< draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt		draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-08.txt >
	ACE M. Jones		ACE M. Jones
	Internet-Draft Microsoft		Internet-Draft Microsoft
	Intended status: Standards Track L. Seitz		Intended status: Standards Track L. Seitz
	Expires: March 21, 2020 RISE SICS		Expires: April 3, 2020 RISE SICS
	G. Selander		G. Selander
	Ericsson AB		Ericsson AB
	S. Erdtman		S. Erdtman
	Spotify		Spotify
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	Arm Ltd.		Arm Ltd.
	September 18, 2019		October 1, 2019
	Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)		Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)
	draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07		draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-08
	Abstract		Abstract
	This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT)		This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT)
	that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-		that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-
	possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also		possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also
	sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification		sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification
	provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key		provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key
	Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800) but using CBOR and		Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800) but using CBOR and
	CWTs rather than JSON and JWTs.		CWTs rather than JSON and JWTs.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 43 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on March 21, 2020.		This Internet-Draft will expire on April 3, 2020.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 23 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 23 ¶
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . 3		3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . 3
	3.1. Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.1. Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key . 5		3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key . 5
	3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-		3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-
	Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key 6		3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key 7
	3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 8
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	6. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		6. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		7.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		7.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		7.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This specification describes how a CBOR Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392] can		This specification describes how a CBOR Web Token (CWT) [CWT] can
	declare that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-		declare that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-
	of-possession (PoP) key. Proof of possession of a key is also		of-possession (PoP) key. Proof of possession of a key is also
	sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification		sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification
	provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key		provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key
	Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" [RFC7800] but using CBOR		Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" [RFC7800] but using CBOR
	[RFC7049] and CWTs [RFC8392] rather than JSON [RFC8259] and JWTs		[RFC7049] and CWTs [CWT] rather than JSON [RFC8259] and JWTs [JWT].
	[JWT].
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
	14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	This specification uses terms defined in the CBOR Web Token (CWT)		This specification uses terms defined in the CBOR Web Token (CWT)
	[RFC8392], CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152], and		[CWT], CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152], and
	Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] specifications.		Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] specifications.
	These terms are defined by this specification:		These terms are defined by this specification:
	Issuer		Issuer
	Party that creates the CWT and binds the claims about the subject		Party that creates the CWT and binds the claims about the subject
	to the proof-of-possession key.		to the proof-of-possession key.
	Presenter		Presenter
	Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key		Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key
	skipping to change at page 3, line 50 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 50 ¶
	3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys		3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys
	By including a "cnf" (confirmation) claim in a CWT, the issuer of the		By including a "cnf" (confirmation) claim in a CWT, the issuer of the
	CWT declares that the presenter possesses a particular key and that		CWT declares that the presenter possesses a particular key and that
	the recipient can cryptographically confirm that the presenter has		the recipient can cryptographically confirm that the presenter has
	possession of that key. The value of the "cnf" claim is a CBOR map		possession of that key. The value of the "cnf" claim is a CBOR map
	and the members of that map identify the proof-of-possession key.		and the members of that map identify the proof-of-possession key.
	The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the CWT,		The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the CWT,
	depending upon the application requirements. For instance, some		depending upon the application requirements. For instance, some
	applications may use the CWT "sub" (subject) claim [RFC8392], to		applications may use the CWT "sub" (subject) claim [CWT], to identify
	identify the presenter. Other applications may use the "iss" claim		the presenter. Other applications may use the "iss" claim to
	to identify the presenter. In some applications, the subject		identify the presenter. In some applications, the subject identifier
	identifier might be relative to the issuer identified by the "iss"		might be relative to the issuer identified by the "iss" (issuer)
	(issuer) claim [RFC8392]. The actual mechanism used is dependent		claim [CWT]. The actual mechanism used is dependent upon the
	upon the application. The case in which the presenter is the subject		application. The case in which the presenter is the subject of the
	of the CWT is analogous to Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)		CWT is analogous to Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0
	2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation usage.		[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation usage.
	3.1. Confirmation Claim		3.1. Confirmation Claim
	The "cnf" claim in the CWT is used to carry confirmation methods.		The "cnf" claim in the CWT is used to carry confirmation methods.
	Some of them use proof-of-possession keys while others do not. This		Some of them use proof-of-possession keys while others do not. This
	design is analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]		design is analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
	SubjectConfirmation element in which a number of different subject		SubjectConfirmation element in which a number of different subject
	confirmation methods can be included (including proof-of-possession		confirmation methods can be included (including proof-of-possession
	key information).		key information).
	skipping to change at page 5, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 45 ¶
	}		}
	}		}
	The COSE_Key MUST contain the required key members for a COSE_Key of		The COSE_Key MUST contain the required key members for a COSE_Key of
	that key type and MAY contain other COSE_Key members, including the		that key type and MAY contain other COSE_Key members, including the
	"kid" (Key ID) member.		"kid" (Key ID) member.
	The "COSE_Key" member MAY also be used for a COSE_Key representing a		The "COSE_Key" member MAY also be used for a COSE_Key representing a
	symmetric key, provided that the CWT is encrypted so that the key is		symmetric key, provided that the CWT is encrypted so that the key is
	not revealed to unintended parties. The means of encrypting a CWT is		not revealed to unintended parties. The means of encrypting a CWT is
	explained in [RFC8392]. If the CWT is not encrypted, the symmetric		explained in [CWT]. If the CWT is not encrypted, the symmetric key
	key MUST be encrypted as described in Section 3.3.		MUST be encrypted as described in Section 3.3. This procedure is
			equivalent to the one defined in section 3.3 of [RFC7800].
	3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key		3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
	When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the		When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the
	"Encrypted_COSE_Key" member is an encrypted COSE_Key [RFC8152]		"Encrypted_COSE_Key" member is an encrypted COSE_Key [RFC8152]
	representing the symmetric key encrypted to a key known to the		representing the symmetric key encrypted to a key known to the
	recipient using COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0.		recipient using COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0.
	The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could		The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could
	subsequently be encrypted for use in the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member:		subsequently be encrypted for use in the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member:
	skipping to change at page 7, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 45 ¶
	derived from the key or where not all of the parties involved are		derived from the key or where not all of the parties involved are
	validating the cryptographic derivation, implementers should expect		validating the cryptographic derivation, implementers should expect
	collisions, where different keys are assigned the same Key ID.		collisions, where different keys are assigned the same Key ID.
	Recipients of a CWT with a PoP key linked through only a Key ID		Recipients of a CWT with a PoP key linked through only a Key ID
	should be prepared to handle such situations.		should be prepared to handle such situations.
	In the world of constrained Internet of Things (IoT) devices, there		In the world of constrained Internet of Things (IoT) devices, there
	is frequently a restriction on the size of Key IDs, either because of		is frequently a restriction on the size of Key IDs, either because of
	table constraints or a desire to keep message sizes small.		table constraints or a desire to keep message sizes small.
			Note that the value of a Key ID for a specific key is not necessarily
			the same for different parties. When sending a COSE encrypted
			message with a shared key, the Key ID may be different on both sides
			of the conversation, with the appropriate one being included in the
			message based on the recipient of the message.
	3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified		3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified
	Proof of possession is often demonstrated by having the presenter		Proof of possession is often demonstrated by having the presenter
	sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by		sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by
	the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a		the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a
	"challenge". There are, however, also other means to demonstrate		"challenge". There are, however, also other means to demonstrate
	freshness of the exchange and to link the proof-of-possession key to		freshness of the exchange and to link the proof-of-possession key to
	the participating parties, as demonstrated by various authentication		the participating parties, as demonstrated by various authentication
	and key exchange protocols.		and key exchange protocols.
	skipping to change at page 8, line 13 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 29 ¶
	specified, as this is also protocol specific.		specified, as this is also protocol specific.
	Note that other means of proving possession of the key exist, which		Note that other means of proving possession of the key exist, which
	could be used in conjunction with a CWT's confirmation key.		could be used in conjunction with a CWT's confirmation key.
	Applications making use of such alternate means are encouraged to		Applications making use of such alternate means are encouraged to
	register them in the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods" registry		register them in the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods" registry
	established in Section 7.2.		established in Section 7.2.
	4. Security Considerations		4. Security Considerations
	All the security considerations that are discussed in [RFC8392] also		All the security considerations that are discussed in [CWT] also
	apply here. In addition, proof of possession introduces its own		apply here. In addition, proof of possession introduces its own
	unique security issues. Possessing a key is only valuable if it is		unique security issues. Possessing a key is only valuable if it is
	kept secret. Appropriate means must be used to ensure that		kept secret. Appropriate means must be used to ensure that
	unintended parties do not learn private key or symmetric key values.		unintended parties do not learn private key or symmetric key values.
	Applications utilizing proof of possession SHOULD also utilize		Applications utilizing proof of possession SHOULD also utilize
	audience restriction, as described in Section 4.1.3 of [JWT], as it		audience restriction, as described in Section 3.1.3 of [CWT], as it
	provides additional protections. Audience restriction can be used by		provides additional protections. Audience restriction can be used by
	recipients to reject messages intended for different recipients.		recipients to reject messages intended for different recipients.
	A recipient might not understand the "cnf" claim. Applications that		A recipient might not understand the "cnf" claim. Applications that
	use proof-of-possession keys in CWTs with the "cnf" claim MUST ensure		use proof-of-possession keys in CWTs with the "cnf" claim MUST ensure
	that the parts of this specification that they use are implemented by		that the parts of this specification that they use are implemented by
	the intended recipient.		the intended recipient.
	CBOR Web Tokens with proof-of-possession keys are used in context of		CBOR Web Tokens with proof-of-possession keys are used in context of
	an architecture, such as the ACE OAuth Framework		an architecture, such as the ACE OAuth Framework
	skipping to change at page 8, line 52 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 19 ¶
	necessary to apply data origin authentication and integrity		necessary to apply data origin authentication and integrity
	protection (via a keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data		protection (via a keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data
	origin authentication ensures that the recipient of the CWT learns		origin authentication ensures that the recipient of the CWT learns
	about the entity that created the CWT since this will be important		about the entity that created the CWT since this will be important
	for any policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary		for any policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary
	from changing any elements conveyed within the CWT payload. Special		from changing any elements conveyed within the CWT payload. Special
	care has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the CWT		care has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the CWT
	since those not only require integrity protection but also		since those not only require integrity protection but also
	confidentiality protection (e.g., either by encrypting the "cnf"		confidentiality protection (e.g., either by encrypting the "cnf"
	element, as specified in Section 3.3, or by encrypting the whole CWT,		element, as specified in Section 3.3, or by encrypting the whole CWT,
	as specified in [RFC8392]).		as specified in [CWT]).
	As described in Section 6 (Key Identification) and Appendix D (Notes		As described in Section 6 (Key Identification) and Appendix D (Notes
	on Key Selection) of [JWS], it is important to make explicit trust		on Key Selection) of [JWS], it is important to make explicit trust
	decisions about the keys. Proof-of-possession signatures made with		decisions about the keys. Proof-of-possession signatures made with
	keys not meeting the application's trust criteria MUST NOT be relied		keys not meeting the application's trust criteria MUST NOT be relied
	upon.		upon.
	5. Privacy Considerations		5. Privacy Considerations
	A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the		A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the
	skipping to change at page 10, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 8 ¶
	able to represent the perspectives of different applications using		able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
	this specification in order to enable broadly informed review of		this specification in order to enable broadly informed review of
	registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could		registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
	be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular		be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
	Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other		Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
	Experts.		Experts.
	7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration		7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration
	This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA "CBOR Web		This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA "CBOR Web
	Token Claims" registry [IANA.CWT.Claims] established by [RFC8392].		Token Claims" registry [IANA.CWT.Claims] established by [CWT].
	7.1.1. Registry Contents		7.1.1. Registry Contents
	o Claim Name: "cnf"		o Claim Name: "cnf"
	o Claim Description: Confirmation		o Claim Description: Confirmation
	o JWT Claim Name: "cnf"		o JWT Claim Name: "cnf"
	o Claim Key: TBD (maybe 8)		o Claim Key: TBD (maybe 8)
	o Claim Value Type(s): map		o Claim Value Type(s): map
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]		o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]
	skipping to change at page 12, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 45 ¶
	o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "kid"		o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "kid"
	o Confirmation Key: 3		o Confirmation Key: 3
	o Confirmation Value Type(s): binary string		o Confirmation Value Type(s): binary string
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of [[ this document ]]		o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of [[ this document ]]
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
			[CWT] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
			"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
			May 2018, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
	[IANA.CWT.Claims]		[IANA.CWT.Claims]
	IANA, "CBOR Web Token Claims",		IANA, "CBOR Web Token Claims",
	<http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.		<http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object		[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
	skipping to change at page 13, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 27 ¶
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
	[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",		[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
	RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,		RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
	"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
	May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]		[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
	Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and		Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
	H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for		H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
	Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0		Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
	Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-21		Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-21
	(work in progress), February 2019.		(work in progress), February 2019.
	[IANA.JWT.Claims]		[IANA.JWT.Claims]
	IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",		IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
	<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.		<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
	[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web		[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
	Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, May 2015,		Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.		2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
	[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,		(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
	[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]		[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
	Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,		Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
	"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion		"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
	Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-		Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
	2.0-os, March 2005,		2.0-os, March 2005,
	skipping to change at page 14, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 14, line 35 ¶
	JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,		JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
	June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.		June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
	Acknowledgements		Acknowledgements
	Thanks to the following people for their reviews of the		Thanks to the following people for their reviews of the
	specification: Roman Danyliw, Benjamin Kaduk, Michael Richardson, and		specification: Roman Danyliw, Benjamin Kaduk, Michael Richardson, and
	Jim Schaad.		Jim Schaad.
	Ludwig Seitz and Goeran Selander worked on this document as part of		Ludwig Seitz and Goeran Selander worked on this document as part of
	the CelticPlus project CyberWI, with funding from Vinnova.		the CelticPlus projects CyberWI and CRITISEC, with funding from
			Vinnova.
	Document History		Document History
	[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]		[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
			-08
			o Addressed remaining Area Director review comments by Benjamin
			Kaduk.
	-07		-07
	o Addressed Area Director review by Benjamin Kaduk.		o Addressed Area Director review by Benjamin Kaduk.
	-06		-06
	o Corrected nits identified by Roman Danyliw.		o Corrected nits identified by Roman Danyliw.
	-05		-05
	o Added text suggested by Jim Schaad describing considerations when		o Added text suggested by Jim Schaad describing considerations when
	using the Key ID confirmation method.		using the Key ID confirmation method.
	-04		-04
	o Addressed additional WGLC comments by Jim Schaad and Roman		o Addressed additional WGLC comments by Jim Schaad and Roman
End of changes. 24 change blocks.
	38 lines changed or deleted		49 lines changed or added
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