< draft-ietf-6lo-privacy-considerations-00.txt   draft-ietf-6lo-privacy-considerations-01.txt >
Network Working Group D. Thaler Network Working Group D. Thaler
Internet-Draft Microsoft Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Informational October 18, 2015 Intended status: Informational July 6, 2016
Expires: April 20, 2016 Expires: January 7, 2017
Privacy Considerations for IPv6 over Networks of Resource-Constrained Privacy Considerations for IPv6 over Networks of Resource-Constrained
Nodes Nodes
draft-ietf-6lo-privacy-considerations-00 draft-ietf-6lo-privacy-considerations-01
Abstract Abstract
This document discusses how a number of privacy threats apply to This document discusses how a number of privacy threats apply to
technologies designed for IPv6 over networks of resource-constrained technologies designed for IPv6 over networks of resource-constrained
nodes, and provides advice to protocol designers on how to address nodes, and provides advice to protocol designers on how to address
such threats in IPv6-over-foo adaptation layer specifcations. such threats in adaptation layer specifications for IPv6 over such
links.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Amount of Entropy Needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Amount of Entropy Needed in Global Addresses . . . . . . . . 3
3. Potential Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Potential Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. IEEE-Identifier-Based Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. IEEE-Identifier-Based Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Short Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Short Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RFC 6973 [RFC6973] discusses privacy considerations for Internet RFC 6973 [RFC6973] discusses privacy considerations for Internet
protocols, and Section 5.2 in particular covers a number of privacy- protocols, and Section 5.2 in particular covers a number of privacy-
specific threats. In the context of IPv6 addresses, Section 3 of specific threats. In the context of IPv6 addresses, Section 3 of
[I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy] provides further [RFC7721] provides further elaboration on the applicability of the
elaboration on the applicability of the privacy threats. privacy threats.
When interface identifiers (IIDs) are generated without sufficient When interface identifiers (IIDs) are generated without sufficient
entropy compared to the link lifetime, devices and users can become entropy compared to the link lifetime, devices and users can become
vulnerable to the various threats discussed there, including: vulnerable to the various threats discussed there, including:
o Correlation of activities over time, if the same identifier is o Correlation of activities over time, if the same identifier is
used for Internet traffic over period of time used for traffic over period of time
o Location tracking, if the same interface identifier is used with o Location tracking, if the same interface identifier is used with
different prefixes as a device moves between different networks different prefixes as a device moves between different networks
o Device-specific vulnerability exploitation, if the identifier o Device-specific vulnerability exploitation, if the identifier
helps identify a vendor or version or protocol and hence suggests helps identify a vendor or version or protocol and hence suggests
what types of attacks to try what types of attacks to try
o Address scanning, which enables all of the above attacks by off- o Address scanning, which enables all of the above attacks by off-
link attackers. link attackers. (On some Non-Broadcast Multi-Access (NBMA) links
where all nodes aren't already privy to all on-link addresses,
address scans might also be done by on-link attackers, but in most
cases address scans are not an interesting threat from on-link
attackers and thus address scans generally apply only to routable
addresses.)
Typically "enough" bits of entropy means at least 46 bits (see For example, for links that may last for years, "enough" bits of
Section 2 for why); ideally all 64 bits of the IID should be used, entropy means at least 46 or so bits (see Section 2 for why) in a
routable address; ideally all 64 bits of the IID should be used,
although historically some bits have been excluded for reasons although historically some bits have been excluded for reasons
discussed in [RFC7421]. discussed in [RFC7421]. Link-local addresses can also be susceptible
to the same privacy threats from off-link attackers, since experience
shows they are often leaked by upper-layer protocols such as SMTP,
SIP, or DNS.
For these reasons, [I-D.ietf-6man-default-iids] recommends using an For these reasons, [I-D.ietf-6man-default-iids] recommends using an
address generation scheme in [RFC7217], rather than addresses address generation scheme in [RFC7217], rather than addresses
generated from a fixed IEEE identifier. generated from a fixed link-layer address.
Furthermore, to mitigate the threat of correlation of activities over Furthermore, to mitigate the threat of correlation of activities over
time on long-lived links, [RFC4941] specifies the notion of a time on long-lived links, [RFC4941] specifies the notion of a
"temporary" address to be used for transport sessions (typically "temporary" address to be used for transport sessions (typically
locally-initiated outbound traffic to the Internet) that should not locally-initiated outbound traffic to the Internet) that should not
be linkable to a more permanent identifier such as a DNS name, user be linkable to a more permanent identifier such as a DNS name, user
name, or stable hardware address. Indeed, the default address name, or fixed link-layer address. Indeed, the default address
selection rules [RFC6724] now prefer temporary addresses by default selection rules [RFC6724] now prefer temporary addresses by default
for outgoing connections. If a device needs to simultaneously for outgoing connections. If a device needs to simultaneously
support unlinkable traffic as well as traffic that is linkable to support unlinkable traffic as well as traffic that is linkable to
such a stable identifier, this necessitates supporting simultaneous such a stable identifier, this necessitates supporting simultaneous
use of multiple addresses per device. use of multiple addresses per device.
2. Amount of Entropy Needed 2. Amount of Entropy Needed in Global Addresses
In terms of privacy threats discussed in In terms of privacy threats discussed in [RFC7721], the one with the
[I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy], the one with the need for the most entropy is address scans of routable addresses. To
need for the most entropy is address scans. To mitigate address mitigate address scans, one needs enough entropy to make the
scans, one needs enough entropy to make the probability of a probability of a successful address probe be negligible. Typically
successful address probe be negligible. Typically this is measured this is measured in the length of time it would take to have a 50%
in the length of time it would take to have a 50% probability of probability of getting at least one hit. Address scans often rely on
getting at least one hit. Address scans often rely on sending a sending a packet such as a TCP SYN or ICMP Echo Request, and
packet such as a TCP SYN or ICMP Echo Request, and determining determining whether the reply is an ICMP unreachable error (if no
whether the reply is an ICMP unreachable error (if no host exists) or host exists with that address) or a TCP response or ICMP Echo Reply
a TCP response or ICMP Echo Reply (if a host exists), or neither in (if a host exists), or neither in which case nothing is known for
which case nothing is known for certain. certain.
Many privacy-sensitive devices support a "stealth mode" as discussed Many privacy-sensitive devices support a "stealth mode" as discussed
in Section 5 of [RFC7288] whereby they will not send a TCP RST or in Section 5 of [RFC7288] or are behind a network firewall that will
ICMP Echo Reply. In such cases, and when the device does not listen drop unsolicited inbound traffic (e.g., TCP SYNs, ICMP Echo Requests,
on a well-known TCP port known to the scanner, the effectiveness of etc.) and thus no TCP RST or ICMP Echo Reply will be sent. In such
an address scan is limited by the ability to get ICMP unreachable cases, and when the device does not listen on a well-known TCP or UDP
errors, since the attacker can only infer the presence of a host port known to the scanner, the effectiveness of an address scan is
based on the absense of an ICMP unreachable error. limited by the ability to get ICMP unreachable errors, since the
attacker can only infer the presence of a host based on the absense
of an ICMP unreachable error.
Generation of ICMP unreachable errors is typically rate limited to 2 Generation of ICMP unreachable errors is typically rate limited to 2
per second (the default in routers such as Cisco routers running IOS per second (the default in routers such as Cisco routers running IOS
12.0 or later). Such a rate results in taking about a year to 12.0 or later). Such a rate results in taking about a year to
completely scan 26 bits of space. completely scan 26 bits of space.
The actual math is as follows. Let 2^N be the number of devices on The actual math is as follows. Let 2^N be the number of devices on
the subnet. Let 2^M be the size of the space to scan (i.e., M bits the subnet. Let 2^M be the size of the space to scan (i.e., M bits
of entropy). Let S be the number of scan attempts. The formula for of entropy). Let S be the number of scan attempts. The formula for
a 50% chance of getting at least one hit in S attempts is: P(at least a 50% chance of getting at least one hit in S attempts is: P(at least
one success) = 1 - (1 - 2^N/2^M)^S = 1/2. Assuming 2^M >> S, this one success) = 1 - (1 - 2^N/2^M)^S = 1/2. Assuming 2^M >> S, this
simplifies to: S * 2^N/2^M = 1/2, giving S = 2^(M-N-1), or M = N + 1 simplifies to: S * 2^N/2^M = 1/2, giving S = 2^(M-N-1), or M = N + 1
+ log_2(S). Using a scan rate of 2 per second, this results in the + log_2(S). Using a scan rate of 2 per second, this results in the
following rule of thumb: following rule of thumb:
Bits of entropy needed = log_2(# devices per link) + log_2(seconds Bits of entropy needed = log_2(# devices per link) + log_2(seconds
of link lifetime) + 2 of link lifetime) + 2
For example, for a network with at most 2^16 devices on the same For example, for a network with at most 2^16 devices on the same
long-lived link, and the average lifetime of a device being 8 years long-lived link, and the average lifetime of a link being 8 years
(2^28 seconds) or less, this results in a need for at least 46 bits (2^28 seconds) or less, this results in a need for at least 46 bits
of entropy (16+28+2) so that an address scan would need to be of entropy (16+28+2) so that an address scan would need to be
sustained for longer than the lifetime of devices to have a 50% sustained for longer than the lifetime of the link to have a 50%
chance of getting a hit. chance of getting a hit.
Although 46 bits of entropy may be enough to provide privacy in such Although 46 bits of entropy may be enough to provide privacy in such
cases, 59 or more bits of entropy would be needed if addresses are cases, 59 or more bits of entropy would be needed if addresses are
used to provide security against attacks such as spoofing, as CGAs used to provide security against attacks such as spoofing, as CGAs
[RFC3972] and HBAs [RFC5535] do, since attacks are not limited by [RFC3972] and HBAs [RFC5535] do, since attacks are not limited by
ICMP rate limiting but by the processing power of the attacker. See ICMP rate limiting but by the processing power of the attacker. See
those RFCs for more discussion. those RFCs for more discussion.
If, on the other hand, the devices being scanned for do not implement If, on the other hand, the devices being scanned for respond to
a "stealth mode", but respond with TCP RST or ICMP Echo Reply unsolicited inbound packets, then the address scan is not limited by
packets, then the address scan is not limited by the ICMP unreachable the ICMP unreachable rate limit in routers, since an adversary can
rate limit in routers, since the attacker can determine the presence determine the presence of a host without them. In such cases, more
of a host without them. In such cases, more bits of entropy would be bits of entropy would be needed to provide the same level of
needed to provide the same level of protection. protection.
3. Potential Approaches 3. Potential Approaches
The table below shows the number of bits of entropy currently The table below shows the number of bits of entropy currently
available in various technologies: available in various technologies:
+---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+ +---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+
| Technology | Reference | Bits of Entropy | | Technology | Reference | Bits of Entropy |
+---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+ +---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+
| 802.15.4 | [RFC4944] | 16+ or any EUI-64 | | 802.15.4 | [RFC4944] | 16+ or any EUI-64 |
| Bluetooth LE | [I-D.ietf-6lo-btle] | 48 | | Bluetooth LE | [RFC7668] | 48 |
| DECT ULE | [I-D.ietf-6lo-dect-ule] | 40 or any EUI-48 | | DECT ULE | [I-D.ietf-6lo-dect-ule] | 40 or any EUI-48 |
| MS/TP | [I-D.ietf-6lo-6lobac] | 8 or 64 | | MS/TP | [I-D.ietf-6lo-6lobac] | 7 or 64 |
| ITU-T G.9959 | [RFC7428] | 8 | | ITU-T G.9959 | [RFC7428] | 8 |
| NFC | [I-D.ietf-6lo-nfc] | 6 or ??? | | NFC | [I-D.ietf-6lo-nfc] | 6 or ??? |
+---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+ +---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+
Such technologies generally support either IEEE identifiers or so Such technologies generally support either IEEE identifiers or so
called "Short Addresses", or both, as link layer addresses. We called "Short Addresses", or both, as link layer addresses. We
discuss each in turn. discuss each in turn.
3.1. IEEE-Identifier-Based Addresses 3.1. IEEE-Identifier-Based Addresses
Some technologies allow the use of IEEE EUI-48 or EUI-64 identifiers, Some technologies allow the use of IEEE EUI-48 or EUI-64 identifiers,
or allow using an arbitrary 64-bit identifier. Using such an or allow using an arbitrary 64-bit identifier. Using such an
identifier to construct IPv6 addresses makes it easy to use the identifier to construct IPv6 addresses makes it easy to use the
normal LOWPAN_IPHC encoding with stateless compression, allowing such normal LOWPAN_IPHC encoding with stateless compression, allowing such
IPv6 addresses to be fully elided in common cases. IPv6 addresses to be fully elided in common cases.
Interfaces identifiers formed from IEEE identifiers can have Global addresses with interface identifiers formed from IEEE
insufficient entropy unless the IEEE identifier itself has sufficient identifiers can have insufficient entropy to mitigate address scans
entropy, and enough bits of entropy are carried over into the IPv6 unless the IEEE identifier itself has sufficient entropy, and enough
address to sufficiently mitigate the threats. Privacy threats other bits of entropy are carried over into the IPv6 address to
than "Correlation over time" can be mitigated using per-network sufficiently mitigate the threats. Privacy threats other than
randomized IEEE identifiers with 46 or more bits of entropy. A "Correlation over time" can be mitigated using per-network randomized
number of such proposals can be found at link-layer addresses with enough entropy compared to the link
lifetime. A number of such proposals can be found at
<https://mentor.ieee.org/privecsg/documents>, and Section 10.8 of <https://mentor.ieee.org/privecsg/documents>, and Section 10.8 of
[BTCorev4.1] specifies one for Bluetooth. Using IPv6 addresses [BTCorev4.1] specifies one for Bluetooth. Using routable IPv6
derived from such IEEE identifiers would be roughly equivalent to addresses derived from such link-layer addresses would be roughly
those specified in [RFC7217]. equivalent to those specified in [RFC7217].
Correlation over time can be mitigated if the IEEE identifier itself Correlation over time (for all addresses, not just routable
changes often enough, such as each time the link is established, if addresses) can be mitigated if the link-layer address itself changes
the link lifetime is short. For further discussion, see often enough, such as each time the link is established, if the link
lifetime is short. For further discussion, see
[I-D.huitema-6man-random-addresses]. [I-D.huitema-6man-random-addresses].
Another potential concern is that of efficiency, such as avoiding DAD Another potential concern is that of efficiency, such as avoiding
all together when IPv6 addresses are IEEE-identifier-based. Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) all together when IPv6 addresses
Appendix A of [RFC4429] provides an analysis of address collision are IEEE-identifier-based. Appendix A of [RFC4429] provides an
probability based on the number of bits of entropy. A simple web analysis of address collision probability based on the number of bits
search on "duplicate MAC addresses" will show that collisions do of entropy. A simple web search on "duplicate MAC addresses" will
happen with MAC addresses, and thus based on the analysis in show that collisions do happen with MAC addresses, and thus based on
[RFC4429], using sufficient bits of entropy in random addresses can the analysis in [RFC4429], using sufficient bits of entropy in random
provide greater protection against collision than using MAC addresses can provide greater protection against collision than using
addresses. MAC addresses.
3.2. Short Addresses 3.2. Short Addresses
An IPv6 interface identifier formed from a "Short Address" and a set A routable IPv6 address with an interface identifier formed from the
of well-known constant bits (such as padding with 0's) lacks combination of a "Short Address" and a set of well-known constant
sufficient entropy to mitigate address scanning unless the link bits (such as padding with 0's) lacks sufficient entropy to mitigate
lifetime is extremely short. Furthermore, an adversary could also address scanning unless the link lifetime is extremely short.
use statisical methods to determine the size of the L2 address space Furthermore, an adversary could also use statisical methods to
and thereby make some inference regarding the underlying technology determine the size of the L2 address space and thereby make some
on a given link, and target further attacks accordingly. inference regarding the underlying technology on a given link, and
target further attacks accordingly.
When Short Addresses are desired on links that are not guaranteed to When Short Addresses are desired on links that are not guaranteed to
have a short enough lifetime, the mechanism for constructing an IPv6 have a short enough lifetime, the mechanism for constructing an IPv6
interface identifier from a Short Address could be designed to interface identifier from a Short Address could be designed to
sufficiently mitigate the problem. For example, if all nodes on a sufficiently mitigate the problem. For example, if all nodes on a
given L2 network have a shared secret (such as the key needed to get given L2 network have a shared secret (such as the key needed to get
on the layer-2 network), the 64-bit IID might be generated using a on the layer-2 network), the 64-bit IID might be generated using a
one-way hash that includes (at least) the shared secret together with one-way hash that includes (at least) the shared secret together with
the Short Address. The use of such a hash would result in the IIDs the Short Address. The use of such a hash would result in the IIDs
being spread out among the full range of IID address space, thus being spread out among the full range of IID address space, thus
mitigating address scans, while still allowing full stateless mitigating address scans, while still allowing full stateless
compression/elision. compression/elision.
For long-lived links, "temporary" addresses might even be generated For long-lived links, "temporary" addresses might even be generated
in the same way by (for example) also including in the hash the in the same way by (for example) also including in the hash the
Version Number from the Authoritative Border Router Option (ABDO) if Version Number from the Authoritative Border Router Option
any. This would allow changing temporary addresses whenever the (Section 4.3 of [RFC6775]), if any. This would allow changing
Version Number is changed, even if the set of prefix or context temporary addresses whenever the Version Number is changed, even if
information is unchanged. the set of prefix or context information is unchanged.
In summary, any specification using Short Addresses should carefully In summary, any specification using Short Addresses should carefully
construct an IID generation mechanism so as to provide sufficient construct an IID generation mechanism so as to provide sufficient
entropy compared to the link lifetime. entropy compared to the link lifetime.
4. Recommendations 4. Recommendations
The following are recommended for adaptation layer specifications: The following are recommended for adaptation layer specifications:
o Security (privacy) sections should say how address scans are o Security (privacy) sections should say how address scans are
mitigated. An address scan might be mitigated by having a link mitigated. An address scan might be mitigated by having a link
always be short-lived, or might be mitigated by having a large always be short-lived, or might be mitigated by having a large
number of bits of entropy, or some combination. Thus, a number of bits of entropy in routable addresses, or some
specification should explain what the maximum lifetime of a link combination. Thus, a specification should explain what the
is in practice, and show how the number of bits of entropy is maximum lifetime of a link is in practice, and show how the number
sufficient given that lifetime. of bits of entropy is sufficient given that lifetime.
o Technologies must define a way to include sufficient bits of o Technologies should define a way to include sufficient bits of
entropy in the IPv6 interface identifier, based on the maximum entropy in the IPv6 interface identifier, based on the maximum
link lifetime. Specifying that a random EUI-48 or EUI-64 can be link lifetime. Specifying that randomized link-layer addresses
used is one easy way to do so, for technologies that support such can be used is one easy way to do so, for technologies that
identifiers. support such identifiers.
o Specifications should not simply construct an IPv6 interface o Specifications should not simply construct an IPv6 interface
identifier by padding a short address with a set of other well- identifier by padding a short address with a set of other well-
known constant bits, unless the link lifetime is guaranteed to be known constant bits, unless the link lifetime is guaranteed to be
extremely short. extremely short.
o Specifications should make sure that an IPv6 address can change o Specifications should make sure that an IPv6 address can change
over long periods of time. For example, the interface identifier over long periods of time. For example, the interface identifier
might change each time a device connects to the network (if might change each time a device connects to the network (if
connections are short), or might change each day (if connections connections are short), or might change each day (if connections
skipping to change at page 8, line 14 skipping to change at page 8, line 34
[RFC5535] Bagnulo, M., "Hash-Based Addresses (HBA)", RFC 5535, [RFC5535] Bagnulo, M., "Hash-Based Addresses (HBA)", RFC 5535,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5535, June 2009, DOI 10.17487/RFC5535, June 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5535>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5535>.
[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown, [RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012, (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.
[RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C.
Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over
Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque [RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217, Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,
skipping to change at page 8, line 41 skipping to change at page 9, line 20
Petrescu, A., and A. Yourtchenko, "Analysis of the 64-bit Petrescu, A., and A. Yourtchenko, "Analysis of the 64-bit
Boundary in IPv6 Addressing", RFC 7421, Boundary in IPv6 Addressing", RFC 7421,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7421, January 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7421, January 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7421>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7421>.
[RFC7428] Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets [RFC7428] Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets
over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", RFC 7428, over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", RFC 7428,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7428, February 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7428, February 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7428>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7428>.
[I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy] [RFC7668] Nieminen, J., Savolainen, T., Isomaki, M., Patil, B.,
Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Privacy Shelby, Z., and C. Gomez, "IPv6 over BLUETOOTH(R) Low
Energy", RFC 7668, DOI 10.17487/RFC7668, October 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7668>.
[RFC7721] Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy
Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms", Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy-08 (work RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016,
in progress), September 2015. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>.
[I-D.ietf-6man-default-iids] [I-D.ietf-6man-default-iids]
Gont, F., Cooper, A., Thaler, D., and S. LIU, Gont, F., Cooper, A., Thaler, D., and S. (Will),
"Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers", "Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers",
draft-ietf-6man-default-iids-08 (work in progress), draft-ietf-6man-default-iids-11 (work in progress), April
October 2015. 2016.
[I-D.ietf-6lo-6lobac] [I-D.ietf-6lo-6lobac]
Lynn, K., Martocci, J., Neilson, C., and S. Donaldson, Lynn, K., Martocci, J., Neilson, C., and S. Donaldson,
"Transmission of IPv6 over MS/TP Networks", draft-ietf- "Transmission of IPv6 over MS/TP Networks", draft-ietf-
6lo-6lobac-02 (work in progress), July 2015. 6lo-6lobac-05 (work in progress), June 2016.
[I-D.ietf-6lo-btle]
Nieminen, J., Savolainen, T., Isomaki, M., Patil, B.,
Shelby, Z., and C. Gomez, "IPv6 over BLUETOOTH(R) Low
Energy", draft-ietf-6lo-btle-17 (work in progress), August
2015.
[I-D.ietf-6lo-dect-ule] [I-D.ietf-6lo-dect-ule]
Mariager, P., Petersen, J., Shelby, Z., Logt, M., and D. Mariager, P., Petersen, J., Shelby, Z., Logt, M., and D.
Barthel, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over DECT Ultra Low Barthel, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over DECT Ultra Low
Energy", draft-ietf-6lo-dect-ule-03 (work in progress), Energy", draft-ietf-6lo-dect-ule-05 (work in progress),
September 2015. May 2016.
[I-D.ietf-6lo-nfc] [I-D.ietf-6lo-nfc]
Hong, Y. and J. Youn, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Hong, Y. and J. Youn, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over
Near Field Communication", draft-ietf-6lo-nfc-02 (work in Near Field Communication", draft-ietf-6lo-nfc-03 (work in
progress), October 2015. progress), March 2016.
[I-D.huitema-6man-random-addresses] [I-D.huitema-6man-random-addresses]
Huitema, C., "Implications of Randomized Link Layers Huitema, C., "Implications of Randomized Link Layers
Addresses for IPv6 Address Assignment", draft-huitema- Addresses for IPv6 Address Assignment", draft-huitema-
6man-random-addresses-02 (work in progress), August 2015. 6man-random-addresses-03 (work in progress), March 2016.
[BTCorev4.1] [BTCorev4.1]
Bluetooth Special Interest Group, "Bluetooth Core Bluetooth Special Interest Group, "Bluetooth Core
Specification Version 4.1", December 2013, Specification Version 4.1", December 2013,
<https://www.bluetooth.org/DocMan/handlers/ <https://www.bluetooth.org/DocMan/handlers/
DownloadDoc.ashx?doc_id=282159>. DownloadDoc.ashx?doc_id=282159>.
Author's Address Author's Address
Dave Thaler Dave Thaler
 End of changes. 41 change blocks. 
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