC layer with MTU lower than this limit, greater; thus for a MAC layer with MTU lower than this limit,
fragmentation and reassembly at the adaptation layer are required. fragmentation and reassembly at the adaptation layer are required.
The IEEE 1901.1 MAC supports upper layer packets up to 2031 octets. The IEEE 1901.1 MAC supports upper layer packets up to 2031 octets.
The IEEE 1901.2 MAC layer supports the MTU of 1576 octets (the The IEEE 1901.2 MAC layer supports the MTU of 1576 octets (the
original value of 1280 bytes was updated in 2015 [IEEE_1901.2a]). original value of 1280 bytes was updated in 2015 [IEEE_1901.2a]).
Though fragmentation and reassembly are not needed in these two Though these two technologies can support IPv6 natively without
technologies, other 6lo functions like header compression are still fragmentation and reassembly, it is possible to configure a smaller
applicable and useful, particularly in high-noise communication MTU in high-noise communication environment. Thus the 6lo functions,
environments. including header compression, fragmentation and reassembly, are still
applicable and useful.
The MTU for ITU-T G.9903 is 400 octets, insufficient for supporting The MTU for ITU-T G.9903 is 400 octets, insufficient for supporting
IPv6's MTU. For this reason, fragmentation and reassembly as per IPv6's MTU. For this reason, fragmentation and reassembly as per
[RFC4944] MUST be enabled for G.9903-based networks. [RFC4944] MUST be enabled for G.9903-based networks.
3.4. Routing Protocol 3.4. Routing Protocol
Routing protocols suitable for use in PLC networks include: Routing protocols suitable for use in PLC networks include:
o RPL (Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks) [RFC6550] o RPL (Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks) [RFC6550]
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the IEEE 1901.2 standard refers to ITU-T G.9903 for LOAD-based the IEEE 1901.2 standard refers to ITU-T G.9903 for LOAD-based
networks. networks.
4. IPv6 over PLC 4. IPv6 over PLC
6LoWPAN standards [RFC4944], [RFC6775], and [RFC6282] provides useful 6LoWPAN standards [RFC4944], [RFC6775], and [RFC6282] provides useful
functionality including link-local IPv6 addresses, stateless address functionality including link-local IPv6 addresses, stateless address
auto-configuration, neighbor discovery and header compression. auto-configuration, neighbor discovery and header compression.
However, due to the different characteristics of the PLC media, the However, due to the different characteristics of the PLC media, the
6LoWPAN adaptation layer cannot perfectly fulfill the requirements. 6LoWPAN adaptation layer cannot perfectly fulfill the requirements.
Besides, some of the features like fragmentation and reassembly are These considerations suggest the need for a dedicated adaptation
redudant to some PLC technologies. These considerations suggest the layer for PLC, which is detailed in the following subsections.
need for a dedicated adaptation layer for PLC, which is detailed in
the following subsections.
4.1. Stateless Address Autoconfiguration 4.1. Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
To obtain an IPv6 Interface Identifier (IID), a PLC device performs To obtain an IPv6 Interface Identifier (IID), a PLC device performs
stateless address autoconfiguration [RFC4944]. The autoconfiguration stateless address autoconfiguration [RFC4944]. The autoconfiguration
can be based on either a long or short link-layer address. can be based on either a long or short link-layer address.
The IID can be based on the device's 48-bit MAC address or its EUI-64 The IID can be based on the device's 48-bit MAC address or its EUI-64
identifier [EUI-64]. A 48-bit MAC address MUST first be extended to identifier [EUI-64]. A 48-bit MAC address MUST first be extended to
a 64-bit Interface ID by inserting 0xFFFE at the fourth and fifth a 64-bit Interface ID by inserting 0xFFFE at the fourth and fifth
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be set to zero. In order to avoid any ambiguity in the derived be set to zero. In order to avoid any ambiguity in the derived
Interface ID, these two bits MUST NOT be used to generate the PANID Interface ID, these two bits MUST NOT be used to generate the PANID
(for IEEE 1901.2 and ITU-T G.9903) or NID (for IEEE 1901.1). In (for IEEE 1901.2 and ITU-T G.9903) or NID (for IEEE 1901.1). In
other words, the PANID or NID MUST always be chosen so that these other words, the PANID or NID MUST always be chosen so that these
bits are zeros. bits are zeros.
For privacy reasons, the IID derived by the MAC address SHOULD only For privacy reasons, the IID derived by the MAC address SHOULD only
be used for link-local address configuration. A PLC host SHOULD use be used for link-local address configuration. A PLC host SHOULD use
the IID derived by the link-layer short address to configure the IPv6 the IID derived by the link-layer short address to configure the IPv6
address used for communication with the public network; otherwise, address used for communication with the public network; otherwise,
the host's MAC address is exposed. the host's MAC address is exposed. Implementations should look at
[RFC8064] as well, in order to generate a stable IPv6 address using
an opaque IID.
4.2. IPv6 Link Local Address 4.2. IPv6 Link Local Address
The IPv6 link-local address [RFC4291] for a PLC interface is formed The IPv6 link-local address [RFC4291] for a PLC interface is formed
by appending the IID, as defined above, to the prefix FE80::/64 (see by appending the IID, as defined above, to the prefix FE80::/64 (see
Figure 2). Implementations should look at [RFC8064] as well, in Figure 2).
order to generate a stable IPv6 link-local address using an opaque
IID.
10 bits 54 bits 64 bits 10 bits 54 bits 64 bits
+----------+-----------------------+----------------------------+ +----------+-----------------------+----------------------------+
|1111111010| (zeros) | Interface Identifier | |1111111010| (zeros) | Interface Identifier |
+----------+-----------------------+----------------------------+ +----------+-----------------------+----------------------------+
Figure 2: IPv6 Link Local Address for a PLC interface Figure 2: IPv6 Link Local Address for a PLC interface
4.3. Unicast Address Mapping 4.3. Unicast Address Mapping
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power lines, PLC Data Link layer provides the function of power lines, PLC Data Link layer provides the function of
segmentation and reassembly. A Segment Control Field is defined in segmentation and reassembly. A Segment Control Field is defined in
the MAC frame header regardless of whether segmentation is required. the MAC frame header regardless of whether segmentation is required.
The number of data octets of the PHY payload can change dynamically The number of data octets of the PHY payload can change dynamically
based on channel conditions, thus the MAC payload segmentation in the based on channel conditions, thus the MAC payload segmentation in the
MAC sublayer is enabled and guarantees a reliable one-hop data MAC sublayer is enabled and guarantees a reliable one-hop data
transmission. Fragmentation and reassembly is still required at the transmission. Fragmentation and reassembly is still required at the
adaptation layer, if the MAC layer cannot support the minimum MTU adaptation layer, if the MAC layer cannot support the minimum MTU
demanded by IPv6, which is 1280 octets. demanded by IPv6, which is 1280 octets.
In IEEE 1901.1 and IEEE 1901.2, since the MAC layer supports payloads In IEEE 1901.1 and IEEE 1901.2, the MAC layer supports payloads as
of 2031 octets and 1576 octets respectively, fragmentation is not big as 2031 octets and 1576 octets respectively. However when the
needed for IPv6 packet transmission. The fragmentation and channel condition is noisy, it is possible to configure smaller MTU
reassembly defined in [RFC4944] SHOULD NOT be used in the 6lo at the MAC layer. If the configured MTU is smaller than 1280
adaptation layer of IEEE 1901.2. octects, the fragmentation and reassembly defined in [RFC4944] MUST
be used.
In ITU-T G.9903, the maximum MAC payload size is fixed to 400 octets, In ITU-T G.9903, the maximum MAC payload size is fixed to 400 octets,
so to cope with the required MTU of 1280 octets by IPv6, so to cope with the required MTU of 1280 octets by IPv6,
fragmentation and reassembly at 6lo adaptation layer MUST be provided fragmentation and reassembly at 6lo adaptation layer MUST be provided
referring to [RFC4944]. referring to [RFC4944].
5. Internet Connectivity Scenarios and Topologies 5. Internet Connectivity Scenarios and Topologies
The network model can be simplified to two kinds of network devices: The network model can be simplified to two kinds of network devices:
PAN Coordinator (PANC) and PAN Device. The PANC is the primary PAN Coordinator (PANC) and PAN Device. The PANC is the primary
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PLC Device PLC Device
\ +--------- \ +---------
PLC Device \ / PLC Device \ /
\ \ + \ \ +
\ \ | \ \ |
PLC Device -- PANC ===========+ Internet PLC Device -- PANC ===========+ Internet
/ / | / / |
/ / + / / +
PLC Device---PLC Device / \ PLC Device---PLC Device / \
/ +--------- / +---------
PAN Device---PAN Device PLC Device---PLC Device
<-------------------------> <------------------------->
PLC subnet (IPv6 over PLC) PLC subnet (IPv6 over PLC)
Figure 6: PLC Tree Network connected to the Internet Figure 6: PLC Tree Network connected to the Internet
Mesh networking in PLC is of great potential applications and has Mesh networking in PLC is of great potential applications and has
been studied for several years. By connecting all nodes with their been studied for several years. By connecting all nodes with their
neighbors in communication range (see Figure 7), mesh topology neighbors in communication range (see Figure 7), mesh topology
dramatically enhances the communication efficiency and thus expands dramatically enhances the communication efficiency and thus expands
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Due to the high accessibility of power grid, PLC might be susceptible Due to the high accessibility of power grid, PLC might be susceptible
to eavesdropping within its communication coverage, e.g., one to eavesdropping within its communication coverage, e.g., one
apartment tenant may have the chance to monitor the other smart apartment tenant may have the chance to monitor the other smart
meters in the same apartment building. For security consideration, meters in the same apartment building. For security consideration,
link layer security is guaranteed in every PLC technology. link layer security is guaranteed in every PLC technology.
Malicious PLC devices could paralyze the whole network via DOS Malicious PLC devices could paralyze the whole network via DOS
attacks, e.g., keep joining and leaving the network frequently, or attacks, e.g., keep joining and leaving the network frequently, or
multicast routing messages containing fake metrics. A device may multicast routing messages containing fake metrics. A device may
also join a wrong or even malicious network, exposing its data to also join a wrong or even malicious network, exposing its data to
illegal users. Thus it is highly recommended to conduct a mutual illegal users. Mutual authentication of network and new device can
authentication between the network and the device tending to join in be conducted during the onboarding process of the new device.
it. Pre-installed certificates can be transported over DTLS to Methods include protocols such as [RFC7925] (exchanging pre-installed
facilitate the authentication. Alternatively, as per certificates over DTLS) , [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] (which
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security], provisioning a unique pre-shared uses pre-shared keys), and
keys (PSKs) to each PLC device is also feasible. In both cases, if [I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join] (which uses IDevID and
the PLC device is not direct neighbor to the PANC/JRC, where the MASA service). It is also possible to use EAP methods such as
authenticate is conducted, another PLC device which has joined the [I-D.ietf-emu-eap-noob] via transports like PANA [RFC5191]. No
network can act as a proxy to help exchange the authentication specific mechanism is specified by this document as an appropriate
messages. mechanism will depend upon deployment circumstances. The network
encryption key appropriate for the layer-2 can also be acquired
during the onboarding process.
IP addresses may be used to track devices on the Internet; such IP addresses may be used to track devices on the Internet; such
devices can in turn be linked to individuals and their activities. devices can in turn be linked to individuals and their activities.
Depending on the application and the actual use pattern, this may be Depending on the application and the actual use pattern, this may be
undesirable. To impede tracking, globally unique and non-changing undesirable. To impede tracking, globally unique and non-changing
characteristics of IP addresses should be avoided, e.g., by characteristics of IP addresses should be avoided, e.g., by
frequently changing the global prefix and avoiding unique link-layer frequently changing the global prefix and avoiding unique link-layer
derived IIDs in addresses. [RFC3315], [RFC3972], [RFC4941], derived IIDs in addresses. [RFC3315], [RFC3972], [RFC4941],
[RFC5535], [RFC7217], and [RFC8065] provide valuable information for [RFC5535], [RFC7217], and [RFC8065] provide valuable information for
IID formation with improved privacy, and are RECOMMENDED for IPv6 IID formation with improved privacy, and are RECOMMENDED for IPv6
networks. networks.
8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge suggestions from the members of the IETF We gratefully acknowledge suggestions from the members of the IETF
6lo working group. Great thanks to Samita Chakrabarti and Gabriel 6lo working group. Great thanks to Samita Chakrabarti and Gabriel
Montenegro for their feedback and support in connecting the IEEE and Montenegro for their feedback and support in connecting the IEEE and
ITU-T sides. Authors thank Scott Mansfield, Ralph Droms, Pat Kinney ITU-T sides. Authors thank Scott Mansfield, Ralph Droms, Pat Kinney
for their guidance in the liaison process. Authors wish to thank for their guidance in the liaison process. Authors wish to thank
Stefano Galli, Thierry Lys, Yizhou Li and Yuefeng Wu for their Stefano Galli, Thierry Lys, Yizhou Li, Yuefeng Wu and Michael
valuable comments and contributions. Richardson for their valuable comments and contributions.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[IEEE_1901.1] [IEEE_1901.1]
IEEE-SA Standards Board, "Standard for Medium Frequency IEEE-SA Standards Board, "Standard for Medium Frequency
(less than 15 MHz) Power Line Communications for Smart (less than 15 MHz) Power Line Communications for Smart
Grid Applications", IEEE 1901.1, May 2018, Grid Applications", IEEE 1901.1, May 2018,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8360785>. <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8360785>.
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May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8505] Thubert, P., Ed., Nordmark, E., Chakrabarti, S., and C. [RFC8505] Thubert, P., Ed., Nordmark, E., Chakrabarti, S., and C.
Perkins, "Registration Extensions for IPv6 over Low-Power Perkins, "Registration Extensions for IPv6 over Low-Power
Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) Neighbor Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) Neighbor
Discovery", RFC 8505, DOI 10.17487/RFC8505, November 2018, Discovery", RFC 8505, DOI 10.17487/RFC8505, November 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8505>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8505>.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join]
Richardson, M., "6tisch Zero-Touch Secure Join protocol",
draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-zerotouch-join-04 (work in
progress), July 2019.
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]
Vucinic, M., Simon, J., Pister, K., and M. Richardson, Vucinic, M., Simon, J., Pister, K., and M. Richardson,
"Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) for 6TiSCH", draft-ietf- "Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) for 6TiSCH", draft-ietf-
6tisch-minimal-security-15 (work in progress), December 6tisch-minimal-security-15 (work in progress), December
2019. 2019.
[I-D.ietf-emu-eap-noob]
Aura, T. and M. Sethi, "Nimble out-of-band authentication
for EAP (EAP-NOOB)", draft-ietf-emu-eap-noob-01 (work in
progress), June 2020.
[I-D.ietf-roll-aodv-rpl] [I-D.ietf-roll-aodv-rpl]
Anamalamudi, S., Zhang, M., Perkins, C., Anand, S., and B. Anamalamudi, S., Zhang, M., Perkins, C., Anand, S., and B.
Liu, "Asymmetric AODV-P2P-RPL in Low-Power and Lossy Liu, "AODV based RPL Extensions for Supporting Asymmetric
Networks (LLNs)", draft-ietf-roll-aodv-rpl-07 (work in P2P Links in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", draft-ietf-
progress), April 2019. roll-aodv-rpl-08 (work in progress), May 2020.
[I-D.ietf-roll-unaware-leaves] [I-D.ietf-roll-unaware-leaves]
Thubert, P. and M. Richardson, "Routing for RPL Leaves", Thubert, P. and M. Richardson, "Routing for RPL Leaves",
draft-ietf-roll-unaware-leaves-15 (work in progress), draft-ietf-roll-unaware-leaves-15 (work in progress),
April 2020. April 2020.
[I-D.popa-6lo-6loplc-ipv6-over-ieee19012-networks] [I-D.popa-6lo-6loplc-ipv6-over-ieee19012-networks]
Popa, D. and J. Hui, "6LoPLC: Transmission of IPv6 Packets Popa, D. and J. Hui, "6LoPLC: Transmission of IPv6 Packets
over IEEE 1901.2 Narrowband Powerline Communication over IEEE 1901.2 Narrowband Powerline Communication
Networks", draft-popa-6lo-6loplc-ipv6-over- Networks", draft-popa-6lo-6loplc-ipv6-over-
skipping to change at page 18, line 30 skipping to change at page 18, line 47
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>. 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.
[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy [RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007, IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.
[RFC5191] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Ed., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H.,
and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, DOI 10.17487/RFC5191,
May 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5191>.
[RFC5535] Bagnulo, M., "Hash-Based Addresses (HBA)", RFC 5535, [RFC5535] Bagnulo, M., "Hash-Based Addresses (HBA)", RFC 5535,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5535, June 2009, DOI 10.17487/RFC5535, June 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5535>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5535>.
[RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque [RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217, Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>.
[RFC7925] Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.
[RFC8036] Cam-Winget, N., Ed., Hui, J., and D. Popa, "Applicability [RFC8036] Cam-Winget, N., Ed., Hui, J., and D. Popa, "Applicability
Statement for the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Statement for the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy
Networks (RPL) in Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Networks (RPL) in Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
Networks", RFC 8036, DOI 10.17487/RFC8036, January 2017, Networks", RFC 8036, DOI 10.17487/RFC8036, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8036>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8036>.
[RFC8064] Gont, F., Cooper, A., Thaler, D., and W. Liu, [RFC8064] Gont, F., Cooper, A., Thaler, D., and W. Liu,
"Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers", "Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers",
RFC 8064, DOI 10.17487/RFC8064, February 2017, RFC 8064, DOI 10.17487/RFC8064, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8064>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8064>.
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