< draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-00.txt		draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-01.txt >
	ACE Working Group M. Jones		ACE Working Group M. Jones
	Internet-Draft Microsoft		Internet-Draft Microsoft
	Intended status: Standards Track L. Seitz		Intended status: Standards Track L. Seitz
	Expires: January 18, 2018 RISE SICS		Expires: May 3, 2018 RISE SICS
	G. Selander		G. Selander
	Ericsson AB		Ericsson AB
	E. Wahlstroem		E. Wahlstroem
	S. Erdtman		S. Erdtman
	Spotify AB		Spotify AB
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	ARM Ltd.		ARM Ltd.
	July 17, 2017		October 30, 2017
	Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)		Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)
	draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-00		draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-01
	Abstract		Abstract
	This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT)		This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT)
	that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-		that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-
	possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also		possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also
	sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key. This		sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification
	specification provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-		provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key
	Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800), but		Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800), but using CBOR and
	using CBOR and CWTs rather than JSON and JWTs.		CWTs rather than JSON and JWTs.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on January 18, 2018.		This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2018.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	skipping to change at page 2, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 38 ¶
	3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-		3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-
	Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key 6		3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key 6
	3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	6.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 9		6.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	6.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		6.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	6.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		6.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This specification describes how a CBOR Web Token [CWT] can declare		This specification describes how a CBOR Web Token [CWT] can declare
	that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-		that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-
	possession (PoP) key. Proof of possession of a key is also sometimes		possession (PoP) key. Proof of possession of a key is also sometimes
	described as the presenter being a holder-of-key. This specification		described as being the holder-of-key. This specification provides
	provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key		equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for
	Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" [RFC7800], but using CBOR		JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" [RFC7800], but using CBOR [RFC7049] and CWTs
	[RFC7049] and CWTs [CWT] rather than JSON [RFC7159] and JWTs [JWT].		[CWT] rather than JSON [RFC7159] and JWTs [JWT].
	1.1. Notational Conventions		1.1. Notational Conventions
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
	[RFC2119].		[RFC2119].
	Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values		Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
	are case sensitive.		are case sensitive.
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	This specification uses terms defined in the CBOR Web Token [CWT],		This specification uses terms defined in the CBOR Web Token [CWT],
	CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152], and Concise		CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152], and Concise
	Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] specifications.		Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] specifications.
	These terms are defined by this specification:		These terms are defined by this specification:
	Issuer		Issuer
	Party that creates the CWT and binds the proof-of-possession key		Party that creates the CWT and binds its claims to the proof-of-
	to it.		possession key.
	Presenter		Presenter
	Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key		Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key
	cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a		cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a
	recipient.		recipient.
	Recipient		Recipient
	Party that receives the CWT containing the proof-of-possession key		Party that receives the CWT containing the proof-of-possession key
	information from the presenter.		information from the presenter.
	skipping to change at page 4, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 39 ¶
	MUST be ignored.		MUST be ignored.
	This specification establishes the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods"		This specification establishes the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods"
	registry for these members in Section 6.2 and registers the members		registry for these members in Section 6.2 and registers the members
	defined by this specification. Other specifications can register		defined by this specification. Other specifications can register
	other members used for confirmation, including other members for		other members used for confirmation, including other members for
	conveying proof-of-possession keys using different key		conveying proof-of-possession keys using different key
	representations.		representations.
	The "cnf" claim value MUST represent only a single proof-of-		The "cnf" claim value MUST represent only a single proof-of-
	possession key; thus, at most one of the "COSE_Key" and		possession key. At most one of the "COSE_Key" and
	"Encrypted_COSE_Key" confirmation values defined below may be		"Encrypted_COSE_Key" confirmation values defined below may be
	present. Note that if an application needs to represent multiple		present. Note that if an application needs to represent multiple
	proof-of-possession keys in the same CWT, one way for it to achieve		proof-of-possession keys in the same CWT, one way for it to achieve
	this is to use other claim names, in addition to "cnf", to hold the		this is to use other claim names, in addition to "cnf", to hold the
	additional proof-of-possession key information. These claims could		additional proof-of-possession key information. These claims could
	use the same syntax and semantics as the "cnf" claim. Those claims		use the same syntax and semantics as the "cnf" claim. Those claims
	would be defined by applications or other specifications and could be		would be defined by applications or other specifications and could be
	registered in the IANA "CBOR Web Token Claims" registry		registered in the IANA "CBOR Web Token Claims" registry
	[IANA.CWT.Claims].		[IANA.CWT.Claims].
			/--------------------+-----+-------------------------------\
			| Name | Key | Value type |
			|--------------------+-----+-------------------------------|
			| COSE_Key | 1 | COSE_Key |
			| Encrypted_COSE_Key | 2 | COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0 |
			| kid | 3 | binary string |
			\--------------------+-----+-------------------------------/
			Figure 1: Summary of the cnf names, keys, and value types
	3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key		3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
	When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the		When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the
	"COSE_Key" member is a COSE_Key [RFC8152] representing the		"COSE_Key" member is a COSE_Key [RFC8152] representing the
	corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example (using		corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example (using
	JSON notation) demonstrates such a declaration in the CWT Claims Set		CBOR diagonstic notation) demonstrates such a declaration in the CWT
	of a CWT:		Claims Set of a CWT:
	{		{
	"iss": "https://server.example.com",		/iss/ 1 : "coaps://server.example.com",
	"aud": "https://client.example.org",		/aud/ 3 : "coaps://client.example.org",
	"exp": 1361398824,		/exp/ 4 : 1361398824,
	"cnf":{		/cnf/ 8 :{
	"COSE_Key":{		/COSE_Key/ 1 :{
	"kty": "EC",		/kty/ 1 : /EC/ 2,
	"crv": "P-256",		/crv/ -1 : /P-256/ 1,
	"x": "18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM",		/x/ -2 : b64'18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM',
	"y": "-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA"		/y/ -3 : b64'-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA'
	}		}
	}		}
	}		}
	The COSE_Key MUST contain the required key members for a COSE_Key of		The COSE_Key MUST contain the required key members for a COSE_Key of
	that key type and MAY contain other COSE_Key members, including the		that key type and MAY contain other COSE_Key members, including the
	"kid" (Key ID) member.		"kid" (Key ID) member.
	The "COSE_Key" member MAY also be used for a COSE_Key representing a		The "COSE_Key" member MAY also be used for a COSE_Key representing a
	symmetric key, provided that the CWT is encrypted so that the key is		symmetric key, provided that the CWT is encrypted so that the key is
	skipping to change at page 5, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 5 ¶
	explained in [CWT]. If the CWT is not encrypted, the symmetric key		explained in [CWT]. If the CWT is not encrypted, the symmetric key
	MUST be encrypted as described below.		MUST be encrypted as described below.
	3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key		3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
	When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the		When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the
	"Encrypted_COSE_Key" member is an encrypted COSE_Key [RFC8152]		"Encrypted_COSE_Key" member is an encrypted COSE_Key [RFC8152]
	representing the symmetric key encrypted to a key known to the		representing the symmetric key encrypted to a key known to the
	recipient using COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0.		recipient using COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0.
	The following example (using JSON notation) illustrates a symmetric		The following example (using CBOR diagnostic notation, with
	key that could subsequently be encrypted for use in the		linebreaks for readability) illustrates a symmetric key that could
	"Encrypted_COSE_Key" member:		subsequently be encrypted for use in the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member:
	{		{
	"kty": "oct",		/kty/ 1 : /Symmetric/ 4,
	"alg": "HS256",		/alg/ 3 : /HMAC256/ 5,
	"k": "ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE"		/k/ -1 : h'6684523ab17337f173500e5728c628547cb37df
			e68449c65f885d1b73b49eae1A0B0C0D0E0F10'
	}		}
	The COSE_Key representation is used as the plaintext when encrypting		The COSE_Key representation is used as the plaintext when encrypting
	the key. The COSE_Key could, for instance, be encrypted using a		the key. The COSE_Key could, for instance, be encrypted using a
	COSE_Encrypt0 representation using the AES-CCM-16-64-128 algorithm.		COSE_Encrypt0 representation using the AES-CCM-16-64-128 algorithm.
	The following example CWT Claims Set of a CWT (using JSON notation)		The following example CWT Claims Set of a CWT (using CBOR diagnostic
	illustrates the use of an encrypted symmetric key as the		notation, with linebreaks for readability) illustrates the use of an
	"Encrypted_COSE_Key" member value:		encrypted symmetric key as the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member value:
	{		{
	"iss": "https://server.example.com",		/iss/ 1 : "coaps://server.example.com",
	"sub": "24400320",		/sub/ 2 : "24400320",
	"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",		/aud/ 3: "s6BhdRkqt3",
	"exp": 1311281970,		/exp/ 4 : 1311281970,
	"iat": 1311280970,		/iat/ 5 : 1311280970,
	"cnf":{		/cnf/ 8 : {
	"Encrypted_COSE_Key":		/COSE_Encrypt0/ 2 : [
	"(TBD)"		/protected header / h'A1010A' /{ \alg\ 1:10 \AES-CCM-16-64-128\}/,
	}		/unprotected header/ { / iv / 5: h'636898994FF0EC7BFCF6D3F95B'},
	}		/ciphertext/ h'0573318A3573EB983E55A7C2F06CADD0796C9E584F1D0E3E
			A8C5B052592A8B2694BE9654F0431F38D5BBC8049FA7F13F'
			]
			}
			}
			The example above was generated with the key:
			h'6162630405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10'
	3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key		3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key
	The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of a		The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of a
	Key ID instead of communicating the actual key, provided the		Key ID instead of communicating the actual key, provided the
	recipient is able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In		recipient is able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In
	this case, the issuer of a CWT declares that the presenter possesses		this case, the issuer of a CWT declares that the presenter possesses
	a particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm		a particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
	proof of possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"		proof of possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"
	claim in the CWT whose value is a CBOR map with the CBOR map		claim in the CWT whose value is a CBOR map with the CBOR map
	containing a "kid" member identifying the key.		containing a "kid" member identifying the key.
	The following example (using JSON notation) demonstrates such a		The following example (using CBOR diagnostic notation) demonstrates
	declaration in the CWT Claims Set of a CWT:		such a declaration in the CWT Claims Set of a CWT:
	{		{
	"iss": "https://server.example.com",		/iss/ 1 : "coaps://server.example.com",
	"aud": "https://client.example.org",		/aud/ 3 : "coaps://client.example.org",
	"exp": 1361398824,		/exp/ 4 : 1361398824,
	"cnf":{		/cnf/ 8 : {
	"kid": "dfd1aa97-6d8d-4575-a0fe-34b96de2bfad"		/kid/ 2 : h'dfd1aa976d8d4575a0fe34b96de2bfad'
	}		}
	}		}
	The content of the "kid" value is application specific. For		The content of the "kid" value is application specific. For
	instance, some applications may choose to use a cryptographic hash of		instance, some applications may choose to use a cryptographic hash of
	the public key value as the "kid" value.		the public key value as the "kid" value.
	3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified		3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified
	Proof of possession is typically demonstrated by having the presenter		Proof of possession is typically demonstrated by having the presenter
	skipping to change at page 8, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 30 ¶
	necessary to apply data origin authentication and integrity		necessary to apply data origin authentication and integrity
	protection (via a keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data		protection (via a keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data
	origin authentication ensures that the recipient of the CWT learns		origin authentication ensures that the recipient of the CWT learns
	about the entity that created the CWT since this will be important		about the entity that created the CWT since this will be important
	for any policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary		for any policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary
	from changing any elements conveyed within the CWT payload. Special		from changing any elements conveyed within the CWT payload. Special
	care has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the CWT		care has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the CWT
	since those not only require integrity protection but also		since those not only require integrity protection but also
	confidentiality protection.		confidentiality protection.
			As described in Section 6 (Key Identification) and Appendix D (Notes
			on Key Selection) of [JWS], it is important to make explicit trust
			decisions about the keys. Proof-of-possession signatures made with
			keys not meeting the application's trust criteria MUST NOT not be
			relied upon.
	5. Privacy Considerations		5. Privacy Considerations
	A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the		A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the
	same key is used with multiple parties. Thus, for privacy reasons,		same key is used with multiple parties. Thus, for privacy reasons,
	it is recommended that different proof-of-possession keys be used		it is recommended that different proof-of-possession keys be used
	when interacting with different parties.		when interacting with different parties.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	The following registration procedure is used for all the registries		The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
	skipping to change at page 10, line 49 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 24 ¶
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of [[ this document ]]		o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of [[ this document ]]
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[CWT] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,		[CWT] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
	"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-ace-		"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-ace-
	cbor-web-token-07, June 2017,		cbor-web-token-07, June 2017,
	<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-		<https://tools.ietf.org/html/
	token-07>.		draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-07>.
	[IANA.CWT.Claims]		[IANA.CWT.Claims]
	IANA, "CBOR Web Token Claims",		IANA, "CBOR Web Token Claims",
	<http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.		<http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO		[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
	10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November		10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
	2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.		2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
	[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform		[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
	Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,		Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
	RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,		RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
	[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an		[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
	IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,		IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
	[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security		[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,		(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
	[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and		[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
	Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity		Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
	within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509		within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
	(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer		(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
	Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March		Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
	2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.		2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
	[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object		[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
	Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,		Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
	October 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.		October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
	[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",		[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
	RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,		RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
	7.2. Informative References		7.2. Informative References
	[IANA.JWT.Claims]		[IANA.JWT.Claims]
	IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",		IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
	<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.		<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
			[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
			Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, May 2015,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
	[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, May 2015,		(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, May 2015,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
	[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]		[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
	Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,		Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
	"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion		"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
	Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-		Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
	2.0-os, March 2005,		2.0-os, March 2005,
	<http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/>.		<http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/>.
	[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data		[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
	Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March		Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
	2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.		2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
	[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-		[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
	Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",		Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
	RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,		RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.
	Acknowledgements		Acknowledgements
	Thanks to the following people for their reviews of the		Thanks to the following people for their reviews of the
	specification: Michael Richardson and Jim Schaad.		specification: Michael Richardson and Jim Schaad.
	Open Issues		Open Issues
	o Convert the examples from JSON/JWT to CBOR/CWT.		o Convert the examples from JSON/JWT to CBOR/CWT.
	Document History		Document History
	[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]		[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
			-01
			o Now uses CBOR diagnostic notation for the examples.
			o Added a table summarizing the "cnf" names, keys, and value types.
			o Addressed some of Jim Schaad's feedback on -00.
	-00		-00
	o Created the initial working group draft from draft-jones-ace-cwt-		o Created the initial working group draft from draft-jones-ace-cwt-
	proof-of-possession-01.		proof-of-possession-01.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Michael B. Jones		Michael B. Jones
	Microsoft		Microsoft
End of changes. 35 change blocks.
	76 lines changed or deleted		113 lines changed or added
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